

96

US DOC 775.314

U.S. INTERESTS IN AFRICA

HARVARD COLLEGE LIBRARY
DEPOSITED BY THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
MAR 1 1 1980

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 16, 18, 19, 22, 24, 25, 29; NOVEMBER 13 AND 14, 1979

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs



2

1017

U.S. INTERESTS IN AFRICA

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 16, 18, 19, 22, 24, 25, 29; NOVEMBER 13 AND 14, 1979

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON: 1980

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin, *Chairman*

L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina
DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida
CHARLES C. DIGGS, Jr., Michigan
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York
LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana
LESTER L. WOLFF, New York
JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, New York
GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York
DON BONKER, Washington
GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts
ANDY IRELAND, Florida
DONALD J. PEASE, Ohio
DAN MICA, Florida
MICHAEL D. BARNES, Maryland
WILLIAM H. GRAY III, Pennsylvania
TONY P. HALL, Ohio
HOWARD WOLPE, Michigan
DAVID R. BOWEN, Mississippi
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, Indiana

WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan
EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, Illinois
PAUL FINDLEY, Illinois
JOHN H. BUCHANAN, Jr., Alabama
LARRY WINN, Jr., Kansas
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
TENNYSON GUYER, Ohio
ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JOEL PRITCHARD, Washington
MILLICENT FENWICK, New Jersey
DAN QUAYLE, Indiana

JOHN J. BRADY, Jr., *Chief of Staff*

SARAH LISENEY, *Staff Assistant*

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York, *Chairman*

CHARLES C. DIGGS, Jr., Michigan
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois
WILLIAM H. GRAY III, Pennsylvania
HOWARD WOLPE, Michigan
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, Indiana

WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JOHN H. BUCHANAN, Jr., Alabama
MILLICENT FENWICK, New Jersey

JOHNNIE CARSON, *Subcommittee Staff Director*
STEPHEN D. NELSON, *Minority Staff Consultant*
STEVE WEISSMAN, *Subcommittee Staff Associate*
DAVID FRANK, *Subcommittee Staff Associate*

CONTENTS

WITNESSES

	Page
Tuesday, October 16, 1979:	
Hon. Andrew Young, former U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations.....	2
Hon. Joseph J. Sisco, president, American University.....	4
Thursday, October 18, 1979:	
Hon. David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs..	46
Jorge I. Dominguez, professor, Harvard University.....	64
M. Crawford Young, professor, University of Wisconsin—Madison..	78
Friday, October 19, 1979:	
Robert Price, associate professor of political science, and associate director of the Institute of International Studies at the University of California at Berkeley.....	113
Chester Crocker, director of African studies at the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies.....	126
Monday, October 22, 1979:	
Abraham Katz, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International Economic Policy and Research.....	152
Ann Seidman, professor, Clark University.....	176
Sally Miller, Department of Commerce.....	186
Wednesday, October 24, 1979:	
Charles P. Eddy, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Energy and Minerals, Department of the Interior.....	211
Morris A. Adelman, professor, MIT/Harvard.....	220
Thursday, October 25, 1979:	
Hon. C. Fred Bergsten, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, Department of the Treasury.....	244
Gerald B. Helman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations.....	280
Monday, October 29, 1979:	
Richard Sklar, professor, University of California at Los Angeles.....	306
James Turner, professor, Cornell University.....	313
Robert Rotberg, professor, MIT/Harvard.....	316
Tuesday, November 13, 1979:	
Ruth Schachter Morgenthau, Adlai Stevenson Professor of International Relations, Brandeis University.....	342
Patrick O'Meara, director of African studies program, Indiana University.....	362
Jorge Braga De Macedo, assistant professor, Yale University.....	367
Wednesday, November 14, 1979:	
William J. Foltz, Council on Foreign Relations.....	390
J. Daniel O'Flaherty, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace..	396
Arthur W. Lewis, Director of Africa Region, International Communication Agency.....	443

APPENDIXES

1. Statement of Clifford Ashu Arrey, "United States Interests in Africa: Africa in the International Arena".....	471
2. Tables submitted by the Bureau of Mines showing dependency on African minerals by the United States, Europe, and Japan.....	478
3. Memorandum from International Communication Agency, showing increase in coverage of Africa by the U.S. media.....	536
4. Tables submitted by the Department of the Treasury, listing U.S. aid to Africa, World Bank and IDA lending by region, and World Bank, IDA, and African Development Bank lending to African countries..	537

U.S. INTERESTS IN AFRICA

An Overview

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1979

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2:40 p.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Stephen J. Solarz (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. SOLARZ. The hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa is called to order.

This has been an important year in the history of Africa, and I thought I might begin these hearings by taking note of the fact that since the Subcommittee on Africa was reconstituted earlier in the year, a number of significant developments have taken place on the African Continent. We have witnessed the overthrow of Idi Amin in Uganda; the deposal of the Emperor Bokassa in the Central African Empire; and the removal of President Maceas in Equatorial Guinea. Democracies have been established in Nigeria, in Upper Volta, and in Ghana; and hopefully as a result of the efforts now underway in London, it may be possible to achieve before the year is over a peaceful end to the conflict in Zimbabwe.

Now, it would of course be an exaggeration to suggest that the Subcommittee on Africa of the House of Representatives is entitled to the credit for all these promising, and progressive, and productive developments, but I would like to believe that in some small way this subcommittee under the leadership in the past of my good friend from Michigan, Mr. Diggs, together with the active participation of all of the other members of the subcommittee, has in some small way contributed in a positive fashion to these very welcome developments.

This is the first of what will be a series of eight or nine hearings on American interests in Africa. In the past, the Congress, as the administration, has tended to focus on individual African policy problems without regard to our overall interests in Africa as a whole. We focused on questions involving the Horn; on matters involving southern Africa; on policy issues with respect to the Magreb, and some of the difficult questions involved in our relationship with a variety of central African countries as well.

While obviously Africa is a very varied continent, nonetheless, it seemed to us that it might make sense to see whether it was possible to devise and develop a set of criteria concerning our overall interest in Africa which would give us a better opportunity to weigh the merits

of any particular African policy against our overall interest in the continent.

In subsequent hearings we will be focusing specifically on our military interests in Africa; our diplomatic interests in Africa; our economic interests in Africa; our humanitarian interests in Africa; our developmental interests in Africa.

But today we begin the hearings with an overview of our interests in Africa, and we are particularly fortunate to have with us today two distinguished diplomats, each of whom in his own time and in his own way has contributed very significantly to the evolution of American foreign policy in Africa.

We are particularly pleased to have, first of all, a former colleague of ours in the House of Representatives, and our past Ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young.

Mr. Young, as we all know, has long been active in efforts to improve American relations with Africa, and it is no secret that he has played an important role in the improvement of our African diplomacy in recent years. I think to the extent our relations with Africa have significantly and measurably improved over the course of the last few years, it is in large measure due to the role which Ambassador Young played in his capacity as our representative at the United Nations.

We are equally happy to welcome to the witness table today a gentleman who has appeared here often in the past, Joseph Sisco, who is now the president of American University, and who was a leading force in Africa policymaking under three American administrations. Dr. Sisco was Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs under President Johnson, and he dealt extensively with the situations in Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa, and almost two decades ago with the initial crisis in the Congo. Subsequently he was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East and South Asia under President Nixon. More recently, he was Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs under President Ford, working closely with Secretary of State Kissinger on such issues as Angola and Southern Africa.

I must say that in my 5 years as a member of this committee I have rarely heard a more articulate and able witness on the many occasions that he appeared before us in his official capacity than Secretary Sisco.

I am particularly delighted that he is here with us today in his private capacity as a citizen because I know this will give him an opportunity to speak his unfettered mind, and to give us the benefit of his own analysis of our interests in Africa as a whole.

We will begin the hearing by asking Ambassador Young to give us his views on American interests in Africa and how we can best go about promoting them.

Ambassador Young?

STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREW YOUNG, FORMER U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this committee. It is always a pleasure to come to chat with you about Africa. I do not think it was bragging, I think that this com-

mittee over the years has perhaps been the only part of our Government that has kept our Nation very much aware of events in Africa, and of the long-range interests of the United States in the African Continent.

Let me be very elementary—not for the committee—but just to summarize my views of Africa. That is, Africa has 400 million people, has 52 or more independent nations; it possesses at least 13 of some 19 major minerals that our economy depends on to maintain its productivity. Africa now supplies us with almost 40 percent of our oil imports. Africa is also the center of some of the cheapest and most available hydroelectric power anywhere in the world.

Presently we are running a \$12 billion trade deficit with the African Continent.

Now, as I see what is happening in the world in which we live, and as I see what is happening to this Nation, more and more we are becoming interdependent—not because we are getting weak, but because our economy is expanding, and in that expansion no nation is capable anymore of being self-sufficient. So, it requires certain interdependencies. We have developed an interdependency with Africa in terms of natural resources. That creates problems for us because, as we get some \$18 billion worth of primarily oil and minerals from the African Continent, and only find ways to sell them \$6 billion worth of goods in return, we are depriving ourselves of the kind of market that would literally produce millions of jobs for Americans if that market potential were being realized as it is.

We have put very little in the way of a governmental investment into Africa. Essentially, our attention toward Africa has been significant, but it has been educational; it has been Public Law 480; it has been basic human needs assistance. It has been as charity and I have no problems with charity, I believe in charity. But I think we do ourselves a disservice when we relate charitably to a part of the world and neglect our own self-interest in that part of the world.

I see Africa as a potential market, a potential market that is asking for involvement with the United States. We recently took a trade mission to some 10 African nations for 17 days in connection with the Department of Commerce, the State Department, the Eximbank, and OPIC. We took that mission not because we were trying to push American goods, but because African leaders kept saying to me, "Why is it that you only come to do business with us on oil? We have lots of things that Americans can help us with.

So, when we went to Nigeria and assisted an American company in putting together a \$500 million fertilizer development project, we were making a massive contribution toward remedying the trade deficit which we have with Nigeria, which with Nigeria alone is about \$5 billion; but we were also helping Nigeria to feed some of its 80 million citizens and develop an agricultural system that contributes to their stability and to their overall development needs.

Similarly, in Uganda—as a result of the crisis in Uganda and the tremendous deterioration under Idi Amin, the Uganda coffee crop had been harvested and was standing idle for lack of trucks. An American businessman was able to work out a \$28 million contract to provide American-made trucks, trained drivers, establish a maintenance operation that not only assisted us in keeping Americans working, but

enabled them to get their coffee crop to market in order to deal with some of their balance-of-payment problems.

I think this kind of interdependency between the United States and the African Continent is something that, unfortunately, we have neglected. We should say, though, that we are the only ones that have neglected it. Our European friends have not neglected it. One of the problems we ran into in Cameroon, for instance, where in helping them to develop a rural electrification program out of their enormous hydro-electric potential an American corporation gave them a phenomenal bid to construct a plant that would produce small generators and transformers, and establish a system of rural electrification—which is the key to their development. It was the best offer, it was the best available program for them, but that American company was running up against a 50-year interest-free financing from another government where there was a 10-year grace period and then 40 years with no interest on up to \$50 million. We found that the American company could not do business with that kind of competition.

So, everybody in the world realizes the tremendous potential of Africa. I think this committee is to be commended for once again taking an opportunity to communicate with the American people and with the remainder of the Congress the economic and strategic importance, as well as the political and humanitarian values of our relationships with the African Continent.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. Mr. Secretary? We are using those titles for old times' sake.

Mr. Sisco?

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH J. SISCO, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

Mr. Sisco. Mr. Chairman, I want to associate myself with what my friend, Andy Young, has said with respect to the role of the committee. I have tried to follow it with reasonable care from afar, but I have been too busy fund-raising for the American University and I can tell you that I have missed you all and find this a very welcome respite from the kind of high-level, sophisticated begging that I have had to do on behalf of the university over the last 3 or 4 years.

Now, I am presumed to know something about the Middle East—I am not really presumed to know a great deal about the African Continent, and I am keenly aware that I am among experts. In fact, I feel a little bit like the man who could talk about nothing else except how he survived the Johnstown Flood. Everywhere he went he talked about how he survived the flood. 'Lo and behold, he died and went up to the pearly gates, and was welcomed by St. Peter. He said, "Welcome. This is your first day, a very easy schedule. We have a tea at 4 p.m., and of course you will be expected to make some appropriate remarks."

He said, "Fine. I am going to talk about how I survived the Johnstown Flood." Well, that gave St. Peter some pause and he said, "Are you sure you want to talk about this?" He said, "I certainly am." So, St. Peter said, "All right, but bear one thing in mind, Noah will be in the audience." [Laughter.]

So, it is in that spirit that I am going to make a few brief observations regarding American policy in Africa.

Historically, I think, there have been three approaches to our policy in Africa. There are those who would emphasize the geopolitical significance of Africa from the point of view of American national interest. There are those who would emphasize, on the other hand, the African orientation of the problems and give emphasis to that approach. And then there is a third viewpoint that really says that Africa is not too important and we should only be involved in the most minimal sort of way.

From my vantage point over the last 25 years, I think our policy has tended to fluctuate between these three approaches. I suppose you cannot ever expect that a number of these inconsistencies and contradictions will be eliminated in their entirety because these problems do not present themselves in a very clear-cut, distinct way. Normally there is an amalgam, normally there is a combination of internal and external factors.

I agree with Andy Young that this is a continent and an area of increasing importance that has been low on the scale of our priorities, I think it is important as one looks at the African Continent on an overall basis that our approach be one of selective engagement. We cannot do everything in the entire continent, but our approach must be based on a priority of interests, and an integrated approach, using whatever instrumentalities are appropriate.

Moreover, I would say this, that when you get down to talking about U.S. policy about Africa, or U.S. policy toward the Middle East or Latin America, that is a big swallow indeed because, basically, in most instances these problems have to be approached on a case-by-case basis and on the basis of the definition of the national interests between the United States and a given country in the area.

You have asked, Mr. Chairman, that we try to delineate what the national interests of the United States are. I think that is a useful yardstick, except my experience has been that the policymaker has tended to confuse a statement of national interest and a statement of objectives with the policy—it is not the policy. The policies flow from the definition of the national interest.

I would merely single out four. Namely, I think we want to assure access to the raw materials of Africa. Second, we certainly want to avoid an extension of war in southern Africa over the black-white conflicts. Third, I believe it is important that we cope more effectively with the expansion of Soviet-Cuban activities in Africa; and fourth, I think our policy has to be directed to laying the foundation, the long-range foundation, for a mutually constructive relationship between the United States and individual African countries.

Here I want to say at the outset that I do not apologize to anyone for the role that the United States has played since World War II in taking the lead politically in the process of decolonization. I am sure that our policy was imperfect. I am sure that in retrospect we can look back and say, "Well, we should have done it this way," or, "we should have done it that way." But, if you look at it over the long range of the last 20 or 25 years, I believe that the United States played a positive and constructive role in the decolonization process.

Now, I indicated that African policy has been low on the totem pole. I think it is true, and the awareness, I think, of American policy increased with the developments in Angola in 1975.

I would like for a moment, Mr. Chairman, to concentrate in particular on what I consider to be the increasing, difficult challenge of Soviet-Cuban activities in Africa. Before we can arrive at any kind of a judgment, I think we have to have some understanding as to the factors that have given the Soviets and the Cubans an opportunity to exploit the situation in Africa.

The first is something far away from Africa itself, and that is the achievement of nuclear parity on the part of the Soviet Union with the United States. The very fact that we have "rough equilibrium" means that the Soviet Union now—and we have seen it in the Horn of Africa; we have seen it in Angola; we have seen it in the Caribbean; the Soviet Union now has the option, it has the capacity to project its power into a number of the Third World areas. That is a relatively new development that American policy has faced in the last 2 or 3 years.

Mr. Chairman, I am sure that what I am about to say is quite controversial. I happen to believe that the action taken by the Congress in 1974 in failing to support the administration on Angola and those elements that were friendly to the United States was a mistake for one reason; not that Angola is or was in the vital interests of the United States. I happen to believe that the Soviet-Cuban success there in 1975 and subsequently, has encouraged the Soviet Union: I think they have analyzed that situation as essentially a low-risk operation, particularly in the aftermath of the environment that existed in our country after Vietnam.

So, we have this projection of Soviet power resulting from parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. Second, obviously, the indigenous situations in Africa itself that abets the policy of the Soviet Union in probing the soft spots in various parts of the continent.

We are dealing with a continent and countries where there is weakness of political institutions which generally militates against peaceful change in leadership. These are countries with continuing dependency on the outside, economically and militarily. More importantly, we have seen in the last 3 years a militarization of the African Continent with many, many more African States that have been seeking arms. You have the black-white conflict, which the Russians have been able to exploit. And above all, the black African experience has been historically with Western imperialism. They know how bad Western imperialism was. They unfortunately know too little, and there is too lacking an understanding of what Soviet imperialism in Africa could mean to each individual African because it is beyond their past experience up to this particular point.

Now, in my judgment, any sound American policy has to support African goals in developing the kind of long-range, fruitful relationship that I think is essential for our own interests. Here I have every confidence in the world that we can compete very favorably with the Soviet Union in providing economic and technical assistance, and with the help of our allies.

Moreover, it seems to me that we know as much, and probably a good deal more, about the problems of development, modernization, and stronger political institutions than does the Soviet Union. Therefore

we have capacities that are very formidable indeed, and we should be willing to involve ourselves politically and economically in these areas of vital interest.

But, Mr. Chairman—and this is the point I really want to make—these are important instrumentalities, but I do not believe in the present situation that we can rely exclusively on these capacities in meeting this new challenge of Soviet-Cuban activity in certain parts of Africa's continent. The Soviet thrust is part of a long-range historical process which has seen Western economic and political influence in Africa weakened. The U.S.S.R.'s capacity to provide military assistance has increased markedly beginning, as I said, with Angola in 1975.

Here is what I think is the key point insofar as the last 3 years. The U.S.S.R. has led all others in these last 3 years in arms transfers, training, base facilities, and troop presences in the continent of Africa. I would suggest that this carries the risk that the newly emerging African states feeling threatened and in the context of the increased number of requests that we have seen from them for military assistance, will want added assistance. They have only two alternatives, namely, the United States or the Soviet Union.

I wish I had more confidence that African nationalism can resist the kind of political changes that this kind of Soviet influence, I think, augers for the future.

Certainly, there have been hopeful developments and you cited them, Mr. Chairman, at the outset, and we all welcome these. But the important thing is this, that I for one do not accept the view that if we are responsive to friendly States in the African Continent, to their requests for military assistance, that we are injecting the cold war on the African Continent. I believe the last 3 years have seen a marked militarization in the African Continent, and I think that militarization is reflected in increased Soviet-Cuban activities; and I think the United States has to be responsive on a highly selective basis where our interests are vital, and respond as appropriate with the instrumentalities at our disposal—political, economic, and military.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Sisco's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH J. SISCO, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

There are three approaches to American policy toward Africa which have its supports among policy-makers and experts.

First, are those who emphasize the geo-political significance of certain parts of the continent, stressing its increasing importance as a source of raw materials, including oil from Nigeria, chrome, platinum, manganese, cobalt, gold, uranium and diamonds; America's increased trade and direct investments in black Africa; and shipping through the Suez Canal and south of Cape Hope which carry 70 percent of the raw materials and 80 percent of the oil needed by our European allies. This approach has taken on increased importance as a result of the projection of Soviet power, utilizing the Cuban proxy, beginning with developments in Angola in 1975.

A second view gives primary emphasis to the African orientation of problems, stressing their indigenous character, maintaining that the primary United States' role should be to assist Africans in achieving solutions which would reduce the pretext for outside intervention.

A third contrasting approach would have the United States remain only minimally involved. The assumption made is that U.S. capacity to influence developments is only marginal, that the Africans need to find their own way,

that African nationalism will prevent their falling into the Soviet orbit, that no key U.S. interests have been affected adversely by the Soviet-Cuban thrust.

Our policy has tended to fluctuate between these three approaches. Some inherent contradictions and inconsistencies are inevitable since while there is a need for a clear, broad conceptual framework within which U.S. policy in Africa can be pursued, the reality is there can be no single yardstick applicable to the continent, and that the U.S. national interests involved have to be determined for the most part on a case by case basis. Common sense dictates that not all situations are equal: the importance of the Horn of Africa strategically outstrips the significance of our relations with a small, poor French African nation; Nigeria as a source of oil is more important to the West than other African nations with minimal raw materials; our policy toward Morocco has to take into account the new dimension of Soviet support of the Polisario.

A debate on which of the above approaches should be primary does not help the policy maker very much on any given development for the choices are inevitably an amalgam, not clear-cut and distinct. The important thing is that our policy be one of selective engagement based on priority of interests, and that our approach be an integrated one addressing itself both to the external and internal factors of the situation. In some instances it will be of major importance to stand up to the Soviets. This does not in any way obviate the need to play an active role in helping by diplomatic and economic means to remove legitimate African grievances. The route of high principle and least involvement may make sense in a good many other instances where our interests are only marginally involved, provided we avoid assuming the mantle of moral arbiter.

A delineation of our national interests in Africa is a useful yardstick. But in doing so, it is important to bear in mind that expressions of interest do not constitute a policy. We have four principal interests:

First, to assure access to the raw materials of Africa.

Second, to avoid an extension of war in southern Africa over black-white conflicts.

Third, to cope more effectually with the expansion of Soviet-Cuban activities in areas of particular interest to us, such as in the Horn of Africa.

Fourth, to lay the foundation for a mutually constructive long-term relationship between the United States and individual African countries as these countries are able over the next two decades to make a reality of their political independence, recently achieved with the significant help of the United States as a leader in the process of decolonization.

Until 1975, when Soviet-armed Cubans tipped the balance in Angola, low priority was given to U.S. policy on black Africa. This expanding Soviet role from Angola to the Horn of Africa and the continuing danger of a race war in Southern Africa requires that higher priority be given by the U.S. to certain parts of Africa. I wish to concentrate in particular on the increasing difficult challenge of Soviet-Cuban activities in Africa.

In arriving at a judgment as to how to deal effectively with it, it is important to have some notion as to the factors which have created the opportunities for the Soviet Union.

The first is the achievement of nuclear parity by the U.S.S.R. and the development of very substantial conventional capacity which has given the Soviets the option to project its power beyond its own sphere. Angola is the first example, the Horn of Africa second. The failure of the Congress to support the Administration's request for support in Angola in 1975 was a mistake. Angola is not of vital interest to the United States, but the Soviet-Cuban success there encouraged them to view extension of its position into parts of Africa as low risk undertakings, particularly in light of the post-Vietnam attitudes of non-involvement prevalent in the U.S.

Secondly, are the indigenous situations existing in Africa which have abetted a Soviet policy of tactical opportunism. These include: the weakness of political institutions which militate against peaceful changes in leadership; the continuing dependency of states economically and militarily on outside sources; the militarization of African conflicts as more states seek arms; the continuing black-white conflict; the experience of black Africans with Western imperialism and lack of understanding Soviet imperialism, and differences over borders.

In my judgment, American support for African nationalist goals is essential to developing a long-term fruitful relationship. We can and should compete very

favorably with the U.S.S.R. in providing economic and technical assistance as can our OECD allies. Moreover, we are in an advantageous position vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. in helping African states with their prime concerns of development, modernization, and stronger political institutions. Our strengths and capacities are formidable, and we should be willing to involve ourselves politically and economically, in areas of vital interest.

But we cannot rely exclusively, or even primarily, on the aforementioned capacities in meeting the challenge of Soviet-Cuban activities in certain key parts of the African continents. The Soviet thrust is part of a long historical process which has seen Western economic and political influence in Africa weakened. The U.S.S.R.'s capacity to provide military assistance has increased, beginning particularly in Angola in 1975; the U.S.S.R. has led all others since then in arms transfers, training, base facilities, and troop presences. A less willing U.S. to be responsive to increased perceived African needs of military assistance, alongside a stepped-up Soviet involvement, carries the risk that newly emergent African states feeling threatened will in the future seek out more frequently the U.S.S.R. and there is little reason to believe that such states can resist effectively political changes inimical to their and our interests in such circumstances of increased dependency.

Admittedly, there have been hopeful changes in Africa this past year, though these have been in countries where Soviet influence is either not present or minimal. We have seen the transfer of power by orderly process from military to civilian government in Nigeria and Ghana; Kenya prepares for November elections just 15 months after an orderly transfer of power from Kenyatta to Moi; Idi Amin of Uganda, Macie Nguema Biyoyo in Equatorial Guinea, and Emperor Bokassa in the Central African Republic has been ousted. If there is an indication that the black continent is beginning to free itself from the shackles of home-grown dictatorship, it is a welcome development indeed.

African states seeking military support from one side or the other is not new; what is new is the current asymmetry in the willingness of Western and Communist powers to respond to African requests. A recent report indicates that in the last three years the Soviet Union and its allies account for between two-thirds and three-quarters of African arms imports. It would be premature to suggest that this assure Soviet success. But it is important for the United States to be fully sensitive to the fact that Africa today is changing from a colonial system in which the West was dominant to a new order, as yet undetermined, and that our involvement—politically, economically, militarily, diplomatically—and that of our allies is essential in shaping the future new order in Africa.

Some additional policy suggestions, some of which are being pursued by the Carter administration and others requiring fresh emphasis, are as follows:

(1) An effective diplomacy in Africa, as in a number of other parts of the world, requires an end to the image of uncertainty being projected abroad by the United States today. This necessitates steps to strengthen our global strategic deterrent, particularly to meet the vulnerability of our Minuteman missiles in the early eighties; pressing our European allies to accept a greater tactical nuclear capacity, and above all, giving higher priority to developing a credible United States conventional option available for use in trouble spots of vital interest to the United States. Our present conventional option and response time capability is woefully inadequate.

(2) A sharp psychological change in attitude, in the aftermath of Vietnam, is required regarding the willingness of the United States to involve itself with its political, economic, military, and strategic capacities in areas of vital interests. This is primarily a function of Presidential leadership. Soviet tactical opportunism in Africa, the Gulf, and the Caribbean have been abetted by its assessment that the United States is either unable or unwilling to act decisively.

(3) We should continue to give our support to nationalist goals of the Africans and support peaceful change. However, we are seeing an increased militarization of the African scene, a reflection of instability and conflicts. We should not be deterred by specious arguments that we are exporting the cold war to Africa. Military assistance does not resolve internal issues, arising from drives to develop, modernize, and alter political and social patterns. But once certain conflicts are militarized, we must recognize that U.S. and Western willingness to be responsive on a highly selective basis to assistance requests, in the face of increased Soviet-Cuban support, is unavoidable and essential if we are to influence the ultimate shape of governments. We should be as concerned with the ultimate

nature of African leadership and governments as the means by which such leadership is achieved. The present weakness of many African states means they are not in a position to shape their own future alone; the new order will reflect both indigenous factors and the role of external powers.

(4) Neither race war nor cold war is in the Western interest. As indicated, our policy has to address both internal and external factors. We must be willing to support our friends politically and provide both economic and military aid help commensurate with our regional and global interests. There should be further attempts to work in close concert with our European allies, even though it is recognized there are many competitive aspects to our relationships.

(5) Too often our policy in Africa has been of the crisis management variety. Increased sensitivity to the opportunities of preemption by political and economic means is very desirable.

(6) The interests we have in Africa are not of such a magnitude that linkage is called at this time. Working out rules of the game with the U.S.S.R. is unrealistic. A more effective means is to do all possible to create the "objective conditions" in specific countries which reduce the opportunities for Soviet-Cuban activities. This means an integrated approach using all appropriate political, economic, and military means.

(7) Aid should be tied more directly to our political objectives in relation to specific countries.

(8) We should encourage more private U.S. investments in the more stable and friendly African countries whose receptivity level is positive.

(9) We should focus on key African countries such as Kenya, Sudan, and Morocco, Botswana, Zambia, even possibly Nigeria, as possible recipients of added military assistance.

(10) We should strengthen our facilities in Diego Garcia which will facilitate more frequent naval visits in the Gulf, the Arabian Peninsula, and African waters.

(11) If further Soviet-Cuban activities threatening our interests continue in Africa and the Caribbean, consideration should be given to the current state of bilateral relations between the United States and Cuba.

(12) While avoiding a policy of overt alignment with South Africa, continuing to condemn apartheid, and encouraging in-country liberal trends, our approach to South Africa should be to seek its cooperation in support of peaceful resolution of the Zimbabwe and Namibia problems.

(13) While the London Conference is adjourned, the United Kingdom initiative has led to meaningful progress and merits our full support. Zimbabwe is the prime responsibility of the United Kingdom, and our attitude regarding the possible lifting of sanctions against the Muzorewa government should be guided in the first instance by the United Kingdom decision. The fact that Muzorewa has accepted the UK proposal for constitutional changes in Zimbabwe and Nkomo and Mugabe have not should also be taken fully into account. It is important, in this connection, that we be at least as concerned over the kind of government that ultimately emerges in Zimbabwe as we are with bringing an end to the violence.

(14) We should continue to concert with our European allies and the United Nations and press for South African cooperation looking toward an early election, in which SWAPO would participate, for an independent Namibia.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. You know, Secretaries and Ambassadors, as well as Congressmen, come and go, but one thing that remains the same is the bells. When two bells ring it means we have a vote, as we do now on final passage of the Justice Department authorization. I think the best thing would be for the committee to recess, and we will resume the hearing with questions at 3:25.

Thank you very much for your testimony.

[Whereupon, a short recess was taken.]

Mr. SOLARZ. Gentlemen, in the final analysis our overall policy objectives with respect to Africa depend on the decisions we make in individual instances. I would like to begin by asking each of you to comment about what may be the most important individual issue

confronting us with respect to Africa today. That is the question of what we do concerning sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

I realize, of course, that the London conference is still underway and we all hope that in spite of the developments of the last few days, it may still be possible to get all of the parties to the conflict back together at the negotiating table, and that somehow or other an agreement can be stitched together. Certainly, a year ago—even a few months ago—if anyone had suggested that the Patriotic Front and the Salisbury government would be meeting in London they probably would have been labeled hopelessly naive. But great progress has been made and we hope that eventually an agreement will be forthcoming.

But, if it should turn out that the Patriotic Front cannot be induced to return to the conference table and that Bishop Mozerewa and his delegation and government agree not only to accept the British Constitution that was put on the table at the Lancaster House Conference, but to implement it as well, and as a result Britain decides to lift sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, what do you think our Government ought to do at that time in terms of whether or not we should maintain sanctions against that country, Mr. Ambassador?

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, may I, before going to that, have a word or two with Dr. Sisco about our introductory presentations because I think we were saying something quite different.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, Mr. Ambassador, since you demonstrated great flexibility when you were our Ambassador to the U.N., I think the least I can do is demonstrate great flexibility as chairman of this committee. We will have sure rebuttals before proceeding to the question period.

Mr. YOUNG. Not really rebuttal because I think in principle I agree with what Dr. Sisco has said. It is just that I would like to make a distinction between Soviet weapons and Soviet influence.

There are many places where the Soviets have provided weapons and yet, there are very few of them where those weapons have produced influence. I was talking about Nigeria. The Nigerian Air Force still flies Migs. Their soldiers still use the AK-7's. The same thing is true in Egypt. The same thing is true in Somalia. The same thing is true in Guinea. It is true not only to the extent of Angola and Mozambique, but in Angola we still have some 20,000 Cubans present.

As I have defined American interests, in none of these places have the Soviets been able to interfere with American interest. In fact, the Soviet presence in Angola did not interfere with Neto working very closely with the West—with Germany, France, England, Canada, and the United States—in developing an attempt to have a peaceful transition in Namibia.

The Cuban troops I contend—and I have heard, say, from the vice president of Gulf Oil Co.—that they could not supply this country with almost \$1 billion worth of oil a year if the Gulf Oil installations in Cabinda were not being defended by Cuban troops.

Boeing Aircraft put in a tremendous air safety radar landing device in the airport in Luanda. They were protected in doing that by Cuban troops.

We now have in terms of increased trade more Eximbank exposure, and we have sold more American goods in Angola than we have in

Liberia, which is supposed to almost exist in a special relationship with the United States. Liberia was founded by American blacks returning to the African Continent.

In Mozambique, where there is presence of Soviet weapons and where the Frelimo Army was trained by the Soviets, they have refused to allow the Soviets to have a naval base. They are buying their development equipment from the United States and financing it through U.S. banks. Part of that is the failure of the Russians to deal with the question of development.

What you hear around Africa is that because the West would not sell guns for liberation movements, or for independence, they had to turn to the Soviets for weaponry. But as soon as they are free they realize they cannot eat bullets. If you want to grow food, you come to the United States. If you want to drill oil in 200 feet of water 8 miles offshore, you have to come to Texas.

The development apparatus of the private sector of the United States has been one of our greatest allies in replacing what might have been some Soviet influence. Now, it may not always be that way, but I think along with our development presence we have exercised very good politics: we have worked with African nations. Nigeria, for instance, went from a military government with Soviet weapons. But when they decided to develop a civilian constitution, they came to the United States and modeled it after our system, and they recently returned to civilian rule—on October 1 of this year—with a very elaborate American-style constitution, protecting human rights and, hopefully, assuring freedom of the press and many of the things that we hold dear.

Now, I think the reason that is possible is what I have always contended, that the predominant influences—cultural, religious and educational—in Africa were established by American religious forces that gave the primary education. I mean, Agostinho Neto's father was a Methodist minister. Every African liberation movement leader got his primary education in a missionary educational operation. They got their higher education for the most part in England and in the United States. Even those who have studied in the Soviet Union have come back from the Soviet Union pretty much interested in the Western patterns of development.

I guess I think that what we need in Africa is not military domination, we need the possibility of a continued economic and political relationship, and we need to make sure that is not interfered with by any military activity. So far, I think, we have been able to do a very good job, putting the emphasis on our political and economic power. If I can go on, that is one of the reasons why our decision on what to do about Zimbabwe is going to have an impact on the total economic, geopolitical situation. So long as we have respected African priorities and, as Dr. Sisco said, promoted rational decolonization efforts, there has been almost no room for Soviet influence.

It is only when the political process breaks down and people feel as though they have to resort to military means to get their independence—as we did in the days of George Washington and Thomas Jefferson. That is one of the things that Julius Nyerere said to a group of our businessmen one time, "Sometimes you modern Americans do not

understand us in Africa," but he was sure that Washington and Jefferson would.

What we have done in this country has captured the imagination of the Africans, and so long as we live up to what our heritage is and respect the human rights and priorities, democratic priorities of African States, we can maintain those political and economic relationships.

Mr. Sisco. Let me make a brief comment on that, Mr. Chairman. I know you are very anxious to get at some rather specific questions.

I would make the same distinction in principle that Ambassador Young has made between Soviet capacity, Soviet assistance, and the fact that it does not necessarily spell Soviet influence and Soviet success.

My concern is that basically people have approached African problems on an "either/or" basis. The argument has been whether the indigenous is primary or the external factor is primary. Military assistance to African countries is not new. What is new is the asymmetry of the last 3 years; namely, that more Africans are asking for military help, and that the Soviet Union has responded in a far more substantial way than the United States and the West.

Ambassador Young, I am sure, would agree that these are dependent States. They are now getting away from the old Western imperialist system. What that new order will be in Africa is still undetermined, and certainly our support for African nationalism is key. But I maintain that the majority of the African countries cannot shape their own future and that order alone, that what comes out 5 or 10 years from now is going to be a combination of those indigenous factors as well as the reflection of the influences of external powers.

For that reason my plea is not "either/or." but my plea is basically an attitudinal change, that we have to be responsive not for the reason that Ambassador Young has indicated; namely, American political dominance in the area; but rather to make it very, very clear that we are going to play a decisive role with all of the instrumentalities available to us in shaping that future world order. In the last analysis I am all for peaceful change in Africa, but we have been insufficiently concerned, in my judgment, as to what the ultimate outcome of that change is in Africa. I think we ought to be just as concerned in Zimbabwe as to the kind of government that comes out from that particular situation as we are, understandably, to achieve this in a way to avoid race war between the blacks and the whites.

Mr. SOLARZ. We will, with the permission of the committee, attribute this recent colloquy between the two witnesses to their time, rather than the time of the chairman. [Laughter.]

We began the year by establishing martial law in this committee, and the gentleman from Pennsylvania's objections have been heard and dispatched in a summary proceeding. [Laughter.]

I would like to restate very briefly the question on Zimbabwe in terms of what we should do. If it should turn out that the Patriotic Front refuses to return to the negotiating table and that the bishop accepts the British constitution and agrees to implement it, and the British then decide to lift sanctions, under those circumstances, what do you think we should do in terms of whether or not to maintain sanctions ourselves?

Mr. YOUNG. Well, I think that is highly unlikely because I do not think that the Patriotic Front is going to walk out. I think what the Patriotic Front is saying is that they do not want to give an unconditional support to this constitution until they understand what the transition arrangements are going to be. For instance, there is some feeling that the British are talking about a very short transitional period. I think you as a candidate, having been out of the district, would hardly like to go back to your district and have an election in 2 months if you had not been there in 18 years.

I think we talked in the Anglo-American plan about a 6-month transition period. So, if the Patriotic Front wants to make sure that they are going to have a fair chance to run an election before they accept a constitution, then I think American politicians who understand the problems of running elections, ought to be very sensitive to that and sympathetic, and encourage the British to be patient and work out these difficulties.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. SISCO?

Mr. SISCO. I think I would agree, first of all, with Ambassador Young's judgment that this negotiation is going to continue. I think it was a remarkably positive initiative on the part of Mrs. Thatcher, and I think the United States should give it its full support.

But insofar as sanctions are concerned, I think we should use two guiding principles in this situation. One, the British have prime responsibility. We should be guided by their decision in the first instance.

Second, if it should evolve that the conference actually breaks up at this particular juncture, and we have the situation of where Muzorewa has accepted the constitutional proposal of the United Kingdom, and Mugabe and Nkomo have not, then I think this is a factor that we must also inevitably weigh in the balance as, I am sure—the political situation being what it is in the United Kingdom—they will also have to weigh that in the balance.

What I am trying to suggest to you is that if unfortunately—and as I say, I share Ambassador Young's assessment and hope that the conference will actually come to a successful fruition; they are very close on the constitution; they ought to be able to find accommodation on the transitional arrangement. But if they do not, I think the political process in the United Kingdom is such that sanctions will be lifted inevitably in November—from what I know of the domestic situation there—and I think that is something that will have to be taken heavily into account by this Congress as well.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Ambassador, if I can pursue your own response just for a moment. We all, of course, hope that the conference will succeed. But if it should turn out—for whatever reasons—that it does not, but that the Salisbury government accepts and implements the new constitution, thereby eliminating the blocking mechanism under which the whites now have the virtual monopoly over the senior positions in the army, judiciary, civil service, and police, which the current constitution gives them; and agrees furthermore to new elections, if that is what the British should insist on, at that point, would there be a continuing justification for the maintenance of sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia?

Mr. YOUNG. If the constitution is assumed by this committee and the Congress of the United States to be a free and fair constitution, and if we are convinced as political leaders in a democratic society ourselves, that it is possible to have free and fair elections under that constitution and the concurrent transition arrangements, then I do not think we ought to let a stubborn and intransigent Patriotic Front simply block progress in Zimbabwe.

But I think we have to be very careful about making that determination. I think the constitutional issue right now that the Patriotic Front has questions about is the question of, who pays for the end of the Land Tenure Act; and should they mortgage their government to the tune of a billion or more dollars in order to encourage the flight of whites from their country?

I think in the original suggestions of an Anglo-American plan and the arrangements made by Dr. Kissinger, that a development fund, formed by a multinational institution force, working through the World Bank would do that. I do not think you have objections from the Patriotic Front on that question if the money was provided. But, to ask them to start their government, after having had to fight for it, accepting the responsibility of paying off the people that they think deprived them of their land for the last 50 years, I think very few Americans would consider very fair and a legitimate constitution.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do both of you think the United States should be prepared to contribute to some kind of international fund which would make resources available to a new government in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, designed to enable them to acquire white-owned land through the payment of reasonable compensation to those who own that property now?

Mr. SISCO. Well, clearly I would strongly support that, Mr. Chairman. Moreover, I would also favor efforts to broaden the support among many of our friends who have as significant an interest in what evolves in that situation as we do.

Mr. YOUNG. Let me say, I have always supported that development fund, but I really have to question it now. The reason I question it now is that something that this Nation wanted, that this Congress voted for, for years, was an end to Idi Amin. We have not been able to find any money—significant money—in this Congress to help the people in Uganda redevelop their economy, nor to assist Tanzania after they got rid of Idi Amin.

If we are going to come up with hundreds of millions of dollars now for Rhodesia for a white land-redemption program, you really brand the Congress of the United States as paying and aiding whites, and refusing blacks. I think the Congress has to be very careful as it approaches the African Continent, and has to make sure that we are aiding the entire African Continent and not just bailing whites out in Rhodesia and South Africa.

Mr. SOLARZ. I think you have defined the problem with exquisite sensitivity, Mr. Ambassador. The question is whether, assuming the only way to get an agreement on the constitution and thereby bring the war to an end, is through the establishment of such a fund, whether, given the other consequences which you describe—our willingness to underwrite such a fund in light of our unwillingness to

provide comparable resources elsewhere in Africa—the tradeoff is worth it. Are American interests advanced by contributing to such a fund, thereby bringing the war to an end; or are American interests advanced by avoiding the characterization as a government which is willing to subsidize white landowners but is not willing to help poor black people elsewhere on the continent?

Mr. YOUNG. Let me rephrase that answer because I understand that Senator Hatfield did attach an amendment just on Friday to the foreign aid bill that would allow up to \$20 million to be spent on assistance in Uganda.

I think that so long as we are doing things in a balanced way; and I think so long as we are very careful about the administration of this fund—and I would assume that World Bank administration would be appropriate. But, the politics of Africa unfortunately are the politics of race. For 200 years, colonialism meant racism. I think we did not have a colonial burden. So, it is very important for us to escape the tag of having anything we do as a nation be attributed to a racial motivation because I think our credibility in Africa right now is very, very high. I think in anything we do and any way we do it, that credibility is what makes it possible for us to do business, assist in development. Frankly, the Russian failure is that they have not been sensitive to these kinds of racial subtleties.

Mr. SOLARZ. I would like to ask just two more questions now and then yield to my colleagues.

Mr. Ambassador, on your recent trip to Africa, according to the press, you made efforts in most of the countries you visited to try to persuade the governments there to undertake some new initiatives with respect to Israel, as a way of helping to reduce Israel's isolation in the international community.

Can you tell us at all whether you achieved any positive results in these discussions, and whether you think there is any possibility that some of the black African countries that broke diplomatic relations with Israel after 1967 might be prepared to consider resuming diplomatic relations with Israel?

Mr. YOUNG. I think there is some interest. Only 1 of the 10 nations that I talked to rejected that idea. That country happens to be basically very self-contained and almost isolationist in its policies, even on the African Continent. They were just not interested in the Middle East at all.

But the president of the Organization of African Unity did say that he would be consulting with his colleagues about reconvening a delegation from the OAU, such as the one that visited Africa after the 1967 war, and that as a result of that they might be able to enter into a dialog with Israel that might lead to it. My suggestion was, if the United States should be talking with Palestinians, that Africans should be talking with Israelis; and that we ought to be talking about some of the same things—how to reconcile Israeli sovereignty and Palestinian security and rights; that that dialog would be very helpful.

I think everybody was interested in that dialog. I think they were concerned about the possible format. In southern Africa, people were concerned about the more immediate problems of Rhodesia. But no-

body rejected the idea out of hand except one that was basically isolationist.

Mr. SOLARZ. Let me say, Mr. Ambassador, I think your efforts in that regard are not only deeply appreciated, but extremely important because it would be exceedingly encouraging if some of the black African countries were willing to reestablish diplomatic relations with Israel in the relatively near future.

My final question has to do with some of the unfortunate—and I think unwarranted—consequences which resulted from your resignation as our Ambassador to the United Nations. Both of us in our own ways have, among other things, I am sure, tried to work for a reconciliation between the black and Jewish communities in our country. It is a coalition in which both of us have invested a good deal of effort and energy, and a coalition which we felt was not only in the best interest of black Americans and Jewish Americans, but in the final analysis in the best interest of all Americans.

I was deeply disturbed following your resignation when it appeared for a while that it was producing some new and seemingly deep division between the black and Jewish communities in our country. To some extent these divisions were fueled by allegations, rumors, and reports that you were in effect driven from office as a result of pressure from the organized Jewish community in our country, and by pressure from the State of Israel abroad.

I wonder if it might be possible for you this afternoon to lay these allegations to rest and let us know—and through us the American people—whether in fact your resignation was in any way related to pressure from the organized Jewish community in our country, or Israel overseas.

Mr. YOUNG. Well, let me say, at the time of my resignation there was an effort underway between the White House and the Ambassador to Israel that had been approved by Foreign Minister Dayan, that would have put Israel on record as opposing my resignation. Unfortunately—or maybe fortunately—Prime Minister Begin was ill at that time and we did not get approval in time, events were heating up here so rapidly.

I frankly found that while I understood the origin of the policy of not talking to the PLO, and I respected the origin of that policy that Mr. Sisco was a part of, as necessary to help the removal of Egyptian troops. That policy was reaffirmed by President Carter in order to get some understandings on the west bank and Gaza into the Camp David accords.

So, I understood the reasons for the policy, historically, and agreed with those reasons. But in the situation I found myself in, I thought it was in the American interest and in Israel's interest, and Arab interest, for me to talk to the representative of the PLO. Now, once having done that, I would have either had to say, "I'm sorry and I was wrong, and I will not do it again," or I had to resign. I was not sorry. I did not think I was wrong, and I would do it again. So, I thought that it was important for me to resign, and I still support this administration. I understand why that policy cannot change at this time. But frankly, I do not think that the tensions that have

emerged over this, that have been portrayed by the press as black and Jewish tensions, are as real and strong as the press implies.

I think you pointed out, and I agree, that in terms of the Congressional Black Caucus and Jewish Members of Congress there is a tremendous similarity of voting records. In fact, there are numbers of Congressmen—including the chairman of this committee—that have a 100-percent voting record as far as the Black Caucus is concerned, and only 2 percent of your district is black. I think the same thing can be said of the gentleman from Philadelphia, who would certainly have a 100-percent record in support of Israel; and the former chairman, Congressman Diggs.

So, in terms of real politics, the civil rights organizations, the historic relationship between the black and the Jewish communities, I do not think that is a real problem. I do think there are some differences, and those differences are being discussed at the highest level by responsible black and Jewish leaders. I am very hopeful that nothing but good can come from this kind of dialog.

Mr. SOLARZ. So, I gather it would be fair to say that your resignation was essentially and primarily a function of your disagreement with the policy, rather than a function of pressure brought to bear on the administration to get rid of you, by the Jewish community.

Mr. YOUNG. It certainly was.

Mr. SOLARZ. A result of your differences with the policy.

Mr. YOUNG. It was a result of my having to differ with the policy.

Mr. SOLARZ. I appreciate that, Mr. Ambassador, and I thank you.

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to say that.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Goodling.

Mr. GOODLING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, with your new experience in fundraising perhaps you might be available to help some of us in trying to fill our campaign coffers at the present time. [Laughter.]

Mr. Ambassador, as a response to my chairman's remarks you said—and I am paraphrasing—that the Patriotic Front would certainly want to make sure that as part of a government they would not have a debt because of the white land problem.

But then you seemed to bristle when my chairman suggested that countries may get together and collectively establish such a fund so that they would not have that debt. Is that some kind of "no win" program, or what did you have in mind?

Mr. YOUNG. No, I think it is something that we have to be very careful about. I have tried consistently to keep American positions following the lead of both Britain and the frontline African States—both are our allies in this situation. Our future depends on good relations to both. I think so long as we are aware of sensitivities in both of those groups, I think it would be very helpful for us to give assistance.

Mr. GOODLING. Second, if you were Margaret Thatcher, what would your next move be in relationship to the Rhodesian problem? Let me couple that with, what do you think the frontline states are doing at the present time to encourage a decent solution to this problem?

Mr. YOUNG. Well, I think that Margaret Thatcher and Lord Carington have done an excellent job up until now. I would like to point out, though, that they are only doing what we tried to get them to do

3 years ago, and which they said was not right. They are now doing identically the same thing. Because they are doing it with the full support of the British Government and without the Labor Party in opposition—as they were in opposition I think it is working. I also think it could have worked 3 years ago.

But, we have to have some kind of face-saving mechanism to give the Patriotic Front enough time to run an election. At the same time—

Mr. GOODLING. You mean to run, not to win.

Mr. YOUNG. I said, to “run.” At the same time, I think there needs to be enough assurance to Bishop Muzorewa and his government that the mechanisms will be fair to him and that, should he win the election, he would have a viable economy that could run the country.

Now, I am not convinced that either group came to Lancaster House hoping for as much agreement as they reached. I think Bishop Muzorewa and the Patriotic Front both came because they did not want to take the blame for not coming. I think that they will not leave because they do not want to take the blame for breaking up the conference. I think that Lord Carrington has been very patient and very strong in being tough with first one side and then the other; but then backing off just enough to give them a face-saving way out. I am convinced he is going to do it again.

Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Secretary, one of the three or four points you mentioned dealt with our coping with the expansionist policy of Russia in Africa. How, specifically, would you suggest we cope with that policy?

Mr. SISCO. I do not really think that I can respond adequately to that question for this reason: I think that each of these instances has the earmarks of being *sui generis*. I do not, for example, take the view that all Cuban activity in Africa threatens our interest. I think it is important that we know how significant the country is; how significant our interests are in relationship to that country.

But now I would go a little bit beyond this. We are seeing this outward thrust, a new development; more Soviet responsiveness insofar as requests for military assistance. It is very difficult to pinpoint either any given time or any given country at which one ought to attempt to say, draw the line—and I do not like that phrase because it is normally misunderstood. My concern is that if the general attitude develops in Africa that the Soviet Union is more responsive to what they perceive—rightly or wrongly—are increased needs of military assistance, and where that problem has been essentially militarized as a result of Soviet and Cuban responsiveness, my plea is that we should not feel inhibited in being equally responsive because what we are seeing in the last 3 years is that the Russians are being by far more responsive than we are. And in the aftermath of this Vietnam syndrome both our friends as well as our foes are beginning to wonder generally—and it goes beyond the African Continent. They are not beginning to wonder about our capacity, but they are beginning to wonder about our will.

I think the right lesson from Vietnam, applied to Africa and elsewhere is that, yes, it was an overextension of American power, and we

cannot be the world's policeman all over the globe. But I think we are in danger of drawing the wrong lesson, and that is that we are projecting today an image of uncertainty, and an indication to friends and foes alike that the United States is not willing to involve itself politically, economically, strategically, and militarily in areas of vital interest. I am not talking about "gun-boat diplomacy," Mr. Congressman, but I think that there is required an attitudinal change. I think we are a country today that is in transition. We are a country that is trying to find a new role in the world from what we perceive to be the overextension in Vietnam, and what it is, should be, over the next 5 or 10 years.

So, when we are talking about the African Continent we have to be highly selective. We have to be very sure that the country is important. But we also have to realize that what happens in Africa is part of a broader global context, and that if the Soviets become the wave of the future it may not mean that Country X tomorrow or the next day is going to go Marxist, or necessarily take a contrary position, other than our own, as we have seen in the recent nonaligned conference just 4 weeks ago. But, eventually the role of the Soviet Union in this continent will be increased in places where there are vital interests if this trend continues.

Specifically, I am concerned, for example, about the Russian position in Ethiopia. I am concerned that we have now Soviet support for the Polisario through Algeria, and we have had a friend, Morocco, that has been a staunch friend of the West: and I believe we ought to be responsive in the form of additional military assistance to Morocco for one reason: namely, they are up against a disequilibrium in the present situation. Namely, the Russians are supporting the Polisario through the Algerians, and we have not yet responded to what they perceive to be increased needs.

We ought to be worried about what the ultimate outcome will be. And, as far as Rhodesia is concerned, I agree basically with what Ambassador Young has expressed. However, I want to make it clear that I would like to see a government that is basically friendly to the West come out from an election. I am not as relaxed as many are about an election where the result might be a government that does not threaten our vital national interest directly, but at a minimum, participates in a nonaligned conference and berates American policy all over the world.

Mr. GOODLING. I find this topic very interesting, Mr. Chairman, U.S. interests in Africa. About a year ago when we were visiting in the White House and we had a discussion about foreign policy, you may remember, I said to the President, "Would you please have a fireside chat and tell the American people, who know very little about our interests in Africa, why we should be interested in Africa?"

A year later, when we were invited down to have them announce what our policy was going to be in relationship to Rhodesia I said to the Secretary of State, "Now you are asking for a rubberstamp. What did I ask you to do a year ago," and he said, "You asked us to inform the American people just why we have an interest in Africa." I am still waiting for that to take place. Perhaps this will be the channel in order to inform the American people.

The additional ten minutes that I would have, to equal your time, I want to give to my colleague from New Jersey when it is her turn.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you, Mr. Goodling.

Mr. Gray.

Mr. GRAY. I would like to defer my time to my colleague from Michigan, who has to leave. So, I will reserve to come back with my time at that point.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you. I want to thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania for yielding and allowing me this opportunity to raise a couple of issues before I have to leave this particular hearing.

As I listened to the testimony today, it captures—in my mind—the basic division that exists in our approach to the African Continent within this country overall. On the one hand a substantial agreement between both Mr. Young and Mr. Sisco, and the long-term view that America indeed has vital interests in Africa. And second, that we do need to be very directly and immediately concerned with the competition from the Soviet Union and other Communist expansionist forces within the continent.

Where I hear a substantial difference, though, is how we get to that point of protecting those vital interests and how we in fact achieve that goal of protecting American national self-interests within the African Continent.

I happened to have the opportunity some years back to spend a couple of years in West Africa. I wish all Americans could have that kind of opportunity because I think where we sometimes lose out in that competition and lose out in terms of American foreign policy objectives is our insistence upon applying the way we see the world to what is in fact happening in Africa, or Asia. There are specifically two kinds of traps, and I would like to get some response from both of the gentlemen to this observation, two traps in the way Americans approach that issue.

One of them is our own racial hangups. We fairly consistently, I think, are trapped by our own hangups about race within our own society, which produces enormous conflict here at home. I have the feeling that the same racial hangups are getting in the way of our perceptions about what is happening in Africa. That is not in our own self-interest. Aside from all the human rights considerations, I think our own racism is getting in the way of our understanding of that continent. Specifically, I think the question we ought to be asking ourselves in terms of Rhodesia is, do we have the same posture with regard to the dispute that is underway within that continent if in fact we were talking about a conflict in Nigeria, as distinct from a conflict between the white minority regime and the black population.

While it is certainly true that we want to protect our interests and try to adopt policies to which Africa will be responsive so that they will see their interests as coinciding with our interests, as long as we keep saying things—however unintentionally—that seem to put us on the side of those forces that are trying to resist the movement toward majority rule, especially when a principle of race is involved, a principle that seeks to structure society around the issue of race, I think that we are defeating our own self-interest in our effort to identify ourselves with the aspirations of people throughout the African Continent.

The other issue is the issue on how we approach the issue of the Communist competition. I heard Mr. Sisco say a moment ago that

while he can subscribe to all the general principles that Mr. Young has articulated, that the bottom line ultimately is the real concern with whether the regimes that come into power are pro-Western or not. I can think of no regime in the Third World that was more pro-Western than the Samozza regime in Nicaragua; I can think of no regime that was more "pro-Western" than the regime of the Shah in Iran; I can think of no regime that professes to be more anti-Communist than the present white regime in South Africa, and I submit it is precisely because we get blinded by those protestations of anticommunism that leads us into getting trapped. So, we create our own self-fulfilling prophesy time after time, after time. That is precisely because we do not understand how these issues are perceived from the African point of view that we stand to again get ourselves trapped—whether it is Rhodesia, South Africa, or elsewhere on the continent.

I cannot describe to you, looking at this from the standpoint of Nigeria, for instance—given my own experience in that particular country—how absurd we sometimes appear, and how absurd the Soviet Union oftentimes appears. You have in all of those countries in Africa fragile regimes; artificial boundaries, culturally diverse societies; an enormous struggle for competition and for power. They know in advance, if they are going to call themselves Communist they get assistance from one side; anti-Communist, they get assistance from another side.

The conflicts themselves within those countries are anything but ideological and arise out of a whole series of institutional and other issues that are at stake within the struggle for power.

Well, I have raised two issues. What I am trying to suggest, I would like to invite some reactions, how do we get out of our falling into the trap where we see issues through our own racial prism, or through our preoccupation with the issue of the extent to which other governments protest their friendliness toward our own interests?

Mr. Sisco. Mr. Congressman, let me correct something. I, for one, did not use the phrase "pro-Western." I used the phrase, "friendly to the United States." Let me explain what I mean by friendly to the United States.

I am not talking about African countries allied with the United States, either formally or informally. I am talking about States that are truly independent, nonaligned in the nonalliance sense. I think that the way the word "nonalignment" is being thrown around today is a disgrace because what we saw at the nonaligned conference here a few weeks ago was basically a Cuban thrust to line up the group behind Soviet policy.

So, when I use the phrase—just so the record is clear—"friendly to the United States." I mean independent African States, free to choose their direction and to develop in the way they see fit.

Mr. WOLPE. I am glad for that clarification, but if I may, with all respect, Mr. Sisco, when you use phrases as you did earlier in your testimony of the notion that African States—you were concerned—do not have the capacity to on their own resist intrusions from without—

Mr. Sisco. Excuse me, I must interrupt you. I said that Africans are too weak and are not in a position to shape their own future on their

own, and that the future order in Africa will be a combination of what they, themselves, are able to do, and a reflection of the external powers to the area.

Mr. WOLPE. I understand. What I am saying is, that statement could not be a more eloquent comment on the difficulties that we get into in creating our own self-fulfilling prophesy because from an African perspective that kind of statement sounds like Africans do not have the capacity to make determinations of their own.

I submit that until we begin fully to identify ourselves with the capacity of Africans, as Americans, to make political determinations on their own, we are going to unintentionally—I recognize the sincerity of what you are urging and the very commitment that you express, I do not think our goals are in any respect different. What I am saying is, I do not think it is heard in this country very frequently how that kind of statement of yours is going to be received elsewhere in the world.

I invite any other reaction, Mr. Sisco, Mr. Young.

Mr. SISCO. I would just add that I do not disagree with the notion that we basically have to be very sensitive to avoiding imposing our set of values, our way of looking at things on the African nations themselves.

I understand very clearly, Mr. Congressman, that based on the history of interaction between the newly emerging African countries and Western imperialism, that what we say is probably read considerably different than it would be read within the confines of our own democracy or the Western World.

But, by the same token, we have got to say these things as we see them in this respect. I am convinced that most of these African countries are going to be shaped by their own means and the outside influence, relatively, of the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union over the next decade.

My view is, let us use all the instrumentalities that we have in order to help shape the ultimate result. My criticism of what I have seen of policies in recent time is that it has struck me that we have been more concerned with the importance of peaceful change, as crucial as that is, and less concerned as to what the ultimate leadership is in an African country.

So, the reason for my relative emphasis—I am not talking about an “either-or” situation—is that we have to take into account the means by which the objectives is achieved; and we have to be very clear as to what that objective is.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mrs. Fenwick.

Mrs. FENWICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think one of the troubles we are running into—and I do not know to whom to address this—is that some colonial powers who did for a long time hold African countries seem to be doing marvelous business with them, without the slightest trouble; in fact, sending troops all over the place—and you know of which country I am thinking of—without any suggestion that this is looked upon unfavorably. I do not know how they get away with it. I do not know what the answer is.

But, there is something else that worries me even more. It was said here, I think by my colleague, that pro-Communist nations can an-

nounce themselves as pro-Communist and get help from the Soviet Union: and pro-Western states, or states that are more prepared to be independent, can announce themselves as such and get help from us. That simply is not true.

Polisario is getting aid through Algeria from Russia. Somalia, with that magnificent port at the very point where we need some kind of stability, has been denied arms. You do not get arms from us by asking for them or by showing that you are not a tool or a puppet of the Russians. You do not get arms. Morocco is not getting them, or is having great difficulty, in any case, getting any kind of arms, although their own territory is being invaded.

Now, I remember years ago, Mr. Ambassador, I was so impressed and struck by something you always said at our meetings, "Yes, we must talk of majority rule, but we must talk of minority rights." You said that to many people when it was not very easy to say. I think that is the real point of the United States, that we do believe in both.

Now, also we have this difficulty, we seem to be able to enunciate principles clearly, but we have difficulty in being clever. It is not clever of us, in my opinion, to let Somalia and Morocco go without arms when we can see that all you have to do is proclaim an interest and a willingness to vote with the Soviet Union countries, and you get anything you want. We have had up until now—with one exception—very good support from Morocco in the UN and in other ways, too. We have not shown ourselves to be very faithful friends when they are in very grave difficulties.

What would you suggest? Which of you would say "yes" or "no" tomorrow to aid for Somalia or to aid for Morocco?

MR. YOUNG. Shall I go first and let the Secretary give the final answer?

MRS. FENWICK. You go first.

MR. YOUNG. I like Somalia: they are marvelous people. They have no business in the Ogaden, though. I think if you ever gave Somalia guns to go into the Ogaden, you would lose access to the port in Mombasa. Our Kenyan allies, I mean, they are more afraid of Somalia than they are of the Soviet Union. It has been Kenya that has been the hold-back on our assistance to Somalia.

MRS. FENWICK. I see.

MR. YOUNG. Another kind of complication exists in the Polisario. I have not heard any liberation movement plead and beg for Western support like I have heard the Polisario. By the same token, I know Morocco is our historic friend. Right now, though, our economic interest, particularly oil, is much more in line with Algeria. Morocco's main trading partner, other than the French, is the Soviet Union on a major phosphate development project. It gets so complicated, I would rather keep us out of it. In talking with Houphouet Boigny, who is, I guess, amongst the most anti-Communist French Africans, and asking him was he going to the OAU "meeting of wise men" on the Sahara. He said, "Wise men leave the Sahara alone."

I guess until there is a clear-cut consensus, or direction, I would certainly give Morocco military assistance to defend Moroccan territory; but I am not sure that the Western Sahara is Moroccan territory, and I think I would really be a little reluctant to get us involved in

that because I am sure we have more to lose than we have to gain. When you gain the Western Sahara you have something in the neighborhood of 200,000 people and 500 miles of sand.

Mrs. FENWICK. But, Mr. Ambassador, is it not also true that if you abandon one friend after another you lose in ways that may not be specific as to that small country, but you are certainly telling the rest of the world something, "Do not have any friendship with the United States because they will abandon you."

You know, our colleague spoke earlier of our having supported Iran. Well, certainly, there is no communism as far as we can tell yet, in Iran. We do not always get Communists where we support the wrong side.

What I am trying to say is, there are lots of lessons to be learned, not just for Morocco and Algeria, but for the whole rest of the world.

Mr. YOUNG. Our behavior ought to be, we are with the right if we do not have a relationship. The Black Caucus used to say a long time ago, we have no permanent friends, no permanent enemies, only permanent interests.

Mrs. FENWICK. That was an English Prime Minister.

Mr. YOUNG. When our friends are in keeping with American values and interests, I think, we would certainly support our friends. But when our friends, even our best of friends, become expansionists with our weaponry, I get nervous.

Mrs. FENWICK. We support lots of people who are expansionists. I do not know if you approve of Tanzania moving into Uganda, but they also moved into Seychelles and have troops there now in Seychelles, I understand.

Mr. YOUNG. I do not think that is the case.

Mrs. FENWICK. Yes; Tanzanian troops are in Seychelles. They had a coup.

Mr. YOUNG. No; Tanzania did not have a thing to do with that.

Mrs. FENWICK. It said so in the paper.

Mr. YOUNG. Tanzania has said on our last visit, Nyerere said as soon as the Government in Uganda can defend itself and protect itself, that they are anxious to withdraw because it is costing them money and is really literally hurting their economy. In fact, he is hoping that anybody would come in and help Uganda because he thinks Tanzania has done more than their share.

Mrs. FENWICK. Well, I do not think it is very satisfactory. I think what we are doing is simply convincing people that it is not worthwhile to be a friend of the United States. Yes; we can give them money and do—despite what our own people feel about that—but I think we are losing very seriously in the respect of the world. I wondered if the Secretary had any thoughts on that.

Mr. SISCO. The only comment I would make, with all due respect to what Ambassador Young had to say, he said he would keep out of Morocco. Well, I think this illustrates what I said in my opening comments. You have here a situation where it is becoming increasingly militarized as a result of Soviet support of the Polisario, through Algeria. Now, he would stay out of this. There is an asymmetry that is developing in that situation from the point of view of military support. Now, how long do we stay out of it? Do we wait until Morocco

is overturned simply because some of the Polisario have raised the flag of a war of liberation? I do not see that this serves the national interest of the United States.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Gray.

Mr. GRAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me certainly welcome Mr. Sisco and also Ambassador Young. Let me just say how delighted I am to see both of them, particularly Ambassador Young who, I think, represents a major directional change in our foreign policy vis-a-vis the continent of Africa. He has over the years as our Ambassador to the U.N. certainly increased our influence there and our relationships, particularly with the black African nations.

Ambassador Young, you mentioned the markets that are available in Africa and talked about the various trade deficits we have there. What, in your opinion, is the reason why we have not realized those markets, and what do you think we are going to have to do to change that situation?

Mr. YOUNG. We really have not needed those markets. We have been blessed with an economy that has an enormous abundance of natural resources in our own hemisphere, and we have been able to buy up almost everything we can produce in this country ourselves.

The thing that makes these markets necessary for us now in a way that they were not 10 years ago is the expansion of our economy and the strengthening of our economy. I mean, this administration alone, in the last 3 years, has produced 8 million new jobs. Those new jobs mean more people going to work, and even if we are conserving oil and energy, expansion of our economy, running 3 to 5 percent at some points in the last few years, is going to mean that we are going to import more and more oil, even if we exact the best of energy policies.

As long as we are a petroleum-dependent society, we are going to need to sell more abroad to finance our needs from abroad.

The other thing is, you know, until we realize that need, and that this need for exports is not going away ever again, regardless of what we do domestically about energy, then we begin in the Congress to make it attractive and make it possible for American businessmen to do business abroad, as the Germans have. I mean, right now we are buying \$6 billion worth of oil from Nigeria, and they are giving all their money to build their expressways to West Germany. The consumer market is run by the British. The Italians are developing apartments and housing, and the Israelis are doing the water projects. I think all that is wonderful, except that means \$6 billion worth of American money, and Americans are not doing any of the work to get it back. I think we are just going to keep in the competition now in a way we did not have to compete with our friends before.

Mr. GRAY. As you know, for a number of years our African policy was influenced to a large degree by our relationship with South Africa. How do you perceive the coming of age of nations like Nigeria, that has demonstrated very clearly its economic muscle in terms of getting people to the table at London—what many people have forgotten about, that the Nigerians nationalized BP—how do you perceive the continuing relations between this nation and South Africa?

Mr. YOUNG. I mean, I have a hangup about South Africa. I think South Africa is the kind of thing you cannot get away from once you get involved with it.

I think we have a long-range interest in what happens in South Africa, and I think we ought to exercise that interest as responsibly and as objectively as possible. I think that it is possible for South Africa to have a transition to a more democratic society without destroying its economy. I think it can only do that if it has close relationships with the United States.

Those relationships, however, cannot be just relationships with the white minority population, they have to be a total relationship with all other people of South Africa. I think we are working with South Africa right now, indirectly, on Namibia and on Rhodesia. Depending on their cooperation continuing on those two places, I think if we can have majority rule achieved under U.N. supervision in Namibia in the coming year, I think there are lots of things possible. South Africa is not a situation I am willing to give up on.

Mr. GRAY. The other question I wanted to ask in relation to South Africa, do you think that this Government ought to pursue a policy of urging private disinvestment in South Africa?

Mr. YOUNG. Why do you want to ask me that? [Laughter.]

Let me say, I have a very complicated policy on that in my own mind because it is a tactical decision. I think that nobody is going to walk away from approximately \$3 billion worth of plant and equipment. If anybody did walk away from it, it would not be difficult for South Africa to fill that plant and equipment and run it at a profit without our help and involvement.

So, I basically oppose Federal attempts to totally divest ourselves of all relationships with South Africa.

By the same token I think that South Africa would not be moving at all, nor would any of our corporations be doing anything if it were not for the pressure in our university and our churches, and also if it were not for the kind of leverage that this administration has exercised in relationship to South Africa on the present arms embargo and working with them to try to bring about a transition in Namibia and assist and restrain the situation in Rhodesia.

So, I would think everybody ought to put pressure on, but I think it ought to be run by the executive branch more than the legislative. As a former Congressman, I never thought I would ever say that.

Mr. GRAY. Mr. Sisco, in your testimony one of the recurring themes is the emphasis on military assistance, or it seems to point in that direction.

On page 8 of your testimony you state:

But once certain conflicts are militarized we must recognize that U.S. and Western willingness to be responsive on a highly selective basis to assistance requests, in the face of increased Soviet-Cuban support, is unavoidable and essential if we are to influence the ultimate shape of government.

Now, I am wondering, are you advocating that we ship arms and maybe even troops into selective military situations and, if so, which ones would you point to presently that require that, or which ones in the past would reflect that kind of need?

Mr. Sisco. Well, Mr. Gray, let me make first a comment, if I could, with respect to what Ambassador Young said earlier.

I faced this question of divestment over this past year on our own university campus. This was not a mere rhetorical question, but it was necessary to make a decision. What we did, with the board's approval is, I can say with a great deal of confidence, that our all too small endowment portfolio has stocks, and there is no corporation in that portfolio that does any significant business with South Africa. You cannot monitor those things too precisely, but there is no stock in that portfolio that is doing anything of any significance with South Africa.

Insofar as the response to your question. I do not have any specific country in mind. You note, Mr. Gray, that I have tried to underscore a change of attitude. I happen to believe that the environment in our country as a result of Vietnam has tended to tie our hands emotionally. We have all been scarred in one way or another.

I believe that the Soviets have assessed our political environment in such a way that they feel that they can undertake some of these assistance undertakings with very little risk in their undertaking them.

So, what I am really trying to say here is that rather than get into an argument as people have historically gotten into an argument over African policy, I know that military assistance cannot solve a number of these indigenous problems. I know that America has to be responsive to the needs of modernization and development, and in the last analysis it is the government concerned that has to deal with that internal situation.

The situation today, Mr. Gray, in Africa is different than what it was 3 and 5 years ago. For the first time the Soviet Union has a real conventional capacity. It is using that conventional capacity and there is no panacea, no one yardstick that one can apply to this situation. What I am pleading for is the removal of what I consider to be the psychological inhibition in our country, as a result of Vietnam, in an America that seems less willing to be responsive.

Mr. GRAY. I suppose the problem I have with it—I can understand what you are saying—but in your testimony, when you make a statement like that, it seems to me that if we cannot specify a situation current or in recent history, that we open the possibility—particularly when you combine it with the one statement, I think you mentioned participation in the nonaligned conference and criticism of the U.S. policy—I wonder whether or not we are going to be able to develop relations with African nations who will not agree with us sometimes, who will criticize our foreign policy. What basis, then, will we use to make judgments to provide military assistance and to get involved in a military way?

Mr. Sisco. Well, in the first instance I would underscore the desire of the Government itself. I am not trying here to suggest that the United States should go out on a shopping expedition in Africa and say, "Look, we want to distribute arms all over Africa." What I am trying to suggest is that we, in the last 2 or 3 years, are facing a different situation; an experience that is different from the Western imperialistic experience that Africans had heretofore.

Mr. SOLARZ. If the witnesses will excuse us for a minute, we are now into the second bells of a vote. In 10 minutes we will resume.

[Whereupon, a short recess was taken.]

Mr. SOLARZ. Will the sergeant at arms capture the witnesses and bring them back to the witness table? The interrogation is about to proceed. I was trying to be polite. [Laughter.]

I see that one of the witnesses has been forcibly returned. Where is the other?

Mr. Gray.

Mr. GRAY. The only problem that I have, Mr. Sisco, is that when we talk about greater military involvement and cannot identify some examples, recently or even now, where that should take place, it concerns me that those who may not agree with us in terms of structure of government and doing everything our particular way, we would get involved in a situation which would not be to our best interest.

I would just reiterate that I think one of the past problems of American foreign policy in the continent of Africa has been not understanding the very powerful forces of nationalism; the unwillingness to be tied to any one side of the United States-Soviet dialog; and that if we begin to see Africa, the continent, simply in terms of a battlefield between the United States and Soviets, that we will overlook some of the very important self-interests that African nations have, which they are not going to give away to any side.

The example is Egypt kicking out the Russians when it was no longer in their interest to be aligned that way. The fact that Nigeria took arms, equipment, their planes, but yet has a government structured along our lines and are moving very, very pro-Western. So, I just mention that to you.

One last question for both gentlemen, and that is the recognition of Angola. Should the United States, Mr. Sisco, in your opinion move in the direction to establish a formal relationship with Angola?

Mr. SISCO. Well, I do not basically know what is in the morning telegrams. One thing I learned, when you leave government you lose your security blanket of reading the intelligence reports and the morning telegrams, and you rely essentially on the New York Times. You are therefore not necessarily the best-informed individual in the world.

I would merely say by way of a general comment that I would like to see that situation more stabilized before any final judgment is made.

Mr. GRAY. Mr. Ambassador, would you give a comment on our recognition, or relationship with Angola?

Mr. YOUNG. Well, I think I base my opinion on a longstanding relationship with this government in Angola, the MPLA government. They came to visit some of us when I was in Congress, in 1975, shortly after the Portuguese Government fell and before there was an attempt to take power.

What they said to me was that they would like to be a genuine non-aligned African country. They put it this way, they said, "We do not want you to do to us what you did to the Cubans." I said, "What do you mean?"

He said, "We do not want you to force us to be totally dependent on the Soviet Union." He said, "We are not going to turn our backs on the Soviet Union because they helped us and gave us arms when nobody else would. But, we do not want to be totally dependent on them and we know the only way that can happen is for us to have as good a relationship with the United States as we do with the Soviet Union."

Now that, I think, still is the dominant opinion of the people in power, in spite of the fact that Cubans and Russians are there. Again, that is simply because they have had a very bad deal from the Russians. At one point there were talks of some 70 percent of the fish off their shores being sent back to Russia; 20 percent going to the Cubans, and them being left with 10 percent. You get a better deal than that from the worst American corporation. [Laughter.]

They found, on the other hand, after dealing with Gulf and with Boeing—they are involved with a number of mineral companies—that they have had a very good experience dealing with American business. So, they want to maximize their relationship with us. I think it is in our interest to move ahead with that. I think that is what I would see as the way of preventing Soviet influence.

Not long ago—almost a year, though—there was talk of a Cuban-sponsored invasion of Zaire by the Katangan mercenaries, or forces in Angola. We blamed the Cubans. I always said it was the East Germans and not the Cubans. I mean, my U.N. intelligence, I thought, was as good if not better than the intelligence traffic that we would get because our sources were very bad in Africa. As a result of a number of missions—Dick Moose and my successor at the U.N., Don McHenry—we negotiated a complete withdrawal of Katangan forces from the Zaire border. We worked with the Nigerians and with Cameroon to get Neto and Mabutu reconciled. We have close to \$2 billion invested in Zaire, and that investment would have been terribly jeopardized by any kind of military activity. That investment was essentially protected and American influence was advanced in both Zaire and Angola by an aggressive diplomatic approach.

I think we are so much better than the Russians diplomatically and economically. That is the approach I prefer. A part of this approach at this time—and we would have been better off a year ago, even—would have been to recognize Angola and have an American diplomatic presence there.

Mr. GRAY. Thank you, Mr. Secretary and Mr. Ambassador; let me thank both of you. Let me just say to Ambassador that the bridge building that you have done in the U.N. and also in the continent of Africa certainly will be a great credit to this Nation over the years to come.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOLARZ. The gentleman from Indiana wins the award for patience and perseverance. Mr. Fithian.

Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first of all congratulate you for having these hearings. I have found this afternoon's testimony to be very, very informative.

Mr. Ambassador, I am a person who knows of no single example in history where differences have been narrowed by refusing to sit down and talk with people with whom we have differences. So, let me, as one member of this panel, congratulate you for acting out this conviction, even though it brought great public and personal pain to you.

I am concerned about the balance of power in the world, and in general how Africa fits into that. I am especially concerned about your views—both of you—as to what if any impact on the balance of power

in the Middle East activities in the Horn of Africa might have, either in the present context or, as you project those activities in the balance of power structure in the Middle East on down over the next decade.

Mr. SISCO. I would be glad to say something on that. First, as I have indicated, I am as concerned as you are, Mr. Congressman, about this new capacity of the Soviet Union. One thing that I did not emphasize in my oral statement, which is included in my written statement, is that I believe that our conventional option and our conventional capacity is today woefully inadequate in light of the substantial, increased strength of the Soviet Union in this respect. I think it is important for us to strengthen this option in hopes, frankly, that we will never have to use it—whether we are talking about the Horn of Africa or in the Straits of Hormog, the lifeline of the oil shipments.

If you take the present Soviet position in Ethiopia and the increased Soviet-Cuban presence in South Yemen, combined with the increased strength of the Soviet Union in transport and capacity to move a brigade and forces. I think this is important insofar as the strategic interests of the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, and the potential for differences between us. Particularly in circumstances where, if our CIA reports are correct, the Soviet Union sometime in the early 1980's will become an oil-importing nation rather than an oil-exporting nation, as is the case today. So that the scramble for raw materials, for energy, will be a factor of increasing importance, it seems to me, in the strategic equation.

That is why in my statement, Mr. Congressman, I really began from the beginning, so to speak. The beginning, as far as I am concerned, is the so-called rough equilibrium which the Soviet Union has achieved with the United States. I think it is necessary for Europe to strengthen its tactical nuclear capacity in light of the SS-20 of the Soviet Union: and I think, as I have indicated we, the Americans, need something more than merely the 82d Airborne Division in the Carolinas as a conventional option—not that I want to use it. Not that I am promoting “gunboat” diplomacy, but because we face an increasing challenge from the Soviet Union.

Mr. FITHIAN. I will come back to Ambassador Young in just a moment, but I want to clearly delineate my position on this. I have some problem with the all-encompassing nature of what I take to be your advice to the committee, to use our influence to get this country involved almost anywhere where there is a challenge in Africa, militarily. I have great difficulty subscribing to that. As a matter of fact, I think Ambassador Young's argument that in the long haul in a country's development it is more important to help them develop economically than it is perhaps to rush in with the military power to offset Russian influence in that particular country.

Mr. SISCO. Congressman, if I could interrupt you. Frankly, you seem to be reading more into what I have said than at least I intend to indicate. I am not suggesting here a policy of involving the United States—to use your words—“almost everywhere,” and I do not quarrel with the notion that our instruments of diplomacy, economic assistance, are primary in responding to the nationalist needs of the African countries. You and I do not have an iota of difference.

All I am trying to say, in very simple language, is that we have a new equation in Africa in the last 3 years. It is a new projection of power. I happen to believe that these small African States are dependent on external sources and external influences. I do not think we can disregard that.

Mr. FITHIAN. If I may interrupt. I was one who voted against your position in Angola. I for one distinguish—perhaps erroneously—between the geopolitical and economic influence of an area such as Angola, with that of an area adjacent to the Middle East, where you are talking about the crossroads of the world in oil, transportation, and so on.

Mr. SISCO. I do, too.

Mr. FITHIAN. So, I was trying to narrow my particular focus on what I perceive at least to be one of the areas that I have the greatest concern about.

Mr. SISCO. I agree with you, the Horn of Africa and South Yemen, from a strategic point of view to the United States, is much more important than Angola. I said in my statement I do not consider Angola a country or an area of vital interest. I do think that the Horn of Africa and the Straits of Hormog are very key from our point of view. So, I agree with you.

Mr. FITHIAN. Mr. Ambassador?

Mr. YOUNG. I make a distinction between the Horn of Africa and the Straits of Hormog, and the situation in Yemen; all of them are extremely difficult. But, we did not really have any difficulty when the Russians were in Somalia, though it was a terribly disturbing presence to us.

The Somalis are some of the shrewdest folks I have ever run across. They will use anybody to do what they want to do and they are not going to give it up. Now, the Russians and the Cubans went in and drove them out of Ogaden. I do not know how many Cubans you had there and I do not know what kind of money. We were using figures of close to \$1 billion that the Russians put into Ethiopia.

I contend they have hardly anything to show for it in Ogaden. I have not read the reports recently on Somali troops in Ogaden, but I would be willing to bet you that they are right back in Ogaden today where they were before the Cubans got there. The Western Somali Liberation Front and the Somali Government are so intertwined—in fact, in sitting down with Siad Barre and the people around him, half of the people in the room came from the Ogaden. They think of that as Somali territory.

Now, when you put it in the context of the Middle East and the oil supply, they are not basically that interested in that. They only want to use anybody to get what they want. Now, the Israelis had a relationship with Ethiopia for many, many years and may still, I am not sure. But I think that is a good case where caution on our part is proper. We did give technical assistance; we did give "nonlethal" military assistance to Somalia. We continue to give food aid to Ethiopia. I do not know how long it takes, but I think that without investing a great deal of American money, certainly nothing in the neighborhood of what the Russians invested, \$1 billion, I doubt that in the whole region we invested \$100 million in both Ethiopia and

Somalia combined in recent years. The Russians probably put something in the neighborhood of \$2 billion and a lot of troops in that region.

I think we found a way to use our—something—to protect our interest. Now, I must confess that when you cross the waters, my knowledge begins to run out. I am concerned about Yemen, but I am not sure that we know enough about Islamic society to know how to deal with that at this point. The group that is most militant and most effective in that entire region, though, happens to be the PLO. That has been one of the reasons for my concern and for my actions in the past. They are far more effective, and the Iranian Ambassador prior to the fall of the Shah always cautioned me that the Palestinian influence in Iran was something that he was concerned about.

I think that these indigenous political and cultural forces are at work there. I do think we have a vital interest at stake there. I think we have to be extremely sensitive in dealing with that whole problem.

Mr. FITHIAN. And is it then your general conclusion that the activities—not counting South Yemen, but in the Horn—are better understood simply in terms of their indigenous contours, rather than to see this as a prospective area of influence by the Soviet Union to use as a position, if you will, within the Middle Eastern context?

Mr. YOUNG. No. I do not disagree with Dr. Sisco on Russian aggressiveness and intentions in the region. I think that I would prefer that we find ways to increase our influence first through development assistance and through building stable nationalist nations, wherever possible. The Russians have usually been effective when those kinds of conditions have not been met, and where there has been a kind of degeneration in the social situation.

Mr. FITHIAN. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say in closing that as one Member of the House in listening to those two people I rather regret that the American Government lost the services of both of you and would hope that might be remedied down the way.

Mr. SISCO. Oh, you can never tell about the future.

Mrs. FENWICK. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SOLARZ. The gentlewoman from New Jersey.

Mrs. FENWICK. Could it not be said, we all agree that we should proceed on the basis of whatever aid we can, developmental, technological, and all that sort of thing, absolutely. But that we also must develop the capacity and the will not to use it, but to be seen to have it. Would you both agree with that?

Mr. SISCO. I would agree with that 100 percent, and you said it much better, certainly, than I have.

Mr. YOUNG. I would agree with what I know you mean. [Laughter.]

But I do not like to agree when people do that and then say, "OK, we ought to have an automatic 5-percent increase in the defense budget."

Mrs. FENWICK. I know, I understand. I am not great on the B-1 bomber myself.

Mr. SOLARZ. There are several questions I would like to ask both of the witnesses at this point. I think we have a tendency in this country to devalue somewhat the currency of the vocabulary in which

we describe our diplomacy by characterizing, for example, virtually any interest we have abroad as a "vital interest." Obviously, we have a variety of different interests, but it is also obvious that some are more important than others, and some are far more important than others.

In the Middle East we clearly have "vital interests" in terms of access to oil. There are few interests that are greater than that. We clearly have a "vital interest" in Western Europe, and the maintenance of the balance of power and avoidance of Soviet hegemony of the European Continent is a matter of great concern to our country.

Similarly we have, I think, "vital interests" in the Far East, particularly in terms of our relationship with Japan and China.

By comparison, since this is a hearing to deal with the whole question of American interests in Africa, how important do you believe our interests are in Africa? Clearly, we do have interests there and they are of some significance, but are they nearly as significant as our interests in these other parts of the world, and to the extent they are not, in what ways do you think they differ?

Mr. SISCO. In my judgment they are not as important as, for example, in the Middle East, in the area of the gulf, in the area of the Arabian Peninsula, just to give one example.

I do think that African policy has been a grandchild and, for all of the reasons which I think both Ambassador Young and I have given, politically, economically, and so on, there is more attention that has to be paid to Africa.

I do not believe that we have a "vital interest" in Africa, of the kind that compares with the Middle East. I consider these of a lesser magnitude, and I hope that I made that very clear in my written statement.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Ambassador?

Mr. YOUNG. Let me say that I think we have an equivalent interest, and by the turn of the century a greater interest.

Mr. SOLARZ. In Africa?

Mr. YOUNG. In Africa.

Mr. SOLARZ. Than?

Mr. YOUNG. But for the same reason. Right now I would say our oil imports, 40 percent of them are coming from Africa. That is essentially new oil in Africa. There are six American oil companies and one French company that are drilling for oil, just for the last 6 months, in Cameroon. Nigeria's oil is essentially new oil. Angola's oil, Gabon's oil, the oil on the West Coast of Africa from Angola on up to the Ivory Coast is probably in the same stage now that Middle East oil was in 25 years ago. Now, whether there is an equivalent development possibility continuing for the next 20 years is not yet clear. But every time they have looked for oil and needed it along that West African Coast, they have found it. Now, that is one interest.

The other interest, I think, that goes along with oil—even if our oil continues to come from the Middle East, primarily—the problem we have with the Middle East is that they have oil but no population. Africa has the population. As long as we are going to pay somebody for oil, we have to find somebody to sell some goods to. The development needs of, say, close to 200 million people along the West African

shoreline are going to be the market that will determine the economic destiny of a free world for the year 2000.

We watched Japan. In fact, the Germans told me about the Japanese sending a group of 125 people to live in Germany for about 6 years to study and analyze the German market, and decide what piece of it they are going to get their economy to share. Then, when they finally moved in, they moved in and took the piece of the German market that they had studied and anticipated.

The Japanese are doing that right now with Africa. The Lome convention is essentially a very significant humanitarian operation by the European Common Market. But basically they are cornering markets for the future. I think our country right now is being every bit as much challenged by our economic vulnerability in fact, much more by our economic vulnerability than by our military vulnerability.

The key to strengthening our economic security, I think, is the developing world. Africa, especially West Africa right now, and hopefully if we solve the situation in southern Africa, you create another southern Africa bloc which, with the economy of South Africa and Rhodesia functioning as part of a free world, would be a tremendous African market of another 50 million for goods and services from this country.

I think in order to be able to survive economically and pay for our own anticipated imports by the turn of the century you have to start doing the kind of infrastructure and basic economic development in those markets that we did not do, really, in the Middle East 25 and 30 years ago.

Mr. SOLARZ. I think it would probably be fair to say, Mr. Secretary, that you are rather concerned about the Cuban presence in Africa. You find the existence of somewhere between 30,000 and 40,000 Cuban troops on the continent a cause of concern and an objective threat to American interests in Africa.

I think it would probably be fair to say, Mr. Ambassador, that you view the presence of Cuban forces in Africa with much greater equanimity and that you have not—at least based on your public comments—felt that they constitute a particularly serious threat to American interests.

Mr. YOUNG. I think the Peace Corps can deal with the Cubans in Angola, I really do.

Mr. SOLARZ. I would like to ask you, Dr. Sisco, why you are concerned about the presence of those Cuban forces in Africa; and then you, Mr. Ambassador, why you are not concerned about their presence in Africa.

Mr. SISCO. Well, I think that perhaps in listening to Ambassador Young and listening to myself, as I indicated earlier, I think he probably has more confidence than I do that African nationalism in the present situation of increased projection of Soviet power can sustain what we both want—he and I—namely, African States that are truly independent and able to pursue their own course in their own way, as nonaligned.

I am convinced that there are a number of African States that are too weak and too dependent to decide in a conclusive sort of way their own ultimate leadership and where they will stand in the order of things in

Africa. And that in this new projection of power of the Soviet Union, military success does not assure political success for them any more than our assistance would assure, or has assured in the past, success for us.

I think that we have to be willing to use all of our instrumentalities to influence the shape of things in the future. I think this means all instruments. That is why I underscored, Mr. Chairman, the need, in my judgment, for basically an attitudinal change. One of the things that concerns me is that, even though I said at the outset that there are three basic approaches, really two basic approaches, and the argument of policymakers continues to boil down to "either-or," all I am trying to suggest is, it cannot be "either-or."

In the first instance, I agree with Ambassador Young; you have to address yourself to African nationalism; to problems of race; to the indigenous factors that make for this dependency and relative instability in Africa. There is no quarrel in this regard. You can send 1,000 gunboats, and it is not going to help directly to resolve these internal issues on the African Continent or anywhere else.

As you put it very fairly, I think perhaps the Ambassador is more relaxed about the activities of the Soviets and the Cubans. They are there for one reason, namely, to shape the future, what that future order will be in Africa. I want to be sure that the United States plays a comparable role, and therefore I would agree with increasing the magnitude of importance and attention to our African policy.

Mr. SOLARZ. I would like to follow up on your response for 1 second. To the extent that the Cuban troops in Africa appear—in the case of Angola and Ethiopia, where the bulk of them are—to be there in response to the invitation and with the approval of sovereign governments, in what sense do they constitute a threat to American interests in a way that the presence of American forces in many countries around the world, at the request and with the approval of sovereign governments, does not constitute a threat to the Soviet Union?

Mr. SISCO. First, let me say that in those two particular instances, I think the situation has developed in such a way that I would not want to be misunderstood, suggesting that we should try at this particular juncture in either of these two situations a policy of military assistance. I think the matter has gone beyond that.

I am basically concerned over the long-range orientation of governments. I do not happen to believe that a Soviet-Cuban presence in a number of these places allows for the kind of freedom of choice which I think, hopefully, the Africans will achieve in time.

Mr. SOLARZ. For the governments in which these troops are located, or for neighboring governments as well?

Mr. SISCO. Well, it depends again on what countries you are talking about. I was really, in this instance, in response to your question, referring to the governments we were talking about.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Ambassador?

Mr. YOUNG. We have more involved in Africa than I think we understand sometimes. I said flippantly that the Peace Corps could take care of the Cubans. What I meant by that, essentially, is that the Peace Corps could do everything the Cubans are doing, nonmilitarily.

If the Peace Corps were there doing it, a couple of things would happen. One is, if you could ever replace the Cubans, you could force some kind of reconciliation with the forces to the south, and there could be a nonmilitary solution to that continued conflict, which I think is likely anyway as soon as we get a settlement in Namibia.

We have to remember that we have Gulf Oil in Angola; we have Union Carbide in Angola; we have Boeing in Angola, and we probably have, to my knowledge, Eximbank involved to the tune of several hundred million dollars.

Now, because Angola's future depends on trade, that trade is inevitably going to be directed to the West, simply because the Russians are not yet buying anything that is produced in Africa. So, that gives us, in addition to our governmental resources, it gives us the tremendous resources of the private sector, that are terribly influential. One bank in New York City has more money invested in Africa than all the World Bank operations put together. That one bank does more consulting on a day-to-day basis with African Ministers of Finance and African heads of State than our State Department and the Russians.

Basically, there is a similarity of interests between Western economic interests and U.S. Government policy. The Russians have failed miserably in development, and it is because of that failure and our private-sector success. I would agree with Dr. Sisco that you just cannot rely on that. We have been very lucky being able to rely on that for so long; that there really needs to be more strategic thinking about our vital interests and how we deal with them. One word of caution on that, too. President Numayri in the Sudan said to us, "The Sudan is as big as the United States east of the Mississippi River and has 18 million people." So, he said, "We do not worry when anybody invades us. They can come into our country, they can go 2 or 3 days and we can watch them and decide what they are doing; and then we can decide how we are going to isolate them or get rid of them; and what we are going to do about them."

There is a completely different attitude toward the territorial imperative in Africa than there is in Europe. There is much more give and take around borders, and people are conditioned to look in terms of long-range influences.

I think that our Africa policy has to develop a geopolitical strategic approach which is in keeping with the African reality, and not import a European concept of territoriality to the African Continent where, you know, very little of the real estate is worth fighting over.

Mr. SOLARZ. I would like to ask both of you, briefly, what you think we should do if it turns out that South Africa rejects the latest proposals put forward by the Secretary General with respect to Namibia. As you know, until recently there were two fundamental objections that South Africa had to the United Nations proposal: One had to do with the Secretary General's recommendation for the establishment of bases by SWAPO in Namibia; the other had to do with the reluctance of Angola and Zambia to agree to United Nations monitoring of the SWAPO bases in their country. Now, SWAPO has agreed to forego any insistence on bases in Namibia and Angola and has proposed to establish a 50-kilometer-wide militarized zone on both sides of the border, monitored by the United Nations forces.

That would seem to many of us to be a very conciliatory and equitable proposal and one, I think, would be left with the conclusion that if South Africa rejected this proposal, it really did not want an international solution to the Namibian problem, but was intent on proceeding with an internal settlement.

In the event they do reject this proposal, what do you think we should do, particularly in terms of whether, at that point, we should be prepared to support some form of mandatory sanctions against South Africa?

Mr. YOUNG. Well, let me say that I think if they have not accepted that proposal and do not accept that proposal, we will be presented with a mandatory sanction resolution at the United Nations. I think we ought to be very careful about the kind of mandatory sanction resolution we accept. I still uphold the notion that generalized sanctions with no time limits are apt to be ineffective and very difficult to enforce. But, if there is a sanction resolution which is specifically related to peace in Namibia and to acceptance of this report, and if there can be an enforceable sanction with a definite time limit, one preferably that would be ended once the South African Government accepted the report and allowed the United Nations to resume its responsibilities, I would hope that the United States would support it.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you have any specific forms of sanctions in mind?

Mr. YOUNG. Well, I think there has been a committee of five Western members of the Security Council that has been working on sanctions resolutions now for about 2 years, and their governments and legal departments have done a lot of work on this. I think they will know what they are willing to work with or not. I just hope there is a close enough relationship with the African group so that they can work out something that is both effective and agreeable.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Secretary, under such circumstances, what do you think we should do?

Mr. SISCO. Quite frankly, Mr. Chairman, I do not know what my answer would be under those circumstances because, one, I think I would want to really look at the details in a very, very concrete way as to the proposal rejected. I, for one, have always thought that we should expect more from South Africa vis-a-vis the Namibia question; that it is less delicate in many ways, from their point of view, than the problems that have given rise vis-a-vis South Africa in relationship to the Rhodesian question.

There is no doubt that we have gone through a history of both the carrot and the stick with South Africa. I have never personally been reluctant to use either one, depending on what the circumstances are, but offhand, I would not want to say explicitly at this point, until I knew what we are addressing.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Secretary, I agreed with much of what you had to say today, but I was somewhat troubled by the argument you put forward in favor of our supplying arms to Morocco for use in the Sahara. I happen to think this is a very close question, and there are very good arguments that can be adduced on both sides of the issue. But it did not seem to me that the particular justification that you offered for providing arms to Morocco, namely, that the Polisario was

receiving assistance from the Soviet Union via Algeria, was a particularly persuasive one.

Let me tell you why, and I would appreciate your response. I do not think it is fair to say that we should arm Morocco for its war in the Sahara because Algeria is giving Soviet arms to the Polisario, any more than it would be fair to say we should give American arms to the Polisario because Egypt is giving Soviet arms to Morocco.

I was in the Magreb recently, and while it is quite true that Algeria is giving Soviet arms to the Polisario, the truth of the matter is that the Soviet Union itself is not directly giving arms to the Polisario. The Polisario leaders with whom I met, if anything, rather resented the fact that they were one of the few liberation movements in the world which has not received any support, militarily or diplomatically, from the Soviet Union. While there is no doubt that Algeria, in a number of instances, has taken positions supportive of the Soviet Union, it is also clear that there are many areas in which Algeria has taken positions that are much more in conformity with our interests than with the interests of the Soviet Union. For example, they vigorously opposed the efforts of Cuba at the conference in Havana to make the nonaligned movement a Soviet stalking horse. They oppose the Cuban intervention in Ethiopia. They have worked for reconciliation between North Yemen and South Yemen.

Whatever else one might want to say about Algeria, it seems to me fairly clear that it is not a Soviet satellite. So, in that sense, I do not see how the mere fact that Algeria, having purchased arms from the Soviet Union, is giving arms to the Polisario without, presumptively, either Soviet encouragement or approval, but rather because Algeria genuinely identifies—rightly or wrongly—with the Polisario as an indigenous liberation movement which has objectives which it feels are compatible with its own national purposes, why that constitutes a justification for us to help Morocco because we have to counter Soviet influence in the Magreb.

As I see it, the Russians really have not been involved in this one.

Mr. SISCO. Well, obviously, in a statement of the kind that I have indicated and written, I was trying to use this as an illustration within the context of Soviet activities within Africa. My concern is, an asymmetry is developing in that situation because I think my objective would be the same as yours; namely, let us hope that this can be moved toward a peaceful accommodation and a peaceful resolution. My concern is that we would not be contributing toward a peaceful resolution of that particular issue if we allow this asymmetry to continue to develop in this serious way.

Mr. SOLARZ. I suppose my point, Mr. Secretary, is that the asymmetry does not exist in the terms in which you describe it, because I do not see how the provision of arms to the Polisario by Algeria means, or represents, a Soviet involvement in the conflict. If it did, there might be justification for your argument. If in fact we could establish, (a) that the Soviet Union is directly giving arms to the Polisario; or (b) that the Soviet Union has given arms to Algeria expressly for the purpose of giving them to the Polisario; or (c) that the Soviet Union has encouraged Algeria to help the Polisario, I think your conclusion might follow from your premise.

Mr. SISCO. I am not sure that you can say what you just said with that much assuredness, Mr. Chairman. I just do not really accept the view that the Soviets are in this thing with as clean hands as you have indicated. So, I think there is a difference of judgment.

Mr. SOLARZ. Are you sure that they are not?

Mr. SISCO. Well, I am certainly as sure as I think you can be insofar as the opposite point of view in that regard.

Mr. SOLARZ. Just one or two more questions. Both of you have dealt extensively with international organizations, you, Mr. Secretary, as the Assistant Secretary for IO; Ambassador Young, obviously, as our representative at the United Nations.

How important would you say Africa is in the context of the United Nations and other international organizations?

Mr. YOUNG. The Africa group now, in the United Nations, basically runs the United Nations if you are not careful. There is an African president of the Security Council, and I think we are scheduled to have possibly an African successor to Kurt Waldheim when he steps down. So, I think for the next decade at least you can be assured that there will be a tremendous amount, an increasing African influence in all of the international organizations. In most of those international organizations the African group has been very cooperative with us, especially in regard to Middle East items. They were very helpful in the World Health Organization and in terms of resisting attempts of the Arab group to bring reprisals against both Egypt and Israel.

My experience was that whenever we go to the Africans in advance of their decisionmaking process, which starts quite early, and explain to them our position and the terms on which we can cooperate with them, they will usually be willing to work with us. When we have had trouble with the African group was when we did not let them know what our position was until after they had formed their position. It is very difficult for them to change positions.

Mr. SISCO. I would agree with Ambassador Young insofar as the increasing influence of Africa at the United Nations and in the United Nations system in the sense of being able to achieve concrete results by their votes. After all, they are quite numerous; the organization has changed from its original membership of 51 to 88 and now 150-plus.

One of the concerns that I have is the relative loss of support for the United Nations in our country. One of the reasons is that power and responsibility in the organization has become skewed. Africa's real strength in the world order will really depend on the capacity that they can develop in making a reality of their political and economic independence. As I say, I hope that we will play a major role in assisting them in making that a reality.

My concern is—and I have seen this over the years—initially, when the newly emerging countries got in, this was their badge of independence, an opportunity rightly to play a significant role on the international scene. I would hope that as this process matures, that we can find on the basis of broader consensus, more intensive consultation, as Ambassador Young has indicated; a way to operate the United Nations more on the basis of accommodation and consensus rather than steamroller votes that have lost the credibility of the General Assem-

bly and, frankly, are not implemented by the advanced countries who have the economic wherewithal to carry them out in fact.

Mr. SOLARZ. To what extent do both of you think West European interests in Africa differ from our own; and to the extent they do, what implications does that have for American policy toward Africa?

Mr. SISCO. The interest is complementary and competitive. Mrs. Fenwick referred earlier to the very fact that a change in government was brought about by one of our Western allies. If we had been involved in this way, the difference is that we are a superpower and it brings in the potential of conflict with the "other side." They—France—can get away with this and we cannot.

But I think myself that insofar as—again to come back—the United Nations is concerned, I would hope that over the next decade we can develop an organization which broadly reflects the views of the maximum number, including our own and the West. Our interests, as far as the Europeans are concerned, are common in the sense that we want stability and order in Africa, and certainly that is a common interest with our European allies.

Mr. SOLARZ. You both have been very patient in staying so long, and I appreciate it. I would like to ask two final questions, one for Ambassador Young and one for Secretary Sisco.

Mr. Ambassador, in the past, I gather, you have publicly opposed the withdrawal of American investment from South Africa, at least in any obligatory sense. What would your position now be with respect to a prohibition on new American investment in South Africa as a way of expressing American concern over the continuation of apartheid and the disenfranchisement of the black majority. Do you think that would constitute a productive and progressive approach to our relationship with South Africa, or not?

Mr. YOUNG. Well, right now I think it might be counterproductive. I think that is one of the kinds of things, though, that ought to be considered.

You see, I am still counting on South Africa coming through on Namibia. I think we ought to give them every possible chance. I think if they do not come through on Namibia, that signifies that they have adopted the kind of hard-line, go-it-alone policy which is sure to lead to trouble, and which probably would mean that investments would not be safe there anyway.

Mr. SOLARZ. So, under those circumstances, I gather, you would probably be sympathetic toward such legislation?

Mr. YOUNG. Down the road, yes. But right now I would hold off.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Secretary, one of the central thrusts of your testimony and your analysis of our interest in Africa is the fragility, as you see it, of many of these new nation states on the continent that lack the internal resources and strength to resist a new form of imperialism—in the form not of Western domination, but of Soviet and Cuban forces. And you find that due to their lack of historical experience with Soviet imperialism they are perhaps not as skeptical and as concerned about Soviet advances in Africa as you think they should be.

On other hand, it seems to me that if one looks at the history of the Soviet relationship with several important African countries over the

course of the last few decades, one notices that in Egypt, in the Sudan, in Somalia—I suppose now to a somewhat lesser extent in Guinea and some other countries as well—despite an original massive Soviet military, political and diplomatic presence, in every one of these instances the Russians have been given their walking papers. They overreached themselves.

I wonder to what extent those examples indicate that there is an underlying resiliency to African nationalism which we can in fact count on to assert itself over the long run in terms of depriving the Soviet Union—either directly or indirectly through its agents in Africa—of a permanent foothold on the continent.

Mr. SISCO. The trouble with trying to make the kind of points that I have been trying to make throughout this hearing is that people come away with the impression that I think the Soviets are 10 feet tall. I do not think they are, either in Africa or anywhere else, and that they have very definite limits and constraints with respect to their policy in Africa as well as a number of outlying areas.

I have tried to suggest that we ought to use all of our instrumentalities; and I have tried to emphasize that we are a lot better at this problem of contributing to African development and modernization, and helping them strengthen weak political institutions than are the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union, as you say and I agree, have not been successful colonizers. I am not suggesting otherwise by the emphasis that I have given to being responsive primarily to situations that have already been militarized by the Soviets in Africa. I do not want in any way to derogate from the importance of the United States using the capacities that it has, and capacities that I think put us in a much more favorable position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union than they are towards us.

So, I am not so sure that in actuality we are so far apart on this thing. Again, I want to reiterate, I do not think it is an “either-or” question. I think you have to consider matters on a case-by-case basis.

When I said, for example, that in my judgment our interests in Africa are of less of a magnitude than the gulf of the Middle East, well, I would make a very specific exception to a country such as Nigeria, for example. I think Nigeria is quite vital to our interests and will become increasingly so for the number of reasons which Ambassador Young has given.

That is why there are so many dangers to how these things are interpreted when you begin to talk about American policy toward an entire African Continent, even though I agree that there are certain common, basic principles, or a broad framework within which I hope American policy has been and can be pursued in the future.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, let me say in conclusion that at a time when there are many people in the country who continue to speculate about the validity of the congressional role in the formulation of our foreign policy, I think there are few examples, few more constructive examples, of the way in which Congress and the administration can work cooperatively in foreign policy than in the case of this subcommittee, which has historically, had a very productive relationship with the administration. In large measure, I think, that is due to the

role which the two of you have played in your capacity as important administration officials, helping to formulate our foreign policy toward Africa.

I think this hearing has really been tremendously helpful in setting forth some of the general concerns to guide us as we consider what to do about Africa. I know I deeply appreciate the fact that both of you were willing to come. You know by now, I consider you both not only my advisers, but my friends. I truly hope that we will be able to continue to stay in touch in the future so that when I have to make some thorny decisions I can still call each of you up on the phone and ask what I should do. So, let me thank you very much for coming. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:50 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

U.S. INTERESTS IN AFRICA

Communism In Africa—How Great Is Communist Influence?

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 18, 1979

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 10:15 a.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Stephen J. Solarz (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. SOLARZ. The hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa will come to order.

This morning the subcommittee will be holding the second in a series of hearings on U.S. interests in Africa. Our hearing today will focus upon the issue of outside Communist influence in Africa. In particular we will attempt to analyze the nature, the extent and the relative effectiveness of Cuban and Soviet military, political, and economic involvement on the African Continent.

At the present time there are a sizable number of Soviet, Cuban, East German, and Chinese citizens providing technical assistance to various African nations. There are also about 40,000 outside Communist military personnel in sub-Saharan Africa, 90 percent of whom are Cubans operating in Angola and Ethiopia.

We will be discussing today whether through these activities or the exporting of weapons outside Communist nations have established any lasting or significant gains on the African Continent. We will consider whether Communist involvement constitutes a threat and, if so, whether the threat is growing or diminishing to American interests in Africa. In measuring the success or failure of various Communist endeavors in Africa we will consider whether any pattern emerges detailing African resistance or receptivity to Communist activities on the continent.

In addition we will discuss the question of whether there is a unified, coherent Soviet-Cuban strategy for Africa. Our examination of the motivation, scope and future possibilities for Cuban military involvement is particularly timely given the widespread interest and in some cases alarm in our Nation concerning Cuban foreign policy, particularly in Africa.

Certainly our consideration of Soviet-Cuban interaction in Africa as we weigh the extent to which Cuban troops in Africa are Soviet surrogates or independent actors, or maybe some combination of both, will raise issues vital to the conduct of our foreign policy.

We are joined today by three very distinguished witnesses, all of whom are especially well qualified to help the subcommittee explore the contours and ramifications of outside Communist involvement in

Africa and the extent to which it poses a threat to American interests on the continent.

Our first witness today is the Honorable David Newsom, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. Mr. Newsom is also a former Ambassador to Libya, to Indonesia, where I first had the pleasure and privilege of meeting him several years ago, and to the Philippines, as well as a former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Mr. Newsom is particularly well versed in the complexities of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.

Following Mr. Newsom's testimony and some questions which the committee will put to him at that time we will then hear from our other witnesses. First, we will hear from Prof. Jorge Dominguez of Harvard, who is widely recognized for his expertise on Cuban foreign policy. Professor Dominguez has published many essays on that topic and has testified before the House on the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba and before the Senate on the Panama Canal treaties.

Our final witness will be Prof. Crawford Young of the University of Wisconsin. Professor Young, who is one of the country's leading experts on the politics and the economy of Zaire and who has shared his wisdom on that complex and controversial subject with the subcommittee on previous occasions, has also written a number of books and scholarly articles on African politics.

I want to personally thank each of you gentlemen for taking the time to share your views with us this morning.

Secretary Newsom?

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID D. NEWSOM, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

MR. NEWSOM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome this opportunity to appear before your subcommittee today. I appreciate the courtesy given my testimony. I do have to return to the Department but Deputy Assistant Secretary Bill Harrop will remain and be available for questions. I regret personally I cannot hear the statements of the other two witnesses but I look forward to reading them.

I will give a shortened version of the statement which has been submitted to the subcommittee.

I wish to commend this subcommittee and its chairman for the serious and positive interest in our relations with Africa which you have displayed. It is the continuation of a long tradition of which I was the beneficiary some years ago when I was Assistant Secretary.

You have asked me to speak today on the issue of communism in Africa. I thank you for the opportunity to put this current and significant subject in perspective.

Since few African governments describe their policies or ruling parties as Marxist-Leninist or scientific socialists and since they do not follow any rigid Soviet model when we speak of communism in Africa we are speaking almost exclusively of the role of the Soviet Union, Eastern European countries under Soviet domination, Cuba, and to a much lesser extent, China.

We believe U.S. interests are affected by the presence of substantial organized military forces from Cuba backed up by assistance from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and particularly by the extensive flow of weaponry from Communist countries to Africa.

At a time when African countries continue to struggle under the burden of enormous economic problems, the Communist presence and its accompanying military hardware represent an economic and financial burden that diverts resources from constructive development.

The obligations incurred for the Communist nations' support can and do include facilities and rights to the naval forces of the Soviet Union while states which have a substantial Communist military presence have sought to maintain their essential independence. We cannot discount the effect of the financial and political debts they must repay to the Communist world.

In addition, Communist states have not lent support to the fair and peaceful solutions to the tragic and complicated problems of southern Africa, problems to which the highest priority must be given both in global and in African terms.

Let me turn to discuss where Communist personnel and assistance are found in Africa, where their influence has been reduced and finally to the policies of the United States with respect to this presence.

It is my understanding that the focus of the subcommittee's attention is sub-Saharan Africa. I will therefore concentrate on that area.

By our best estimate Communist military personnel numbered approximately 41,000 in sub-Saharan Africa in 1978. They were primarily Cuban in Angola and Ethiopia.

Communist country civilian technical experts in Africa in 1978 were estimated at 37,000 of whom about 7,500 were Soviets or East Germans and most of the remainder were from Cuba.

Approximately 18,000 were Cubans and 11,000 Chinese.

The largest concentrations of Chinese technicians are in Somalia and Zambia; 3,000 in the former and 5,000 in the latter.

For the record we can provide the subcommittee with a complete breakdown of these estimates.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Secretary, I think it would be useful if we included that material in the record when you submit it.

[The material referred to follows:]

COMMUNIST ECONOMIC TECHNICIANS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA—1978¹

Country	Totals	U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe ²	Cuba	China
Angola.....	9,910	1,400	8,500	10
Ethiopia.....	1,400	650	500	250
Gabon.....	75	10		65
Gambia.....	75			75
Ghana.....	175	95		80
Guinea.....	1,035	700	35	300
Guinea-Bissau.....	405	265	85	55
Kenya.....	30	25		5
Liberia.....	210	10		200
Madagascar.....	200			200
Mali.....	1,025	475		550
Mauritius.....	15			15
Mozambique.....	1,270	750	400	120
Niger.....	160	10		150
Nigeria.....	1,750	1,625		125
Rwanda.....	60	10		50
Sao Tome and Principe.....	260	20	140	100
Senegal.....	500	100		400
Sierra Leone.....	310	10		300
Somalia.....	3,050	50		3,000
Sudan.....	755	125		650
Tanzania.....	1,365	165	200	1,000
Zambia.....	5,645	125	20	5,500
Others.....	7,525	1,020	1,090	5,415
Total.....	37,225	7,640	10,970	18,615

¹ Number of persons present for a period of 1 month or more during 1978. Rounded to the nearest 5.

² More than half are Soviets, nearly 1,000 are believed to be East Germans.

COMMUNIST MILITARY PERSONNEL IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA—1978¹

Country	Total	U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe ²	Cuba ³	China
Angola.....	20,300	1,300	19,000	-----
Equatorial Guinea.....	290	40	150	100
Ethiopia.....	17,900	1,400	16,500	-----
Guinea.....	330	100	200	30
Guinea-Bissau.....	205	65	140	-----
Mali.....	195	180	-----	15
Mozambique.....	1,130	230	800	100
Other.....	1,330	500	485	345
Total.....	41,680	3,815	37,275	590

¹ Number of persons present for a period of 1 mo or more during 1978. Rounded to the nearest 5.

² Mainly Soviets, Among Eastern Europeans, most are believed to be East Germans.

³ Includes troops.

Mr. NEWSOM. Let me make several observations about the Communist nations present.

With the exception of Ethiopia it will be noted that the largest concentration of Communist military personnel is in those former Portuguese territories where the successful liberation movements received strong preindependence Soviet support.

In Ethiopia a leftist revolution turned to the Soviets and to the Cubans for military and civilian help emphasizing the threat posed by Somali military activities in the Ogaden region.

Soviet and Cuban objectives in Africa are harmonious but not necessarily synonymous. Castro sees a special mission for Cuba in Africa. Soviet motivations are probably a mixture of geopolitical, strategic and ideological. To gain their objectives the Soviets rely heavily on military rather than economic assistance. They probably attach the greatest importance to their help to Ethiopia.

Despite the close ties there are undoubtedly problems in the Moscow-Addis Ababa relationship.

Communist nations continue to support liberation movements in southern Africa primarily through equipment and advisers. Soviets and Cubans provide support for combat operations against UNITA in Angola.

The publicity afforded Soviet activities in Africa gives the impression that Soviet policy in Africa is an across-the-board success. Such is not the case. The Soviets' position over the years has been reduced in Ghana and Guinea, The Sudan, Somalia, and Egypt. Even some of the states where the Soviets retain considerable influence have indicated a desire to strengthen their ties with the West.

Recently we have seen the ouster of two more Soviet clients, Idi Amin in Uganda and Macias in Equatorial Guinea. Both of these regimes, well recognized as two of the grossest violators of human rights, received considerable support from the Soviet Union and its allies including military hardware and training.

The supply of weapons and training by the Communist nations to these insecure and repressive regimes has helped sustain them and has contributed to some of the most grisly crimes against human dignity ever perpetrated on the African or any continent.

The committee has also expressed an interest in the question of Chinese influence and activities. Chinese activities are less significant

today than in the 1960's and reflect a policy aimed primarily at parrying Soviet advances. Their efforts have been largely in the propaganda field although they continue modest aid programs and military assistance.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Secretary, if you will forgive me for interrupting at this point, we have a vote in progress and those were the second bells. I would like to recess temporarily and I will be back in about 10 minutes, hopefully with some of my colleagues, to get the benefit of your testimony.

[The subcommittee recessed for a vote on the floor at 10:28 a.m.]

AFTER RECESS

Mr. SOLARZ. The hearing is called to order.

Secretary Newsom, please resume where you left off. May I ask whether you will be in a position to stay briefly after you finish your testimony to answer a few questions?

Mr. NEWSOM. Yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Harrop can fill in later on when we get the real debate going. Please proceed.

Mr. NEWSOM. Our own response to the Communist presence in Africa is based on the premise that African nations will fundamentally seek international alignments which further their own central priorities. These are an end to racial discrimination and white minority rule, the maintenance of territorial integrity, and progress in economic development.

Africa is a continent of moving not still pictures. Permanent characterizations are risky. As I have already demonstrated, a number of countries have found that in the long run their interests lie in rejecting an exclusive dependence on the Communist countries.

In support our own long-term interests on the continent of Africa and in recognition of the forces of African nationalism this administration has pursued and continues to pursue positive regional policies that respond to local realities and that avoid East-West confrontations.

We consider as essential elements of this approach the promotion of our economic, cultural, and social ties with the African continent; ties which address the genuine needs of African nations. Second, the peaceful resolution of conflicts and disputes in Africa as elsewhere. Third, the consideration of security requests from African nations with legitimate defense needs. Fourth, in Africa as elsewhere the fostering of respect for individual human rights and a continued respect for African nationalism.

Our reaction to the Communist presence in Africa therefore has been part of a broader African policy. Even in those countries where there is a substantial Communist presence we have sought to maintain a dialog. In this dialog it is clear that we will take no steps which would suggest an endorsement or acceptance of their willingness to accept and maintain Communist troop presence in their territories.

In such cases as Ethiopia our dialog is necessarily restricted by their failure to take actions required by our legislation.

We do not believe that the Soviet Union is well equipped to contribute importantly to the fundamental long-term goal of Africa

namely economic development. While we provide military equipment within limits we prefer to compete where we have a comparable advantage in the support for economic and social development. This approach I might add depends heavily upon the willingness of Congress to provide adequate foreign aid resources.

In addition, the states of sub-Saharan Africa still look to us as the primary peacemaker. They still find in us ideals they would like to apply to their own societies.

Our African policy is on a firm footing which in the long run will serve both our own interests and those of Africa. Our concern for peaceful resolution of conflicts or addressing the root causes of unrest and turmoil through trade, aid, and economic ties, our assistance for legitimate self defense needs and our reliance upon an open dialog based on mutual respect have, I believe, resulted in our being in a strong position, vis-a-vis the African continent, than the Soviets and other Communist countries with their Migs and Kalashnikov bearing troops.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be prepared to answer any questions.

[Mr. Newsom's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID D. NEWSOM, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

I welcome this opportunity to appear before this sub-committee today.

I wish, first, to commend this sub-committee and its chairman for the serious and positive interest in our relations with Africa which you have displayed. It is the continuation of a long tradition of which I was the beneficiary when I was Assistant Secretary for Africa some years ago.

You have asked me to testify today on the issue of communism in Africa. I thank you for the opportunity to put this current and significant subject in perspective.

When we speak of communism in Africa, we are speaking almost exclusively of the role of the Soviet Union, the Eastern European countries under Soviet domination, Cuba, and, to a much lesser extent, China.

A few African governments—Mozambique, Angola, Benin, Congo, Ethiopia—describe their policies or ruling parties as Marxist-Leninist or scientific socialist but their policies are mixed and do not follow any rigid Soviet model. Even in Ethiopia there is evidence of a resistance on the part of the leadership to the total adoption of the Marxist-Leninist pattern of internal policies and organization.

I do not wish to enter into the argument over whether the military and civilian personnel from the communist states are in Africa according to a long term design or simply through exploiting opportunities. It makes relatively little difference whether they created the opportunities or took advantage of them. The fact is that such personnel are in Africa and they are there in relatively large numbers. Whatever the origin of their presence, that presence represents a threat to our interests and, in our view, to the long term interests of the African states as well.

We believe these interests are affected particularly by the presence of substantial organized military forces, particularly from Cuba, and by the extensive flow of weaponry from communist countries to Africa.

In both global and African terms, the highest priority must be given to a peaceful resolution of the tragic and complicated problems of Southern Africa. The communist states have not lent support to fair and peaceful solutions. They have advocated military options rather than urging all parties to pay the political price of peaceful settlements.

At a time when the African countries continue to struggle under the burden of enormous economic problems, the communist presence and the military hardware represent an economic and financial burden that diverts resources from constructive development.

The obligations incurred for the communist nations' support can and do include facilities and rights to the naval forces of the Soviet Union—a clear and unwarranted extension of global competition to Africa.

While even those African states which have a substantial communist military presence have sought to maintain their essential independence, we cannot discount the effect of the financial and political debts they must repay to the communist world for this political and military support on their long term outlook and international orientation.

It is well to keep in mind, as we consider how to meet this problem, that the communist countries claim that:

Their personnel are there at the invitation of recognized sovereign African states:

They are there in support of liberation movements recognized by the Organization for African Unity;

They are there to protect weaker, black African states from the military power of South Africa, or from outside aggression.

Neither the states directly involved nor the Organization of African Unity challenge these assumptions—just as the OAU has never challenged the right of African states to call on the help of other non-African states meet problems of defense or internal security and development.

To say that there has been no formal challenge, however, does not mean that African states, including some of those in which communist block military personnel are present, are reconciled to these situations or wish to see them prolonged. African states have long made it clear that, while they recognize the right of governments to call on outside help, they would much prefer that African problems be resolved without outside intervention. The heritage of the colonial period has left a strong distaste for the influence and presence of non-African powers, whether communist or non-communist.

Whatever may be their private views, African states—including the more conservative ones—have publicly resisted actions and policies which appear to make African conflicts part of the larger East-West confrontation. Most have preferred that the Western response to the presence of communist personnel in Africa be through approaching the African problems which provided the original rationale rather than through global strategic moves.

Let me now turn to discuss where the communist personnel and assistance are found in Africa, where their influence has been reduced, and, finally, to the policies of the United States with respect to this presence.

It is my understanding that the focus of the committees' attention is on sub-Saharan Africa. I will, therefore, concentrate on that area. I would note that there are Soviet and other Eastern European and possibly Cuban military technicians in Algeria and Libya, but there are no organized communist troop units in this portion of Africa. There is some communist equipment provided by Algeria and possibly Libya to the Polisario in the Sahara.

Communist military personnel numbered, in 1978, by our best estimate, approximately 41,000 in sub-Saharan Africa. Of these, an estimated 3800 were from Eastern Europe, probably about half Soviets and the bulk of the remainder from East Germany. The largest concentrations were in Angola and Ethiopia, and the major groups were Cubans who numbered approximately 37,000, including 19,000 in Angola and 16,500 in Ethiopia. The next largest concentration, after these two countries, was in Mozambique, where there were an estimated 1130 personnel from all communist countries. Other countries where there were communist military personnel included Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Mali. Some of the Soviet, East German and Cuban personnel in Zambia are assigned to help the Zimbabwe African People's Union, Joshua Nkomo's Rhodesian liberation movement.

While there has been some reduction in personnel in Equatorial Guinea and Guinea since these estimates, and probably some reduction in Cuban forces in Ethiopia, we believe that the overall total on the continent is substantially the same now.

Communist country technical experts in Africa in 1978 were estimated at 37,000, of whom about 7500 were Soviets or East Germans. Approximately 18,000 were Cubans and 11,000, Chinese. They were present in at least twenty-three countries; the largest concentration was in Angola where about 10,000 were present, mostly Cubans. The same countries which had concentrations of military personnel also had civilian technicians. The only other important concentration of Soviet civilian technicians is in Nigeria where there are about 1600.

The largest concentrations of Chinese technicians are in Somalia and Zambia, 3000 in the former, 5000 in the latter.

I can provide the sub-committee, for the record, a complete breakdown of these estimates.

It will be noted that, with the exception of Ethiopia, the largest concentration of communist military personnel is in those former Portuguese territories where the successful liberation movements receive strong pre-independence Soviet support. With the departure of the Portuguese, these leaders, particularly in Angola, turned to the Soviets and their Cuban and East German allies for the military help required to secure power and for the civilian help required to replace the Portuguese.

In Ethiopia, a leftist revolution turned to the Soviets and the Cubans for military and civilian help, emphasizing to Africa and to the world, as a rationale for their intervention, the threat posed by the Somali military activities in the Ogaden region.

As I have noted, the bulk of the manpower has been supplied by Cuba. The Soviet Union has supplied the equipment and, undoubtedly, much of the financing. The East Germans supplement these contributions with technical skills and sophisticated equipment.

Soviet and Cuban objectives in Africa are harmonious, but not necessarily synonymous. Cuba sent technicians to Africa before the more dramatic cooperation with the Soviets which we have witnessed in the last few years. Castro, emphasizing the African element in the Cuban population, sees a special mission for Cuba in that continent.

Soviet motivations are probably a mixture of geopolitical, strategic and ideological. The Soviet approach continues to be one of seizing opportunities as they arise and of relying heavily on military rather than economic assistance to gain their objectives.

East Germany is a relative newcomer to the African scene. Until 1973, its actions in Africa were predominantly aimed at gaining international legitimacy and diplomatic recognition. Once this was achieved, its African priorities became more focused on support for Soviet aims, spreading of Marxist-Leninist ideology, securing markets and long term supplies of materials and competing against the Federal Republic.

The Soviets probably attach the greatest importance to their help to Ethiopia. They continue to supply arms, training, construction services and advice to the Ethiopian forces. Cuban combat forces continue to help protect Ethiopian frontiers in the Ogaden and probably provide some logistical and other support for the Ethiopian campaigns in Eritrea.

Despite the close ties there are undoubtedly problems in the Moscow-Addis Ababa relationship. The Ethiopian inability to win a military success this past summer in their campaign against the Eritreans, despite massive Soviet support, was a disappointment to both and did nothing to promote mutual confidence in either's ability to achieve a military solution. Soviet economic assistance to the Mengistu regime has been relatively modest. Ethiopian failure to move quickly in the formation of a civilian Marxist party to replace the military regime must give pause to the more dogmatic Marxist-Leninists who support the Ethiopian revolution.

In Angola, the Soviets and Cubans continue to provide support for combat operations against the rival liberation movement of UNITA. The East Germans also provide advisors, though they have vehemently denied reports that they have provided troops as well. So, too, do Soviet and Cuban personnel provide significant support to the Mozambican military. So far these have been advisors rather than combatants. In the Rhodesian conflict, the Soviets, along with the East Germans, continue to provide military assistance almost exclusively to ZAPU rather than the Patriotic Front as a whole. The Cubans, on the other hand, along with the Ethiopians, are providing training to both ZAPU and ZANU.

Through their activities in Africa, the Soviets have had fairly regular naval access to repair facilities in Ethiopia and Angola. Soviet ships also call in Mozambique and a small West African patrol "shows the flag" using ports such as Conakry and Cotonou, as well as Luanda. A number of other countries have resisted Soviet attempts for naval access.

The publicity afforded Soviet activities in Africa and the fact that Moscow is the dominant foreign influence in a few areas, like Ethiopia, gives the impression that Soviet policy in Africa is an across-the-board success. Such is not the case.

The Soviet's position over the years has been reduced in places like Ghana, Guinea, the Sudan, Somalia and Egypt. And even some of the states where the

Soviets retain considerable influence have indicated a desire to strengthen ties with the West.

Recently we have seen the ouster of two more Soviet clients—Idi Amin in Uganda and Macias in Equatorial Guinea. Both of those regimes, well recognized as two of the grossest violators of human rights, received considerable support from the Soviet Union and its allies, including military hardware and training. The indiscriminate supply of weapons and training by the communist nations to insecure and repressive regimes has sustained them and contributed to some of the most grisly crimes against human dignity ever perpetrated on the African or any continent.

The committee has also expressed an interest in the question of Chinese influence and activities. I have referred above to Chinese technicians in Zambia and Somalia. There are approximately 500 Chinese military technicians scattered through the continent and in excess of 10,000 civilian technicians. Despite this presence and their major effort in Africa in the 1960's, they are of relatively minor significance today. Chinese policy is aimed primarily at parrying the Soviet advances. Their efforts have been largely in the propaganda field. The Chinese continue modest aid programs and their military assistance has been limited to supplying light weapons and some training. They are one of the primary suppliers to Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe Africa National Union.

Our own response to the communist presence in Africa is based on the premise that African nations will fundamentally seek international alignments which will further Africa's own central priorities. These priorities are:

Self-determination: An end to racial discrimination and white minority rule;
The maintenance of territorial integrity;
Progress in economic development.

A minority of the countries in Africa have felt that they have found support for these priorities in close ties with the communist countries. The reasons are partly historic, stemming from our own past policies with respect to the Portuguese territories and our identification with the former colonial powers and with South Africa.

But Africa is a continent of moving, not still, pictures. Permanent characterizations are risky. As I have already demonstrated, a number of countries have found that, in the long run, their interests lie in rejecting an exclusive dependence on the communist countries. Nationalism is a powerful force in Africa, and no African leaders or peoples wish to come under the lasting influence of any foreign power.

I should note that the African states have been particularly helpful at the United Nations and in UN agencies, especially with regard to attempts by certain states to take action against their fellow OAU member Egypt for its role in the Middle East peace process.

In support of our own long-term interests on the continent of Africa and in recognition of the forces of African nationalism, this Administration has pursued and continues to pursue positive regional policies that respond to local realities and that avoid East-West confrontations. We consider as essential elements of this approach:

First, promotion of our economic, cultural and social ties with the African continent. We continue to build on the strength of relationships which have grown over the years, addressing through trade, investment and technical assistance the genuine needs of African nations and, in so doing, promoting both our own well-being and strengthening the independence of Africa states. Such a long-term commitment, we believe, is perhaps the strongest approach to the deterrent of communist influence;

Second, we shall continue to seek the peaceful resolution of conflicts and disputes in Africa as elsewhere, through strengthening the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity. A resort to violence to solve disputes almost inevitably entails human suffering and a diversion of resources away from the development process. We recognize full well that peace is an indispensable prerequisite for development in its fullest sense. Conversely, continued turmoil, conflict and a resort to arms provide opportunities for communist exploitation. This Administration has, therefore, placed a high priority on the search for peaceful conflict resolution in Africa and, Mr. Chairman, we shall continue to do so.

Third, we shall continue to consider security requests from African nations with legitimate defense needs. While recognizing that we cannot and should not downplay African security concerns, any increase in our military assistance

will be prudent. We have not attempted to compete with communist nations in an indiscriminate arms race in Africa, for to do so would have been contrary to our own arms control restraints and counterproductive with respect to our other policy objectives.

Fourth, in Africa as elsewhere, this Administration has sought to foster respect for individual human rights. We have pursued this objective both because it is inherently right to do so and because we believe it to be a vital component in the peaceful development of the continent.

And fifth, a continued respect for African nationalism which we believe to be a positive force in Africa's political, social, economic and cultural development and in sustaining the ability of African nations to retain and strengthen their independence from outside powers.

Our reaction to the communist presence, therefore, has been a part of a broader African policy designed to support

The resolution of those African problems which threaten the peace and provide the opportunities for communist exploitation;

The constructive participation of African nations in international fora;

The peaceful economic development of these nations.

To this end we have sought to maintain a dialogue, even with those countries where there is a substantial communist presence. In most instances, this is reciprocated by the African nations. Angola, for example, has cooperated closely with the UN plans for settlement in Namibia, as Mozambique has cooperated with us in the search for peace in Rhodesia.

In this dialogue, it is clear that we will take no steps which would suggest an endorsement or acceptance of their willingness to accept and maintain communist troop presences in their territories. In such cases as Ethiopia, too, our dialogue is necessarily restricted by their failure to take actions required by our legislation.

The Soviet Union is not well equipped to contribute importantly to economic development, the fundamental long term goal of Africa. The Soviets do not provide a market for most African goods; they are not part of the world economic system, not members of the IMF; they have no multilateral companies to spread technology; their ruble is not convertible. We prefer to compete not in the field of arms deliveries, where the Soviets are efficient and without scruples. While we provide military equipment within limits, we prefer to compete where we have comparative advantage, in the support for economic and social development.

This approach, I might add, depends heavily upon the willingness of Congress to provide adequate foreign aid resources.

The states of Sub-Saharan Africa still look to us as the primary peacemaker. They still find in us ideals they would like to apply to their societies. They still find in the Western nations their best hope in their quest for development. The West remains their main trading partners.

Our African policy is on a firm footing which in the long run will serve both our own interests and those of Africa. Rather than contributing to conflict, we are attempting to foster peaceful solutions. Rather than treating the symptoms of unrest and turmoil, we are attempting to deal with the root causes. We rely on our trade, aid and economic ties and on an open dialogue based on mutual respect. Our assistance is designed to meet the pressing needs of economic development and to help countries meet their legitimate self-defense needs.

On balance, I believe that these policies have resulted in our being in a stronger position vis-a-vis the African continent than the Soviets and other Communist states have achieved with their MIGs and Kalashnikov-bearing troops.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for what I think is really a rather thoughtful and balanced statement. I do have a number of questions I would like to ask.

On page 2 of your testimony you indicate that whatever the origin of the presence of Communist forces in Africa it represents a threat to our interest on the continent. I have taken the liberty of paraphrasing your testimony. I think I have done it accurately.

Given the fact that you subsequently went on to indicate that the Communist forces in Africa are there at the invitation of the sovereign

governments where they are located; and they are there in a number of instances to protect those countries against what those countries perceive as the threat of foreign aggression; and that they are also there, as you indicated, in conformity with at least some of the objectives of the OAU in connection with the liberation movements that are struggling for independence in southern Africa, and given further, the extent to which you indicated in your testimony there are a number of African countries which had a substantial Communist military presence in their countries in the past but who managed either to evict those troops or to free themselves of Communist influence or domination; and given, furthermore, as you indicated, there are today a number of countries in Africa with a Communist military presence that in a variety of ways nonetheless have cooperated with us in the effort to solve some problems in Africa; in what particular sense do you mean to suggest that the presence of these troops constitutes a threat to our interests?

Mr. NEWSOM. What I was seeking to say, Mr. Chairman, was the original request by these countries for troops were in the context of recognized African objectives either the preservation of territorial integrity or assistance in internal security in the case of Angola or assistance in defending against possible attacks from the south.

Once the forces are there we cannot escape the conclusion that they are also being used to support a continued political orientation and an internal political organization favorable to the Communist countries and unfavorable to us in the development of the national policies of these countries and the development of their trade patterns.

It is hard for us to escape the conclusion that the presence of these forces particularly in Angola is used to support the interests of one point of view or one approach to the problems of southern Africa and makes the general approach to a peaceful resolution of these problems more difficult.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Secretary, in what way do you think that the domestic or foreign policies of Angola or Ethiopia, which are the two countries that have the largest presence of Communist forces on the continent, would be likely to change if the Cuban troops in those countries were removed tomorrow?

Do you in fact anticipate that there would be any significant change in the domestic or foreign policies of either Government if the Cuban troops left?

Mr. NEWSOM. It is hard to see the constructive hand of either the Soviets or the Cubans influencing the Government of Angola or any other Governments in which they have a presence toward a constructive attitude toward the peace efforts.

What the African Governments are doing in a word is in spite of the presence of the Communist troops and probably it is not made any easier by their presence—

Mr. SOLARZ. I was under the impression, Mr. Secretary, that at least in the case of Angola, the Government of that nation has played a very constructive and conciliatory role in the search for a settlement in Namibia. Whether that was in spite of the presence of Cuban troops or because of them or whatever, the fact is they have been as cooperative as I rather we have asked them to be and as we could have expected them to be.

I am not sure in what sense the presence of Cuban troops in Angola has dissuaded or prevented the Angolan Government from cooperating not only with respect to the ongoing negotiations concerning Namibia but for that matter concerning their relationship with Zaire. After Shaba II, Neto and Mobutu did agree to tranquilize the border and to set in motion a kind of central African détente and yet all these Cuban troops were there.

If the Cubans have a stake in turmoil and conflict and they are in a position to assert a baneful influence on Angola, presumably the Angolans would not have cooperated with the Western Five in Namibia and would never have agreed to the arrangement which they entered into with Zaire. Nonetheless they did.

I come back to the question, in what sense has the presence of Cuban forces in Angola militated against a constructive diplomacy on the part of Angola with respect to these problems?

Mr. NEWSOM. The present leadership in Angola has pursued a constructive policy but it is hard to see ultimately a solution to the problems of that area without a solution also of Angola's internal problems.

The Cuban troops are there and understandably I suppose from their standpoint to support the Government that invited them in but not in our view as a more constructive presence would seek to do to try to work toward a national reconciliation or a national cohesion within Angola which would be essential to ultimate peace in that area.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do we know in fact whether the Cubans have advised the Angolans not to cooperate with the West on Namibia or with Zaire in terms of normalizing the relationship between those two countries?

Mr. NEWSOM. We have no evidence that they have been giving that kind of advice to Angola. The point I am making is neither do we have any evidence that they are making any constructive effort to resolve the internal problems which are also part of the picture.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Secretary, is it primarily the magnitude of the Cuban presence in Africa that concerns us or it is the mere fact of the Cuban military presence itself that primarily concerns us?

Mr. NEWSOM. I think it is both. I think it is hard for us to accept the necessity for so large a number of troops in these two countries and it is also frequently declared by the Africans to be contrary to their own desires to have an extended foreign troop presence. In cases of the presence of other foreign troops in postcolonial Africa they have gone in to meet a particular problem and then have left.

There seems to be no indication that is the intention of the Cubans.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Secretary, are we at all concerned that the Cuban forces in Angola and Ethiopia may be used to launch invasions of neighboring African countries?

Mr. NEWSOM. I think they represent a force that could perhaps be employed in military activities in other parts of southern Africa in a manner which we would consider contrary to our interests.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you think that the Cuban forces in Angola and Ethiopia would be likely to remain there if the indigenous conflicts in both of those countries could in one way or another be resolved?

If the Savimbi insurgency in Angola were somehow or other terminated politically or militarily, and if the Eritrean and Ogaden situations were satisfactorily resolved, do you think that the Angolan and Ethiopian Governments would continue to request the presence of

Cuban troops on their soil and do you think in fact the Cubans would want to remain?

Mr. NEWSOM. This is the stated position of both the Angolans and the Ethiopians. I am not sure we have any indication that either the Cubans or the Ethiopians and Angolans have looked ahead to see precisely under what conditions these troops would be withdrawn. We assume if these two Governments sought their withdrawal that they would be withdrawn. We have no indication that that has yet occurred or is likely to occur in the near future.

Mr. SOLARZ. In that sense I gather you would distinguish between the presence of Cuban troops in Angola and Ethiopia, and the presence in a variety of east European countries of Soviet troops that are there and are likely to remain there regardless of what the Governments want.

I gather you are saying if the Angolan or Ethiopian Governments ask the Cubans to leave it is our judgment that the Cubans would in fact go.

Mr. NEWSOM. That remains to be seen.

Mr. SOLARZ. Is it your judgment they probably would?

Mr. NEWSOM. I do not think we are in a position to reach that judgment.

Mr. SOLARZ. At our first hearing in this series former Secretary Sisco testified that in his judgment Polisario was receiving Soviet arms and support and therefore we ought to come to the assistance of Morocco to equalize the situation.

Does the administration have any information to the effect that the Polisario is receiving Soviet support in the form of arms or in any other way?

Mr. NEWSOM. Our information is they are receiving Soviet equipment but primarily through Algeria and Libya and they have some Cuban technicians and doctors but not a large number.

Mr. SOLARZ. Are they receiving those Soviet arms at the request or the direction of the Soviet Union?

Mr. NEWSOM. I would certainly assume the Soviets are supplying either Libya or Algeria with the full knowledge that some of the arms are being passed on to the Polisario.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mrs. Fenwick?

Mrs. FENWICK. I would like to ask how many Communist troops were in Egypt before they were ousted?

Mr. NEWSOM. My best recollection and I would have to leave open the possibility of correcting the record is there were no organized troop units but there were several thousand technicians. I can provide the exact data for the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

When President Sadat ordered the removal of all Soviet personnel and Soviet-controlled equipment from Egypt in July 1972, it is estimated that there were between 17,000 and 20,000 Soviet personnel in Egypt.

The Soviet military presence in Egypt peaked in late 1970. By the end of 1970, Soviet-manned aircraft and missile sites were the dominant factor in the air defense of Egyptian cities and towns and Egyptian forces in the field.

During 1971-1972 the Soviet role in Egyptian air defense was, to a limited degree, reduced. In 1971 Soviet personnel manning SAM-3 sites close to the Suez Canal front (some 3,000 to 4,000 men) were partially withdrawn, but new, mobile SAM-6's were introduced. By 1972, the number of combat aircraft actually man-

ned by Soviet personnel had fallen to approximately 60 MIG 21's and SU-11's and 5 or 6 MIG 23's.

During 1970-1972 the Soviet fleet had repair, refit and replenishment facilities complete with fuel and supply depots in both Alexandria and Port Said. Soviet naval vessels had unrestricted access to these parts and two or three Soviet vessels were usually present in the ports at any one time. Soviet naval reconnaissance aircraft based at the Cairo-West airfield covered much of the eastern Mediterranean. The Soviet Navy established naval air bases at Mersa Matruh, west of Alexandria, and Aswan in 1971.

Mrs. FENWICK. I would be grateful. That was also my impression that there were no organized troops.

I would like to ask your opinion of the presence of the Cuban troops in Angola that certainly there was some kind of a coup that threatened the Neto government and I think it was in 1976 and not from Savimbi but from indigenous local people in the area and the Cuban troops were very helpful in putting down that insurrection.

Is that accurate?

Mr. NEWSOM. That is our understanding.

Mrs. FENWICK. As long as Cuban troops remain there, there is not much point in Neto who apparently is presumed to be no longer with us but I mean that Government, if it is not popular at home entirely certainly as long as they have Cuban troops to protect them from the people around them they are not going to get into any kind of a reconciliation with Savimbi and the south.

I would think that would be one of the main blocks to peace in Angola, that is the presence of the Cuban troops from that point of view. Am I wrong?

Mr. NEWSOM. This was the point I was making earlier that while the Cubans may not stand in the way of Angola's participation in peaceful processes in other parts of southern Africa they certainly do not seem to be playing any role that encourages internal reconciliation or cohesion within Angola.

Mrs. FENWICK. As I understand it Zaire is having great difficulty getting any of their coal out through the Benguela to Lobito on account of the activity in the south. Is that correct?

Mr. NEWSOM. That is largely because of Savimbi activity.

Mrs. FENWICK. Where do they get on?

Mr. NEWSOM. Our best guest is from a variety of sources probably coming in part through South Africa.

Mrs. FENWICK. What make are they?

Mr. NEWSOM. I think our best guess is a variety of European arms.

Mrs. FENWICK. I have one or two more questions.

Mr. SOLARZ. While you are looking, Mrs. Fenwick, may I slip in one or two more questions?

Mrs. FENWICK. Certainly, if you will let me slip in.

Mr. SOLARZ. Absolutely.

Every member of the committee can always jump in whenever he or she wants. We run a very loose ship here.

Mr. Secretary, are we at all concerned about the presence of Cuban technicians in Africa? If the Cuban military troops were removed but the 17,000 Cuban technicians were still trotting around the continent doing whatever they do would that be a source of concern to us?

Mr. NEWSOM. The primary concern is over the troop presence. The next concern would be over the presence of military hardware which represents in our view in some countries an excessive expenditure and

obligation for military hardware diverting resources from economic development. We cannot quarrel with the presence of technicians from Eastern Europe and Cuba who are there for constructive developmental reasons.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you think that the Cuban troops are there primarily because Castro wanted to send them there for his own purposes or because he was directed to send them there by the Soviet Union?

Mr. NEWSOM. We feel it was a combination of interests. Castro was attracted by the idea of playing this kind of role in Africa. The Soviets were more than willing to supply the logistics and equipment that made it possible.

Mr. SOLARZ. Would Castro have sent the troops there if he did not want to?

Mr. NEWSOM. We have no indication in recent years of Castro refusing something which the Soviets might have wanted him to do nor do we have an indication to the contrary. The interests of the two countries seem to be sufficiently parallel that that kind of problem does not arise.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mrs. Fenwick?

Mrs. FENWICK. What is happening in Eritrea? Apparently the Cubans are unwilling to fight against the Eritreans because of their old friendliness with them. They confine their troops to the Somalia border but they do give aid and technicians and release the Ethiopian troops to fight the Eritreans.

How are the Eritreans, who presumably want self-determination rather like the Polisario, supplied?

Mr. NEWSOM. Our understanding is that the Cubans primarily have helped in Eritrea with logistical support and some maintenance facilities but they have not actually been doing the fighting in Eritrea. The Ethiopians now hold most of the major towns in Eritrea but the Eritreans are still conducting a major resistance.

Mrs. FENWICK. How?

Mr. NEWSOM. Through seaboard help probably coming down the Red Sea or across from the Arabian Peninsula or through the Sudan.

Mrs. FENWICK. I meant to say who is supplying them?

Mr. NEWSOM. Probably Syria and Iraq are the primary suppliers to the Eritrean liberation movements.

Mrs. FENWICK. Because Eritrea was part of Mussolini's Ethiopia was it not?

Mr. NEWSOM. Yes, but it is half Muslim and half Christian.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Secretary, I have two final questions, unless Mrs. Fenwick has further questions, before asking our other witnesses to testify.

As I understand it there are today over 13,000 French troops in Africa. There are Belgian forces and British forces as well. Aside from the fact that obviously the French, the Belgians and the British are occasionally allied with us and the Cubans are not, do we make any distinction in terms of the concerns we have expressed about the presence of the Cuban forces in Africa that would not be applicable to other foreign forces in Africa as well? Would we say the fact that the others, even though they have intervened militarily as recently as a few weeks ago in the Central African Empire cum Republic and, prior to that, in a number of other instances including Chad and Zaire, are essentially sympathetic to our interests, while the Cubans are hostile, is the controlling factor here?

Or do we make other distinctions between the presence of these different forces in Africa as well?

Mr. NEWSOM. There are not, to my knowledge, any British forces any longer in Africa. The French forces are there in certain countries under postcolonial agreements. The Belgians have technician and training cadres in Zaire in a program very much in our interest because of the importance of that country.

I think two things can be said about the French forces that contrast them with the Cuban forces. One is, where the French have intervened, as in Chad, their intervention has, to a large extent, been to achieve a broader objective of the resolution of an internal problem. Second, the French troops and their actions are subject to the active scrutiny of the democratic society in France, while the Cuban troops are not.

Mr. SOLARZ. That is an interesting distinction.

Mr. Secretary, you indicated in your testimony that the Communists have received a number of facilities and rights in Africa, presumably as a result of their military activities on the continent.

Can you indicate precisely what facilities and rights you are referring to, and do they include any bases?

Mr. NEWSOM. The nearest thing to a base are facilities that they have in Ethiopia at the present time, and they have certain port rights in other places in the continent. I will ask Mr. Harrop to submit that for the record.

[The following was subsequently supplied for the record:]

In Ethiopia, there is a floating Soviet dock at Dahlak for use by its vessels. In Angola, the Soviets usually maintain a naval ship in Luanda. After losing its rights in Conakry, the Soviets, from time to time, use air facilities in Angola to stage TU-95 naval surveillance flights over the South Atlantic.

Mr. SOLARZ. They have no formal military bases?

Mr. NEWSOM. They never call their facilities formal military bases.

Mr. SOLARZ. Are the facilities they have, in your judgment, a kind of quid pro quo for the military assistance they have provided?

Mr. NEWSOM. In Ethiopia we cannot help but feel that is part of the deal.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do those facilities constitute a threat to our own strategic or military interests in the region?

Mr. NEWSOM. If they enable our principal potential adversary to strengthen his military presence in an area of the world, that is important to us, I would say; yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Secretary, are you suggesting the use of military forces in foreign countries is acceptable to the extent that those forces are dispatched by countries which have periodic elections in which more than one party can participate, but they are by definition unacceptable if they come from countries in which elections are either infrequent, or meaningless when they do occur?

Mr. NEWSOM. I am suggesting the French presence in Africa is one that is under constant scrutiny and is one about which there is a considerable amount of debate in France itself. We do not have the impression that is true with Cuba.

Mrs. FENWICK. Is it not true that the presence of French troops, which seem to be so enthusiastically greeted by those nations who receive them, does allow those states to continue to vote with the OAU and to be nonaligned and independent and, in other words, they do not have to follow our line or any line we would like to see them follow?

The presence of Cuban troops does produce a different effect. They go there. They stay there. They keep the regime in power, whether or not the local people like it. The effect is completely to be subservient to Soviet desires and votes and everything else.

It produces a client state and not a nonaligned.

Mr. NEWSOM. I think, in fairness to the realities of Africa, that on African issues a country like Angola and, perhaps somewhat to a less extent Ethiopia, still seem to be relatively free to follow the OAU majority, and that is less so in international issues and international forums. There they tend quite slavishly to follow the Soviet line.

Mrs. FENWICK. I wonder if you could give us the countries to which you refer on page 12? I would be grateful. Certain countries are not named.

We have not attempted to compete with Communist nations in this current arms race. Have we any figures on that arms race? We know, according to some reports, that the Soviet arms aid to Ethiopia was in the nature of some \$2 billion, which seems incredibly high. Other reports say \$1 billion.

Do we have any idea of the arms race on our side and the total for the Communist?

Mr. NEWSOM. Here is a chart of the Soviet arms transfers to sub-Saharan Africa for 1973 to 1977, which totals \$1,355 million. I will submit this for the record.

[The following was subsequently provided for the record:]

Various countries played different roles in different bodies. This list is not meant to be all inclusive but rather as illustrative. It includes Nigeria, Tanzania, many of the francophone states such as Senegal, the Ivory Coast and Upper Volta.

Soviet arms transfers to sub-Saharan Africa—1973-77

Recipient:	Millions U.S. dollars
Angola -----	\$340
Benin -----	10
Chad -----	5
Congo -----	30
Equatorial Guinea -----	5
Ethiopia -----	300
Guinea -----	40
Guinea-Bissau -----	10
Madagascar -----	5
Mali -----	50
Mozambique -----	40
Nigeria -----	70
Somalia -----	260
Sudan -----	20
Tanzania -----	70
Uganda -----	80
Zambia -----	20
Total -----	1,355

NOTE.—Country data are not yet available for 1978. Total Soviet arms transfers to sub-Saharan Africa in 1978 are estimated at \$1,200 million, a record high. A substantial proportion of 1978 transfers went to Ethiopia.

Mr. SOLARZ. For the record, if you could include a comparable chart indicating our own transfers, and if you could bring both of those as up to date as possible, we would appreciate it.

[The following was subsequently submitted for the record:]

COMMERCIAL EXPORTS LICENSED UNDER ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT
[Dollars in thousands]

63

	Fiscal year—									
	Data not available prior to fiscal year 1971									
	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976*	1977	1978 pre- liminary	1971-78	
Africa.....	3,899	4,747	1,382	5,604	2,545	30,357	19,785	14,019	82,338	
Angola.....	7	7	1	3	6		22		45	
Benin.....									(*)	
Botswana.....	47	35	11	5	10	63	2	25	198	
Burundi.....		1								
Cameroon.....	3	14	3		6	1,063	7,732	2,838	1	
Central African Empire.....	2	2	54						11,660	
Chad.....									57	
Djibouti.....	3	1	2	3	2		15		16	
Equatorial Guinea.....									11	
Ethiopia.....	105	103	107	46	50	34	1,074		(*)	
Gabon.....		(*)	1	2		22	178		1,520	
Gambia.....				263				1	204	
Ghana.....	20	1	12	1	23	1	283	39	264	
Guinea.....								2	379	
Ivory Coast.....	1			252				2	2	
Kenya.....	1,329	1,302	86	1,986	860	50	227	10	263	
Lesotho.....								284	6,124	
Liberia.....	2	55	251	1	2	6	1	1	1	
Madagascar.....							92	23	3	
Malawi.....	5	5			213		66	1	431	
Mali.....									280	
Mauritania.....				1	1	3			10	
Mauritius.....									5	
Mozambique.....	5	6	3	7	8	28	98		100	
Niger.....	72	38	100	111	43	84	38	10	105	
Nigeria.....									448	
Reunion (French).....	21	303	693	2,155	427	23,532	1,614	4,421	125	
Rwanda.....	(*)			1					33,166	
Senegal.....									1	
Seychelles.....			1	2	19	2	197	45	(*)	
Sierra Leone.....	26			2	2	3			267	
Somalia.....				2	2			1	31	
South Africa.....									4	
St. Helena (United Kingdom).....	2,120	437	3	41	807	4,825	5,702	4,670	(*)	
Sudan.....									18,606	
Swaziland.....									(*)	
Tanzania.....	76	31				14	89		103	
Togo.....	45	219	31	227	36	77	351	4	113	
Uganda.....								423	1,409	
Upper Volta.....	5	34	6	275		109			109	
Zaire.....						144			464	
Zambia.....	3	2,141	13	205			54		54	
	3	12	2	15	29	173	1,733	937	5,205	
						124	216	156	556	

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. We appreciate your testimony.

Our next witness will be Professor Dominguez.

Professor, before you begin, let me say I am serving on the Conference Committee on the Budget, and a critical juncture has arisen in our consideration of that legislation. The chairman of the committee has asked me to come over to offer my judgment on the latest pernicious proposal submitted to us by the Senate.

With your permission, I would temporarily like to turn the Chair over to Mrs. Fenwick. This is from a political and parliamentary point of view, unprecedented. We never let Republicans chair these proceedings, but in the case of Mrs. Fenwick, we will make an exception. She is such an outstanding member of the committee and the Congress and such a close personal friend that I will waive the traditional consideration.

I want you to know that I hope to be back by the time both of you finish delivering your formal testimony. I have had a chance to look at it already. You can expect a vigorous interrogation when I return.

Professor, please proceed.

STATEMENT OF JORGE I. DOMINGUEZ, PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mrs. Fenwick.

I am delighted to be here to present testimony. I will try to abbreviate my remarks that I have submitted for the record.

The Cuban Government has had an active foreign policy toward Africa since the early 1960's. That was part of its efforts to counter the policies of the U.S. Government to isolate Cuba throughout the world.

Cuba's early and activist African policy was also derived from the ideological commitments of the revolutionary leadership. They believed then, and do still today, that it is the duty of revolutionaries to assist their comrades whenever that is feasible.

Strategy and belief, therefore, are the long-term underpinnings of Cuba's African policies. The scale, the forms, and the methods of these activities have, of course, changed, for Cuba is not, in my judgment, a newcomer to African affairs in the late 1970's nor can these African policies be attributed merely to the Soviet Union's undoubted influence in Cuba.

There have been several changes in Cuba's African policies from the 1960's to the 1970's within the context of a long term evolving Cuban concern with that continent. The first has been the broadening of objectives. The Cuban Government now perceives itself as having a good deal of international influence. Cuban diplomacy has come to have the characteristics of a major power, even if its base is a small country.

The Cuban Government rejects the view, implicit in many statements of U.S. Government officials, that small countries should have parochial foreign policies. The Cuban Government's view is that the U.S. Government has no more rights to be concerned with African affairs than does Cuba. From that perspective, one could say that the

Western Hemisphere now has two major powers, the United States and Cuba.

While the Cuban Government itself recognizes the incomparably greater power of the United States, it does not recognize any U.S. claims that Cuba should curtail its influence to its own boundaries alone. There is the intention and the behavior of a major power on very limited resources.

That view, to be sure, has implications not only for Cuban policies in Africa but, for that matter, everywhere.

A second change in Cuba's African policies has been far more sustained support for incumbent governments than for the oppositions to these governments. The most dramatic shift that you yourself, Mrs. Fenwick, noted was the change in the Horn of Africa. Cuba had supported Eritrean rebels before, and now it supports the Ethiopian Government.

In my view, Cuba has always had a preference for dealing with governments rather than with their oppositions. The main thing that has changed is, there are now more governments willing to deal with Cuba and seek its support.

A third change that is quite plain, obviously, is one of scale. The change of scale has been extraordinary. We now have, as Secretary Newsom indicated, between 35,000 and 40,000 Cuban combat forces in Africa. The change in scale has been made possible by several important changes in Cuba.

Cuba could not have sent such large forces overseas in the 1960's, but the internal military situation in Cuba has changed. The Cuban Government has defeated the counterrevolution there. The Cuban Government now has more personnel that it can send on technical assistance missions than it once had. The Cuban economy, which had collapsed twice during the 1960's, recovered in the early 1970's, while the performance of the Cuban economy has been much poorer in the late 1970's and, partly because of its Cuban activities in Africa, it is still not so bad as it once was, and it has made it easier for Cuba to be active overseas.

It is also worth remarking that Cuba had a baby boom in the early 1960's, and many of these people are prime military age. The result has been, Cuba has been able to commit overseas per capita military commitment that is about the same as the United States had at the peak of the Vietnam war.

A discussion of the Cuban presence in Africa needs to distinguish between the more common foreign aid programs and the two special cases of Angola and Ethiopia.

The general Cuban foreign aid programs emphasize providing personnel and not cash for civilian and military projects in fields such as health, education, construction, sports, fishing, military and police training, and even bodyguard services.

The Cuban Government has also been willing to provide training for political officers within the armed forces or in civilian settings.

One consequence of Cuba's reliance on personnel rather than cash or equipment has often been the need to form consortia with other Communist countries, whenever a foreign aid program becomes really quite large. The Soviet Union and East Germany have been its principal

partners in these endeavors. The Soviet Union and East Germans provide the hardware and the cash and the Cubans provide the training.

The Cuban Government has made it clear that it prefers these kinds of foreign aid programs to the larger and costlier commitments to Angola and to Ethiopia, although it has also made clear that these commitments remain quite firm.

The Cuban design has been to reduce the military combat component of the Cuban presence in Angola and Ethiopia and to increase the civilian component. That was attempted before the first Shaba invasion, but it was the judgment of both the Governments of Angola and Cuba at the time that Cuba's military presence had to be increased once again for fear of future war with Zaire and with South Africa.

To analyze the nature of the Cuban military presence and of the Cuban civilian military balance in Africa, and especially in Angola and Ethiopia, I would like to recall some important features of the Cuban Armed Forces.

The Cuban Government deemphasized reliance on a permanent standing force in the early 1970's. Instead, it has come to rely on a large and competent military reserve force. Reservists have accounted for no less than half, and at times for as many as four-fifths, of the Cuban combat forces in the Angolan and Ethiopian-Somali wars.

Indeed, the Cuban Armed Forces do not go into combat without a large reserve component. That has become a standard operating procedure.

My estimate is that the U.S. Government estimates of Cuban military capabilities have been systematically on the low side because they take no account of the role of the military reserves.

Another important feature is that many of these Cuban military personnel can perform quite different tasks, even social and economic ones, and not just military. Because so many of the Cuban troops overseas are reservists, they find it easier to change from military to civilian tasks.

These considerations, in turn, make it very difficult to estimate the military and civilian trends of Cuba's presence in Africa. For instance, one can at times observe a decline of Cubans in military uniform and an increase of Cuban civilians. This may have been accomplished literally, through a change of clothes.

Another factor is the internal characteristics of the Cuban armed forces in terms of ethnic composition. The Cuban troops in Africa include white and black soldiers in a context of fairly cordial race relations. Unlike the East Germans or the Soviets, the Cubans claim a degree of kinship with the Africans that appears to have at least a powerful political symbolism. This may make it easier for the Cubans to have influence than for other Communist governments, even though the top Cuban officer corps remains disproportionately white.

Another factor worth mentioning is the level of education of the Cuban Armed Forces. Cuban military are able to impart some skills to their African colleagues because the Cubans do have more training, but the education distance is not so great. The typical Cuban junior officer's education is just beyond that of high school, and thus it is

much less likely to breed the kind of educational arrogance that at times can crop up into these assistance relationships.

This takes me, briefly, to a consideration of the Soviet military support for Cuba and Cuba's general dependence on the U.S.S.R.

The Cuban revolutionary government could not have survived without massive Soviet economic, military, and other assistance. Cuba could not have undertaken its efforts in Angola and in the Horn of Africa in the absence of Soviet support.

It is important to bear in mind that the Soviet Union too, perhaps paradoxically has come to depend on Cuba to some degree. The Soviet Union would not be in the position of considerable influence it now has in Africa without Cuban help. Soviet influence has come to depend in part on Cuban troops. This mutual dependence has strengthened their bilateral alliance and it has strengthened Cuba's bargaining relationship with the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet-Cuban relationship that had reached a low ebb in the late 1960's has shown a marked improvement ever since and notwithstanding the recent concern over Soviet military forces in Cuba my own judgment is that the Soviet military presence in Cuba bears at most an indirect albeit important relationship to Cuban military activities in Africa.

The nature of the training that the Cubans receive make it possible to professionalize the Cuban military as well as to conduct joint Soviet-Cuban combat operations in Africa particularly in the Horn of Africa. There is no convincing evidence that Cuba's military manpower has been so strained that Soviet troops are needed in Cuba to replace Cuban troops in Africa. There is also no evidence that the Cuban Government relies on the Soviet troops for its own security nor are these forces necessary to deter the United States from a very unlikely invasion of Cuba.

The forces in Cuba that have a combat dimension in my view have no direct relationship to Cuba's ability to deploy combat forces in Africa.

Cuba and the United States perceive each other and are perceived by most as having profoundly opposite policies and interests in Africa. It would be silly of me to deny that conflict.

I do think it would be useful to underline that there are some common interests on which a somewhat different U.S.-Cuban relationship might be built. For example Cuba has had a stake for some time in ending the wars that engulf the Luanda government. At the very least Cuba is motivated to dampen down these conflicts for the sake of protecting its own troops from further casualties and other costs.

It would appear that the Cuban Government has supported the improvement in relations between Angola and Zaire. It also seems that the Cuban Government has tried to support those initiatives of the Luanda government that have induced SWAPO to negotiate more seriously. These decisions I think are consistent with U.S. policies toward those countries.

In the case of Zimbabwe or Rhodesia one often loses sight of the fact that both Cuba and the United States support black majority rule and oppose allowing the white minority to retain a political veto.

It is also often forgotten that Cuba advocates in part out of its own national experience peaceful multiracial relationships.

In the case of the Horn of Africa it is also often forgotten that Cuba's defense of Ethiopia against Somalia was not utterly inconsistent with U.S. policies. The U.S. Government's declared policies are opposed to what Somalia did, the use of aggressive war to redraw the boundaries of Africa.

If one believes that one of the national interests of the United States is to allow U.S. based enterprises to operate without being expropriated, Cuba's military defense of Gulf Oil's installations in Cabinda may also be taken as yet another example of a convergence of United States and Cuban interests.

The differences between the United States and Cuba over Africa are many and severe. They are well known and sketched briefly in my written testimony.

I do think it is useful to bear in mind that one could find some common interests between Cuba and the United States if these two governments at some future date may want to build a different relationship.

I also think it would be helpful to bear in mind that Cuba cannot translate easily or automatically its military power into political influence. In my view the Cuban Government attempted without success to persuade the Angolan Government to stop the Katanga of Shaba rebels residing in Angola from launching the second invasion of Zaire's Shaba province.

President Carter has claimed that Cuba could have done more. Yet experience that we ourselves have had in Vietnam suggest that it is not always easy or even possible for the militarily stronger government to impose its policy preferences on the weaker host government.

Not even President Carter apparently questions the intentions of the Cuban Government in trying to stop Shaba II before it occurred. My guess is it would have been difficult for Cuba to do more without intervening far more openly and directly into the internal processes of the Angolan Government and the MPLA, an outcome that I am sure we would have found equally unappealing.

It also seems that the Cuban Government has advised the Ethiopian Government to seek a politically negotiated settlement in Eritrea rather than to rely so heavily on military repression. Cuba was willing to send combat troops to the Ogaden against Somalia but not into Eritrea. It is quite clear in their relationship Cuba is the clear dove on the Eritrean question.

Cuba has been assisting Ethiopia in its campaign in Eritrea as you yourself, Ms. Fenwick, indicated, by continuing to station Cuban troops to guard the Somali frontier and to release Ethiopian Armed Forces to fight in Eritrea and Cuba has been providing general support to the Ethiopian military. Cuba has not committed massive front line combat troops to the Eritrean front and it appears to have failed time and again to persuade Addis Ababa to negotiate more seriously.

The long-term trend of Cuban involvement in Africa has been toward an increase in commitment and deployment and while it would be difficult for Cuba to open yet another front it cannot be ruled out. It would be surprising, but so too were Cuba's decision surprising, to send troops to Angola and to Ethiopia.

Their origin of the Cuban presence predates the closeness of Soviet-Cuban alliance. In my judgment Cuba is not a puppet responding simply to a puppeteer. These are two allies with convergent interests and policies that mutually need each other. To the question as to why Soviet and Cuban policies are so close one could counterpose another question that must be in the minds of the leaders of these countries; why break up a winning team?

Cuban influence in Africa derives in part from a combination of its strengths and its weaknesses. It is small enough not to be feared too much but it has enough to offer that other countries may wish to welcome them.

Cuba's actual operations in Africa have changed in the late 1970's. They began with small missions that emphasized mostly military advice but by the time Cuban combat forces landed in Angola it was primarily a Cuban operation with Soviet weaponry, funds and nuclear cover and it is really different in the Horn of Africa where one really witnessed for the first time a much more overt joint combat operation between the Soviet Union and Cuba.

Whether that results from the fact that it is easier for the Soviet Union to transfer forces to the more strategically important Horn of Africa or whether that is a further development in the Soviet-Cuban military relationship, it is hard to say. In my judgment Cuba does not have a strategy for Africa but a strategy for the world.

Africa has become the single most important piece in that but not the only one. Cuba believes that it has a right to participate in deciding the affairs of the world especially now that it chairs the nonaligned movement. It believes that it has as much a right as anyone else to be active internationally. Military messianism is difficult for any one to control.

As the former President of Nigeria once put it, Cuba may overstay its welcome for the sake of pursuing its objectives, but that has yet to occur.

In the meantime the main steps that might reduce the Cuban military presence in Africa appear to be unthinkable. One set of steps might be to establish a more secure international environment for both Angola and Ethiopia so that Cuban troops would be needed less. Given that the United States does not have as a policy the destruction of Ethiopia's territorial integrity or the advancement of Somalia's territorial claims on the one hand or that the United States has a stake in stabilizing Angola's borders with its neighbors, at least for the sake of the neighbors then one could imagine a convergence of the policies of the United States, Cuba, and these African Governments.

Another obstacle remains in place and that is to consider Cuba as a sovereign government rather than merely as a Soviet appendix and to envisage that the United States and Cuba might be able to work toward some common ends without obviously harboring illusions of a friendship that is unlikely to develop.

My guess is the longer term policy might be where the United States would negotiate directly with Cuba as a serious actor and not just as if Cuba were a Soviet surrogate.

Thank you.

Mrs. FENWICK. Thank you very much, Professor Dominguez.

[Mr. Dominguez' prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JORGE I. DOMINGUEZ, PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT,
HARVARD UNIVERSITY, OCTOBER 18, 1979

The Cuban government has had an active foreign policy toward Africa since the early 1960s.¹ That was a part of its efforts to counter the policies of the U.S. government to isolate Cuba throughout the world. Cuba's early and activist African policy was also derived from the ideological commitments of the revolutionary leadership. They believed then, and do still today, that it is the duty of revolutionaries to assist their comrades whenever that is feasible. Strategy and belief, therefore, are the long-term underpinnings of Cuba's African policies. The scale, forms and methods have, of course, changed but Cuba is not a newcomer to African affairs in the late 1970s, nor can those African policies be attributed merely to the Soviet Union's influence in Cuba.

There have been several changes in Cuba's African policies from the 1960s to the 1970s within the context of a long term evolving Cuban concern with that continent. The first has been a broadening of objectives. Cuba no longer fears international isolation as it once did. Its worldwide policies are still defined often in opposition to the United States, but Cuba now has more general affirmative objectives of its own. The Cuban government now perceives itself as having a good deal of international influence. Cuban diplomacy has come to have the characteristics of a major power, even if its base is a small country. There are now Cuban government positions on a wide array of subjects and countries throughout the world. The Cuban government rejects the view, implicit in many statements of U.S. government officials, that small countries should have parochial foreign policies. In the Cuban government's view, the U.S. government has no more rights to be concerned with African affairs than does Cuba. The U.S. government, according to the Cuban government's view, has no right to question the presence of Cuban combat troops in Africa, or of Soviet military and civilian personnel in Cuba, so long as the United States has military forces stationed abroad. From this perspective, the western hemisphere now has two major powers, the United States and Cuba. And while the Cuban government recognizes the incomparably greater power of the United States, it does not recognize any U.S. claims that Cuba should curtail its influence to its own boundaries alone. This view, of course, has implications for Cuban policies everywhere, not just in Africa.

A second change in Cuba's African policies has been a far more sustained support for incumbent governments than for the oppositions to these governments. The most dramatic shift, of course, occurred in the Horn of Africa, as Cuba dropped its earlier support of Eritrean rebels to support the Ethiopian government. In fact, however, Cuba has always had a preference for dealing with governments rather than with their oppositions. The main thing that has changed is that there are now more governments willing to deal with Cuba and to seek its support.

A third change has been one of scale. Cuba's presence in Africa was counted in the few hundreds, by and large, in the 1960s. Support for such governments as Algeria or Guinea did not entail very large forces. The Cuban presence in the Congo (Brazzaville) in the mid-1960s was perhaps the largest such contingent, but its size pales in comparison with the contemporary Cuban presence in Angola and in Ethiopia. The change in scale has been made possible by several important changes within Cuba.

Cuba could not have sent such large forces overseas in the 1960s. At that time, all military forces were needed for the defense of Cuba itself against possible external attacks, and or the defense of the government against internal efforts to overthrow it. Moreover, the technical quality of the Cuban armed forces was very low. In the 1960s, too, Cuba needed every possible physician or construction worker for tasks at home. The Cuban economy had collapsed in the early 1960s, and then it collapsed again, even more severely, in the closing years of that decade.

¹ The basis for this testimony can be found in my book, *Cuba: Order and Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), and in the following articles: "Cuban National Security in the 1970s: Critique and Evaluation," ed. Martin Weinstein, *Revolutionary Cuba in the World Arena* (Philadelphia: ISHI Press, 1979); "The Armed Forces and Foreign Relations," eds. Cole Blasier and Carmelo Mesa-Lago, *Cuba in the World* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979); "Cuban Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 57, No. 1 (1978), among others. Still pertinent is my testimony, "U.S. Trade Embargo of Cuba," presented to the Subcommittees on International Trade and Commerce and on International Organization, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Hearings, Ninety-fourth Congress, first session.

By the 1970s, important changes in all these factors made it possible for Cuba to expand its overseas presence. The fear of external invasion and of internal insurrection had waned. The Cuban armed forces underwent an impressive program to modernize weapons inventories and to professionalize military personnel, eventually making victories possible in two African wars. The Cuban economy recovered impressively during the early 1970s, as the world price of sugar rose and improvements were made in internal economic management. While the growth performance of the Cuban economy in the late 1970s has been poor (just above zero growth of gross product per capita in constant prices), it has not been negative. Moreover, Cuba is now beginning to produce a surplus of professional in a number of fields—particularly health care—who thus become available for foreign aid projects as well as for foreign contracts in the case of some governments that can pay for these services. Finally, Cuba had a "baby boom" in the early 1960s; many of these are now of prime military age. The result has been that Cuba's per capita military commitment overseas is about the same as that of the United States at the peak of the Vietnam war.

A discussion of the Cuban presence in Africa needs to distinguish between the more common foreign aid programs and the two special cases of Angola and Ethiopia. The general Cuban foreign aid programs emphasize providing personnel, not cash, for civilian and military projects. Cuba prefers to send health personnel, rather than to provide the funds for the medical equipment. Cuba might also send construction personnel to build a hospital, or to build dams and highways, rather than to provide financing for such projects. Cuba will provide generally a wide array of specialists in such fields as health, education, construction, sports, fishing, military and police training, and even bodyguard services. The Cuban government has also been willing to provide training for political officers, within the armed forces or in civilian settings.

One consequence of Cuba's reliance on personnel, rather than cash, has often been the need to form consortia with other Communist governments whenever a foreign aid program becomes quite large. Cuba can handle alone small programs of foreign assistance, to Tanzania or to Equatorial Guinea, for example. But Cuba has needed and has sought the participation of other Communist governments in the larger projects in Angola, Ethiopia or South Yemen. The Soviet Union and East Germany have been its principal partners in these endeavors. Foreign aid packages provided by these consortia can be quite attractive. The Soviets and the East Germans may provide the hardware and the cash, and the Cubans may provide the training. The Cuban government's programs have a high political content, however. For countries that wish to receive Cuban assistance but wish to maintain some distance from Cuba's own brand of socialism, this political content may present a problem. But in Angola or in Ethiopia, Cuba's political education programs appear to have helped to strengthen these governments' political strength within their respective armed forces and civilian organizations.

The Cuban government has made it clear that it prefers these kinds of foreign aid programs to the larger and costlier commitments to Angola and to Ethiopia, although it has also made clear that these commitments remain quite firm. The Cuban design has been to reduce the military combat component of the Cuban presence in Angola and in Ethiopia and to increase the civilian component. That had certainly begun to occur early in 1976. At that time, it seemed that the MPLA was securely enough in power in Luanda that Cuban military forces could be reduced. This process was reversed, however, in the spring 1977 with the first invasion of Shaba province in Zaire by exiles operating out of Angola. The Luanda and Havana governments came to the conclusion that a larger Cuban military presence was required. Internal weaknesses in the MPLA's control of Angola, and internal dissension within the MPLA, also persuaded the Cuban government of the need for a larger military presence.

To analyze the nature of the Cuban military presence, and of the Cuban civilian and military balance in Africa (especially in Angola and in Ethiopia), it is important to recall some essential features of the Cuban armed forces. The Cuban government decided to deemphasize reliance on a permanent standing force in the early 1970s. Instead, it has come to rely on a large military reserve force. The degree of combat skill and readiness of the military reserve, of course, varies a great deal from unit to unit. But my own estimate is that Cuba's order of battle for the defense of the homeland remains above 300,000 when one includes the ready reserves (I am conscious that this estimate is about twice bigger than the U.S. government's estimates). The Cuban government has a high

confidence in these military reserves. Some reservists participate in the regular war games of the Cuban armed forces. Reservists have accounted for no less than half, and at times for as many as four-fifths, of the Cuban combat forces in the Angolan and Ethiopian-Somali wars. Indeed, the Cuban armed forces do not go into combat without a large reserve component. This is a standard operating procedure. Thus U.S. government estimates of Cuba's military capabilities have been systematically on the low side because they take no account of the role of reserves.

A second important feature of the Cuba armed forces is that many of its personnel can perform quite different tasks. Beginning as revolutionaries in the 1960's, Cuban military leaders believed that soldiers should also be prepared to perform certain social and economic tasks. Although the specifics have changed over time, the Cuban armed forces still have a capability to act beyond the narrow confines of a military mission. And because so many of the Cuban troops overseas are reservists, they find it even easier to change from military to civilian tasks.

These considerations, in turn, make it very difficult to estimate what are the trends in Cuba's presence in Africa. For example, one can at times observe a decline of Cubans in military uniform and an increase of Cuban civilians. But this may have been accomplished literally through a change of clothes. The same people may be competent at different tasks. And if a military threat reappears or worsens, these civilians can very quickly take up arms. There is evidence that this has occurred already, especially in Angola.

A third factor related to the internal characteristics of the Cuban armed forces is its ethnic composition. The Cuban troops in Africa include white and black soldiers in a context of fairly cordial race relations. Unlike the East Germans or the Soviets, the Cubans can claim a degree of kinship with the Africans that appears to have a powerful political symbolism. This may make it easier for the Cubans to have influence than for other Communist governments. However, the top Cuban officer corps remains disproportionately white; it is unclear how widespread has been knowledge of this fact or what consequences it might have.

A fourth factor is the level of education of the Cuban armed forces. It stands somewhere in between that of the Angolan and Ethiopian forces, on the one hand, and of the Soviets and East Europeans, on the other hand. The typical Cuban infantry soldier now has upper elementary or junior high school education. The typical Cuban junior officer's education is only somewhat beyond that of a high school graduate. Only in the more technical branches of the armed forces do university-trained officers become the norm. The Cuban military are thus able to impart some skills to their African colleagues, because the Cubans do have more training. But the educational distance is not so great as with the European military personnel; it is much less likely to breed the kind of educational arrogance that at times can crop up into these assistance relationships.

This takes us to a consideration of the Soviet military support for Cuba and of Cuba's general dependence on the Soviet Union. The Cuban revolutionary government could not have survived without massive Soviet economic, military and other assistance. Moreover, Cuba could not have undertaken its war efforts in Angola and in the Horn of Africa in the absence of Soviet support. But it is important to bear in mind that the Soviet Union, too, perhaps paradoxically, has come to depend on Cuba to some degree. The Soviet Union would not be in the position of considerable influence it now has in Africa without Cuban help. Soviet influence has come to depend in part on Cuban troops. This mutual dependence has strengthened their bilateral alliance, and it has strengthened Cuba's bargaining relationship with the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet-Cuban relationship reached a low ebb in 1967-1968. The relationship has shown a marked improvement ever since. Soviet military and civilian personnel in Cuba had been few when the 1970s opened, but these numbers increased rapidly during the first half of this decade. It has been clear for some time—all that was required was a reading of the Cuban press—that Soviet military personnel in Cuba had a command structure and that their military training mission was complex. This training mission has long had a combat dimension, to wit, to demonstrate combat techniques and to coordinate Soviet-Cuban military maneuvers. Indeed, the Soviet Union and Cuba probably could not have conducted their joint operations during the Ethiopian-Somali war if they had not had this kind of prior military training coordination on the ground. But this Soviet force,

to the best of my knowledge, has never had a combat mission. It lacks the airlift and sealift capabilities for that purpose. And, more importantly, the Soviet Union does not attack with such small forces. Soviet military doctrine continues to emphasize massive troop movements.

It follows, then, that the Soviet military presence in Cuba bears only an indirect (albeit important) relationship to Cuban military activities in Africa. The nature of the training makes possible not only the professionalization of the Cuban military but also joint Soviet-Cuban combat operations in Africa. But there is no convincing evidence that Cuba's military manpower has been so strained that Soviet troops are needed in Cuba to replace Cuban troops in Africa. There is no evidence that the Cuban government relies on the Soviet troops for its own security. Nor are these Soviet forces necessary to deter the United States from invading Cuba. Apart from the fact that a U.S. invasion of Cuba is highly unlikely, there are many other Soviet personnel in Cuba who would die in the event of such an external attack. The "tripwire" is provided by the thousands of Soviet civilian and other military personnel who would die if a major war were to break out over Cuba. My judgment thus remains that the Soviet forces in Cuba that have a combat dimension have no direct relationship to Cuba's ability to deploy military forces in Africa.

Cuba and the United States perceive each other, and are perceived by most people, as having profoundly opposite policies and interests in Africa. It would be silly to deny the fact of this conflict. But it may be useful to underline that there are some common interest on which a different U.S.-Cuban relationship might be built. For example, Cuba has had a stake for some time in ending the wars that engulf the Luanda government. At the very least, Cuba is motivated to dampen down these conflicts for the sake of protecting its own troops from further casualties and other costs. Thus it appears that the Cuban government supported the improvement in relations between Angola and Zaire. It also seems that the Cuban government has tried to support those initiatives of the Luanda government that have induced the South West Africa's People's Organization (SWAPO) to negotiate more seriously over the future of that land. These decisions are quite consistent with U.S. policies toward those countries.

In the case of Zimbabwe or Rhodesia, one often loses sight of the fact that both Cuba and the United States support black majority rule and oppose allowing the white minority to retain a political veto. It is also often forgotten that Cuba advocates, in part out of its own national experience, peaceful multiracial relationships. This multiracial character of Cuban life and policies have also facilitated relations with the multiracially more open MPLA in Angola.

In the case of the Horn of Africa, it is also often forgotten that Cuba's defense of Ethiopia against Somalia was not utterly inconsistent with U.S. policies. The U.S. government supported the government of Emperor Haile Selassie for many years, in part in explicit opposition to Somalia's ambitions. The U.S. government's declared policies are opposed to what Somalia did: the use of aggressive war to redraw the boundaries of Africa. More generally, from the perspective of supporting a tolerable international order in Africa, the United States might even welcome any effort—even Cuba's—that would deter other countries to attempt what Somalia did.

And if one believes that one of the national interests of the United States is to allow U.S.-based enterprises to operate without being expropriated, Cuba's military defense of Gulf Oil's installations in Cabinda may also be taken as yet another example of a convergence of U.S. and Cuban interests.

The differences between the United States and Cuba over Africa are, of course, many and severe. Cuba tends to support the kind of centralized authoritarian political systems that are often inconsistent with the values that U.S. policy claims to profess. Cuban counterinsurgency operations in Angola do bring anguish and suffering to many. The continued presence of Cuban troops in Angola may have served as a disincentive to the MPLA to negotiate with its opponents. Thus the effect of the Cuban military presence may be to prolong a bloody war that might have been ended through negotiations at an earlier time. Cuban policies toward South Africa or Zimbabwe-Rhodesia are far more radical, and receptive to violence, than U.S. policy is. And Cuba and the U.S. do compete for political influence throughout the continent. But it is worth bearing in mind that it is not impossible to find some common interests between Cuba and the U.S. that governments may wish to use in the future to improve relations.

It is also useful to bear in mind that Cuba may have found that military power is not easily or automatically translated into political influence. Admittedly, my inferences here will be even more speculative than some earlier ones. And yet, it seems that the Cuban government attempted to persuade the Angolan government to stop the Katanga or Shaba rebels residing in Angola from launching the second invasion of Zaire's Shaba province. I have already indicated that this moderate position can be attributed quite simply to Cuba's wish to reduce the threats to the Cuban soldiers in that country. It is evident that Cuba failed to persuade the Angolan government to take those steps to prevent the invasion. President Carter has claimed that Cuba could have done more. And yet, experience from many countries—including the U.S. experience in Vietnam—shows that it is not always easy or even possible for the militarily stronger government to impose its policy preferences on the weaker host government. Not even President Carter apparently questions the intentions of the Cuban government in trying to stop Shaba II before it occurred. And I am prepared to believe that it would have been difficult for Cuba to do more without intervening far more openly and directly into the internal processes of the Angolan government and the MPLA—an outcome that may have been equally unappealing to the United States.

It also seems that the Cuban government has advised the Ethiopian government to seek a politically negotiated settlement in Eritrea rather than to rely so heavily on military repression. Cuba's motivation is more complex. In part, it stems from Cuba's earlier sympathies with the Eritrean rebellion. In part, it may stem from Cuba's own preference in ethnic relations to deemphasize the use of force. And, in part, of course, it stems from the desire to reduce the risks to the Ethiopian government and thus to Cuban troops stationed in the area. It remains striking that Cuba was willing to send combat troops to the Ogaden against Somalia, but not into Eritrea. The language used by the governments of Cuba and Ethiopia to describe their views of the Eritrean situation is markedly different—with Cuba the clear dove. It should be said, of course, that Cuba has been assisting Ethiopia in its campaign in Eritrea. The most important help has been the continued stationing of Cuban troops to guard the Somali frontier and to fight Somali guerrillas. This releases the Ethiopian armed forces to concentrate on the Eritrean campaign. And Cuba's general program of support of the Ethiopian military and government has also many direct and indirect benefits for the latter's Eritrean campaign. But Cuba has not committed massive front-line combat troops to the Eritrean front, and it appears to have failed time and again to persuade Addis Ababa to negotiate more seriously.

The long term trend of Cuban involvement in Africa has been toward an increase of commitment and deployment. It would surely be difficult for Cuba to open a third front—apart from Angola and the Horn of Africa—in support of the Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia or in support of SWAPO in Namibia. But it cannot be ruled out. It would be surprising, of course, but so were Cuba's decisions to send troops to Angola and to Ethiopia. Whatever the outcome, Cuba's African policies are its own. Their origin predates the closeness of the Soviet-Cuban alliance that has no doubt developed. Cuba is not a puppet responding to a puppeteer. These are two allies with convergent interests and policies that mutually need each other. To the question as to why the Soviet and Cuban policies are so close one could counterpoise another question that must be in the minds of the leaders of these countries: why break up a winning team?

Cuban influence in Africa derives from a combination of its strengths and its weaknesses. Cuba is small and underdeveloped enough that it can say it should not be feared. But Cuba has enough to offer to many of these African countries, in training and manpower, that it may be welcome. Cuba's own ethnic relations and the willingness of its overseas personnel to live with ordinary people there, and to pitch in the doing of the dirty jobs, has generated a degree of personal warmth that is at times lacking in the case of the Soviets or the East Europeans. Cuba has also used the kinship between the Spanish and Portuguese languages to its advantage in the former Portuguese colonies—a difference with the Ethiopian situation.

Cuba's actual operations in Africa have changed in the late 1970's from small missions that emphasized mostly military advice, to a large scale but primarily Cuban combat operation in Angola (with Soviet weaponry, funds and nuclear cover), to a joint combat operation between the Soviet Union and Cuba in

Ethiopia. That may simply have resulted from the fact that it was easier for the Soviet Union to transport forces to the more strategically important Horn of Africa, but it may also portend a further development in the Soviet-Cuban military relationship.

Cuba does not have a strategy for Africa. It has a strategy for the world. Africa has become, of course, the single most important piece in that, but not the only one. Cuba believes that it has a right to participate in deciding the affairs of the world, especially now that it leads the Non-Aligned Movement. It believes that it has as much a right as anyone else to be active internationally, to advance its interests, perceived to be global, and its ideology, perceived to be correct. Military messianism is difficult for anyone to control. As the former President of Nigeria put it, Cuba may overstay its welcome for the sake of pursuing these objectives.

In the meantime, the main steps that might reduce the Cuban military presence in Africa appear to be unthinkable. One set of steps would seek to establish a more secure international environment for both Angola and Ethiopia so that Cuban troops would be needed less. Given that the United States does not have as a policy the destruction of Ethiopia's territorial integrity or the advancement of Somalia's territorial claims, on the one hand, and that the United States has a stake in stabilizing Angola's borders with its neighbors for the sake of the neighbors at least, on the other hand, one could imagine a convergence of the policies of the United States, Cuba, and these African governments toward these ends. But another obstacle seems to remain in place. That is to consider Cuba as a sovereign government rather than as a Soviet appendix, and to envisage that Cuba and the United States might be able to work toward some common ends, without harboring illusions of a friendship that is unlikely to develop. The U.S. government took some steps in the directions of treating Cuba as a sovereign country with which positive relationships are possible under both the Ford and the Carter administrations. These trends were interrupted for a variety of reasons, including Cuba's entry into two African wars. But these wars should have increased the incentive to deal with Cuba. In the final analysis, the only way of reducing or eliminating those elements of Cuban policies the U.S. does not like leads through Havana. The U.S. needs to negotiate directly with Cuba, not just as if Cuba were just a Soviet surrogate.

Mrs. FENWICK. I wonder if you could tell us briefly, have you any rundown on the amount of aid to Cuba? I remember in the 1960's it was reported that the Soviet Union gave Cuba \$1 million a day. The other day I see that it is \$8 million now.

Is that so?

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. I think the \$8 million in President Carter's speech was intended more as a number to indicate that it is a great deal of aid. It is really quite difficult to pinpoint a specific number. One of the reasons it is difficult is that Soviet weapons transfers to Cuba have been free of charge so one would have to compute a price to that to include in that \$8 million a day.

There is no doubt that there is an enormous amount of assistance in weaponry and hardware and it has been increasing.

Another type of assistance that is somewhat difficult to calculate is the Soviet Union has postponed requiring repayment on the huge debt that Cuba had already incurred in the 1960's and both principal and interest to the latter part of the 1980's.

Some of the aid is much easier to calculate. The Soviet Union has been providing a subsidy to Cuban sugar over the world price of sugar. The Soviet Union has been providing petroleum subsidies to Cuba.

Because the Soviet-Cuban prices tend to be often imputed and more politically negotiated than reflecting more real price relationships even that is somewhat difficult to calculate. Cuba seems to be paying somewhat more for Soviet machinery and equipment than it could get on the

free world market. There is also a return subsidy to the Soviet heavy industry.

Mrs. FENWICK. Why do they buy more expensive equipment from Russia when they could buy it at other places?

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. Because they do not have the convertible currency to buy it from other countries.

Mrs. FENWICK. Cuba has no convertible currency?

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. Cuba has very limited convertible currency and it runs a huge deficit on its relationships with Western countries that is partly subsidized by the Soviet Union.

I would be very reluctant to answer your question directly and to put a number. President Carter's statement is, it is a great deal, and my statement is, Cuba could not survive without it. Those would be the answers I would leave on the table.

Mrs. FENWICK. Professor, that is what makes it difficult to feel that Cuba is not a puppet. If they are receiving such aid as you describe and would die without it and there does not seem to be any evidence that they have ever taken an independent line.

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. There is very little evidence in recent years that they have taken an independent line. There is a good deal of evidence that they have taken an independent line say in the mid and late 1960's even though they were receiving massive Soviet assistance also at that time. They did thumb their noses at the Soviet Union at the time one of the leading officials of the Cuban Government spoke about more than one imperial power by which he meant not only the United States but also the Soviet Union and the Cuban Government denounced Communist parties in Latin America that were affiliated with the Soviet Union.

Mrs. FENWICK. What stand did they take on Czechoslovakia's invasion?

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. That was the turnover. That was the turning point. The relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union had gotten so bad by late 1967 and early 1968 that the Cuban leadership announced the discovery of what they call a microfaction within the Cuban-Communist party including members of the central committee who were expelled.

Their principal quarrel was they were too close to the Soviet Union. These people were arrested and thrown in prison.

There were a variety of fights between Cuba and the Soviet Union that culminated with Soviet sanctions on Cuba. The Soviet Union froze the level of petroleum deliveries. Cuba imports about 99 percent of its petroleum from the Soviet Union.

Mrs. FENWICK. When was this?

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. Late 1967 and early 1968. It took about 6 months to negotiate. Finally Cuba had to cave in. There was no alternative in 1968. If you had triple sanctions from the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, you had no choice. In the summer of 1968 Castro went before the television cameras and said contrary to what some of our comrades expect basically we endorse the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Since that time the pattern that you described of increasing close alinement between Cuba and the Soviet Union is where it becomes very difficult to tell them apart and it has occurred.

Let me give you another example where Cuba and Romania had been the only two Communist countries that have refused to break relations with Israel after the 1967 war. Cuba maintained that position, I believe, until 1973 at the time of the 1973 war. You can find a variety of issues where Cuba and the Soviet Union did differ seriously in the late 1960's and even through the early 1970's but you are quite right that one does not find them now.

The point I would make on the puppet argument is while Cuba does depend a great deal there is also a good deal of evidence that the Cuban Government has wanted to do this and they have been there for a long time on their own on their own decisions and often well in advance of the Soviet Union and often much more willing to be committed than the Soviet Union.

I think in the case of the MPLA in Angola, Cuban relations with the MPLA and now with the Angolan Government have been closer than those of the Soviet Union.

I would hesitate to say that the Soviet Union is Cuba's puppet in Angola. You obviously would take me to task on that. I do think it is important to bear in mind that Cuba has not been brought there but it wants to be there and it does not have to be maneuvered into it.

Mrs. FENWICK. There was something that struck me. What you said was so clear. Soviet influence would not be what it is in Africa without the presence of the Cuban troops. When we ask why there is this wide divergence between our aims and theirs, although you could find cooperation with Zaire and basically that is it.

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. Yes.

Mrs. FENWICK. It is that we are not happy to see wide Soviet influence increasing and we know the Cuban troops are, as you say, very rightly are, a part of that. It would not be what it is without the Cuban troops.

On page 1, you speak of Cuba's deep feeling that they must support revolutionaries. On page 2, you speak of their proclivity to support governments. Is that part of what you describe as their complex point of view?

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. One thing that I tried to describe in an article of mine is what I think has been a fairly consistent pattern of choosing. They prefer to support governments and here the judgment would be they prefer to support what they call the revolutionary governments and they would view the support of governments and support for revolution then being most easily reconciled.

When they have not been able to deal with governments they have simply supported revolutionary oppositions. They did that most often in the 1960's when there were very few governments that were either revolutionary or willing to deal with them. Now that there are more of this type they find their hands can be full and they in fact have to turn down apparent requests for further assistance.

That is my view of how they try to reconcile this. Fidel Castro has put it that a revolutionary is an opportunist with principles. It does seem to me this is a pattern of choosing where you take opportunities but you try to do it within a certain ideological framework.

Mrs. FENWICK. Maybe we ought to learn that.

Mr. SOLARZ. It reminds me of a description which Jacqueline Kennedy once applied to her husband. She said he was an idealist without illusions. I do not know if that makes him a revolutionary by Fidel Castro's standards.

Perhaps at this point Professor Young could give us the benefit of his testimony and then we will resume with questions of all three members of the panel.

STATEMENT OF M. CRAWFORD YOUNG, PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN AT MADISON

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, let me thank you for the opportunity to appear before you again today. I wish to stress that I do so as a student of African politics and not as a specialist on the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. or other Communist powers.

My reflections therefore derive principally from observation of the African political scene over the last two decades.

I will focus primarily in my testimony on the role of the Soviet Union because it is by far the most important to begin with and also because the very interesting question of the Cuban role has been so admirably dealt with by Dr. Dominguez, on the Chinese issue, as Mr. Newsom pointed out, involvement in Africa in recent years which has diminished sharply and altered in focus and East European roles while not completely insignificant on the whole, quite secondary with the partial recent exception of East Germany.

There can be little doubt that the visibility of the Soviet Union as well as Cuban on the African scene is much greater than it was a few years ago.

The intuitive sense of a new activism that this observation conveys derives, I believe, in great measure from the large scale Soviet involvement in the civil wars in Angola in 1975 and 1976 and in Ethiopia from 1977 on.

Probably another factor contributing to a widely held impression of greater Soviet impact in Africa is the rise in the past decade of a series of African States which officially describe themselves as Marxist-Leninist. The most recent list of such states would include Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Somalia, Madagascar, Soa Thome e Principe, Benin, and Congo-Brazzaville.

This past August a group of Western Africanists had the opportunity in Moscow for a conversation with leading Soviet specialists on African affairs at the U.S.S.R. African Institute. We asked, as our first question, the director of the African institute whether in fact these developments did suggest a new direction in Soviet policy in Africa and as my own point of departure let me quote his reply.

"There has been," he argued at some length, "no change in Soviet policy toward Africa * * *" which he asserted had been quite consistent from the early 1960's. "The only element that changed was the situation in Africa itself which presented new opportunities."

It is true that most Western analysts do detect significant variations in Soviet policy orientations over time. I will not take the time to review these. They are developed in my written testimony. There is

evidently a very large movement from the old days of the 1950's of the Stalinist suspicions of African nationalism through the phase in the early 1960's of interest in the so-called national democracy experiments in Egypt, Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, and Mali then a subsequent phase of disillusion with those experiments from 1967 to 1974 and a more subdued role based primarily on state-to-state relationships. Of these the most significant or visible development was the warmer relationship with Nigeria, a very non-Marxist state which grew out of the Soviet aid to the federal republic during its years of agony during its own civil war.

In contrast to this quiescent period certainly the sheer scale of Soviet involvement in Angola and Ethiopia as well as the Cuban dimension do stand out. There has evidently been a dramatic increase in the basic logistical capacity of the Soviet Union for rapid and large scale response to crisis situations in distant areas. The capacity and willingness of the Soviet Union possibly in cooperation with Cuba, East Germany, and others to forcibly intervene in African crises when favorable opportunities arise is quite evident.

Rather than further pursuing this point let me turn to an examination of the overall pattern of political, military, and economic relationships with Africa generally in recent years.

Beginning with the political front, I think, we may note on the one hand a general desire for correct state-to-state relations with all African states willing to have them, and on the other hand, somewhat preferential ties with states believed to be of progressive orientation or in the Soviet language of socialist orientation.

Only the latter qualify for such particular recognition as long-term treaties of friendship and cooperation which have been signed over the years with Egypt, Somalia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Angola although the Egyptian and Somalian accords were subsequently denounced by those two states.

The Afro-Marxist states generally have quite large Soviet diplomatic establishments and active programs of Soviet political cooperation in consolidating what we might call the political Leninist infrastructure of these states, aid in building a Leninist party; aid in exploiting the state controlled media, especially radio; aid in refining the ideology of these states and aid in training political police units, evidently a particularly sensitive function which is often delegated to East German specialists.

The clear object in this pattern of political cooperation with states of socialist orientation is to reinforce the political apparatus of regimes which are believed by the Soviets to be committed to the eventual construction of socialism in their countries.

Relations may also be quite cordial even absent the sense of ideological fraternity. For example recent CIA documentation shows that countries as non-Marxist as Nigeria and Sudan had respectively in 1977 some 1,390 and 1,800 academic students being trained in Communist countries. While ties with Nigeria have recently been marred by events leading the Nigerians to expel a large number of Soviet military advisory personnel, overall quite friendly links have been maintained with this non-Marxist state. Diplomatic relations to my

knowledge exist with all African States except for Swaziland, Malawi, the Ivory Coast, and South Africa.

At the same time it is important to note that countries such as Egypt, Somalia and Guinea have all demonstrated there is nothing the Soviet Union can do should a particular country decide to reduce or even to sever its ties, nor has the Soviet Union intervened to prevent coups removing leaders who occasionally seasoned their political language with Marxist lexicon, such as Ali Soilih of Comores or Francisco Macias Nguema of unlamented memory in Equatorial Guinea.

There is in short no parallel to what had been termed by some the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty of socialist states, which has been applied in Eastern Europe, most notably in the Czechoslovakia case.

There is ample evidence that the Soviets and their allies well recognize the precarious nature of political power in any African state. As one authoritative East German commentator recently put it:

In spite of the positive results that have been obtained so far because of the weaker social base the inconsistencies in the thinking and behavior of predominantly petty-bourgeois-peasant forces of leadership, the lack of experience and cadres and not least of all an account of the strong economic positions and the ideological influence over which imperialism continues to dispose in these countries, the development of countries with a socialist orientation is by no means irreversible. Changes conceivably of a precipitous nature are possible.

Many observers have noted that by far the most striking dimension of Soviet relationships with Africa lies in the military field, especially in arms supply. In 1977 Soviet arms flowed to less developed countries generally and not just African ones and totalled \$4 billion according to CIA figures, contrasted to \$875 million of economic aid to the same set of countries.

A substantial number of African countries now rely on the Soviet Union for such major weapon systems as aircraft, tanks, missiles, and naval craft. For example half of the 24 African States which by 1978 data had combat aircraft used Soviet planes.

Although the majority of these might be considered as progressive states the list also included such countries as Nigeria and Uganda and here I would differ from Under Secretary Newsom's characterization of Idi Amin as a Soviet or any other description of client.

Beyond ideological preference various factors explain African interest in Soviet equipment. Delivery is generally more expeditious than with Western suppliers. Terms of sale are often concessionary although they are almost always sales and not aid. Whatever doubts may exist as to the quality of Soviet commercial merchandise their military equipment is certainly good.

These kinds of considerations are certainly important in such major transactions as the 1974 \$1 billion arms sale to Libya. It may be noted in passing that the acquisition of the more technologically complex equipment, particularly the later model Migs, will tie the purchasing country not only to Soviet supply of spare parts but also supporting maintenance and logistical and even operating personnel.

In the economic field the Soviet role has been much more modest. In the aid sphere it has been down right miserly, a fact which has by no means escaped the notice of African leaders.

From 1954 to 1977 again according to CIA figures aid to Africa from the U.S.S.R. totaled some \$3.28 billion, a very small sum for 50 odd countries over a quarter of a century. Of this some 44 percent went to Egypt. Another 22 percent went to Algeria, which is 66 percent to two countries. Next in importance was Guinea with some \$201 million. In 1977 there was only \$21 million of new commitment although there were often long pipeline delays in the actual delivery of Soviet aid and almost all of that was to Tanzania.

From 1965 to 1974, Africa received only about 15 percent of Soviet aid. What is particularly striking is the miniscule amounts of aid they have provided even for states espousing scientific socialist ideologies. In 1976 and 1977, countries such as Ethiopia, Benin, Mozambique, and Congo-Brazzaville received quite inconsequential amounts of new economic aid as opposed to military arms supply.

Over the years there have been some quite substantial Soviet projects in Africa, some of them falling in the aid category and some primarily commercial. The Aswan Dam in Egypt obviously was the first major undertaking. Some such as the oft-publicized Nigerian iron and steel complex have moved at strikingly glacial speed. The accord was first announced in 1968, the survey agreement in 1970, the site agreement in 1976, the go ahead in 1977, and the final details were announced only this last summer, an incident which perhaps could give encouragement to our own colleagues in the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Two major undertakings which appear mainly motivated by Soviet raw material needs were the \$2 billion phosphate deal with Morocco announced in 1978 and a bauxite mine in Guinea dating from the early 1970's. The latter was negotiated on terms extremely unfavorable to Guinea with the Soviets initially paying in contrast to their generosity with Cuba only one-third of the world market price for the ore. It required 2 years of acrimonious renegotiation forced by the Guineans to bring them, not up to but closer, to the present world market price.

The most widespread form of Soviet economic accord in Africa interestingly has been with coastal states for fishing rights. Usually the Soviets offer some aid in promotion of a national fishing operation. Such accords exist with Morocco, Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Angola, Mozambique, Somalia, and Mauritius and I defy anyone to find any ideological threat running through that particular listing of countries.

In several of the countries named considerable controversy has emerged over the terms of these arrangements which on close scrutiny appear to be highly advantageous to Soviet merchantile interests.

African trade with the Soviet Union is quite small and not expanding very greatly. According to the most recent U.N. Statistical Yearbook covering 1976 trade data the total African exports to the Soviet Union were only \$850 million and imports from the Soviet Union only \$730 million. The rate of trade growth with Africa since 1970 was lower than with any other geographic region.

A number of very difficult obstacles stand in the way of Soviet trade with Africa. Soviet consumer goods compete poorly with Western equivalents for which well established consumer preferences exist. Of the major commodity exports from Africa the Soviet Union either

has its own supplies such as copper, oil, and vegetable oils or does not encourage consumption such as coffee.

Overall while military supply relationships are of considerable importance and while political linkages are of some consequence the weakness in Africa of economic ties is quite striking.

African evaluations of Soviet objectives and performance vary evidently in function of the ideological perspectives of the regime and the warmth of their Soviet ties. Overall, we may suggest a number of reasons why a number of African States may find good Soviet relations useful. Many find the Soviet connection a gage in nonalignment and too exclusively Western linkages expose a regime to internal pressures as neocolonial in its affinities.

Mr. SOLARZ. Professor, if you will permit me to interrupt at this point, both Mrs. Fenwick and I have read your testimony in full. I would like, without objection, to include your testimony in the record as you have submitted it so it will be there for posterity, and that will give us time to get directly into the questions.

[Mr. Young's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF M. CRAWFORD YOUNG, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN AT MADISON

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, in responding to the invitation of the Subcommittee to testify on the issue of "Communism in Africa," and in particular on the role of the Soviet Union, China and Cuba, I wish to stress that I appear as a student of African politics, and not as a specialist on the foreign policy of the USSR or other Communist powers. My reflections therefore derive principally from observation of the African political scene over the last two decades, completed by some familiarity with the standard secondary sources on foreign policy of Communist powers. I did have the opportunity this past summer to briefly visit three West African states often classified among the "scientific socialist" regimes (Congo-Brazzaville, Benin, Guinea-Bissau): in addition, while attending the International Political Science Association meetings in Moscow this August, there was occasion for extended conversation with scholars associated with the USSR Africa Institute. These experiences contributed some additional insight pertinent to the issues under consideration at these hearings.

I will focus primarily in my testimony on the role of the Soviet Union because it is by far the most important. Another witness, Dr. Jorge Dominguez, will be dealing with the Cuban issue with far greater knowledge than I possess. In recent years, Chinese involvement in Africa has diminished sharply, and altered in stress. Whether or not it was ever properly classified as a "threat" to U.S. interests, there is little justification for such a view today. East European roles, while not completely insignificant, are on the whole quite secondary, with the partial recent exception of East Germany.

In my presentation, I wish to first undertake an overall review of Soviet policy in Africa. By way of conclusion, I will then endeavor brief responses to the dozen explicit queries raised by the Subcommittee.

There can be little doubt that the visibility of the Soviet Union, as well as Cuba, on the African scene is much greater than it was a few years ago. The intuitive sense of a new activism derives in great measure from the large-scale Soviet involvement in the civil wars in Angola in 1975-1976, and in Ethiopia from 1977 on. Probably another factor contributing to a widely held impression of greater Soviet impact in Africa is the rise in the past decade of a series of African states which officially describe themselves as Marxist-Leninist: the most recent list of such states would include Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Somalia, Madagascar, Sao Thome e Principe, Benin, and Congo-Brazzaville. Whether we are witnessing some unfolding "grand design," or simply the opportunistic exploitation of the ebb and flow of African events, is a question best answered by examining the overall pattern of Soviet action in Africa, and not simply focussing on the dramatic cases.

As a point of departure, we may note the response of the Director of the Soviet Africa Institute when this very question was posed to him in August by a group of Western Africanists. There was, he argued at some length, no change in Soviet policy toward Africa, which he asserted had been quite consistent from the early 1960s. The only element that changed was the situation in Africa itself, which offered new opportunities.

Most Western observers, however, have detected significant variations in Soviet policy orientations overtime. One might identify three distinct stages in the development of Soviet African policy before 1975. In the Stalin era, there was little interest in Africa, and hostility to the emergent nationalist leadership as simply "national bourgeois" elements likely to ally with "imperialism." Conditions were believed poor for socialism; only Egypt, Sudan, Algeria and South Africa had significant Communist parties, and relationships were filtered through the metropolitan European Communist parties.

Beginning with the Egyptian arms deal in 1955, one may discern a gradually awakening interest in some African nationalist leaders who were viewed as being of "progressive" orientation. By the early 1960s, such regimes as Egypt, Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, and Mali were considered to be "national democracies," under the leadership of "revolutionary democrats" who might be able to follow a non-capitalist pathway to development, even if their ideological views were some distance removed from orthodox "scientific socialism."

However, the economic difficulties encountered by several of these, irritating disputes with such leaders as Sekou Toure and above all the demise of Kwame Nkrumah, Ben Bella, and Modibo Keita appeared to produce a disillusionment with the "national democracy" formula. During the period 1967-1974, there were fewer Soviet initiatives, and more stress on state-to-state relations. Highlights of this period included the significant and much-appreciated support provided to the Federal Military Government of Nigeria during its civil war, leading to quite good relations with an important state which previously had few Soviet ties, and showed no interest in scientific socialism. There also emerged, among some Soviet analysts, the intriguing doctrine that armies were the most stable and permanent institution in African states, and thus by implication a valuable focal point for Soviet cooperation. This may well explain the careful cultivation of the Somali military long before the declaration for Marxism-Leninism emerged in 1970, or the involvement with the security forces in Idi Amin's Uganda.

Set against the quite modest level of African involvement in the 1967-1974 period, the Angolan and Ethiopian episodes in particular did suggest a willingness, in certain circumstances, to become deeply involved in particular crises. Certainly the sheer scale of Soviet involvement, in terms of amount of military equipment shipped, number of technicians supplied, and diplomatic resources committed, far exceeded any earlier venture, except possibly for Egypt. A dramatic increase in the basic logistical capacity for rapid and large-scale response to crisis situations in distant areas was evident. Obviously, the Cuban dimension to the Angolan and Ethiopian affairs was a novel aspect. These events certainly convincingly demonstrate the capacity and willingness of the Soviet Union, in cooperation with Cuba, to forcibly intervene in African crises when favorable opportunities arise. Rather than further pursue this point, it is perhaps more interesting to examine the extent to which this development is matched by a more active policy in other realms. We will consider in turn the overall pattern of political military and economic relationships in Africa in recent years.

On the political front, we may note, on the one hand, a general desire for correct state-to-state relations with all African states willing to have them, and on the other somewhat preferential ties with states believed to be of "progressive" orientation. Only the latter qualify for such particular recognition as long-term treaties of friendship and cooperation, signed over the years with Egypt, Somalia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Angola (the Egyptian and Somali accords were denounced by these states in 1971 and 1978 respectively). The Afro-Marxist states generally have quite large Soviet diplomatic establishments, and active programs of Soviet cooperation in consolidating what might be termed the political infrastructure of these states: building a Leninist party, exploiting the state-controlled media, especially radio, training political police units, often with East German collaboration.

Relations may also be quite cordial even absent the sense of ideological fraternity. For example, CIA documentation suggests that countries such as

Nigeria and Sudan had 1390 and 1800 academic students respectively being trained in 1977 in Communist countries. While ties with Nigeria have been recently marred by events leading the Nigerians to expel a large number of Soviet military advisory personnel, overall quite friendly links have been paid with this very non-Marxist state. Diplomatic relations exist with all but a handful of countries (Swaziland, Malawi, Ivory Coast, South Africa).

Countries such as Egypt and Somalia have well demonstrated that there is nothing the Soviet Union can do should a particular country decide to reduce or even sever its ties. Nor has the Soviet Union intervened to present coups removing leaders occasionally seasoning their political language with Marxist lexicon, such as Ali Soilih of Comores, or Francisco Macias Nguema of Equatorial Guinea.

Indeed, there is ample evidence that the Soviets and their allies well recognize the precarious nature of political power in any African state; as one East German commentator recently put it: "In spite of the positive results that have been obtained so far, because of the weaker social base, the inconsistencies . . . in the thinking and behavior of predominantly petty-bourgeois-peasant forces of leadership, the lack of experience and cadres, and not least of all an account of the strong economical positions and the ideological influence over which imperialism continues to dispose in these countries, the development of the countries with a socialist orientation is by no means irreversible. Changes—conceivably of a precipitous nature—are possible." (Friedel Trappen and Ulbricht, Weishaupt, "Aktuelle Fragen Des Kampfes um Nationale und Soziale Befreiung im Subsaharischen Africa." *Deutsche Aussenpolitik*. XXIV, 2 (February 1979), 30).

Many observers have noted that by far the most striking dimension of Soviet relationships with Africa lies in the military field, especially in arms supply. In 1977, Soviet arms flow to less developed countries generally totalled \$4 billion, according to CIA estimates, contrasted to \$875 million of economic aid. A substantial number of countries now rely on the Soviet Union for such major weapons Systems as aircraft, tanks, missiles, and naval craft. For example, half of the 24 African states which, by 1978 data, had combat aircraft used Soviet planes. Though the majority of these might be considered as "progressive" states, the list also included countries such as Nigeria and Uganda. Beyond ideological preference, various factors explain African interest in Soviet equipment. Delivery is generally more expeditious than the Western Suppliers; terms of sale are often concessionary (though these are almost always sales, and not "aid"): Whatever doubts may exist as to the quality of Soviet commercial merchandise, their military equipment is certainly good. These kinds of considerations were certainly important in such major transactions as the 1974 \$1 billion sale to Libya. It may be noted in passing that acquisitions of the more technologically complex equipment, particularly the later model MIGs, will tie the purchasing country not only to Soviet supply of spare parts, but also supporting maintenance and logistical, and even operating personnel.

In the economic field, the Soviet role has been much more modest. In the aid sphere, it has been downright miserly, a fact which has by no means escaped the notice of African leaders. From 1954–1977, again according to CIA figures, aid to Africa from the USSR totalled \$3.28 billion. Of this, some 44 percent went to Egypt, and another 22 percent to Algeria. Next in importance was Guinea, with \$201 million. In 1977, there was only \$21 million of new commitment, almost all to Tanzania. From 1965–74, Africa received only about 15 percent of Soviet aid. What is particularly striking is the miniscule amounts of aid even for states espousing scientific socialist ideologies; in 1976 and 1977, countries such as Ethiopia, Benin, Mozambique, and Congo-Brazzaville received quite inconsequential amounts of new economic aid. Mozambique, apparently, is required to pay itself the salaries of the numerous East European technicians serving in the country.

Over the years, there have been some quite substantial Soviet projects in Africa, some primarily commercial. The Aswan Dam in Egypt was the first major undertaking. Some, such as the oft-publicized Nigerian iron and steel complex, have moved at glacial speed; the accord was first announced in 1968, the survey agreement in 1970, the site agreement in 1976, the go-ahead in 1977, and the final details were announced only this last summer. Two major undertakings which appear mainly motivated by Soviet raw materials needs were the \$2 billion phosphate deal with Morocco, announced in 1978, and a bauxite mine in

Guinea dating from the early 1970s. The latter was negotiated on terms extremely unfavorable to Guinea, with the Soviets initially paying only a third of the international market price for the ore. After two years of acrimonious renegotiation forced by the Guineans, they are now paying closer to the world price.

The most widespread form of Soviet economic accord in Africa has been with littoral states for fishing rights. Usually, the Soviets offer some aid in promotion of a national fishing operation; such accords exist with Morocco, Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Angola, Mozambique, Somalia and Mauritius. In several of the countries named, considerable controversy has emerged over the terms of these arrangements, which appear on close scrutiny highly advantageous to Soviet mercantile interests.

African trade with the Soviet Union is quite small, and expanding, only slowly. According to the most recent UN Statistical Yearbook, covering 1976 trade data, total African exports to the Soviet Union were only \$850 million, and imports from the USSR only \$730 million. The rate of trade growth with Africa since 1970 was lower than that with any other geographic region.

A number of very difficult obstacles stand in the way of Soviet trade with Africa. Soviet consumer goods compete poorly with Western equivalents, for which well-established consumer preferences exist. Of the major commodity exports from Africa, the Soviet Union either has its own supplies (copper, oil, vegetable oils), or does not encourage consumption of coffee.

Overall then, while military supply relationships are of considerable importance, and good political linkages are of such significance, the weakness of economic ties is quite striking.

African evaluations of Soviet objectives and performance vary, evidently, in function of the ideological perspectives of the regime, and the warmth of their Soviet ties. Overall, we may suggest several reasons why a number of African states may find good Soviet relations useful. Many find the Soviet connection a gauge of non-alignment; too exclusively Western linkages expose a regime to internal pressures as "neo-colonial" in its affinities. For the more radical states, warm Soviet ties may also symbolize anti-imperialist commitment. At times, balancing the Soviet tie against Western links provides a modest degree of leverage in dealing with more powerful partners. The Soviet Union may provide important diplomatic backing, particularly evident in southern African issues. It may be a source of arms supply not available from the West (civil war Nigeria, Somalia in the 1960s, Ethiopia more recently). A few regimes have made use of Cuban detachments as palace body guards (at different times, Guinea and Equatorial Guinea, among others).

There also are a number of widely shared, though usually discretely expressed, criticisms of the Soviet role. There is, to begin with, a general wariness of super-powers, and their preoccupations with their own rivalries. In some quarters, especially some of the francophonic West African states, there are apprehensions of Soviet subversion, and clandestine support for Marxist opposition groups. Arms supply to hostile neighbors is a major irritant (Tanzania regarding Amin's Uganda, Egypt regarding Libya, Kenya regarding Somalia, Zaire regarding Angola). There is quite widespread criticism, even among radical states, of poor Soviet performance on economic aid, limited possibilities for trade relationships, and the mediocre personal relationships of Soviet personnel with host country nationals.

Soviet objectives, in developing their African relationships, appear to have as point of departure the conviction that, as one of the two great powers in the world, they have the right and obligation to establish their presence wherever global crises are manifest. The growing capacity to project their power to distant places—so well exhibited in the Horn and Angola—reinforces this entitlement. So also does the self-confidence deriving from the strategic parity with the West established by the late 1960s, and possibly a belief that the tides of history are running in their favor. In more specific terms, discernable objectives include the desire for some littoral naval and air base, the former to extend the range of the Soviet Indian Ocean fleet, the latter for aerial patrolling of sea lanes and surveillance of nuclear submarine movements. One may also detect a "counter-imperial" theme in Soviet statements; that the strength of the socialist bloc will enable African states to weaken their ties with "imperialist" states. In recent years, a "counter-Chinese" strategy has been increasingly visible; it has been persuasively argued by Colin Legum that the Soviet decision to become in-

volved in Angola was initially influenced by fears of triumph by a Chinese-supported faction. In some instances, desire for access to resources seems to play a role: the ubiquitous fishing accord, the Moroccan phosphate deal, and the bauxite mine in Guinea are examples. Finally, a diplomatic presence in as many capitals as possible positions the Soviet Union to respond quickly to unanticipated opportunities.

In my own view, all of this falls far short of the "grand design" which some observers have detected. When the diplomatic, ideological, and strategic circumstances are favorable, the Soviet Union may again be a major participant in an African crisis, as it was in the Angolan and Ethiopian cases. Over the years, a number of African states have become more self-assertive; creating the impression of a "weakening" of Western influence. The emergence of the Afro-Marxist state is a significant event of the 1970s; however, these have not been subject to Soviet policy dictation. While, from the vantage point of Washington, there have been Soviet "gains"—there have also been "setbacks" (Guinea, Egypt, Somalia, Sudan). In any case, this ebb and flow of events and relationships is differently viewed in Africa, where the Soviet-American equilibrium is a less central preoccupation.

By way of conclusion, let me respond very succinctly to the specific queries in the invitation to testify:

(1) The Soviet Union, like the United States, seeks to maintain a diplomatic presence wherever possible. In a few countries, such as Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique, the involvement is quite intensive. Cuban involvement is much less extensive, and more concentrated in "progressive" states. Beyond mere diplomatic ties, the Cuban presence is most visible in the military field, though in countries such as Angola and Guinea-Bissau there is also some aid in such fields as health, and cooperation in building a socialist political apparatus. East German involvement has become more important in recent years, and enjoys high priority in Berlin, as evidenced by recent visits of top East German officials. Internal security has been the major sphere of technical assistance. Chinese involvement has sharply diminished, and appears increasingly motivated by opposition to Soviet moves.

(2) Though some "moderate" African states view Cuban activities in Africa with real apprehension, the majority of African leaders do not regard it as a significant threat. Cuba is too small and weak a country to harbor the kind of hegemonical ambitions Africans would believe to be a long-term threat. This is not to say Cuban military activity is always welcome. Whereas the Angolan role was generally accepted, because of South African and American intervention on behalf of other movements, the role in Ethiopia—especially the ambiguous involvement in the Eritrean campaign—was not enthusiastically greeted. Dr. Domingues has well stated the nature of the Soviet-Cuban nexus in Africa. Cuba marches to the beat of its own drums, though obviously Soviet material and logistical support is indispensable to its military ventures, which would not be forthcoming if the Soviets did not approve of Cuban actions.

(3) The Cuban role is shaped by a somewhat messianic self-concept as third world anti-imperial leader. They lack the resources to offer real economic aid, and have no significant trade relationships. They are able to supply some technicians, particularly in the paramedical field: though the quality of their personnel is disputed by some, they do enjoy excellent personal relationships with their hosts, unlike their Soviet counterparts.

(4) The Soviets themselves recognize that no gain in Africa is irreversible. Certainly the Soviets have privileged relationships with a larger number of African states than they did a few years ago. The permanence of these relationships depends upon a number of factors: stability of the incumbent regimes; alternative relationships available among the Western powers; in the long run, the relative ability of the West and the Soviet Union to effectively assist the countries concerned in overcoming the problems of underdevelopment. The Cubans have established themselves as significant actors on the African scene, but do not have the kind of capabilities which would permit a dominant position in a given country. The Chinese seem more preoccupied with their own development problems: the counter-Soviet preoccupation of their diplomacy has reduced their influence, despite the admiration felt by many for Chinese achievements.

(5) Soviet and Cuban involvement has been predominantly military and political. The Chinese have provided some modest and welcome economic aid: their major showcase project, the TAZARA railway, has been tarnished by the per-

sistent operating difficulties of this line, even though they are not responsible for its management.

(6) There are no Communist states in Africa, by any strict definition, though there are eight which label themselves as "Marxist-Leninist". Only two (Congo-Brazzaville and Somalia) have as much as a decade of history. Somalia in the early 1970s had some important achievements, though its economic potential is quite limited; it was hard-hit by the drought years of the Sahel zone, then the disastrous consequences of the 1977 invasion of Ethiopia. Congo-Brazzaville has been plagued by a poorly managed public sector, an over-sized state, and is heavily dependent on foreign-operated off-shore oil and dwindling timber exports. Returns are not in on the other Marxist-Leninist experiments, though there is reason to doubt whether the "scientific socialist" model provides a viable formula for organizing peasant agriculture, and the limited administrative resources of these states makes problematic the operation of a comprehensive parastatal sector.

(7) There is no evidence to date that the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty of socialist states, invoked to obliterate the Prague springtime, in 1968, or the kind of brutal intervention used to quell the Hungarian revolution in 1956 or the East German uprising in 1953, will be extended to Africa. Neither Cuba nor China has shown any evidence of hegemonical aspirations in Africa.

(8) The Soviets have held some base rights in Africa: for example, in Egypt, Somalia, and Guinea. In all three cases, these were subsequently revoked. At the present time, they no doubt have de facto access to some military facilities in Ethiopia and Angola, though not, as far as I know, formally sanctified (by treaty) base rights.

(9) If "Communist-dominated" governments are defined as regimes whose satellite relationship to the Soviet Union is analogous to East Germany or Bulgaria, these would clearly be harmful to United States interests. However, this is not what is at issue in the Afro-Marxist regimes. While these regimes will be very outspoken in international forums in support of radical third world positions, which may be quite close to Soviet positions on such issues as the Middle East or in general "anti-imperial" thrust, there is no reason why harmonious diplomatic relationships cannot be maintained; recent improvements in American ties in Benin and Congo-Brazzaville are cases in point. While the *weltanschauung* of these regimes will make them more suspicious of Western motives, cooperation on the basis of carefully defined mutual interest, especially in the economic sphere, is quite feasible.

(10) The Soviet Union is the most important potential (and actual) source of military supply for southern African liberation movements, and has provided vigorous and unambiguous diplomatic backing for the cause of African rule. To the extent that negotiated solutions based on fundamental principles of majority rule fail, and liberation movements for, forced to pursue their struggle by military means, Soviet military supply will necessarily be of critical importance to them. The Cuban role lies more in the influential position Castro plays in third world anti-imperial milieux. While early in this decade the Chinese were quite influential in liberation politics, they are not in a position to match the Soviets as arms suppliers, and the movements with which they were associated have lately been in eclipse.

The Soviets and Cubans are deeply enmeshed in the Horn crisis, and are likely to continue to be. In my judgment, though their massive aid to the current Ethiopian regime in 1977 probably averted the disintegration of the Ethiopian state, none of the underlying problems of the Ogaden or Eritrea are resolved. In the Western Sahara, the Soviets have played a very subdued role. Primary support for Polisario comes from Algeria.

(11) Soviet, Cuban, or Chinese "influence" in Africa is no more abnormal than American or Western "influence". While Soviet and Cuban "influence" is partly exercised in the direction of combatting what they see as "imperialist" positions in Africa and elsewhere, these arguments will in the long run be persuasive only to the extent that African leaders perceive American interests as antagonistic to their own. The appropriate response to this challenge is to pursue an African diplomacy which seeks out the common ground between American "interests" and African objectives, on the basis of mutual respect, and a sensitivity to African perspectives on the struggle for liberation and development.

(12) My understanding of Soviet strategy in Africa is stated in the body of the testimony. The overlapping but yet distinct goals pursued by Cuba have been convincingly analyzed by Dr. Dominguez in his October 1978 Foreign Affairs article.

Mr. SOLARZ. Let me begin by asking any of you who care to comment, do you have any estimate of the number of Cuban casualties in Angola and Ethiopia as a result of the military activities in which Cuban troops were engaged?

Mr. Harrop?

Mr. HARROP. All we can say, Mr. Chairman, is they have been substantial. We have had various suggestive intelligence information on this. We really do not have any figure in which we have any confidence.

Mr. SOLARZ. Are we talking about several thousand or a few hundred?

Mr. HARROP. I am not sure I can talk as between hundreds and thousands. Let me review that and see if we can submit for the record some representative figure. As I said our information is not as good as we would like it.

[The following was subsequently provided for the record.]

CUBAN CASUALTIES IN ANGOLA AND ETHIOPIA

We do not have precise figures on Cuban casualties in Angola and Ethiopia, but on the basis of fragmentary information and analysis, we believe the number of killed and wounded may well total a few thousand. The majority of these casualties have probably occurred in Angola, where Cuban troops have now been fighting for more than four years. Guerrilla activity in various parts of Angola continues to result in dead and wounded Cuban soldiers, though the numbers are fairly small. Cuban losses apparently were fairly heavy during the short but intense, Ogaden offensive in early 1978, but the relatively low level of Cuban combat activity since then suggests that Cuban casualties in Ethiopia, while continuing, are not high.

Mr. SOLARZ. Can any of you comment on whether or not Cuban forces are engaged in actual fighting combat activities in Angola and Ethiopia today?

Mr. HARROP. They are certainly engaged in Angola in combat activities. In Ethiopia the Cuban forces have been participating in the sweeps which the Ethiopian Government has been conducting in the Ogaden in recent months.

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. Let me add that is my same judgment, that the Cuban Government makes a distinction in the Ethiopian case between the Ogaden with Somali guerrillas and the like and Eritrea.

To go back to your question on the casualties I do not have a number, but two things might be worth saying. The Cuban Government claims they are insignificant, on the one hand at least in terms of numbers of people actually killed, and second they do admit that however insignificant the number of casualties is much higher in the war against Somalia than it was in Angola.

I think that is fairly self-evident, they were meeting a much more conventional army in Somalia rather than guerrillas in Angola.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do any of you have any judgment about how the Cuban people themselves feel about the Cuban military involvements in Africa? Do we have any sense of public opinion in Cuba? Obviously they do not have any visible manifestations of the kind of antiwar movement we had in our country during Vietnam.

Do you have any sense of whether, by and large, the Cuban people approve of what their Government is doing in Africa? Do they oppose it? Do we simply have no way of knowing?

Mr. HARROP. I defer to Professor Dominguez.

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. There is certainly nothing one would call good or extensive evidence. My own efforts at looking at this suggest little bits and pieces of evidence. There is some evidence of resistance to the military draft. There is some evidence of factory managers learning all the loopholes of a draft law so that their skilled mechanics are not drafted to go to Angola to fix up tanks. There is some evidence of insubordination but very small. This comes from the Cuban military press.

The other kind of comment I might make is I was in Havana in January and walked quite freely and tried to talk to a great many people. I might summarize these conversations as follows. There were really two quite different themes. One was pride. The Yankees could not win in Vietnam and we have now won twice that was one way to summarize this mood.

The other theme which is quite important is virtually everyone I knew also knew of someone who had fought in Angola and Ethiopia and had been injured or had been killed, a loved one or a friend or a relative and the like. That would be somewhat contrary to the view that casualties were so limited particularly if one includes not just people who were killed but people who were injured.

There was really a sense of loss and concern about what appears to many of them an open ended commitment.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Harrop, could you tell us, and if you do not have the answer offhand could you submit it for the record, how many African students are studying in the Soviet Union and in other Communist countries in comparison of the number of African students who are studying in the United States and other Western countries?

Mr. HARROP. I think I had better submit that, Mr. Chairman.

[The information referred to follows:]

As of December 1978 there were 11,600 academic students from sub-Saharan Africa in the Soviet Union. There were 8,235 in Eastern Europe and 140 in China. During the 1977-78 school year there were 29,560 African students in the United States. We do not have available to us comparable figures for those studying in Western Europe. Most probably those far exceed the number studying in either the Soviet Union or the United States.

Mr. SOLARZ. Could you also let us know for the record how much economic assistance the Soviet Union has been providing to Africa over the course of the last several years in comparison to the amount of economic assistance the United States has been providing, and where possible, could you give us a breakdown of the countries which have been the recipients of such aid.

Mr. HARROP. We have statistics on that which we will be glad to provide for the record.

Mr. SOLARZ. I think if you could also supplement that with statistics on the economic aid being contributed to Africa by other Eastern bloc countries in comparison to the economic aid being provided to Africa by other Western countries that would also be helpful.

[The materials referred to follow:]

TOTAL OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA¹

[Commitments in millions of dollars]

Donor groups	1974		1975		1976		1977		1978 estimate	
	Commitment	Percent	Commitment	Percent	Commitment	Percent	Commitment	Percent	Commitment	Percent
Total	4,612	100	4,585	100	5,054	100	6,275	100	6,695	100
I. Bilateral (Free World and Communist)	2,529	55	3,731	60	2,575	51	3,277	68	3,485	52
Multilateral	1,179	25	1,383	30	1,656	33	1,998	32	2,260	34
European Communities (ECF) ^a	305	7	176	4	515	10	772	12	850	13
International organizations	874	19	1,207	26	1,141	23	1,226	20	1,410	21
Bilateral and multilateral (OPEC) ^a	904	20	471	10	823	16	1,000	16	950	14
I. United States ^c	270	6	294	6	735	7	737	6	470	7
AID	131	3	160	4	717	4	719	4	330	5
Public Law 480	117	3	108	2	717	2	712	2	319	2
Peace Corps	22	(*)	26	(*)	733	1	728	(*)	21	(*)
Ex-Im Bank (nonadditive)	(84)	(2)	(125)	(121)	798	(2)	749	(2)		
II. Other Free World	4,008	87	4,058	89	4,572	90	5,785	92	6,105	91
A. European (17 countries)	2,027	44	2,138	48	2,413	48	3,157	50	3,320	50
France	562	12	715	16	617	12	597	10	620	9
United Kingdom	170	4	198	4	233	5	154	2	155	2
West Germany	344	7	393	9	313	6	398	6	415	6
Other (12 countries)	646	14	706	15	735	15	1,236	20	1,280	20
European Communities	305	7	176	4	515	10	772	12	850	13

B. Non-European.....	1, 107	24	663	15	1, 018	20	1, 402	22	1, 375	20
Canada.....	203	4	192	4	195	4	402	6	425	6
Oil producers (9 OPEC countries).....	904	20	471	11	823	16	1, 000	16	950	14
C. International organizations.....	874	19	1, 207	26	1, 141	22	1, 226	20	1, 410	21
IBRD (loans).....	394	9	594	13	494	10	505	8	584	9
IDA (loans).....	364	8	373	8	419	9	373	6	429	6
IFC (loans).....	3	(1)	2	(1)	27	1	26	(1)	32	(1)
U.S. programs (grants) ¹⁰	73	1	83	2	70	1	88	2	193	3
African Development Bank.....	40	1	155	3	131	1	234	4	172	3
U.S.S.R.....	334	7	233	5	129	3	119	2	120	2
China.....	17	(1)	73	2	26	1	21	(1)	10	---
East Europe.....	237	5	150	3	57	1	10	(1)	50	---
	80	2	10	(1)	46	1	88	2	515	---

¹ ODA is defined as gross commitments of grants and of concessional loans for development purposes and excludes other official flows consisting mainly of export credits. Exceptions made in this table are the inclusion of nonconcessional loans from the IBRD, IFC and AFDB (African Development Bank). An unknown portion of U.S.S.R. and Eastern European aid to Africa is also nonconcessional.

² European Communities' assistance consists of the European Development Fund grants and soft loans (EDF) and part of the communities' budget (food aid, emergency relief, and some TA), both of which are financed by the 9 members (Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom).

³ Actual.

⁴ Of which bilateral assistance amounted to \$443,000,000 in 1974, and \$438,000,000 in 1975. Only combined data available for 1976. Oil producers comprise Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Kuwait, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates. Multilateral organizations are Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD), Special Arab Fund of Africa (SAFA), Technical Assistance Fund for Africa, and Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (ABEDA).

⁵ Estimate.

⁶ Although data are reported and used by the donor community, U.S. fiscal year data are used here for assistance from International Organizations and from the United States, to avoid confusion regarding the figures prepared for congressional committees which are provided on a fiscal year basis, and are published for the Congress in AID's "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations."

⁷ 15 mo., i.e., fiscal year 1976 plus transitional quarter.

⁸ Negligible.

⁹ Recent changes in donor aid levels partly reflect fluctuations in exchange rates.

¹⁰ U.N. data are not available on a commitments or an expenditures basis. Nor are they comparable since definitions change frequently. (For explanation see notes in "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations." Data for the U.N. specialized agencies has not been available since fiscal year 1969.)

Note: Table comprises all independent African countries including former and current recipients of AID. Data are by calendar year. Exceptions are IBRD, IDA, IFC and AFDB loans and U.S. assistance which are by U.S. fiscal year for the reason explained under footnote 10.

Kenya	405.3	209.7	33.6	34.0	15.4	5.0	121.7	196.6	110.4	3.8	2.0	9.1	71.3
Lesotho	57.0	40.2	6.7	1.9	3.5	15.9	12.2	16.8	2.5	---	1.0	5.8	7.5
Madagascar	131.0	63.2	7.7	16.3	3.7	36.8	5.7	117.8	32.0	9.0	3.8	24.7	48.3
Mauritius	50.2	20.9	3.3	1.0	2.2	13.2	9.9	29.3	11.1	---	7.7	5.0	12.5
Nigeria	86.4	18.2	---	9.0	3.7	5.5	5.0	68.2	62.0	---	5.4	---	8.8
Seychelles	14.7	14.5	1.1	9.2	4.7	1.1	4.4	2	---	---	---	---	(*)
Sierra Leone	19.6	19.6	4.0	2.9	4.6	7.7	7.4	28.4	8.2	---	3	5.0	14.9
Sudan	216.4	139.1	16.2	2.2	14.3	1.0	40.4	77.3	57.0	---	5.2	---	15.1
Swaziland	67.6	35.3	1.4	26.7	6.6	1.7	4.9	32.3	13.0	---	(*)	14.5	4.8
Tanzania	651.3	500.4	21.9	8.4	36.4	92.4	319.3	130.9	72.2	---	5.2	11.0	62.5
Uganda	17.7	3.6	---	11.7	1.2	2.3	1.3	14.1	---	---	6.6	5.0	8.5
Zambia	171.5	119.7	2	11.7	6.4	21.0	80.4	51.8	30.1	---	8	---	20.9
EAC	11.8	16.8	---	2.3	---	2.2	4.3	5.0	---	---	---	5.0	---
C. Other areas	1,089.6	676.1	83.7	45.6	74.8	30.2	403.1	413.5	171.7	.3	26.1	40.4	175.0
Angola	14.9	6.7	1.2	---	---	---	6.7	8.2	---	---	3.7	---	4.5
Burundi	70.8	44.1	1.1	7.2	(*)	10.0	25.5	26.7	13.4	---	1.7	---	11.6
Cape Verde	30.3	25.8	5.5	1.8	4.8	1.0	12.7	4.5	---	---	6	---	3.1
Equatorial Guinea	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Ethiopia	188.6	74.2	6.9	2.3	7.3	7.3	34.5	114.4	57.0	---	10.5	5.0	41.9
Guinea-Bissau	45.0	26.9	2.0	2.6	4.3	---	17.8	18.1	---	---	3	---	17.8
Liberia	89.9	41.3	19.5	---	9.2	---	2.3	48.6	20.3	.3	6	6.7	20.7
Mozambique	124.7	108.2	5.2	1.3	3.3	2.2	99.2	15.5	---	---	3.5	8.0	4.0
Rwanda	149.0	80.0	1.7	1.1	12.1	4.8	45.5	69.0	14.0	---	1.1	12.5	41.4
Sao Tome and Principe	3.2	2.4	3	---	---	---	1.4	8	---	---	3	---	5
Somalia	63.4	25.4	---	3	12.3	2	11.8	38.0	20.0	---	1.9	6.5	9.6
Zaire	309.8	210.1	40.5	20.5	14.7	18.5	145.7	69.7	47.0	---	3.6	---	19.1
D. AFR regional	184.7	155.7	66.4	108.9	2.2	11.8	12.9	29.0	---	---	17.3	2.4	9.3
E. Africa undistributed	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

¹ Official development assistance (ODA) comprises grants and concessional loans for development. However, table does include nonconcessional loans from the IBRD, IFC, AfDB, and Soviet and Eastern European countries.

² Commitments of other members of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee were (in millions of dollars): Belgium 225, of which 191 to former territories (Zaire 139, Rwanda 40, and Burundi 25), Sweden 355, of which 182 to Tanzania, 36 to Kenya, and 12 to Botswana; Netherlands 295, of which 71 to Tanzania, 40 to Kenya, 7 to Mali and Upper Volta; Norway 104; Denmark 77, of which 28 to Tanzania and 10 to Kenya; Japan 70, of which 18 to Zambia and 15 to Niger; Finland 20; Switzerland 28; Australia 11; Austria 28; and New Zealand 1 or less.

³ Total includes OPEC estimates for which a recipient breakdown is not yet available.

⁴ Of which (in millions of dollars): China 10 (20 to Liberia); Eastern Europe 88 (62 to Sudan, 23 to Ethiopia, and 1 to Mozambique); and U.S.S.R. 21 (19 to Tanzania, 1 to Ghana and 1 to Guinea).

⁵ European Communities' 9 donors are: Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.

Note: U.S. ODA consists of AID, Public Law 480 and Peace Corps. All data are by calendar year except for the IBRD, IDA, IFC, AfDB and U.N.

COMMUNIST ECONOMIC CREDITS AND GRANTS EXTENDED TO LDC's

{In millions of U.S. dollars}

	1954-78				1977				1978			
	Total	U.S.S.R.	Eastern Europe	China	Total	U.S.S.R.	Eastern Europe	China	Total	U.S.S.R.	Eastern Europe	China
Guinea	405	212	110	83	1	1	1	---	(1)	---	---	(1)
Guinea-Bissau	28	11	(2)	17	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Ivory Coast	66	48	(2)	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Kenya	23	---	---	18	23	---	---	23	---	---	---	---
Liberia	109	20	(1)	89	---	---	---	---	6	6	---	(1)
Madagascar	213	90	23	100	---	---	---	---	1	1	---	---
Mali	40	5	---	35	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Mauritius	82	5	17	60	17	5	12	(1)	2	---	2	---
Mozambique	54	2	---	52	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Niger	87	7	80	22	---	---	---	---	NA	---	---	(2)
Nigeria	23	1	---	18	---	---	---	---	NA	---	---	---
Rwanda	18	---	---	60	(1)	(1)	---	---	(1)	---	---	(1)
Sao Tome-Principe	103	8	35	4	---	---	---	---	4	---	---	4
Senegal	4	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Seychelles	69	28	---	41	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Sierra Leone	325	164	6	155	(1)	---	(1)	---	18	---	---	18
Somalia	387	65	240	82	62	---	62	---	24	---	24	(1)
Sudan	423	38	23	362	18	18	---	---	3	---	3	---
Tanzania	45	---	---	45	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Togo	31	16	---	15	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Uganda	57	6	---	51	---	---	---	---	(1)	(1)	---	(1)
Upper Volta	103	---	---	103	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Zaire	402	9	62	331	---	---	---	---	12	---	12	---
Zambia	629	67	469	93	58	---	19	39	381	---	352	29
Other	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Total	30,930	17,088	9,036	4,756	982	402	397	182	5,394	3,707	1,502	185

Africa	9,007	3,989	2,350	2,668	304	31	154	119	2,708	2,010	627	71
North Africa	4,183	2,918	934	331	92		35	57	2,130	2,000	110	20
Algeria	1,332	2,716	524	92								
Mauritania	105	8	170	87								
Morocco	2,303	2,098	210	97	92		35	57	2,089	2,000	89	
Tunisia	40	96	20	20								
Other	4,825	1,071	1,416	2,338	212	31	119	62	40		20	20
Sub-Saharan Africa	105	17	88	44	6	6	(1)		579	11	517	51
Angola	49	5	(2)						77	1	76	
Botswana	17											
Burundi	20			17								
Cameroun	79	8		20								
Cape Verde	6	3	1	71								
Central African Empire	17	3		2	(1)			(1)	3	3		(1)
Chad	55	5		14					(1)			(1)
Comoros	(2)			50								
Coni'o	163	28	60	(2)	3		3					
Equatorial Guinea	1	1		75								
Ethiopia	302	105	95	102	23		23					
Galon	27		2	25					45	(1)	45	
Gambia	17	(1)		17					2		2	
Ghana	241	94	105	42	1	1						

1 Not figible.

2 Not available.

Mrs. FENWICK. What about military students?

Mr. SOLARZ. That has already been submitted for the record. I thought this should be a supplement.

If we have basically chosen to compete as Secretary Newsom suggested through economic aid to Africa rather than through matching the Russians rifle for rifle with military assistance we should have some sense of how we are competing in the economic aid area.

Let me ask the three of you if you care to comment on the extent to which the African countries themselves take note of this disparity between our presumptive willingness to be much more generous with economic aid than the Russians, and the Russians' willingness to be much more generous with military aid than we are, and to comment on what the political implications of that are in Africa.

Do we get credit for appearing to be concerned about their genuine development problems in relationship to a lesser measure of concern by the Russians, or do they say that is all well and good but we have to protect ourselves and do they therefore seem to appreciate the Russians more for being more responsive with their military assistance?

Mr. YOUNG. I think it is really only in the last 3 or 4 years that this kind of disparity has become very evident. In my own travels in Africa even in states that fall under the scientific socialist category I have widely heard this observation made, whereas there is perhaps in those states both a desire for military equipment and an understanding and even support for the magnitude of Soviet supply and military support efforts in situations such as Angola and to some extent even Ethiopia.

These states, particularly those that have tried very hard to develop economic relations with the Soviet Union and discovered how difficult it is, have become acutely aware of the limitations.

We have seen as a kind of underreported but quite significant event changes in orientations of countries like Guinea-Bissau, a country which people used to list amongst those states that belong in the scientific socialist category and no longer is perhaps so classifiable.

In 1977 when this state, which had received a great deal of support for its liberation struggle from the Soviet Union and Cuba and so forth, which had been greatly appreciated, when there was a failure of the rice crop, the shortfall in the rice for which there was no foreign exchange [the country has a nonconvertible currency], aid came entirely from Western sources. The Soviet Union made an inconsequential symbolic contribution, that was very much noticed and has given our very able Ambassador in that country the opportunity not to alter positions taken by that country in international forum but quietly to build a quite constructive relationship based upon mutual economic interest.

I think while this has not manifested in a very dramatic public or visible way it is significant. The limitation to it is of course the limitation to the amount of aid that we ourselves are able to offer to African States which representatives of trans-Africa and others have pointed out to the public is really not very great.

Mr. HARROP. I might just add a word or two to that. We of course have a very important supplement and in fact some feel it is more important than our official aid and that is our private investment in

the developing world which is not a resource available to the Soviet Union. I think this is a significant matter. I think we have seen many of the countries in Africa which are thought of either self-styled or generally acknowledged to be progressive countries or radical countries or sympathetic to the socialist side now much more widely seeking **Western private investment.**

There are many examples of this. Guinea is one. Angola is one. The front line states have recently begun to organize a southern African regional development program. They have had a major meeting on that to which they invited the major Western countries as well as the International Bank and the Soviets are also handicapped by not being part of the world economic system. They are not members of those institutions. Their ruble is not convertible.

Mr. SOLARZ. I do not think either of you has really answered the question. The question is: To what extent is there a general perception in Africa that the United States and the West are much more able and willing than the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc countries to provide assistance in dealing with social and economic as distinguished from security problems and to what extent if that perception exists do we get political credit for our actions?

Is this simply a kind of abstract construction which has been invented in Washington, and other places, which has no political meaning in Africa.

Mr. HARROP. I meant to be answering by saying yes, I think there is a recognition of that. I think the fact that the front line states which of course include Mozambique and Angola are interested in turning to the West for assistance demonstrates they recognize where that kind of support is likely to come.

Mr. SOLARZ. Professor Dominguez and Professor Young, and Secretary Harrop if you care to answer, to what extent do you think the Cubans might be inclined to remove or substantially reduce their troop presence in Africa if we were to eliminate the embargo against Cuba and completely normalize our diplomatic relationship with Cuba?

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. I guess the answer to that question is we do not know and we will never know until we try it, if we try it. My own sense has been and it really is just that but it is that the Cuban Government has been interested for some time and remains interested and will again become actively interested in 1981 to improve its relations with the United States.

I think similarly they would like to reduce their military combat exposure in African countries. These are two objectives which good diplomats as we have ought to be able without linking them perhaps explicitly which the Cubans would not accept but in fact these are two kinds of activities that can be done on a gradual basis to mutual benefit and mutual interest and are quite workable. One would help bring about the other.

Mr. SOLARZ. You are supposed to be the Cuban expert. In your judgment if we were to move forward with the elimination of the embargo and the normalization of diplomatic relations without explicitly linking these steps to a Cuban military reduction in Africa, do you think in fact the Cubans would in response to that initiative significantly reduce their military presence in Africa?

Mr. DOMÍNGUEZ. In my judgment if one is willing to move to eliminate by steps, if one wishes which is perfectly feasible, the U.S. embargo on Cuba the Cubans fully understand we also want them, as an unstated quid pro quo, to reduce their presence in Africa and my judgment would be they would.

Mr. SOLARZ. Professor Young?

Mr. YOUNG. I would add to that only that I cannot imagine they would withdraw themselves either from Angola or Ethiopia unless there were at the same time conditions in those two countries that permitted their withdrawal without an immediate collapse of the regimes they have been involved with.

Mr. SOLARZ. You agree with Professor Dominguez they would reduce significantly their military presence, if not completely eliminate it, in response to a lifting of the embargo and normalization of relations?

Mr. YOUNG. I would be surprised if you could negotiate on some kind of quid pro quo basis that kind of thing. I think the resolution of the embargo situation would create a more favorable climate in relationships which facilitate this kind of outcome.

There would still be the specific problem of dealing with the UNITA affair in Angola and the Eritrean and Ogaden thing in Ethiopia. I do not think they could afford in terms of their carefully cultivated prestige and standing in Africa to be seen to be simply abandoning regimes.

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. I agree. I was commenting on a question of reduction and not of total elimination. I would view a complete removal of Cuban forces in Africa really to be a matter to be decided by the local circumstances in those countries.

Mr. SOLARZ. If the local circumstances changed in such a way that Angola's problems with UNITA were resolved and Ethiopia's problems with the Western Somalia Liberation Front and Somalia were resolved, under those circumstances, do you anticipate the Cuban forces would be withdrawn, or would they remain?

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. You are now asking us to be very cheerful. My guess would be the Cubans would be much more eager to withdraw from Ethiopia where, it seems to me, one can have the sense they feel this is not the wisest decision they have taken to be there. They have a variety of differences and problems with the Ethiopian Government.

If they could have a way to pull out from Ethiopia, I think they would.

In the Angolan case, the Cuban commitment is more open ended and they would, I think, be happy to reduce their combat presence, but they would probably retain a large number of civilian advisers. It seems to me their commitment to that government is much more extensive.

Mr. HARROP. I really have difficulty with the thesis that the Cuban presence in Africa is somehow a function or closely related to their relationship with the United States. Whatever the arguments pro and con may be for an improvement of United States-Cuban relations or of diplomatic recognition, I have great difficulty seeing how a change in relations with the United States would automatically lead to Cuba seeing its own role in Africa as different than it now sees it.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mrs. Fenwick.

Mrs. FENWICK. What would Cuba do if we said we would like you to free Matos and the other political prisoners before we start talking more freely? What would they do if we said we would like compensation for the expropriated U.S. assets?

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. On the question of political prisoners, Cuba at long last, after having held large numbers of political prisoners for longer periods of time than virtually any other regime in Latin America, has in recent months been releasing a good many of these political prisoners.

Mrs. FENWICK. Not just the Americans?

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. Not just the Americans, but Cuban nationals who have been in jail, a number of whom have come to the United States or who have gone to other countries in the hemisphere.

Mrs. FENWICK. Do you have numbers on that?

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. The Cuban Government's official numbers were, before this process of release began, that they had about 3,000 political prisoners, although they reject the term "political prisoners." I believe the schedule was they would be down to about 500 or so that they believed they had to keep because they had committed very violent activities against the state.

Mrs. FENWICK. What about Matos?

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. His term is officially about to be up.

Mrs. FENWICK. October 25.

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. We will be able to see what the circumstances will be. My guess is, the Cuban Government will free him and deport him.

Mrs. FENWICK. That would be marvelous.

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. I would agree. That is purely a guess.

On the question of political prisoners as a precondition, my guess is they would say we are, in fact, doing it and we had not done it before.

Mrs. FENWICK. Do you believe it is true?

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. That they are freeing these people? Yes. We have seen many of them land in the United States.

Mrs. FENWICK. That there were so few to begin with?

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. There one now gets into the question of the number of people one would describe accurately as prisoners of conscience, those who did not take up arms against the regime. I think those numbers are likely to be virtually ended by the time this release program is over.

There are those who resisted, and at times very mildly, the policies of the Government, and the Government claims those are not political prisoners in the sense we might use the term. Those numbers are larger. How large, we do not know.

Mrs. FENWICK. What about the compensation for the land?

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. The compensation for the property taken—the Cuban Government has recognized in principle that it owes compensation. The Cuban Government has, in fact, paid compensation to a number of countries and have negotiated agreements with a number of countries such as France and Switzerland, for example, but usually tied to some trade deal.

The way it is done is a part of the proceeds from the sale of sugar to Switzerland going to a compensation fund out of which property is paid for.

It would certainly be inconceivable of Cuba to agree to a compensation schedule without some action on the trade embargo.

My guess is, we get into the old game of how many chips one has. If one believes, as I do, that one might be able to relate some action on the Cuban military presence in Africa to the embargo, then the Cubans would say, what else would you do for us rather than removing the embargo, and one possibility is we will say we will not do anything else, in which case they will say we will not do anything else.

That gets us into problems of U.S. trade law and the question of compensation and a variety of other things.

Mrs. FENWICK. I have other questions, but I will yield to the chairman.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mrs. Fenwick.

Professor Dominguez, you indicated the Cubans felt they might have made a mistake in going into Ethiopia. This is news to me. I do not necessarily doubt it is the case. I think it would be helpful if you could elaborate on that and let us know what these differences between Cuba and Ethiopia are, to which you alluded in your response, and why they seem to be having difficulties with Ethiopia that, you feel, they do not have with Angola.

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. "Mistake" may be a little strong; maybe more doubtful about it. I think there are a number of reasons. I think they believe the MPLA is more serious about its Marxism-Leninism than the Mengistu Government. I think they believe the MPLA has a policy with which they can identify more in terms of race relations than the Mengistu Government does, particularly not only to Eritrea, but toward other communities within Ethiopia.

Those would be two of the main reasons. I think the Eritrean feature—the Cubans have supported the Eritreans. I think they continue to feel uncomfortable about this. A number of the countries, as Secretary Newsom indicated earlier, that seem to be supporting Eritrea are countries with which Cuba has had quite good relations. It strains Cuba's relations with these countries.

Within the nonaligned movement, which Cuba now chairs, there is a good deal of tension over the question of Eritrea.

I do not believe the Cubans would just simply cut and run, and I want to agree with Professor Young's comment that they would simply cut and run from Ethiopia. I do think they feel much more ambivalent about their relations with the Ethiopian Government than they do with Angola.

Mr. SOLARZ. How would you compare the level of military activity in the Ogaden today to the level of military activity in Angola? I do not mean on the part of the Cubans, but I mean in terms of the actual fighting that is going on. Are they both very active or equally active? Is one much more active than the other?

Mr. HARROP. They are both quite active. I think somewhat more so in the Ogaden now than in Angola. Ogaden has really seen a number of engagements in recent months, and very substantial casualties appear to have taken place.

Mr. SOLARZ. Professor Young, do you think scientific socialism, to the extent it has been established and applied in various African governments, constitutes a model for effective economic and social devel-

opment that is applicable elsewhere in Africa? To what extent is it applicable in comparison to other models for social and economic development, such as the Ivory Coast or Kenya, which have followed, perhaps, a more capitalist kind of orientation, or such as some of the one-party African States like Zambia and Tanzania, which are not scientific socialist?

Mr. YOUNG. It is a fascinating question.

The first state to officially describe itself as Marxist-Leninist was Congo-Brazzaville, and it did so only in 1969. Somalia did so in 1970. The rest have all come on since 1975. It is, perhaps, premature to make a very definitive kind of judgment on that because the experience is still very brief.

I might note in passing that the Soviets themselves have some skepticism about the ideological purity or commitment of several of the regimes that so describe themselves, particularly with relation to Congo-Brazzaville, Benin, and Madagascar. They themselves do not call these scientific socialist regimes, but rather socialist oriented countries, a category in which they include not only the eight that I listed, but also some others such as Tanzania, Libya, Algeria. In other words, they do not make such a sharp distinction as the regimes themselves do in their own political vocabulary.

They, as well as others, recognize that the conditions for rigorously pursuing a Marxist-Leninist model of economic development really are not present in most of these states, and the kind of command economy and the kind of comprehensive planning requires a state apparatus which none of these countries is able to command.

An interesting distinction has sometimes been made in Soviet sources between Ethiopia and the others on the ground that Ethiopia is the only one of these states that has had an internal revolution where there was a real element of class struggle internally. The rest of them are merely national liberation movements or, in the case of several of them, merely military juntas who are describing themselves as Marxist-Leninists.

I think in almost all cases, the extent to which the Marxist-Leninist or scientific socialist model has been applied in practice has been somewhat limited, although they have tended to construct quite extensive public sectors.

Generally, they have not endeavored really in scientific socialist structures in their rural policy, with the partial exception of Mozambique, and now in the last few weeks Ethiopia has announced it is going to try and move to collective agricultural production.

I think every experiment that has been made in this direction in Africa suggests that the likelihood of success of collective production policy is extremely slim, that it is highly likely to encounter strong peasant resistance. In the face of strong peasant resistance, the state is simply not able to do what Stalin did in the 1930's, or what was achieved in China or some other places.

The problem with limited administrative resources for effectively managing a very large public sector has been a very big one. Countries like Congo-Brazzaville have had a running crisis with their public sector which has been deficit ridden. Former President Yombi cited a figure of some \$5 million as the collective deficit of the public sector which, in a \$700 million GNP, is a very big figure.

All of these things serve to constrain the extent to which this model can be fully applied. There has been no example in which it has led to really melodramatic success. On the other hand, neither has it led to striking failure.

Mrs. FENWICK. I do not think we should be surprised that collective farming does not work in Africa because it does not work in Russia or anywhere else either. It is not productive. Where they have tried, they are moving more and more toward individual holdings and fewer and fewer collectives. You know what happened in Russia itself, where the private plots are so much more productive.

It is not an African weakness. It is human. It does not work in Russia, so there is no reason to believe it is going to work in Africa either. Russia tried it for 50 years.

I would like to know a little bit more. We have never had a colony in Africa. We have given aid. One of the colonial powers, such as France is extremely popular and has strong economic ties with Africa. Their troops are invited in all the time to help, and then they go away.

We have become a sort of pariah. In the case of Congo-Brazzaville, they will not change their orientation and they will vote for the Soviet Union every time and they will line up against us every time they can. Privately, they are beginning to be more friendly because we are making such efforts, but not publicly.

It is as though they had a pariah friend whom they only spoke to when the shades were drawn. It is as though we were some kind of a horror. I do not know how we have gotten into this position.

That is one question I would like to ask. The other one is, why do these nations who need food and products for their people keep turning to a model that does not work?

That is what absolutely baffles me. For instances, Tanzania. Mr. Nyerere is supposed to be so extremely able. Kenya is doing pretty well right next door, and he does not copy Kenya. He is trying something that has not worked for 50 years.

Mr. YOUNG. I think if any prophet had a development model to offer to Africa that was guaranteed to be effective in all circumstances and contexts, that the continent could be swept. Whether we are talking about basically capitalist or liberal market economy models, whatever, there is a very mixed pattern.

Kenya, which you mentioned as an example, has been effective in certain respects, yet the country experiences very serious balance of payments problems at the present time. In the case of situations like Kenya and Ivory Coast with very good growth rates there is an opinion, especially among young people in these countries, that the price that has been paid for that growth rate in terms of the very heavy foreign presence, particularly in the Ivory Coast—and there are arguments as to the equality of distribution of the benefits of growth.

That is on the one hand, and on the other you have the very modest, if not mediocre, results of those pursuing the scientific socialist pathway.

I think in the eyes of people who are making these choices and evaluations, that is, African intellectuals and officials and so forth, it is not so clear, on the one hand, that socialist policies always fail or, on the other hand, that market economy policies always work.

Mrs. FENWICK. Do they not go to Russia and then go to Belgium? Do they not see what works?

Mr. YOUNG. There are a number of things that, if you do go from Moscow to Western Europe, I think that any of us who made that journey, as I did this summer, certainly are personally and tremendously struck by the contrast and difference. I am not sure the African university student making the same journey comes back with the same kind of impressions, if he or she is evaluating that contrast.

However, I think the prestige of the Soviet model is much less than it was 10 years ago, and one of the important new things in the world is, there is no longer an authoritative model of socialist development as there was 10 or 15 years ago. In this sense they can describe themselves as scientific socialists, without that implying that they necessarily will follow A, B, C, D, E, and F as it did apply when the Chinese revolutionary regime came to power and when the Vietnamese came to power.

People see some achievements and realizations and they also see some flaws and defects in these different models. They see that in all of them there are tremendous difficulties and obstacles to transferring them and applying them to the overwhelming problems, such as the poverty that afflicts a state like Guinea-Bissau.

Mr. SOLARZ. Could any of you let us know why the East Germans are running around Africa as compared to any of the other East European countries? Do the East Germans feel they have some special vocation for Africa?

In the case of Cuba one can understand, even if one does not fully agree, with the sense of identification the Cubans have since part of their people are descendants of Africa and there are certain ideological affinities of Third World countries.

But how does East Germany get involved in this and why East Germany rather than Czechoslovakia, or Hungary, or Romania?

Mr. HARROP. In a portion of his testimony which Mr. Newsom did not cite in his oral presentation, he cited the fact that the East Germans apparently were motivated starting some 10 to 15 years ago by their interest in obtaining competition with the Federal Republic and showing they could be in fact a dominant force on their own in Africa. I think that was a large part of it. They perhaps started from that position and then began as they obtained that recognition which I think they have very much in Africa, they have simply exploited it.

I must say I am a bit at a loss myself to explain why relatively they have devoted so much more of their resources to Africa than other Eastern European countries have.

I think it certainly began from their need to demonstrate they were a sovereign power and an international strength of their own.

Mr. SOLARZ. Profesor Young?

Mr. YOUNG. I think in sharp contrast to the Cuban perspectives on Africa that the East German venture has to be understood above all in terms of the East German situation in Europe and the East German relationship to the Soviet Union, the haunting fear of the East German regime of abandonment by the Soviet Union in the context of some kind of overall settlement with Germany.

The fact is that after 30 years this regime, unlike the Cuban regime, has not been able to legitimize itself internally. The necessity felt by the East German leadership to demonstrate its utility to the Soviet Union is reflected in a remarkable level of high-level East German trips, the visit of Honecker himself to several African countries earlier this year. The quite extensive East German role in this case is entirely integrated with and tied to the Soviet role, to demonstrate not only East Germany's recognition which has been achieved as of several years ago but also the distinctive and important East German contribution to the overall well-being of the socialist camp.

Mr. HARROP. I would agree.

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. Just to amplify on these remarks I might add the Cuban Government has welcomed the East German participation insofar as I can tell in these endeavors and East Germany has increased both its trade with Cuba and its assistance to Cuba in recent years. The pattern of East Germany spread overseas has increased also in the Cuban case.

Mrs. FENWICK. We understand there are East Germans in South Yemen also. Are there also Cubans?

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. Yes; there have been Cubans in South Yemen for many years.

Mrs. FENWICK. Technical or military?

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. Both, military and civilian.

Mr. SOLARZ. Professor Dominguez, could you let us know what advice, if any, the Cubans gave the Angolans with respect to Namibia, with respect to the resolution of Angola's differences with Zaire, and with respect to the continuing conflict against UNITA?

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. It is obviously difficult to tell you with great accuracy not having been privy to those conversations. The only way I could be responsive to your remarks would be to partly relate what the Cuban Government has said it has done and that is in the case of Zaire and Shaba II in particular I think is fairly clear.

They have said they did not want war between Zaire and Angola either directly or by proxy in part quite frankly because they feared Cuban troops would become even more vulnerable than they already were and it was in Cuba's interest as well as in Angola's interest to stabilize the relations between Angola and Zaire.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you personally believe with respect to Shaba II the Cubans were not involved?

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. I personally believe with respect to Shaba II that the Cubans were not involved in the actual crossing and the like. I also think while the Cubans would rather not have that they also were at least privately cheerful that Mobutu was having another headache of someone they do not like.

I also think they had not acknowledged quite so clearly that they had in fact trained Katanga Shaba rebels before and they had fought with them during the peak of the Angolan civil war just before and just after independence and they acknowledged this only when they were challenged by the U.S. Government.

Mr. SOLARZ. Did they encourage Angola to enter into the reconciliation with Zaire following Shaba II?

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. That is my judgment.

Mr. SOLARZ. What have they said insofar as you can tell about Namibia and about UNITA?

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. That is less clear in terms of the evidence available on the public record which is the only evidence I have access to. In the case of UNITA I think one can make a case and I think this is part of what Secretary Newsom was getting at that the Cuban presence in Angola has made it somewhat more difficult for the Luanda Government and UNITA to negotiate politically their differences and that the Cuban Government in part by the very logic of hostility that appears in a war has become so committed to the military defeat of UNITA that it may make a nonmilitary settlement more difficult.

I think in that particular circumstance the Cubans may have become more hawkish.

In the case of Namibia, I am less certain but again my judgment is partly derived from what I said and the logic of the situation of trying to protect the troops is that the Cubans have also told the Luanda Government to be cooperative on an Namibia settlement.

Mr. SOLARZ. Let me make it clear, if there is any doubt as a result of the line of questioning I have been pursuing, that for my own part I think it would be a welcome development if the Cuban troops went home. I think that would certainly be a contribution to the cause of détente, it would substantially improve the international atmosphere, and it would undoubtedly facilitate an improvement in Cuban-American relations. I think it would be helpful in securing the necessary number of votes in the other body for the SALT Treaty and I think it would, in general, contribute to a reduction of tensions on the African Continent.

I have no brief for the Cubans being in Africa although I think that many of the people who object to it are far more uptight about it than the objective facts would suggest they need to be.

Given the massive Cuban involvement in both Angola and Ethiopia, and their presence elsewhere in Africa, how do you account for the fact that they have not been more actively involved in the Zimbabwe situation? They have provided some training advice, I gather, to ZAPU and ZANU, but there are no Cuban troops involved and there is certainly not a massive Cuban presence there. What accounts for that?

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. The official Cuban answer would probably be that they have not been asked by their patriotic front to provide the service, that this is not a government in power that has asked them to come in unlike the case of the Luanda Government.

There is quite different and perhaps at least as important if not a more important consideration that I alluded to in my remarks which is it is already a substantial strain on Cuba to do what they are doing. They are opening a third act of war, committing another 10,000 to 15,000 troops. It is difficult. I thought it was difficult when they opened the war in Angola and I thought it was even more difficult when they opened the war in Ethiopia.

I cannot rule out they would do this once again. I do think that is a consideration.

Mr. SOLARZ. If they sent their own troops into Zimbabwe, to what extent would they be concerned about a South African countermilitary

intervention in that nation which would pose a much more formidable threat to the safety of their troops than would otherwise be the case?

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. The indications that one gets from reading the Cuban military press and speeches and the like which I think is quite mistaken but let me try to be responsive to you by reporting that the Cubans believe they can defeat the South Africans and it would be difficult. They believe they can do so. They infer this in part from the South African withdrawal during the Angolan civil war a number of years ago. I think South Africa withdrew for a variety of other reasons and not because the Cubans licked them in the field.

The Cuban military press here may simply be reporting bluff and bravado rather than reality. One does get the sense that they believe they could fight it out.

Mr. SOLARZ. I have one final question before I yield to Mrs. Fenwick. In your respective judgments, each of you, how concerned are the African countries in which no Cuban troops are located about the Cuban military presence on the continent? How worried are they that this constitutes a potential threat to them? To put it somewhat differently, to what extent does the Cuban and Soviet capacity not only to send substantial numbers of troops to the continent, but also to supply massive amounts of military equipment create a situation in which other African countries are inclined to tilt toward the East, as it were, either because they sense the East—Cuba and the Soviet Union—can do more for them, or out of fear that given this display of Cuban and Soviet military might if they do not tilt in that direction they may be the victims of it themselves at some point in the future?

Has that presence given the Communists a geopolitical advantage as it were, a strategic advantage in Africa, and to what extent does it constitute an actual source of significant concern and worry on the part of other African countries?

Mr. HARROP. I think the reaction is certainly not uniform. There is a great diversity of reaction. A number of the more moderate countries I think are concerned about the implications of the Cuban presence. We have seen indications of that from Senegal and from Zaire and a number of other governments.

There is also in my opinion a growing tendency to be disquieted by the fact that although as we have been pointing out today the motivations and the rationale for the Cubans being in the individual situations in which they find themselves is generally approved by the members of the OAU that they are there for the sake of defending territorial integrity and they are there at the invitation of bona fide governments and so forth, the principles are right.

I think there is a growing sense of disquiet over the scale of this presence and over its apparent durability so that any major non-African intervention, Africa becomes also as a matter of principle increasingly of concern to Africans. I think even people like President Nyerere have some disquiet over the situation. They would like to see African problems resolved by Africans.

Mr. YOUNG. I would agree with most of that. I think the active concern lies mostly in the group of Francophonic West African States. I think that is where it is fairly heavy, the French speaking West African States, and not all but some of the so-called moderate French speak-

ing West African States are the ones that have had this concern, a concern which I think grows out of things which in a way looking at what has happened have been less frequent. That is, both Soviets and Cubans have been much less prone to involve themselves with opposition groups in countries with established governments than they were in earlier years.

It is a very diffuse kind of unease because as Mr. Harrop said it is not founded on what has actually been done but on some kind of uncertainty as to what might happen. It seems to me unlikely that this will in fact happen. Nonetheless that is there for that group of states. For others I think there is more of a tendency to believe Cuba is a small country and Cuba cannot possibly aspire to a role that perhaps superpowers do have and objectively looked at Cuba is not a major threat to African independence. They may have the same kind of ambivalences that the Cubans themselves have on their role in the Ethiopian case, in terms of what kind of moral judgments you could place on that. Nonetheless, they do not read it or see it as a major threat.

In some ways they do so even less because in the West so much has been made of Cuban threat which provokes as a sort of counterreaction the assertion that really there is not conceivable threat at all.

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. My sense would be one of not thinking of it as a great wave of influence of the Soviet Union. There is really one big event that occurred and that was the collapse of the Portuguese empire as Mr. Young indicated in his testimony that really is the one key time where a number of independent states emerged and that is the main gain if you want to put it that way.

Apart from that then the other major instance is Ethiopia but it is not as if every year one would have a new state welcoming Soviet or Cuban forces. There really was this one key instance when one of our NATO allies, Portugal, pulled out and collapsed in its empire and it was the successor states of the Portuguese empire that have welcomed by and large Soviet and Cuban forces.

I think it is important to bear in mind that really was the key factor and not a great tide sweeping the continent.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mrs. Fenwick?

Mrs. FENWICK. You speak of the internal weakness in Angola. How great is that internal weakness apart from the earlier insurrection or the continuing guerilla activity in the South?

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. Obviously that is a big internal weakness. The other one was within the MPLA. There was an intensive coup.

Mrs. FENWICK. Is that apt to happen again? Was it an isolated case?

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. I would defer to those who know more about the Angolan situation but my guess is now that Neto is dead that there may be some difficulty in establishing a successful pattern of new government. I am much less familiar with the internal circumstances.

What I meant by internal weakness was the combination of this agreement within the MPLA and acts in this direction.

Mrs. FENWICK. You speak of the officers in the Cuban troops being white. Is that a reflection of any kind of racism in Cuba? How does that happen?

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. That would be a long answer. Let me just say it is true that the Cuban general staff by and large is white today. This re-

flects a long standing pattern in the Cuban experience where race relations tend to be cordial by and large but the elite military civilian now as before the revolution has been white.

In the particular case of the top general staff in Cuba many of these are people who fought with Fidel Castro in the 1950's or joined the revolution early in the 1960's and at that time President Batista in Cuba had a great deal of political support from organized groups in Cuba's black community and used that to portray Fidel Castro's movement as a white movement. Many of the people actually engaged with Fidel Castro at the time were white and have risen through the ranks and they are now the chiefs.

Mrs. FENWICK. The young officers that are in Africa also are white?

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. The ones that I know best are the people at the top of the general staff. I have either seen those myself or have seen photographs. It is more difficult to see as one goes on if one compares photographs of large groups of people one does find this color pattern in the ranks. There are a lot more black soldiers and a lot more white officers.

Mrs. FENWICK. In the French press at the time of the Shaba there were reports that in the invading troops, the Katangese, were very correct and had white officers. One man wrote that everything was very correct during this time, but when the white officers left they had all kinds of trouble. In fact his own house was looted, et cetera.

I wondered if those were Cuban officers or if not Cuban, what?

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. I do not know the particular case you are referring to but my sense is and I have not seen evidence that would contradict this that the Cubans did not cross the border into Zaire. They may have had relations with these rebels in the past and these may have been white officers from some other extraction or even private seekers of fortune.

Mr. SOLARZ. I have two final questions, particularly for Professor Dominguez and Professor Young, although Secretary Harrop, you may answer if you would like.

In your judgment if the Angolans and Ethiopians asked the Cuban troops to leave, would the Cubans pull them out?

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. I do not know. I think again the official Cuban answer would probably be yes, that they are there at the invitation of the Governments and they would leave if the Governments asked them to leave. The experience of Cuban forces helping to put down that attempted and failed coup in Luanda suggest to me they are willing to help shape the internal forces, to help decide who might be the incumbent there and thus they may have some influence in determining who is the government and it then becomes sort of a moot point as to what this is.

I am not entirely sure the Cubans are willing to let internal forces within Angola or Ethiopia have their day so they could be asked to leave.

Mr. SOLARZ. Professor Young, do you want to answer the question?

Mr. YOUNG. I do think if a regime clearly in power were to ask them to leave I cannot imagine they would stay.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do either of you think the governments in Luanda and Addis Ababa would be reluctant or afraid to ask the Cubans to go, assuming they decided it was in their interest to have them go, because of a fear that if they made such a request the Cubans might ar-

range for them to be deposed in a coup or otherwise get them removed from power for making such a counterrevolutionary request?

Mr. YOUNG. I would not be so categoric in my response to that. I would suspect they would certainly have some consciousness that the presence of those forces was to some extent an element of political leverage. I think in the final analysis if they felt it was in their interest to do so that they would take that risk and go ahead.

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. I think I agree with that sentiment. For the time being both the Governments in power now, I think, would want the Cuban troops to remain.

Mr. SOLARZ. How would each of you respond to the argument that the Cuban presence, particularly in Angola and Ethiopia, constitutes in effect the new form of colonialism in that as a practical proposition the Cubans are even more in control of what goes on in Ethiopia and Angola today, or at least in Angola, than the Portuguese were before the collapse of Portuguese colonialism in 1975?

Mario Suarez, the former Prime Minister of Portugal, made that argument on one of his visits here. I am interested in whether or not you think that reflects the changing political realities in Angola.

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. The Cubans obviously are a new foreign presence with a great deal of political and military clout. The Cubans are not draining the Angolan or the Ethiopian economy. They are not really there, as far as I can tell, in any sort of extractive or exploitive defense. It does seem to me this is an important point to bear in mind.

Foreign presences do vary from each other. We may or may not like what the Cubans are doing. I would agree with the sentiment the chairman expressed that I would like them to withdraw but they are not in that exploitive role.

Mrs. FENWICK. The Cuban presence in Angola produced a fishing agreement with Russia through which, as Ambassador Young described it the other day, 70 percent goes to Russia and 20 percent to the Cubans with 10 percent left for the Angolans.

If that is not exploitation I do not know what is.

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. I am not saying that there are not a number of things the Cubans can gain.

Mrs. FENWICK. They are a party to exploitation.

Mr. SOLARZ. I would say that is a fishy proposition.

Mrs. FENWICK. It happened with bauxite also. Those poor people were paid one-third of the world's price for that.

Mr. DOMINGUEZ. I think as a general matter in the Cuban experience in Angola there are to be sure advantages but on balance it is not primarily an exploited relationship.

Mrs. FENWICK. It is military?

Mr. SOLARZ. Let me say in conclusion that I think this has been a remarkably interesting and informative session. I regret the fact that some of our other colleagues on the committee could not be here.

Mrs. FENWICK. They do not know what they have missed.

Mr. SOLARZ. I think you all have been very forthcoming and I think it has helped to clarify a number of these very important issues. I want to thank all of you for sharing your wisdom and occasionally your wit with us.

The subcommittee is adjourned.

[The subcommittee adjourned at 12:55 p.m. to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

U.S. INTERESTS IN AFRICA

Strategic/Military

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1979

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2:05 p.m. in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Stephen J. Solarz (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. SOLARZ. The subcommittee is called to order.

This is the third in our series of hearings on U.S. interests in Africa. Our first hearing was designed to provide the subcommittee with an overview of American interests in Africa, and we were privileged to have as our two witnesses, two distinguished former diplomats, Joe Sisco and Andrew Young.

Yesterday, we had the second hearing in our series on American interests in Africa, and at that time we focused in on the challenge of communism in Africa.

Today, in our third hearing, the subject will be the U.S. strategic interests in Africa.

It seems to me that there is an increasing tendency in discussions of African policy to refer to possible U.S. strategic interests on the continent. For example, during the Angola crisis in 1975-76, some officials in the Government referred to the military significance of Angola and other states in West Africa. In addition, Secretary of State Kissinger indicated that a failure of the United States to employ its military power in Angola would bring into question the credibility of our global strategic commitments.

There has been considerable discussion in Washington and elsewhere of our protecting the so-called "Cape route" in the Indian and South Atlantic Oceans, through which many essential raw materials are transported to the United States and Western Europe, particularly oil; and in preserving air and naval facilities in the Horn of Africa which is located near the clearly strategic Middle Eastern countries.

We hope today to obtain an in-depth view of U.S. strategic interests in Africa from our distinguished witnesses. We are interested not only in specific military interests, such as they are, but whether or not they are vital to American national security. We would also like to gain a sense of the hierarchy of any strategic interests, and the role that these interests ought to play in the formulation of our African policy.

Our witnesses today are: Dr. Chester Crocker, who is the director of African studies at the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies. He is the author of a recent center study, *Implications of Soviet and Cuban Activities in Africa for U.S. policy*, and of numerous articles on strategic questions in *Foreign Policy*, *Washington Post*, *Strategic Review*, *Orbis*, and other periodicals. I think earlier in the week he had the "Update" article just below mine in the *Washington Post*, both of which dealt with Africa.

Our other witness, who I just found out is a graduate of the same high school from which I graduated back in Brooklyn, Dr. Robert Price is now, unlike other graduates of our distinguished institution, going on to bigger and better things. He is now an associate professor of political science, and associate director of the Institute of International Studies at the University of California at Berkeley.

I don't know about Dr. Price, but back at Midwood High School, I served as mayor of Midwood. I have always said that it is a terrible thing to have reached the pinnacle of your career at the age of 17. I think that I have been going downhill ever since, and he has obviously moved forward.

Dr. Price is the author of *U.S. Foreign Policy in Sub-Sahara Africa: National Interest and Global Strategy*, published by the institute. I might note, parenthetically, by the way, that I read that study about 1 year ago, and I consider it to be one of the most lucid and brilliant analyses of American strategic interests in Africa that I have ever come across. He has also written a study on *Society and Bureaucracy in Contemporary Ghana*, as well as several other articles on capital and politics.

Before calling on Dr. Price, our first witness, I want to take note of the fact that the Department of Defense, whom we had requested to send someone to testify today, has unfortunately neglected to do so. We think that this constitutes a lamentable commentary to the extent to which the Department of Defense appears unprepared to address a potentially serious matter confronting the foreign policy of our own country.

It is a sad day for America when there are only two or three people in the Department of Defense who are capable of addressing indepth such a subject. We requested some witnesses from them. We were told that the two witnesses requested were not available. We indicated that others in the Department who could speak knowledgeably about the subject would be perfectly adequate. What we were interested in were not big names, but information.

If it should turn out that there are only two people in the entire Department of Defense who can comment knowledgeably about American strategic interests in Africa, they must be toasting in the Kremlin to the inadequacy of the American response to the Soviet challenge in that continent.

I intend to forcefully communicate the opinion of the entire subcommittee to Secretary Brown. I think, frankly, this is outrageous. The Department has been on notice for several weeks now that we were planning to hold this hearing, and if they could not find someone in the Department, with hundreds of thousands of employees, to speak about American strategic interests in Africa, then I think something is dreadfully wrong in the Department of Defense.

Mrs. FENWICK. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. SOLARZ. I yield to the gentlewomen from New Jersey.

Mrs. FENWICK. I thank my colleague and chairman for yielding.

I guess I will add my voice to yours in relation to the Defense Department, perhaps two voices rather than one will reach their ears.

Mr. SOLARZ. I thank the gentlewoman for her observation.

Now, since the work of the committee proceeds with or without the Department of Defense, I would like to call on our first witness, Dr. Price.

Gentlemen, I want you to know that your statements, as they have been prepared, will be inserted in the record. If you care to summarize your views orally that would be helpful.

Dr. Price, the eyes of Midwood High School are upon you now. We are counting on you to deliver a memorable statement.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT PRICE, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE ON INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY

Mr. PRICE. Woody Allen is also an alumnus of that high school.

Mr. SOLARZ. We invited him as a witness, but he could not get clearance from the Department of Defense. They did not consider him an adequate substitute. [Laughter.]

Please proceed.

Mr. PRICE. Thank you very much for your complimentary remarks in the introduction. I will try to live up to them.

The increased involvement of the Soviet Union in the affairs of sub-Saharan Africa, which dates from the Angolan civil war of 1975, has raised serious questions in this country concerning threats to our interests in that part of the world.

The assessments of heightened Soviet involvement as somehow threatening to us, and calling, therefore, for a counterresponse is just about unanimously held by Americans. It is hardly surprising that Americans would view increased Soviet activity and influence in Africa as threatening. It is now virtually a part of our national culture to view Soviet gains as equal and opposite losses to the United States.

In my testimony this morning, I will take a heretical view, arguing that close scrutiny of recent Soviet actions in sub-Saharan Africa pose no special threat to us and, therefore, should be observed with a good deal of equanimity by our policymakers.

In the conventional wisdom, contemporary Soviet behavior in sub-Saharan Africa is seen as posing three types of threat to the United States: A military strategic threat to the security of the oil shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean and around the Cape of Good Hope; an economic threat to our trade and business interests through sponsorship of radical or socialist regimes, and here the worry in particular focuses on secure supply of so-called strategic minerals; and then the third threat that is perceived is a general global-strategic threat to the credibility of the United States as a world power.

In my formal statement to the committee, I have commented on all three of these perceived threats. But in my oral remarks, because of

the limitations of time, I would like to focus only on the last, and that is on the notion that the credibility of U.S. power is somehow tied to a willingness to forcefully counter Soviet involvement in Africa, particularly as was the case in Angola and Ethiopia, and should Russian involvement in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia escalate, it should be the case there as well.

I focus on this third issue in my oral testimony in part because I think in the shaping of American foreign policy, it is really the core concern of policymakers in regard to Soviet involvement in Africa.

When one reads or listens to the statements of Secretary of State Kissinger, both when he was in that position and then after, the issue of credibility is preeminent in his concern. I think if one looks also at the statements of Mr. Brzezinski, there, too, you will find that the issue of American resolve, will and determination, or sometimes called credibility, all these code words, are the central concern in regard to Soviet actions in Africa.

It, also, I would add parenthetically, is the most difficult of the various interests to come to grips with. It happens to be the one which is almost purely abstract. The analysis of it is purely abstract, which may be a consequence of the fact that both Secretary Kissinger, and National Security Advisor Brzezinski are both political scientists, and therefore have a particular love for this kind of credibility doctrine. I happen to be a political scientist, too, which may also explain why I am going to comment upon that.

I should also add that the concern with maintaining U.S. credibility is neither new, nor is it focused exclusively on Africa. Recent events in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Iran, and Cuba, to name but a few, have been pointed to by one or another foreign policy expert, as posing tests of America's will, determination, or resolve, whatever. In fact, what one might call the credibility doctrine has had a central place in shaping U.S. foreign and military policy for almost two decades.

At the outset let me stress that I acknowledge the importance of credibility as an aspect of power. It is its psychological dimension. If others believe that a state can and will protect its interests through the application of overwhelming force, then they are likely to shape their behavior accordingly. Thus, the state will, in fact, rarely have to actually deploy force in defense of its interests. My objection, then, is not to the notion of credibility as such, but rather to the current wisdom on how credibility can be maintained.

In understanding the dynamics of credibility maintenance, it is essential to understand that the situations in which credibility is tested are not fixed or given in some objective sense. Credibility is undermined only when a state fails to effectively protect some serious interests, and the existence of a serious interest is defined for the state, as well as for other international actors, by policymakers in their official and unofficial statements. Thus, U.S. credibility would not be undermined by inaction in a situation where political leaders make it clear that the country had no important stake.

But once a situation is publicly defined as threatening to U.S. interests or, as is increasingly common, it is declared by high-ranking officials to be a test of this country's will, then a lack of U.S. response might well place in jeopardy the psychological dimension of U.S. power.

For almost two decades, U.S. policymakers have operated with a completely open-ended definition of the situations that test U.S. determination, vis-a-vis the Soviet. In the prevailing view, the expansion of Soviet influence, even in areas peripheral to U.S. concerns, must be effectively checked in order to put the Soviets on notice of what would be in store for them should real U.S. interests be threatened. Only in this way could a direct confrontation between the nuclear superpowers be avoided, because that is what the argument is.

Under this doctrine, U.S. credibility is on the line in every nook and cranny of the world, regardless of the extent of our tangible interests. Indeed, the more minimal the U.S. stake in a particular situation which calls forth action, the more dramatic is the message regarding the U.S. will to act in matters that are really important.

The foreign policy success that can be attributed to this credibility doctrine was dependent on the presence of two factors, factors that have unfortunately, from the U.S. point of view, ceased to exist in the contemporary world system.

The first of these was Soviet weakness and inhibition. As long as the Soviet Union lacked the means or motivation to demonstrate its own credibility through the application of large-scale force in areas peripheral to it, then the United States could, at relatively low cost, intervene worldwide to demonstrate its resolve. But Soviet actions in Angola, Ethiopia, and perhaps in southern Africa, suggest that this situation may no longer hold. Instead, the Soviet Union is now capable and willing to play the role of a global power.

Consequently, an effort by the United States to check the Soviets in Angola and Ethiopia would have entailed a commitment of significant magnitude, seriously eroding the cost-effectiveness of the credibility doctrine.

More important, such an effort contained a significant risk of direct conflict with the Russians. Thus, in a changed international environment, the very demonstration of credibility at the periphery provides the catalyst for that which the demonstration of credibility was intended to prevent, namely, superpower confrontation.

The second factor that allowed for the success of the credibility doctrine in an earlier era was the absence of autonomous power in the Latin American, Asian, and African periphery. This meant that for many years, the United States could pursue demonstrations of its resolve in the periphery, without very much need to concern itself with the local repercussions of its policy.

In the 1970's, however, a more pluralistic world politics may well place regional constraints on the ability of the United States to pursue demonstrations of credibility. Again, the event in sub-Saharan Africa provides a case in point.

The way in which the Soviet/Cuban involvement fits into the dynamics of African regional politics has presented a major obstacle to the United States in designing a satisfying counterresponse. Communist activity has thus far not occurred indiscriminately, but rather only in those situations in which their actions could be supportive of principles that have strong backing among the governments of African countries.

In the interregional politics of the last two decades, only two issues have emerged upon which there is an overwhelming consensus among states south of the Sahara, the sacrosanct nature of colonially inherited borders, and the need to eliminate colonial rule, or political control by a settler European minority.

Because their actions have been in support of these two principles, the Soviets and Cubans have been successful in gaining acceptance within the region for their recent large-scale involvements.

In Ethiopia, they aided an African Government in resisting two major cessationist efforts. In Angola, their actions were largely viewed within the continent as helping to prevent a continuation of white rule after the Portuguese's departure.

One should note in passing that the significant military assistance provided by the Soviet Union to the guerrilla forces fighting in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia is generally viewed in the same way by the governments of sub-Saharan Africa, as aiding the effort to end white colonial rule.

Two things would seem to follow from the above analysis:

First: Should the Soviets in the future become involved in situations where the sanctity of borders, or the continuation of white rule are not at stake, they will be in a diplomatically much less advantageous position within the region.

Second: For the United States to have demonstrated its resolve by countering the Soviets in Angola or Ethiopia would have meant the use of U.S. power for what would have been perceived in the region as the preservation of white minority rule, and a dismemberment of an established state. The moment the implications for such actions were seen, it would have meant a diplomatic disaster for the United States in Africa, and probably the Third World generally.

While the goodwill of such states may not be necessary to the military or economic survival of the United States, their cooperation in a myriad of international forums is a significant element in the ability of the United States to conduct a successful foreign policy.

Likewise, the development of anti-American sentiments by African governments could be costly to U.S. business, since these governments could discriminate in favor of European and Japanese multinational companies with whom American firms are in competition.

To directly counter the Soviet/Cuban involvement in Ethiopia and Angola, then, would have entailed the sacrifice of significant diplomatic interests in the region. If to this course is added the constraint on action created by the enhanced capacity of the Soviets, in combination with the reluctance of the U.S. public to support foreign military involvement, then it can be seen that these were not opportune situations to demonstrate U.S. will. Since tangible interests were not at stake, there was no particular reason for the Carter, or the Ford administration before it, to react to Soviet moves as if they were directed against the United States, and to make this the centerpiece of their foreign policy posture toward the area.

By so doing, these administrations created a test of credibility which they were not prepared to win, and thus far their own public definition of the situations as a challenge to our resolve may have done more to undermine U.S. credibility with adversaries and allies alike, than anything the Soviets had done on their own.

¶ In conclusion, let me summarize my argument. Maintenance of U.S. credibility involves a concern with the psychological dimension of a power, with how a set of events is perceived. A given Soviet move becomes a threat to U.S. credibility only when it is perceived by various audiences, the Soviets themselves, the U.S. allies, the American public, and the like, only when it is perceived by these audiences as constituting a significant challenge to American interests, influence, desires, et cetera.

When U.S. Government spokesmen define Soviet moves in this manner, even when no tangible interests are at stake, they, themselves, have helped create a test of our resolve or credibility.

If the United States could propose and dispose worldwide, that is, if it could exercise effective global hegemony, then the definition of every Soviet action as a challenge to U.S. credibility would pose little problem. Under such circumstances, successful demonstrations of U.S. resolve would be guaranteed, as frequent opportunities to display America's will to act would, indeed, provide a means to underscore the credibility of U.S. power.

Serious problems arise, however, when hegemony is not assured, when situations arise that preclude a successful exercise of power, or where the costs of success are prohibitive. In such situations, the definition of a threat to the United States, irrespective of whether or not tangible interests are at stake, creates the basis for undermining credibility rather than for enhancing it.

Thus, if the Soviet Union is involved in situations where an effective exercise of U.S. power at feasible cost is highly problematic, and in which no tangible U.S. interests are at stake, a concern for the credibility of U.S. power would dictate that Government spokesmen avoid defining the situation as a direct challenge to the United States. This is the lesson that the situation in sub-Saharan Africa teaches us. ¶

One final comment. I am not suggesting that under contemporary circumstances, the United States adopt a weak or isolationist foreign policy. That is, an unwillingness on principle to exercise power abroad. Rather, I believe what these circumstances make imperative are two things:

First, a rejoining of the concern for the credibility of U.S. power with a concern for protection of tangible interests.

Second, a sensitivity to the political reverberations created by the use of that power among states other than the Soviet Union.

Instead of being an autonomous and overriding criterion in action decisions, credibility ought to be established and maintained as a concomitant of the willingness to use American power in defense of demonstrably established tangible interest. The criterion for engaging in a test of credibility, and for deciding on the extent of resources to be committed to it, would be the significance of the U.S. stake, diplomatic, strategic, or economic, in any given situation.

The use of power would be scaled to the nature of the national interest involved up to and including military intervention. Intervention, however, would be directed to obtaining some tangible goals, with the intangible, psychological aspect of power, that is credibility, following as a side benefit.

Thank you.

[Mr. Price's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. PRICE, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE ON INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY

The increased direct and indirect involvement of the Soviet Union in the affairs of sub-Saharan Africa, which dates from the Angolan civil war of 1975, has raised serious questions in this country concerning threats to our interests in that part of the world. The assessment of heightened Soviet involvement as somewhat threatening to us, and calling, therefore, for a counter-response is almost unanimously assumed by Americans. There is far less consensus, however, on what action ought to be taken. It is hardly surprising that Americans would view increased Soviet activity and influence in Africa as threatening. It is virtually now a part of our national culture to view so-called Soviet gains as equal and opposite losses for the United States. In my testimony this morning I will take a heretical view, arguing that close scrutiny of recent Soviet actions in sub-Saharan Africa pose no special threat to us, and therefore should be observed with a good deal of equanimity by our policy-makers.

In the conventional wisdom contemporary Soviet behavior in sub-Saharan Africa is seen as posing three types of threat to the United States—a military-strategic threat to the security of the oil shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean and around the Cape of Good Hope; an economic threat to our trade and business interests through sponsorship of radical or socialist regimes; and a general global-strategic threat to the credibility of the U.S. as a world power. Let me explore each of these alleged threats in turn:

1. *The threat to the oil shipping lanes.*—The fact that almost all of Western Europe's oil supply and a major portion of U.S. oil imports are carried by giant tankers from the Persian Gulf through the Indian Ocean and around the Cape of Good Hope is what supposedly makes the Eastern Coast of Africa, from Ethiopia to South Africa, strategically important to the United States. It is usually alleged that if the Soviets are allowed to gain significant influence in this area, they will be able to build naval facilities from which they can interdict Western oil shipments, and thereby place an economic stranglehold on the Western Alliance. The policy implication of this set of ideas is that the United States has a strategic imperative to block Soviet advances in the Eastern part of Africa, and most significantly to prevent a Soviet-backed radical destabilization of South Africa, with its naval window on the Cape oil route at the modern Simonstown facility.

The Cape Route Doctrine, which is what this set of strategic ideas is usually called, is constructed out of a set of interlocking political and military/technical suppositions, which, I believe, can be shown to be seriously flawed both logically and empirically. First, let me note in passing, that the automatic assumption that a radical regime aided by the Soviet Union will, as a matter of course, be so subject to Soviet influence that it will allow its ports to be used for offensive naval operations against the West, completely discounts the force of African nationalism. But let us ignore this flawed political analysis and imagine that Soviet/Cuban activity produces a consolidated military regime in Addis Ababa and a radical African government in Pretoria which will permit the establishment of extensive Soviet naval installations on their territories. Even granting this, it is far from clear that a genuine threat to Western shipping lanes would exist. For in order to sustain the argument that Africa's ports are of strategic significance to the West, it is necessary to make a number of not very plausible assumptions about Soviet intentions and capabilities. Is it realistic to assume that even if the Soviet Union had complete access to naval facilities on the Horn and in South Africa, it would and could in fact use them as bases for blockading Western oil shipments?

Any attempt to argue that Soviet access to African ports would pose a threat to oil shipments to the West involves a presupposition regarding Soviet intentions. Is it conceivable, given the global realities of the fourth quarter of the twentieth century, that the Soviets would seriously contemplate blockading vital Western oil shipments? Such a direct act of war against the Western industrialized world would most likely precipitate World War III, making the flow of petroleum an utterly irrelevant issue. Either the ensuing military conflict would be rapidly settled through negotiation, in which case there would be no need for oil in transit since Western stocks would suffice, or the conflict would be "nuclearized," in which case there would also be no need for the blockaded oil shipments, their destinations having ceased to exist. In either case, the events precipitated by the initiation of a blockade would immediately render oil ir-

relevant. Thus if the Soviets wished to begin World War III, it is hardly plausible that they would do so by interdicting Western shipping from bases in sub-Saharan Africa. But let us once again ignore the implausibility of the assumptions underlying the case for the strategic importance of Africa's ports, and accept that an oil blockade is something the Soviet Union would reasonably contemplate. What of the technical aspects involved in implementing such an action?

If the Soviets wished to stop the flow of petroleum from the Persian Gulf, there are far more efficient means for them to do so than to mount a naval blockade from ports in the Horn (Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti) and/or southern Africa. To begin with, the objective of stopping the Persian Gulf oil flow could be most efficiently accomplished by non-naval means. Bombing the oil fields, arranging for their sabotage, or military occupation of the key oil-producing countries all seem preferable on a "cost-benefit" basis. Each of these could be accomplished more swiftly and easily and with a more complete effect than the continuing maintenance of a naval blockade. Furthermore, such methods have the decided advantage of being indirect, rather than direct, acts of war against the Western powers. But even if the Soviets decided to use naval power to interdict oil shipments, they would be unlikely to mount such an operation from bases in sub-Saharan Africa. A blockade of the shipping lanes around the Cape from South African bases is particularly unlikely because it would require effective patrolling of thousands of miles of high seas between the Cape of Good Hope and Antarctica. A more rational target area for a blockade would be the Strait of Hormuz, at the mouth of the Persian Gulf. Thus South African bases make little sense with respect to an Indian Ocean interdiction. Bases on the Horn, being much closer to the Persian Gulf, might appear a more serious threat. However, interdiction in other areas, most especially the Mediterranean and North Atlantic, offer many advantages over an effort in the Indian Ocean.

Occurring in an area proximate to European Russia, an Atlantic-Mediterranean operation would offer the Soviets shorter lines of supply, the opportunity for vastly superior air cover, easier access to major repair facilities, and the like. It would also permit a rapid shift in mission objectives from interdiction to strategic defense—an extremely important advantage to which I shall return later.

The use of African bases by the Soviets would not only be more costly and less effective than available alternatives, but such bases would also be particularly vulnerable to Western attack. Soviet naval facilities on the Horn, on the East African coast, and in South Africa which were being used to support an Indian Ocean-Cape Route blockade could easily be destroyed by U.S. carrier-based air power, and the same task force could be used to provide the necessary protection for shipping. The U.S. capacity to launch and sustain such operations would not be undermined by the denial of African bases to the West, since the United States can project its own power and check the power of other states without the necessity of access to ports such as those in sub-Saharan Africa. And in the unlikely event that sea-based facilities were not sufficient to handle the Soviet presence (which would itself face very severe resupply problems), the U.S. has a substantial base available at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.¹

The technical deficiencies of an Indian Ocean-based interdiction of Persian Gulf oil are not the only considerations rendering such a action highly irrational from the Soviet vantage point. Important strategic considerations add to the difficulties of such an operation. Most qualified observers of Soviet naval expansion agree that the Soviet navy has developed in response to the nuclear threat posed by the U.S. carrier task forces and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and that thus its primary task is to provide strategic defense of the Soviet heartland.² To deploy their submarine fleet so as to interdict Western

¹Carrier task forces can be resupplied and refueled at the Diego Garcia base, its airfields can accommodate the full range of planes in the U.S. arsenal, and it is the only U.S. facility in the region at which the P-3C Orion anti-submarine warfare plane and the KC-135 tanker plane are based. (The former is important for control of the ocean depths, and the latter can refuel B-52 bombers in flight.) In addition, Diego Garcia offers a potential port for submarines.

²From the Soviet point of view, the establishment of naval bases on the Horn of Africa has a strategic function in response to the deployment of Polaris A-3, Poseidon, and Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) by the U.S. These SLBMs are capable of reaching targets in the Soviet heartland from the northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean (the Arabian Sea), and the Soviet naval bases on the Horn, which is adjacent to the Arabian Sea, could be used to protect against such attacks. Thus the motivation of the Soviets in establishing a base like Berbera can be explained more plausibly as defensive than as creating the capability for an attack on Western shipping.

shipping between the Persian Gulf and the waters off the Cape, they would have to accept a fundamental weakening in their navy's capacity to carry out this primary strategic responsibility. This becomes especially clear when the notion of a Soviet move to interdict Western oil supplies is put in realistic international perspective. Since such a move would be considered a major act of war directed against all the Western industrial states, Soviet strategists would have to confront the likelihood that it would be a prelude to a major conventional (and quite possibly nuclear) war. Under such circumstances, at least two considerations would become paramount to them: (1) Europe would be a major, if not the primary, theater of any conventional war fought between the USSR and the West, (2) since there could be no guarantee that the enemy would remain within the bounds of conventional warfare, the Soviet defense against nuclear attack must be on alert. The first consideration—the possibility of a ground war in Europe—would necessitate the deployment of Soviet naval power in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean to prevent supplies originating in the United States from reaching U.S. and allied troops. (This, of course, reinforces the point that if the Soviets wished to blockade Western oil shipments, they could do so best in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean, which is not only a logistically superior area, but would also allow for the strategic placement of the Soviet fleet to meet the global contingencies stemming from the interdiction itself. That is something that a blockade in the Indian Ocean would not allow.)

The second consideration—the expansion of a conventional war into a nuclear conflict—enters in because however much Soviet strategists may believe that a conflict sparked by their action to interdict oil supply lines can be prevented from “going nuclear,” it would be insanity for them to ignore the possibility. Thus they would be concerned with deploying their navy for the defense of the Soviet heartland against nuclear weapons. Since the overall thrust of their recent naval expansion is directed precisely toward countering a submarine and carrier-borne nuclear attack, it is reasonable to assume that in a situation of extreme danger—such as would be created by a Soviet oil blockade—their naval forces would be appropriately deployed to meet such an attack. That is, they would be deployed in the areas from which a U.S. sea-launched nuclear attack would be initiated—the Mediterranean, the North Atlantic and North Sea, and perhaps the Arabian Sea—and not thousands of miles away in the Indian Ocean and off the Cape of Good Hope in search of oil tankers. Therefore, even if we assume the unlikely possibility that the Soviet Union would be willing to run the grave risk of major conventional war (or even nuclear conflict) in order to interdict Western oil shipments, we discover that the interdiction of the Cape Oil Route from bases on the African continent would, from the Soviet vantage point, be strategically untenable. The conditions of global war which would almost certainly result from the act of interdiction would turn the implementation of a Cape Route blockade into an act of strategic suicide.

On careful examination, then, the “security of shipping lanes doctrine” turns out to be based on an interlocking set of dubious assumptions concerning the nature of Soviet motives and capabilities. Thus, the argument that pro-Western governments in Eastern and Southern Africa are vital to the security of the West because of the proximity of these areas to the oil shipping lanes cannot be sustained.

2. *The Economic Threat.*—There can be little doubt that the complementarity between certain raw materials essential for modern industrial production, on the one hand, and the usual mineral endowment of sub-Saharan Africa, on the other, creates a very real U.S. national interest in maintaining continuous and secure access to African minerals. Moreover, since the flow of minerals depends upon the continuous development of reserves, it is also necessary, from the Western point of view, that there be continuous application of capital and technology to at least certain sectors of Africa's mining industry. The conventional wisdom, shared by radicals along with liberals and conservatives, is that the rise to power of marxist governments in Africa will jeopardize the West's access to that continent's minerals. Such wisdom assumes that radical governments are likely to deny essential materials to the West—either because they will adopt economic strategies which seek to break their ties to the capitalist economies and/or because they will use their resources as a political weapon, usually in collaboration with or at the behest of the Soviet Union, in order to undermine the Western political economy. Despite the nearly universal belief that radical political transformation in Africa will jeopardize the West's access

to essential minerals (e.g., chrome, platinum, industrial diamonds, antimony, vanadium, etc.) neither logic nor experience supports such a notion.

Those African countries whose minerals are of interest to the United States and the West share one primary and fundamental structural characteristic—their economies are centered upon the production of minerals for export. In a country like Zambia, the mining sector accounts for 40 percent of GNP, 90 percent of export earnings, and 54 percent of government revenue. Zaire and Nigeria are in a similar situation. Oil accounts for almost 95 percent of Nigeria's export earnings and contributes over three-quarters of total government revenue, while in Zaire, the mining sector (chiefly copper, diamonds, and cobalt) provides 80 percent of export earnings and 30 percent of the state's revenue. What these statistics indicate is that for these countries, and others like them, economic health, social welfare, and political survival are all ultimately dependent upon mineral production and its export. The sale of minerals abroad provides the resources to expand and modernize the economy, the foreign reserve to import everything from machinery for industrial production to perfume for elite consumption, and even the money to pay the salaries of government employees. Given this situation, and given the development and welfare goals pursued by African governments, especially ones adhering to a radical orientation, there is simply no way that an African country possessing significant mineral wealth can forego production for sale abroad. And it happens that the only significant customers are found in the industrial West. Thus mineral-producing African countries, whatever their ideological coloration, are locked into selling their minerals to the West just as the West is locked into buying them.

It is not as a trading partner that African mineral producers are structurally linked to the West. The necessity to maintain mineral exports implies continued exploration for and development of new reserves. Exploration and development require inputs of huge amounts of capital and high levels of technical and managerial know-how; all resources that are sorely lacking in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. It so happens that the only available source for substantial quantities of capital, technology, and management is the West. Consequently African states, radical or not, will as a matter of survival continue to link themselves to the capitalist West through loans, technology licenses, and managerial contracts, as well as through trade.

It is true that radical governments would be likely to pursue an economic strategy whose goal would be economic diversification, and thus less overall reliance on the minerals-export sector, but this would entail a decline in mineral exports relative to other economic sectors—not an absolute decline. Indeed the very goal of diversification implies a continuation and even expansion (in absolute terms) of mineral exports, since only from this sector can the capital and foreign reserve necessary to finance new economic activity be generated domestically.

It is not necessary to rest my case regarding the compatibility of African radicalism and Western economic interests on the structural logic I have just presented. An examination of the policies adopted by radical African states reveals that this is not just some ivory tower theory, but rather that it is reflected in actual experience. If radicalism and close relations by African states with the USSR portend an economic war with the West, then this should be revealed in the policies followed by Guinea, Angola, and Mozambique. The governments of all three countries owe their rise to power and/or their initial survival after independence in large part to Soviet aid, and all three states have political relations with the USSR that are the closest of any country in sub-Saharan Africa. An examination of the economic policy of these states reveals, however, that the conventional equation between radicalism and Soviet influence on the one hand, and a threat to Western economic interests on the other, is misguided. Indeed the policies followed vis-à-vis foreign investments are similar to, and may well be more liberal than, those adopted by many African states usually thought of as "moderate" (e.g., Nigeria, Zambia, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and the like). Guinean bauxite and Angolan oil are produced by Western, including American, multinational companies under arrangements that include foreign equity ownership, and Western countries are the main customers for these countries' export products. The threat which African marxism supposedly represents to U.S. interests does not seem to have overly bothered Gulf Oil, an American company which is happily pumping Angola's petroleum, while reportedly providing up to 90 percent of government revenue, and whose expatriate staff is

protected from local insurgents by a contingent of Cuban troops. In the case of Angola, at least, the U.S. government would seem to be a far greater threat than radicalism to U.S. business interests, since our refusal to normalize relations with that country has given a competitive edge to companies from Europe and Japan, whose governments appear less allergic to Cubans than does ours.

3. *The Threat to the Credibility of U.S. Powers.*—However important our military and economic interests in sub-Saharan Africa may or may not be, the President and his advisors in both this and the previous administration appear far more concerned with what might be called our "credibility" interest. During the Angolan civil war, the Secretary of State Kissinger publicly proclaimed on numerous occasions that the credibility of U.S. power depended upon our willingness to intervene militarily to counter Soviet moves. Later, during the Ethiopian-Somali conflict and again during the Shaba II rebellion in Zaire, National Security Advisor Brzezinski and even the President himself described these situations as tests of our national will, determination, and resolve. And all the time, behind our policy regarding the conflict in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, is the ominous understanding that should the Soviet military involvement deepen a counter response from the U.S. will be necessary in defense of the credibility of U.S. global power.

The point I would like to make to this committee in regard to this credibility doctrine and its application to Africa has three parts:

1. If the events I have mentioned were indeed credibility tests then they were tests of our own making, as our political leaders declared to the world that American will and resolve were on the line in these remote areas.

2. Having created our own test we then promptly flunked it. The Soviets were not countered in either Angola or the Horn of Africa, and in Zaire it was the French, the Belgians, and the Moroccans, not the United States, that demonstrated their capability to project their aims abroad through military action.

3. That we would flunk the credibility tests was predictable from the outset because the very doctrine that raised the issue of our will and resolve is dangerously outmoded in the contemporary world.

Let me now back up and provide the argument that leads to these conclusions. At the outset let me stress that I acknowledge the importance of credibility as an aspect of power—it is its psychological dimension. Both states and individuals can exercise power through a show of force, bending a weaker actor to their will. But to continually muster a show of force is costly. The exercise of power is much more efficient and effective if one state, or individual, believes the other has the capability and resolve to bend it to its will. Then the "bending" will likely occur automatically, without the costliness and "messyness" of a show of force. At the same time, this psychological advantage can only be maintained if the powerful state can actually apply effective force when violations of its interests occur. A state which is willing and able to demonstrate its use of force when only marginal interests are at stake should have a particularly formidable psychological edge in those situations it defines as vital. However, this enhanced credibility is achieved at a significant price. For now, the state, having cast its net over a wide area, must be ready and able to deliver sanctions in many more situations—i.e., there will be more occasions when its credibility will be placed "on the line." And should it find that it lacks the resources to cover all these situations, that it is unable to bring sanctions effectively to bear in those areas of only marginal concern, then its psychological edge in matters of vital concern will be eroded. In other words, by defining its area of concern extremely broadly, a state enhances its credibility, and at the same time it renders that credibility more vulnerable to erosion. This paradox is extremely important in the analysis of current U.S. foreign policy and particularly with regard to its efforts in sub-Saharan Africa.

What must be understood at the outset about the maintenance of U.S. credibility as an international actor is that the situations in which that credibility is tested are not fixed, or given, in some objective sense. They are in part defined by U.S. policymakers and political leaders when they make statements about what is important to our country. U.S. credibility would not be undermined by inaction in a situation in which political leaders made it clear that the country had no important stake. But once a situation is publicly defined as threatening to U.S. interests or, as is increasingly common, as a test of the country's will, determination, and resolve, then a lack of U.S. response might well place in jeopardy the psychological dimension of U.S. power.

Since the late 1950s U.S. policymakers have operated with a completely open-ended definition of the situations that test U.S. determination *vis a vis* the Soviets. In the prevailing view, given systematic expression in the doctrine of limited war as developed by Henry Kissinger when he was still a Harvard professor, we must check the spread of Soviet influence in areas of only peripheral concern to the United States in order to put the Russian leaders on notice regarding what would be in store for them should *real* U.S. interests be threatened. By preparing for and occasionally fighting a limited war on the periphery, the theory holds, the U.S. would be able to demonstrate its resolve regarding vital interests before those are actually encroached upon. In this way the Soviets would be warned off, discouraged from threatening actions that would result in the type of *direct* confrontations with the United States that could lead to nuclear war. The maintenance of credibility, then, is seen as essential for preventing confrontation between the nuclear superpowers. Note that within this foreign policy theory the maintenance of credibility is divorced from the protection of tangible interests. In terms of decisions about the use of American power abroad, the distinction between vital and non-vital interests is obliterated, as are all graduations in-between. Every situation involving Soviet activity demands a successful U.S. blocking action, regardless of whether significant tangible interests are at stake. Indeed, the more minimal the U.S. stake in a situation which calls for action, the more dramatic the message regarding the U.S. will to act.

Whatever U.S. foreign policy success can be attributed to this doctrine of credibility was conditioned by two factors that must be present for it to operate successfully—factors that have ceased to exist in the contemporary world system. The first was the relative military weakness and/or inhibition of the Soviet Union. One of the peculiar features of the “credibility game” as it is structured by limited war theory is that it can be played successfully and safely only when there is a simple player. What if Soviet leaders decided to project their own vision by demonstrating Soviet credibility wherever they perceived Western behavior, or just some changing political situation, to run counter to this vision? If both nuclear powers based their foreign policy on the notion that their determination needed to be constantly demonstrated in every corner of the globe then a direct confrontation—the very situation “credibility bolstering” is supposed to prevent—would seem inevitable. The potential for just such a situation has developed in the post-Vietnam era as the Soviet Union has for the first time emerged alongside the United States as a genuine global power—that is, as a state with the will and military capability to project its power on a global scale. This at least would certainly seem to be the lesson of its current Africa policy.

The second factor allowing for the successful operationalization of the doctrine of credibility was the absence of autonomous power in the Latin American, Asian, and African periphery. Either as a result of economic ties, as in the case of Latin America, or of colonialism, as in Asia and Africa, the United States could for many years pursue demonstrations of its resolve in the “periphery” without very much need to concern itself with the local repercussions of its policy. In the 1970s, however, a more pluralistic world politics may well place regional constraints on the ability of the U.S. to pursue demonstrations of credibility. Under these changed circumstances a Soviet Union more willing and able to demonstrate *its* resolve, and a periphery has automatically accepting of Western action—the weakness of a foreign policy based primarily upon demonstrating credibility becomes manifest. A completely *open-ended* and publicly stated commitment to a demonstration to resolve under these new circumstances creates expectations which cannot easily be fulfilled, and thus establishes the conditions for the very erosion of credibility that it was the purpose of policy to avoid. An examination of the situation in sub-Saharan Africa provides an excellent lesson in the limitation of the credibility doctrine under contemporary circumstances.

The direct military commitment that has been made in Angola and Ethiopia by the Communist powers is certainly unprecedented as far as their involvement in sub-Saharan Africa is concerned. The lesson that some have drawn from the scope and scale of this Communist activity is that some direct American counter-response—a demonstration of U.S. resolve—is especially necessary. The situation, however, holds another and very different message as well. It is that there is now more than one player in the “credibility game.” With the Soviets apparently willing and able to play a role as a global power, the stakes involved in demonstrating resolve through military means in situations in which the Russians are

already deeply involved are far higher than they were previously. Thus a direct military involvement by the United States in Angola and Ethiopia would have entailed a commitment of substantial magnitude, and also contained a significant risk of direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. Under these circumstances not only is the cost-effectiveness of the "credibility doctrine" seriously eroded, but, more importantly, the basis of the doctrine's persuasiveness evaporates as the very demonstration of credibility provides the catalyst for that which it was intended to prevent—direct superpower confrontation.

The difficulties that the U.S. administration has had in fashioning a direct response to Soviet and Cuban activity in Africa are not restricted to the new assertiveness and capacity of these Communist states. The way in which the Soviet/Cuban involvement fits into the dynamics of African regional politics has also presented a major obstacle to designing a wholly satisfying response. The simple fact is that the United States has had precious little success in finding support among African states for its perception of the negative role that Cuban troops and their Soviet advisors and suppliers have been playing in Ethiopia and in Angola. What the United States chooses to call aggression, intervention, and destabilization has been accorded a significant modicum of legitimacy by many African states.

The reason for this is that the Soviet/Cuban involvement has thus far not occurred indiscriminately, but rather only in those situations in which their actions would be supportive of principles that have strong support among the governments of African countries.

In the intra-regional politics of the last two decades two issues have emerged upon which there is an overwhelming consensus, if not unanimity, among the states south of the Sahara—the sacrosanct nature of colonially inherited borders, and the need to eliminate colonial rule (or political control by a settler European minority). The success that the Soviets and Cubans have had in gaining acceptance within the region for their recent large-scale involvement is based on the fact that their actions have been in support of these two principles. In Ethiopia they have aided an African government in resisting two secessionist movements, one of which was supported by an invasion from a neighboring country. In Angola, its actions were largely viewed within the continent as helping to prevent a continuation of white rule after the Portuguese departure.

One should note in passing that the significant military assistance provided by the Soviet Union to the guerrilla forces fighting in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia is generally viewed in the same way by the governments of sub-Saharan Africa—as aid in the effort to end white colonial rule. Thus the Nigerian head of state, speaking before his fellow heads of state and government at the annual Organization of African Unity meeting, declared that the Russians "were invited into Africa for a purpose," and in every case of Cuban involvement "they intervened on behalf of legitimate African interests."

Two things would seem to follow from the above analysis. First, should the Soviets in the future become involved in situations where the sanctity of borders or the continuation of white rule are not at stake, they will be in a diplomatically much less advantageous position within the region. Second, for the United States to have demonstrated its resolve by countering the Soviets in Angola or Ethiopia would have meant the use of U.S. power for, what would be perceived in the region, as the preservation of white minority rule and the dismemberment of an established state. The normative implications of such action aside, it would have meant a diplomatic disaster for the United States in Africa, and probably the "third world" generally. While the goodwill of such states may not be necessary to the military or economic survival of the United States, their cooperation in a myriad of international forums is a significant element in the ability of the United States to conduct a successful foreign policy. Being no longer able to propose and dispose in such world bodies as the United Nations and the World Bank, and enmeshed in a variety of negotiations concerning "North-South" relations and the shape of a "new international economic order," U.S. policymakers can hardly view with equanimity an embittered bloc of African nations. Likewise, the development of anti-American sentiment by African governments could be costly to U.S. business, since these governments could discriminate in favor of European and Japanese multinational companies with whom American firms are in competition.

To directly counter the Soviet/Cuban involvement in Ethiopia and Angola, then, would have entailed a sacrifice of significant diplomatic interests in the

region. If to this cost is added the constraints on action applied by the enhanced capacity of the Soviets and the reluctance of the U.S. public to support foreign military involvement, it can be seen that these were not opportune situations to demonstrate U.S. will. Since tangible interests were not at stake, there was no particular reason for the Carter or Ford administrations to react to Soviet moves as if they were directed against the United States, and to make these the centerpiece of its foreign policy posture. By so doing, these administrations created a test of credibility which they were not prepared to win, and thus by their own definition of the situation may have done more to undermine U.S. credibility with adversaries and allies than anything the Soviets had done on their own.

In conclusion let me summarize my argument. Maintenance of U.S. credibility involves a concern with the psychological dimension of power—with how a set of events is perceived. A given Soviet move becomes a threat to U.S. "credibility" only when it is perceived by various audiences (the Soviets themselves, U.S. allies, the American public, etc.) as constituting a significant challenge to American interests, influence, desires, etc. When U.S. government spokesmen define Soviet moves in this manner, even when no tangible interests are at stake, they contribute to such a perception. If the United States could "propose and dispose" worldwide—i.e., if it could exercise effective global hegemony—then the definition of every Soviet action outside its circumscribed sphere as a challenge to U.S. credibility would pose little problem. Under such circumstances successful demonstration of U.S. "resolve" would be guaranteed, and frequent opportunities to display America's will to act would indeed provide a means to underscore the credibility of U.S. power. Serious problems arise, however, when hegemony is *not* assured: when situations arise that preclude a successful exercise of power, or where the costs of success are prohibitive. In such situations the definition of a threat to the United States, irrespective of whether or not tangible interests are at stake, creates the basis for undermining credibility rather than enhancing it. Thus if the Soviet Union is involved in situations where an effective exercise of U.S. power at feasible cost is highly problematic and in which no tangible U.S. interests are at issue, a concern for the credibility of U.S. power would dictate that government spokesmen avoid defining the situation as a direct challenge to the United States. This is the lesson that the current situation in sub-Saharan Africa teaches.

I am not suggesting that under contemporary circumstances the United States adopt a weak or isolationist foreign policy—i.e., and unwillingness, on principle, to exercise power abroad. Rather, what I believe these circumstances make imperative are two things: first, a rejoining of the concern for the credibility of U.S. power with a concern for the protection of tangible interests; and second, a sensitivity to the political reverberations created by the use of that power among states other than the Soviet Union. Instead of being an autonomous and overriding criterion in action decisions, credibility ought to be established and maintained as a concomitant of the willingness to use American power in defense of demonstrably established tangible interests. The criterion for engaging in a test of credibility, and for deciding on the extent of resources to be committed to it, would be the significance of the U.S. stake—diplomatic, strategic, or economic—in any given situation. The use of power would be scaled to the nature of the national interest involved, up to and including military intervention. Intervention, however, would be directed to obtaining some tangible goal, with the intangible psychological aspect of power—credibility—following as a "side-benefit."

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you, Dr. Price. You get an A-minus for that presentation. I think that it has really been most interesting and informative.

We now have a vote on the way. The committee will recess, and we will be back in 10 minutes.

[Recess.]

Mr. SOLARZ. The meeting of the subcommittee is called to order.

Now that Dr. Price has finished with his testimony, we will ask Dr. Chester Crocker to commence with his.

STATEMENT OF CHESTER CROCKER, DIRECTOR OF AFRICAN STUDIES, GEORGETOWN CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Mr. CROCKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think the place to start, in considering U.S. military and strategic interests in Africa, is by looking at the way outside powers have looked at Africa historically. I see four ways in which they have viewed Africa.

Perhaps the most important and the most consistent has been to look at Africa as an obstacle in the way en route to other parts of the world. It has been a place that you want to get around, get over, or get through. This has explained, of course, the pattern of colonization, the focus of the European colonial powers on the coast of Africa rather than in the hinterland, and the absence of major conflicts, during the colonial period, in the interior of Africa.

Very seldom in modern history has Africa been seen in itself as a place worth fighting over. Rather, it has been for control of coastal stations, airfields, and that sort of thing. The continued prominence of the cape route argument is further evidence of this point. This has been especially true, I would argue, for the big maritime powers, historically for the British, and today for ourselves.

The second view of Africa is to look at it as a kind of strategic hinterland for other neighboring areas of the world: The Mediterranean, the Middle East, or Europe.

During the French colonial period, the French were very active in developing Africa as a strategic hinterland, developing both its manpower and its base infrastructure, with the notion, especially in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War, that France might have to fall back on Africa to defend itself.

This strategy was mirrored again in World War II, when the Allies used Africa as a launching point.

This tradition, if you will, is also reflected in contemporary analysis that looks upon Africa as, in effect, bearing upon the United States-Soviet competition in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea.

A final example would be the case during the forties and fifties when the United States used North African base facilities for the deployment of strategic power, particularly strategic air power.

A third use of Africa, strategically, by outside powers has been as a launching pad for the interdiction or disruption of the interests of the maritime powers. It was, of course, Germany's strategy. It was the Axis strategy during the Second World War.

It is from this perspective that one understands many Western concerns about African strategic space. It is not a question of ourselves owning port and base facilities. It is a question of assuring the Soviets do not, because the fact of the matter is that the strategic lines of communication around Africa are potentially vulnerable.

I would add, in addition, that it has never worked, historically. No power based on Africa has succeeded in disrupting the lines of communication around Africa, but this is because it was possible to cut

off hostile powers, such as Germany, from their heartland in Europe, because of the naval supremacy of the British and the Americans. This cannot be assumed to be the case for the indefinite future.

The fourth view of Africa is as a place, in its own right, of intrinsic strategic interest. As I have mentioned, that has traditionally not been the common view. There are a few exceptions. The rivalry between the Russians, the French, the Italians, and the British during the 19th century over the control of the Nile's sources in Uganda and Ethiopia is perhaps the best example, because it was viewed that control of the upper sources of the Nile had a direct bearing on the future of Egypt and the future of the Suez Canal, and thus the whole position in the eastern Mediterranean.

But there are not too many examples like that in history. There are not too many examples today. I would suggest that perhaps the issue of the future political and economic orientation of the mineral heartland of south-central Africa is such a case.

Second, let us look at how U.S. military interests have evolved over time in the postwar period.

Our interests and our view of Africa since the Second World War have varied, in effect, with changes in the United States-Soviet military balance, the changing image we have had of Africa, and finally with changes in military technology itself. For example, the development of longer range transport aircraft.

The first phase in our view of Africa could be seen primarily in the context of using North African base facilities targeted against the Soviet Union as part of the strategic balance. The Europeans still maintained domination of Africa, and we found that strategically convenient. This phase I would see as ending in the late fifties, when the independence movement got under full swing in Africa.

The second phase runs from roughly 1960 to 1975, and this was a time, I would argue, when we basically were on the way out of Africa, strategically. If you look at the trends from roughly 1960 to 1975, you find us disengaging from Morocco, disengaging under pressure from Libya, and disengaging, hopefully, before the pressure got severe in Ethiopia.

It is also a time in which we began to build up alternatives to military reliance on African real estate itself, namely, by developing the Diego Garcia Base in the Indian Ocean, the reason specifically being to avoid dependence on the easily changed politics of African States, and to be able to have a more durable position that was not dependent on those politics.

The third phase begins with the events that the previous speaker has identified—the Portuguese revolution, the Angolan civil war, and all the upheaval and turmoil of Africa in the past 3 or 4 years. It is a phase of confusion, of a reassessment of American interests, of a domestic debate about what they consist of, and how we might better pursue them.

It does seem to me that we do have some specific military and strategic interests in Africa, and I would like to briefly outline them.

It is still true for us that Africa is a geographic obstacle. We do have need to get to zones of greater priority, at least as we see them, namely,

the northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean, and there are several ways of getting there, but the way around Africa or over Africa is one of the ways of getting there.

If we are unable to reinforce this area, the northwest quadrant, from the Mediterranean or the Atlantic around Africa, the only choice is from the Pacific. So we do have to look to our interests in getting to positions in the Indian Ocean for Middle East reasons, for Persian Gulf and Red Sea reasons.

In practice, this means that the U.S. Navy looks at Africa as a place in which it would like to have some bunkering and replenishment facilities, both to refuel and to take on supplies, to reinforce a carrier task force in a contingency, and this sort of thing. There are not many places at present in Africa where we can do this. To the best of my knowledge, the places in sub-Saharan Africa where we have any such naval rights and access on a regular basis are confined to Dakar, Monrovia, and Mombasa.

The same applies for air reinforcement in the Indian Ocean theater. The way you get there is either from the Atlantic or the Pacific. If you look at the map, you will see that the route through the eastern Mediterranean is best, if you can assume friendly relations with Egypt and Sudan, Saudi Arabia, of course, and Israel. You can get to the area that I am talking about without any great problem.

If you look further south, we have very little in the way of formal overflight or staging agreements in black Africa. We have none, to my knowledge. Furthermore, it is unlikely that you would get them. Even if you got them, they would not be worth much, because it would depend completely on how good your political relations were with the given African state.

Looking further south, still, we could, of course, I assume, obtain overflight and staging rights from South Africa, if we asked for them, but this is not the easiest way to get around Africa. I am not here to advocate that we do that.

Second, we have a very serious interest, I believe, in the commercial maritime cape route, as it is sometimes called. To me there is no debate that the security of the cape route is by far the most important Western interest in the African region.

Having said this, it is important to note that it may be important, but the level of threat to it has to be carefully assessed. Something that is important does not mean necessarily that it is under dire threat. Direct Soviet interdiction of Western shipping in southern African waters is not, to me, credible under peacetime assumptions. It would mean war.

There are few places more difficult for the Soviet Navy to sustain and project power than in southern African waters, particularly while South Africa remains in hands potentially hostile to Moscow.

The Soviets also depend on the cape route, and would have little incentive, it seems to me, to begin World War III in this part of the world.

Far more credible are scenarios involving, perhaps, sporadic interdiction by increasingly well-armed littoral states in the area, or in the context of local conflicts, for example, in the Mozambique Channel.

In addition, I think we must recognize the cape route security is a real issue in any NATO-European contingency. Were the Soviets to

be in a position, from a variety of African bases, to project overwhelming power against the cape route, it would have political effects on our decisionmaking process, in the NATO context, that simply cannot be overlooked.

The clear implication is that the cape route does not compel the West to cooperate at present with any African country. But in the absence of such cooperation, the Western powers, and I mean our European Allies, as well as ourselves, must be prepared to maintain alternative means of keeping that route secure in the event of certain conflict.

A third interest, which I have defined as power projection in Africa, for African purposes, must be considered as a distinct capacity that we have some interest in maintaining. In the past, that was not so. In the past, there was a degree of reciprocal United States-Soviet restraint, which made it less important to think about. There were fewer African conflicts, and African conflicts were less salient.

It is essential for the United States and its Western Allies to maintain some rough equivalence of power projection capability in the African area. Potential hostile preponderance in Africa is not in our interest, and it is not in the interest of Africa.

As the recent Zaire cases have shown, it seems to me that the United States by itself is not at all well endowed with the mobility options for projecting force into Africa. I am not proposing that we should do so repeatedly, that we should make a practice of doing so. I did not come here to name cases, but I would point out that just to get there is becoming increasingly difficult for the United States, at a time when it is becoming less so for the Soviet Union.

Soviet facilities in Angola, Guinea, Mali, Benin, Congo-Brazzaville, and Ethiopia far outmatch our own in this respect. It is through the French logistic infrastructure that we have the capacity at present to maintain some rough equivalence, but only through the French.

A fourth interest concerns the whole area of intelligence and our interests in antisubmarine warfare fields. At present, our intelligence in Africa comes via a variety of means—human, technical, satellite, and so fourth. U.S. access to the South African intelligence product, indirectly through the British connection, is in my view a high utility and low cost arrangement involving, as it does, no formal relationship whatsoever with the South Africans, but giving us, as it does, a very high-quality product.

Antisubmarine warfare intelligence on Soviet sub activity in the area can also be generated by a variety of other means, satellites, aerial surveillance flights from Diego Garcia, staging into Djibouti, into the Persian Gulf from the Azores, from Ascension Island and so forth.

Intelligence coverage targeted on Africa itself is a different issue, which we were not asked to address, but if there is interest, during the question time we can go into that.

A final interest of great importance which we were not directly asked to address, but which to me is strategic, is the growing United States and Western minerals interest in Africa. To separate this from the strategic seems to me to distort, somewhat, the picture.

Now, in reference to the whole question of American involvement in African crises or conflicts, there is simply one point that I would like to emphasize here.

We do have, as a superpower, a world order interest in rules of the game on a global basis in United States-Soviet competition. African events, and African trends. African patterns cannot be neatly isolated, because of geography, from other parts of the world. Precedents are created: The objective facts of a given crisis, or misgivings about a given government, maybe less important than how those facts are perceived by ourselves, Moscow, allied, and nonaligned states. Perceptions are at least as important as the objective facts.

I am not suggesting for a moment that it is in our interests to create tests of our own credibility that we cannot live up to. This is not foreign policy. It is amateurism. I am afraid that we have seen a lot of it lately.

On the other hand, it would be ironic and foolish if we were to walk away and assume that because there are some tests not worth meeting, there are no tests worth meeting in the African area. In my view, there may very well be.

We have many interests in Africa. We would like to see development. We would like to see the advancement of human rights. We would like to see arms transfers reduced. We would like to see an absence of nuclear proliferation in this area. I think that we would like very much to see an environment in which the resort to force declines rather than increases. But for us to say that by unilaterally abstaining from all these things, restraining ourselves in the arms transfer field, for example, or restraining ourselves from ever becoming involved in African political/military affairs, is basically to say that other people will carry the ball, and lead the way, and shape the process of change in Africa.

One final point, Mr. Chairman, and then I will finish my remarks.

I am not an advocate of the domino theory, not in the geographic sense of dominoes, particularly in Africa. There are too many local barriers. There are too many complexities to local conflict in Africa for any one domino to spill over that readily into another domino. But there is a sense in which political dominoes do exist.

African States, like all other States, live in a competitive world environment. They are necessarily going to adjust their behavior and their policies to that environment, and to the extent that there are changes. Africa, too, is part of the world.

[Mr. Crocker's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHESTER A. CROCKER, DIRECTOR OF AFRICAN STUDIES,
GEORGETOWN'S CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

I. THE HISTORICAL PATTERN—AFRICA'S STRATEGIC ROLE SINCE THE 1980'S

A. *Africa as an obstacle and way station to other places*

Africa less a place to get to than get around, over or through.

Explains the chain of colonial naval bases and the focus of European interest on the coast, not the hinterland.

There are today, and have long been, relatively few incentives or interests in Africa itself worth fighting over in the view of outside big powers.

Continued prominence of the Cape Route argument only proves the point.

This is especially true for maritime big powers—UK and U.S.

B. *Africa as a strategic hinterland for defense elsewhere*

France and Afrique Noire—manpower and territory, ports, bases.

Allies in WWII—a striking departure for U.S. and UK to look at Africa this way as a strategic back-up for Europe.

Current focus on Africa as "bearing upon" U.S.-Soviet competition in "more important" regions such as Eastern Mediterranean and Red Sea/Persian Gulf. The U.S. experience in 1940s and 1950s with using Africa for basing of strategic forces and intelligence.

C. Africa as a launching pad for interdiction/disruption of maritime powers

Germans and Axis in both world wars—aimed at commerce and at global maritime mobility.

It is from this perspective that one understands current Western concern: not to own strings of bases and ports but to assure that Soviets do not either. The strategic lines of communication (SLOCs) around Africa are potentially vulnerable.

It has never worked historically as a base of disruption because it can be cut off from the potentially hostile continental power due to assumed maritime supremacy of maritime Western nations. But this may not always be the case in the future.

D. Africa as a place to hold or control in its own right—intrinsic value

Generally, Africa itself has not been seen in this light.

There are exceptions, but they are rare: Nile sources in Uganda and Ethiopia as motive for imperialist competition in 1880s and 1890s. Motive: control Egypt, Suez and thus Eastern Mediterranean.

Mineral heartland of south-central Africa may be today.

II. STRATEGIC MILITARY INTERESTS

A. U.S. perceptions of strategic military interest have gone through several phases since 1945

1. Shaped by the U.S.-USSR strategic balance and degree of mutual restraints; by images of Africa; and by developments in military technology.

2. Phase one ran up to late 1950s: characterized by view of Africa as useful for strategic forces deployment (SAC bases) and intelligence collection targetted on USSR; for these purposes, European control accepted as convenient.

3. Phase two lasted up to mid-1970s when Portuguese coup, Angolan war and expanded Soviet power projection into Africa fundamentally changed the picture. Years 1960-75 characterized by downgrading of Africa strategically; gradual disengagement from U.S. facilities in Morocco, Libya and Ethiopia under local political pressure and in light of technology advances; conscious decision to avoid dependence on African bases and to develop Diego Garcia; and tendency to recognize primacy of European military role.

4. Phase three began in 1975 and continues: a phase of confusion, reassessment of strategic interests, uncertainty about definition of the threat and availability of means to deal with it.

B. Elements of current U.S. interests

1. For the U.S., Africa is still a geographic obstacle "in the way" en route to zones of higher strategic priority: the NW Quadrant of the Indian Ocean, including Persian Gulf and Red Sea-Arabian Peninsula.

There are needs for U.S. to have capacity for presence and reinforcing either from Pacific or Atlantic/Mediterranean or both.

In practice, this means that U.S. Navy still has some requirements for bunkering and replenishment along the African littoral, and there are few places available. It would be preferable to have more port access for periodic naval rotations (MIDEASTFOR), for carrier task forces, and contingencies. If not available, the only alternative is greater afloat logistic and refuelling capacity to permit steady naval presence.

Similarly, for air reinforcement into Indian Ocean area, USAF would like staging and overflight agreements in Africa. But formal agreements are unlikely to be obtainable, and are only useful if political relations are good. At present, U.S. ties with Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti, Israel and Saudis probably offer adequate options, but this could change. Further south, U.S. air rights are "iffy" at best; South Africa would offer rights if we asked, but this is the long way around Africa.

2. In addition to naval and air force lines of communications, there is the question of security of the maritime/commercial Cape Route(s) around Africa.

Security of the Cape Route is by far the most significant Western strategic interest in the African region.

Having said this, it is important to distinguish between the extent of U.S. interest and the extent of the threat to it. Direct Soviet interdiction of Western shipping in Southern African waters is not credible under peacetime assumptions:

It would mean war;

There are few places more difficult for the Soviets to project and sustain force, particularly while South Africa remains in hands potentially hostile to Moscow;

Soviets also depend on the Cape Route; and their shipping could be threatened in many other places in response.

More credible are the possibilities of sporadic interdiction by increasingly well-armed littoral state(s) or in the context of local conflicts.

In addition, Cape Route security is a real issue in any NATO/European contingency: were the Soviets to be in a strategic position—using naval and land-based power—to credibly threaten the route, it would have a direct bearing on Western options in Europe itself since this is the lifeblood of the Alliance.

The clear implications are (a) that the Cape Route interest does not *compel* the West to cooperate militarily with any littoral state in Africa, but (b) in the absence of such cooperation it is essential that Western nations maintain credible naval presence in South Atlantic and Indian Ocean waters using island support facilities and afloat support. The *potential* vulnerability of the route at key choke points should be more consciously an element of planning.

3. Power projection in Africa, for African purposes/contingencies, must be considered as a distinct capacity that is in the U.S. interest to assure.

Less important in the past when (a) no other potentially hostile power had this capacity, (b) African conflicts were less important or less salient and (c) when there was a greater degree of reciprocal U.S.-Soviet restraint.

It is essential that some rough equivalence be maintained between Soviet/Cuban and Western power projection capabilities in Africa: potential hostile preponderance in an unstable continent, permit Moscow to deter the West politically from acting, and reduce Western options.

As recent Zaire cases have shown, U.S. is not well endowed with strategic mobility options into Africa even for purely logistic support purposes: U.S. facilities access limited when compared with Soviet access in Angola, Guinea, Mali, Benin, Congo-Brazzaville, and Ethiopia. French logistic infrastructure critical to Western position.

4. Intelligence and ASW coverage in African/Indian Ocean arena are important U.S. interests.

At present intelligence coverage provided by variety of human and technical means, both American and allied.

U.S. access to South African product on Soviet activity, including naval presence, and ship movements generally is indirect via British. A low cost, high utility arrangement involving no formal relationship with the South Africans whatsoever.

ASW information on Soviet sub activity also generated by U.S. satellite, electronic and aerial surveillance (based on Persian Gulf, Diego Garcia, Morocco, Djibouti, Azores, Ascension).

The other side of this coin is that it is not in U.S. interest for Soviets to obtain easy access to African facilities for maritime reconnaissance flights in the region.

Intelligence coverage targetted on Africa itself (as distinguished from Soviets) not known to be a problem; it is simply a question of money, manpower and policy guidelines.

5. U.S. and Western minerals interests in Africa are substantial and growing. Should be considered a strategic aspect of U.S. interests, but I was not asked to address this matter.

III. AFRICAN CRISES/CONFLICTS AND GLOBAL U.S.-SOVIET COMPETITION

A. *Effects of the global setting on Africa*

Arms diffusion increases as function of power projection and competition by outside powers; but U.S. has no means of curbing this trend by unilateral restraint.

Africans are increasingly forced to "choose" and to seek reliable security partners in an era of internationalized conflict. When conflicts become militarized, even when at African initiative, Africans lose some measure of control over local events—so do powers relying solely on diplomatic instruments.

As weapons proliferate in Africa and more states acquire more advanced weapons systems, African dependence on outsiders *increases* not decreases: dependence a function of training and technology.

Non-alignment placed under growing strain by heightened competition.

B. Importance of African conflicts for U.S. global interests

Conflicts featuring Soviet/Cuban involvement inherently raise questions and choices about U.S. interests, options, credibility.

U.S. interest in reducing arms transfers and limiting nuclear proliferation is adversely affected.

U.S. interest in regional stability, discouraging the use of force and violent solutions is affected.

U.S. world order interests in rules of the game of U.S.-Soviet competition are tested. African events and patterns cannot be neatly isolated from broader global picture. Precedents are created: objective facts of a given crisis may be less important than how those facts are perceived in U.S., Moscow, allied and non-aligned states.

Some African conflicts are inherently more important than others because of location factors, resource endowment, etc. Zaire more important in this sense than Uganda.

There are few *geographic* dominoes in Africa, because of the many local barriers and issues which help to contain internal conflicts from spilling throughout the region. But there are *political* dominoes in that sense that African states will adjust their behavior and policies to the extent that they perceive the external environment to be changing. Africa cannot ignore global trends.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Dr. Crocker, for a very thoughtful presentation.

Now, I want to see if we can join some of the issues on which you have respectively commented.

Let me begin first by asking a few questions of Dr. Price concerning his own analysis of the credibility consideration, and the extent to which the American response, or lack thereof, to various African crises impairs or enhances the credibility of the United States as a reliable ally if a country is determined to resist unwanted encroachment of the Soviet power.

You make the point, Dr. Price, that our credibility is at stake in these local crises in Africa primarily to the extent that we say it is at stake. That we have in the past created, as it were, self-fulfilling prophecies by contending that our credibility was at stake.

Even though, according to your analysis, we had no vital interest involved, we objectively created a situation where our credibility was at stake. When we failed to respond in an appropriate way to such a practice, after defining it as one in which our credibility was at stake, we end up undermining, rather than enhancing our credibility.

I wonder to what extent the credibility of our country comes into question, not simply as a result of how our own policymakers define the crisis, but how the crisis is, in fact, interpreted by public opinion, in general, and by elite opinion, in particular.

If you have a situation in which Soviet forces, or Soviet surrogate forces move into a particular region, or area, or country, to what extent in your judgment would American credibility be involved, even if the President, or the Secretary of State, or the Security Council were convinced that really nothing important was involved here, but when you had editorial writers, and columnists, Western European journalists, and others, saying that this was another example of Soviet aggression.

Under such circumstances, do you think objectively our credibility is involved, or how would you define it?

Mr. PRICE. I think that you make a very important point. The issue of credibility that I tried to suggest, the doctrine of credibility, as I called it, is now so much part of what I would call our political culture, there is a kind of autonomous response outside of official circles. There are two points that I would like to make on this.

First, I think, of course, the President and the very important foreign policy advisers do a lot in shaping public opinion, and therefore I think that in the contemporary world it is their job, and it is in the national interest that they begin to try and modify our political culture, so that it more properly fits in with the existing international realities in a situation where I think our political culture is, in fact, toward a reality which ended sometime around 1970.

So I think that they have a really difficult task, a task which is made particularly hard by the nature of our domestic political system, a situation which appears to have arisen. When I was an undergraduate, and taking courses in political science, the lesson we learned was that presidents could conduct foreign policy pretty much free of domestic politics in their first term.

Mr. SOLARZ. No longer.

Mr. PRICE. That is the point that I wanted to make. But it seems now that presidents begin running for president the day after they are inaugurated, which means that our foreign policy turns out to be an expression of our domestic politics, not only in Africa, but elsewhere. This is not something which I can provide a remedy to, but I think that it is very dangerous, and it is something which poses a problem for the President. The fact that it is a problem, it seems to me, however, should not allow them to say that the President can do nothing about it.

Mr. SOLARZ. Nobody can quarrel with the assertion that the President's key foreign policy advisers are obviously in a position to help shape the way in which a particular crisis is being perceived, but they cannot exclusively shape that perception. So I come back to the question as I posed it to you: Do you believe that our credibility can become involved in a crisis in which, from purely an objective point of view, we may not have any vital or even terribly significant interests, but as a result of independent expressions of concern by Members of the Senate, and perhaps even by some benighted Members of the House of Representatives, by statements in Europe or elsewhere, who do view it as a challenge to American credibility.

Under such circumstances, do you think, that we do have to be properly concerned about the credibility of the American willingness to resist aggression, and that under such circumstances, willy-nilly, our credibility is involved?

Mr. PRICE. I do think so. The problem is that if the President runs with public opinion, then a situation is created where an added emphasis is placed on credibility in a situation where the President, given the circumstances, lacks the resources, within any reasonable context, to actually win that test. That is the dilemma.

Mr. SOLARZ. Let me move on to another aspect of this problem.

As I read your testimony, which I thought was extremely sophisticated and in many respects persuasive, I understood you to be arguing that, in effect, we really have no vital interests in Africa, because

to the extent that you rely, for example, on various mineral resources from the continent, it is your feeling that regardless of the character of the indigenous regimes in Africa, whether they are Marxist, or capitalist, or pro-Soviet, or pro-Western, their interest in selling their resources to us is so overwhelming that it is virtually inconceivable that they would withhold those resources. You cite various contemporary examples, such as the willingness of the Angolans, with the Cuban protection, to continue selling us the oil through the Gulf installation there, as a way of proving your thesis.

However, if what you say is true, where do we draw the line? It seems to me that the logical conclusion of your analysis is, we, in effect, should be prepared to acquiesce in almost any act of Soviet or Soviet surrogate aggression in Africa on the grounds that we really have no vital interests there, and we ought not to engage the power of this country in an effort to resist such aggression, however unjustifiable it may be, given the extent that we do not have vital interests involved.

So are you in effect saying that the Soviet Union has a blank check in Africa, because we really don't have any vital interests there, and we ought not to engage American power in an effort to resist Soviet aggression.

Mr. PRICE. To begin with, I think my argument is that we do have vital interests in the economic sphere. We do have a vital interest in secure access to various essential minerals, and also an interest in seeing that those mineral resources are explored for and developed. So I would say that we do have a vital interest.

My argument is that this vital interest, under existing circumstances, and existing plausible circumstances, and let me emphasize plausible, those vital interests have not been threatened and are not likely to be threatened even in the event of Soviet sponsorship for radical revolutions in the African Continent.

Now, if you want to draw the worst case scenario, Soviet paratroopers landing everywhere from South Africa to Guinea, and securing control over the bauxite mines in Guinea, and the copper in Zaire, and so on, I would say, yes, there is an instance where our tangible interests are threatened, and the U.S. credibility is on the line.

On the other hand, if a radical government comes to power in Mozambique, or Angola, or as there has been one for 20 years in Guinea, it turns out, in fact, for good theoretical reasons, but also the empirical evidence is there, that these governments continue to do business with us, to trade with us.

Mr. SOLARZ. Supposing it were Cuban paratroopers rather than Soviet paratroopers that landed in all those places, would your reaction be the same?

Mr. PRICE. My reaction would be the same to the Cuban paratroopers, but there is a difference between Cuban paratroopers seizing mineral mines and holding them, and Cuban assistance for African political movements, who aid movements to become governments.

You used the term "Soviet aggression in Africa," and this is not a term that I used in my testimony, and for good reason. I don't think there has been any Soviet aggression in Africa. There has been Soviet involvement in Africa. But I don't think that the African countries themselves define what the Soviets and the Cubans have been doing in Africa as aggression.

Mr. SOLARZ. You are properly, I think, concerned about the extent to which we create self-fulfilling prophecies in Africa, which would put our credibility on the line, and then are unable to take those actions, which would establish the extent to which our credibility was being maintained.

However, I think there is another side of the coin, and that is, to what extent is the failure on the part of the United States to respond to the Soviet interventions directly and indirectly in Africa, even in situations where our vital interests are not immediately at stake, and create a situation in which, in effect, we encourage the Soviet Union to believe that they can get away with such interventions in other parts of the world?

Does our failure to respond create objectively a political and psychological environment in which the Soviet conclude that we simply lack the will to respond in general, and if they can get away with it here, they might be able to get away with it somewhere else, thereby objectively increasing the risks of confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States in those areas of the world where we surely will respond?

Mr. PRICE. That is the argument, which I was trying to comment on in what I call the credibility doctrine. My point on that is, up, let us say, until the 1970's, one could take the view that such interventions were necessary to maintain credibility, and we could exercise foreign policy on that basis, because we were, essentially, hegemonic.

Because of the destruction of Europe and the Soviet Union after World War II, because of colonialism, the United States could very much propose and dispose at very low cost worldwide. I am saying that we have to face a new reality. Even if we would like to demonstrate our credibility, because we fear the very thing you are talking about, many circumstances in the world will not provide that opportunity. To try and demonstrate our credibility will be more costly to that credibility than standing back.

For example, one could talk about a case outside of Africa, the Iranian case. The former Secretary of State has granted interviews in many journals in which he has argued that our credibility was on the line because we allowed the Shah to be overthrown. But given the circumstances, within the constraints, what was the alternative?

Fifteen years ago, a few million dollars could engineer a revolution in Iran to put the Shah in power. But the situation in Iran has changed drastically. We are no longer in that position, and my point is, the sooner we face that fact, the better it is going to be for American credibility.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mrs. Fenwick.

Mrs. FENWICK. I am stunned, absolutely stunned to think that we view with perfect calm American lack of any interests in Africa except economic. Are we perfectly prepared to see government after government falling under the influence or control of either Cubans or Russians, provided we can still get our minerals, which you think they would always be willing to sell us? I don't think that is entirely clear.

I don't think that we will have to wait very much longer for evidence to see what happens with Libya and other nations which may cut our supply of something which we consider even more vital than minerals.

That is what is going to happen in my opinion. We are losing by default. What troubles me is this, we have been listening in this committee to a series of interesting and most provocative witnesses who are always talking about responses.

In your testimony, Dr. Price, not once do you say what you think we ought to do. You only talk about responses to Soviet action. Are we supposed to do nothing?

Does the point arise at which we can really say that we don't care what happens to Africa, that we can let the Russians or Cubans take all the bases they want, take Monbasa, or anything else? Just as long as we can get our minerals to feed our industries, we really don't care about Africa. Is that it?

Is that really what we are going to be saying to the world? I don't think that it is good enough.

Mr. PRICE. I think that one wants to talk about our relations with Africa in the context of the circumstances as they develop historically. I just don't see a situation in which the Soviet Union, or the Cubans, have moved into Africa sweeping governments aside and society indiscriminately and taking them over.

Mrs. FENWICK. That is not the point. That is not what I am saying. They are not sweeping the Government aside. They are permeating the area in one place after another, either by landing 2 billion dollars' worth of arms within 10 days in Ethiopia or by moving into South Yemen, where they have troops, non-East Germans—Russians and Cubans.

The point I am trying to make is that I keep hoping that somebody here is going to say, "We cannot continue merely to respond." We ought not only to be concerned about what Russia is doing, but we ought to be doing something ourselves. I don't mean militarily, I mean some kind of plan.

You speak of our tangible interests, are they the minerals and the assurance that we can buy them?

Mr. PRICE. That is right.

Mrs. FENWICK. That is the only interest you think we have?

Mr. PRICE. We can claim, as we often do, to want a better world for everybody, to want human rights in Africa, and these are all quite commendable values. My own feeling is that it is simply not in the power of foreign governments to impose those kinds of values on the African Continent, or to mold the African Continent in our image.

Mrs. FENWICK. No one is suggesting that we should impose our law. But I think it would be wise to have a policy. Now, if we don't care about human rights.

Mr. PRICE. It is not a matter of not caring.

Mrs. FENWICK. In addition to the human rights, which are important, there are bases, which are important, if they all get into the Russian hands, we will not be well off. The submarine fleet of the Russians is enormous, as we know, and suppose they are based all around the continent of Africa?

I believe that anything is possible, and what I keep hoping for is someone who will come before this committee, and address a policy which is both peaceful, constructive, sincerely interested in the welfare of the people, because in my opinion that is the key. The only way that

we are going to beat the Russians in Africa is to say, "Listen, we care far more about your welfare than we do about power." Somebody is going to have to speak like that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PRICE. Could I respond just briefly, just to make a comment on what we should do, and where I think our power does lie.

Mr. SOLARZ. You go right ahead.

Mr. PRICE. The Soviets have advantage in their willingness to use military power in Africa. They have one major disadvantage. Once they place, or help to place governments in power, they are not very well placed to help them with the tasks of economic development. It so happens, for better or for worse, that the capital and technology which all governments sorely lack, and therefore sorely need, happen to be found in the industrial West.

It is, therefore, that connection which the United States can, I think, effectively utilize to establish good relations with all African Government, whatever their ideological coloration, and whatever their past political allegiance. The contemporary history of Guinea in West Africa is a case in point.

Here is a country, which has had the closest long-term relationship with the Soviet Union of any of the African countries, yet are not only our companies involved in that country in the mining of bauxite, but the economic interests that Guinea has had in expanding that bauxite has led in the last year to a major reorientation of its foreign policy vis-a-vis us, and vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

Mrs. FENWICK. The Soviet Union is paying one-third of the world price for the bauxite that they were taking out.

Mr. PRICE. Exactly. We don't have to do that and, therefore, we are in an advantageous position.

Mr. SOLARZ. Now that we have put Dr. Price through the wringer, we will proceed to interrogate Dr. Crocker.

We would not want you to think, Professor Crocker, that you have gotten off the hook completely. I want to come to grips with what seems to be your concern over the strategic significance of the cape route, which has been traditionally cited as one of the major American strategic interests in Africa.

Dr. Price has addressed, albeit not in his oral presentation, in which he summarized his written statement, a number of points which seem to be rather persuasive, and I think that it would be helpful for the committee if you could respond to them.

First he made the point, and I think you indicated that you were more or less in agreement with his analysis yourself in your testimony, that it would be exceedingly unlikely, in the context of peace, for the Soviet Union, even if it had control of the port facilities in South Africa and Mozambique, and was thereby in the position to establish an effective blockade of the cape route, to do so, because any effort to deprive the West of the oil which is its very lifeline, could quite probably produce world war III, which is not presumably what the Soviets have in mind.

In the sense, however, that the Soviets might consider, assuming they had control of South Africa at some point in the future, denying the West access to the cape route in the context of a conventional confrontation, Dr. Price makes the following points.

First: He says, were they to decide to interdict the oil leaving the Persian Gulf, there are other places they could do it, where they would, presumably, be able to do it more effectively, such as the Straits of Hormuz, or the North Atlantic region where the oil would be going to Europe.

Second: He makes the point that in the context of a conventional war between East and West, the Soviet fleet, for strategic purposes, would be needed much more in the North Atlantic and in other areas than it would be in the cape route. So, therefore, it is seemingly unlikely that the Soviets would divert their naval resources to the cape in order to prevent the flow of oil going around the cape at that point.

Therefore, we really need not be terribly concerned about the disadvantages to the West which might ensue at some point in the future, if the Soviets were ever able to get control of the port facilities in South Africa.

What is your response to that argument?

Mr. CROCKER. On the first part of it, Mr. Chairman, would the Soviets start world war III in southern African waters, this to me is the ideal "strawman" argument, but it is necessary to say it because I am afraid some of the advocates of the cape route argument are so simplistic in their own analysis that they lead us to that interpretation of what they are really saying. It is a strawman, of course, I agree with the first point.

But the other point that you make, or that Dr. Price makes, I don't agree with. It seems to me that were the Soviets to be in a commanding position over any part of the cape route, or the cape routes, which they should really be called—namely, from the West African borders at Dakar from the Horn or from South Africa—this would not be in our interests.

In a peacetime situation, if they were in a commanding position vis-a-vis the route, it would have dire implications from the standpoint of anyone doing contingency logistics planning for a NATO-European conflict.

Europe can exist for approximately 30 to 60 days without that cape route, and that route involves not just oil, but minerals. Anybody who has seriously looked at the possibility of keeping a European theater going in conventional wartime circumstances, without that cape route being unquestionably under Western domination, has got a real problem, a real nightmare.

It is not a question of the Soviets actually starting the war in South Africa, or off the cape. The question is the political implications to other people making their own decisions based on the knowledge of what the Soviets could do if war breaks out.

Mr. SOLARZ. How do you respond to the argument that in order for the Soviets to effectively utilize African facilities, particularly southern African facilities, to interdict the cape route, they would be obligated to divert their naval resources, which in the context of the conventional war, they would need in the North Atlantic, and which from their own strategic perspective could be much more effectively utilized in the North Atlantic?

To the extent that they determined, in the context of the conventional war, that the best way to undermine the West was to interdict the oil supplies to Western Europe, and possibly to some extent to

the United States and Japan, that they would be in a better position to do it, and in fact would have the capacity to do it, by interdicting the oil as it left the Persian Gulf, or conceivably even by bombing the oil installations themselves.

In other words, if a situation should develop where the Russians decide that it is in their interest to prevent the West from getting that oil, aren't there other ways in which they would be in a better position to do it than through African facilities, and wouldn't their use of African facilities for that purpose require them to divert naval and other assets, which they could more effectively employ elsewhere?

Mr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, I don't believe it is a subject that can be neatly divided up and segmented in little boxes. I think the Soviets face many alternative means of bringing political and military pressure to bear on our interests in a wartime situation, such as you have described. Taking out the oil installations in the Middle East is, of course, a Soviet option. But it would seem to me that there are many other options as well.

If you look at the cape route, you have mentioned some of them, but there are a number of chokepoints on it that are not often perceived just by looking at a map. It might look as though there is not really a cape route problem, because you can go as far south as you like; but, in fact, you cannot. There is a 40-mile chokepoint off the coast of the southern cape, which in effect all of Western maritime commerce, and Soviet maritime commerce use.

The Soviets have been known to request assistance from South African port officials when they get in trouble because of how severe that chokepoint is.

Mr. SOLARZ. What is a chokepoint?

Mr. CROCKER. A point where a route becomes very narrow because of the seas and currents.

Mr. SOLARZ. Why does the shipping have to go 40 miles south in the cape route? Why can't the shipping be diverted further south than that 40-mile chokepoint?

Mr. CROCKER. It could be, but the shipping would suffer very severe casualties. The weather is just ferocious down there, and that is not just an old wives' tale. It is the knowledge and the operating skills of the pilots and ship captains of the area for many years. There are very unpredictable currents, and rapidly changing weather, very, very high seas, and what-not. The same thing could be said about the Mozambique Channel.

Mr. SOLARZ. What about the possibility of alternative routes to Western Europe and the United States through either the Pacific, or the Suez Canal?

Mr. CROCKER. There are many alternatives. The Suez Canal, of course, is much more convenient for some kinds of ships. The big oil tankers cannot go through the Suez Canal, and the very large ore carriers cannot either, but the smaller ones can. There, again, you have a potential target that could be readily taken out, of course.

There are other ways to get stuff from here to there. If you are talking about oil from Abu Dhabi to France, that is one question. If you are talking about chrome from Zimbabwe and South Africa

to Switzerland, that is another question. If you are talking about Nigerian oil to Japan, that is a third question. I think that we are talking about a great complexity here.

Mr. SOLARZ. I guess, Dr. Crocker, what I am trying to get at is this, in the context of a major conventional war between the Soviet Union and our allies in Western Europe, where the only restraint on the use of power by either side is nuclear weapons, because they do not want the ultimate cataclysm to engulf all of them, is it conceivable that the Russians would not make an effort to interdict the supply of oil from the Persian Gulf?

So the extent that they made such a decision, which I should think clearly they would, there are a variety of ways in which they can do it, even if they did not these facilities in southern Africa, which would, in effect, enable them—I mean they could bomb the oil fields out of existence for a while.

Mr. CROCKER. Of course.

Mr. SOLARZ. They could send submarines into the Straits of Hormuz and drop mines. I think that route is so vulnerable that there is no way to keep it open, in effect, if the other side decides to close it off, other than the threat of nuclear war.

Mr. CROCKER. It seems to me, as I said, there are many ways that they could bring pressure on us, and I am not trying to emphasize specifically the South African dimensions of this. I would view Dakar as an equally significant place, strategically speaking, and so is the Horn, the Straits of Hormuz certainly are, and the Mozambique Channel.

I am pointing out that the Soviets, like any intelligent military planners, would want to look at their options and consider all of them.

Mr. SOLARZ. Dr. Crocker, while Portugal maintained its colonial control of Angola and Mozambique, U.S. naval ships, as you may know, called regularly on the ports of Luanda and Maputo. Before President Johnson terminated his U.S. naval visits to South Africa in 1967, our vessels stopped regularly at Capetown.

In your judgment, what, if any, have been the strategic or military losses to the United States as a result of our not being able to bunker at these southern African ports, in the last few years?

Mr. CROCKER. For peacetime contingencies, or minor crises in the region we are talking about, the losses that you refer to are losses of convenience, and they have cost implications. But they are nothing more than that. I would consider them to be minor in that sense.

At present, the U.S. Navy doesn't rotate destroyers from the west into the Indian Ocean, or bring its carrier task forces in via Africa. It brings them from CINCPAC, from the Pacific Fleet, or down to the Suez from the Mediterranean Fleet. That is, I think, the simplest answer to your question.

Mr. SOLARZ. Dr. Crocker, in your testimony, at the very end you indicated that while there were no geographic dominoes in Africa, there were political dominoes. We had to be concerned about the extent to which unopposed Soviet interventions in Africa created a political environment in which other African countries would bend their policies to accommodate the new perception of Soviet power on the continent.

In that context, I wonder if you could let us know to what extent, in your judgment, any African countries have, in fact, modified or altered their policies as a result of the Cuban intervention in Angola and Ethiopia, which would presumably be an example of the kinds of Soviet thrust which could change the political environment in which the African countries would modify their policies.

Has, in fact, your prophecy of the political domino effect come true?

Mr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, I think that I would like to say just one word about the broader context in which that question sits.

The United States, and you mentioned a moment ago the issue of should the President handle credibility differently, the United States cannot manage the world by itself. It cannot control the consequences of its own action. We are living with the aftermath of Vietnam, and one lesson of Vietnam is that the American political system, as it operates, puts limits on any executive branch in the way it operates. Many other countries have learned lessons from that.

It is precisely because of that experience that our credibility is on the line, not because we want it to be, but because other people are saying: "Maybe the Americans are not to be counted on so much anymore." Then you look at the way that we manage our energy problem, our economy, and monetary system, you look at a whole series of issues, and what do you have? You have questions. The questions are not just coming from the press, and they are not just coming from the Senate. They are coming from the outside world.

Mr. SOLARZ. The thrust of your testimony was that whether or not there were vital strategic, or tangible interests at stake, to the extent that we permitted the Soviet Union, directly or indirectly, to attempt to resolve African problems by military means, without resisting, we would conceivably run the risk of a political domino effect, where other countries would have seen that this intervention was not opposed, and would come to the conclusion that the Soviets presumably represented the wave of the future.

I would like to ask you, now that we have before us two concrete examples of massive Soviet-Cuban involvement on the east and west coasts of Africa, have you seen any other African countries adjusting their policies in light of the Soviet-Cuban success in both of those situations?

Mr. CROCKER. They are not going to announce it in public, but Africans are as rational and pragmatic as anyone else in this world, and I think there are many examples. I think the prime example of the political domino in Africa today is Zambia. Zambia is at the mercy of forces that it cannot control. Zambia was the country, more than any other, that urged South Africa to go into Angola, and so did Zaire. These are facts. Look at where Zambia is now.

Mr. SOLARZ. I think that President Kaunda, who is one of the front-line presidents, just managed to persuade Mr. Nkomo to accept the British constitutional proposal, would probably disagree with you argument that he is completely at the mercy of forces that he cannot control. I think that he still exerts a good deal of influence.

Since you mentioned Zambia, I would like to ask both of you, to the extent that we ought to be concerned about American credibility

in Africa and elsewhere, I would like to know whether you think, should the London Conference collapse, and the war in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia continue, whether you think that it would pose a test of America's credibility if the Cubans—I don't think that this is likely to happen, I am talking hypothetically—if the Cubans decided to intervene in force at the request and on the behalf of the Patriotic Front, do you think that that would pose the kind of situation which would test the credibility of the United States in terms of its willingness to respond to such an intervention in Africa, and how do you think we ought to respond to that situation?

Mr. PRICE. I think, certainly, given the fact that such action would take place in a context which has been set in motion ever since 1976, primarily by then Secretary of State Kissinger, who designed a moderate solution, and we are seeing perhaps, hopefully, the last step in that solution right now, our credibility would be on the line at this point, but there is nothing that we can do about it.

Mr. SOLARZ. I am posing a hypothetical concerning the Cuban intervention after the collapse of the London Conference.

Mr. PRICE. I understand. I am saying, like it or not, because of what has gone on before, as we have already stated numerous times, should the Soviets and Cubans get involved further, our credibility would be tested. Therefore, it would be tested. There would be a test of our resolve.

The question now, what can we do about it, is one of the most perplexing problems of all, because it seems to me that if one were serious about wanting to meet that test of credibility, and one concluded that the only way one could meet that test of credibility would be to check the Soviets and the Cubans, then we would be thrown into a situation which would lead us to engage in either covert or overt military actions, which might help our credibility in one sense, but in the larger sense it would destroy our relations with the States of black Africa, because inevitably, it seems to me the dynamics of that situation would be one in which we align ourselves with a southern African block of states, the dominant force of which would be South Africa.

Mr. SOLARZ. Dr. Crocker?

Mr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, I don't think, as you do that the scenario is very likely. One reason is that there is so much discussion in this country today about Soviet/Cuban involvement in the world. I think the Soviets are becoming aware of the implications.

If they were to do what you are saying, our best way of deterring Soviet/Cuban involvement in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, in a sense, is Ronald Reagan. This is a real prospect that that sort of Soviet activity would throw this country so far to the right on these kinds of issues, and would ruin the SALT Treaty, which is perhaps more important than Ronald Reagan.

I do think that this is a form of deterrence. In other words, you do not always have to respond, in the African context, to an African event.

Second, I feel that it is unlikely that we would ever look at it that way, in terms of U.S. Marines going into Zimbabwe. What worries me is that if the Cubans were to do such a thing, as I think unlikely, the immediate response would come from South Africa, before we had

time to conduct the 1,500 NSC meetings, and the congressional hearings, and so forth, that would be required before we could ever act.

Mr. SOLARZ. If we had to wait for a witness from the DOD, obviously, we would not be able to respond very quickly. [Laughter.]

If South Africa did come to the assistance of the Muzorewa government, under such circumstances, do you think, in your judgment, that would politically preclude our coming to the assistance of the Muzorewa government, not only with troops, but with arms as well? Or, do you think that the larger implications of the Cuban intervention in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia would necessitate a willingness on our part to provide some kind of military assistance, regardless of what South Africa did?

Mr. CROCKER. If South Africa became involved directly on the ground in the Zimbabwe situation, there would be no need for any other intervention. What you would face, however, would be the question of our attitude toward such things as United Nations measures toward lifting of sanctions toward the Muzorewa government, and that would depend, I assume, on the British lead.

Mr. SOLARZ. If South Africa did not get involved?

Mr. CROCKER. I think that it is very unlikely.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mrs. Fenwick.

Mrs. FENWICK. Perhaps Mr. Evans has some questions.

Mr. SOLARZ. I indicated to our good friend who is visiting us today to signify if he had any questions at any point.

Mrs. FENWICK. I would like to say that the President of Zambia is in a difficult if not an impossible position. I think that his anxiety is real and most understandable. That he should have written to Prime Minister Thatcher, as he did, urging her not to press the Patriotic Front to accept the constitution, suggests some of his despair. Did you see that in the paper?

Mr. SOLARZ. No.

Mrs. FENWICK. It is in the Washington Star. I think that his position is desperate, by far the most desperate of all the leaders, and I am terribly sorry for him.

I would like to ask you this: In the event of the hypothesis that our chairman presented, one of the first things that we have to do is to find out what Britain's reaction would be. They are the responsible power, it would seem to me. We should find out first what Britain intends, and whether or not Britain has worked with the Commonwealth countries on their intentions, and how far we would be separated from the African States, frontline or other, in any action that we might take together with Britain.

Dr. Crocker, what would you suggest as a peaceful, intelligent, and sincerely concerned policy for the United States? As I have said, in the long run, if we have a sincere concern for the welfare of people, with the power that we have at our disposal, philosophical more than military, that would prevail. How would you convey that in some useful, practical way?

Mr. CROCKER. May I comment on the first point you made.

I think the frontline states represent a force for diplomacy and for peace in southern Africa, and they are very, very anxious to see that there be some other outside actor which has an interest in peaceful change and avoiding the resort to force. That is why they tried to

work with us on the Anglo-American plan, and that is why they came around to embrace the Thatcher initiative, which they had worried would simply mean unilateral recognition of Muzorewa.

They are, as you have suggested, very much influenced by the fact that they do not control the sources of the arms that are flowing into the area. They are caught between two strong armed elements, if you will, South Africa and Rhodesia, closely aligned with it, and the Soviet/Cuban/East German nexus, and they are not in that sense militarily independent actors. This is the problem.

On the second point that you raised, I agree with you completely. I don't think that either of us suggested that America should have a primarily military policy in Africa. We cannot be effective in Africa, I don't think, without taking the initiative, and it is not going to come through words. It is going to have to come through resources. There simply is no excuse, to my mind, for the inability of our executive branch, or our Congress to deliver more money in terms of concrete programs for Africa.

If we are serious that Africa is becoming more important as a part of the Third World, let's see the evidence for that, in terms of development assistance, military assistance across-the-board. That is the short answer to you, but I would hope that we would have some focus here, like doing some concrete things for refugee crises, doing some concrete things in the area of minerals development, and so forth.

Mrs. FENWICK. Dr. Price, do you want to comment on that?

Mr. PRICE. I think my suggestions would be exactly along the same lines. I see no problems with that at all.

Mr. SOLARZ. Dr. Crocker, with reference to your argument of the 40-mile chokepoint, off the cape coast, how much naval power would the Soviet Union need to actually interdict shipping going through that chokepoint?

To what extent, if they decided to make such an effort, would they, in fact, need port facilities in South Africa to be able to do it?

In other words, could they do it with submarines that could return to home ports and elsewhere, if there was a determination to interdict that route?

Mr. CROCKER. There are several elements here. Submarines are an ideal weapon in southern African waters because there are about four sets of major currents coming together, which make it very difficult to detect a submarine in southern African waters. Sonar is simply not very effective down there. It is possible to operate without being detected as a submariner for a long time.

Having said that, of course, it would be nice to have some shore facilities, and it is a long way away from any other Russian facility that is built up and developed. Therefore, I would assume that it would be nice for them to have some land bases there, and it would be nice to be able to put into them.

Mr. SOLARZ. Would it be necessary?

Mr. CROCKER. I don't think that it would be necessary.

Mr. SOLARZ. How many submarines would you need at any given time to effectively interdict that choke?

Mr. CROCKER. I think that you really need the Defense Department here to go much further down this line of questioning, Mr. Chairman. I am not qualified to really answer that question.

Mr. SOLARZ. It seems to me, even to the extent that one accepts the argument that the cape route does have enormous strategic significance, one might argue that given the technology currently available to the Soviet Union, it could interdict the route, if they so chose, even without base facilities inside Africa.

Mr. CROCKER. Their present naval force configuration does not permit them to keep submarines on stations that far away from other bases, without replenishment of some sort. They have to have some place of support.

Mr. SOLARZ. Since they have so many submarines, wouldn't they rotate them? In other words, send a half a dozen, or whatever it takes to that chokepoint, and let them stay there for as long as they can stay there, and send in a replacement crew, when the original one had to go back.

Mr. CROCKER. Yes, they can rotate them. It seems to me that we really need expert advice to figure out how many ships you need back at home in order to keep three on station, or whatever.

But there is an implication here, which I really want to get on the record, Mr. Chairman. The logic of the cape route argument is not that we need bases in South Africa. The logic is, in part, that it would be very unfortunate if they had bases. The second part of it is, to avoid the dependence on any littoral state, my argument is that we need to have a navy that can keep a presence in that area.

Mr. SOLARZ. But it would not be unfortunate if they had bases, if there are ways that they can effectively block shipping going through the cape route, even without bases. The bases only become unfortunate for us if, in fact, the bases are necessary to interdict the shipping through the cape route, wouldn't you agree?

Mr. CROCKER. That certainly gives them a much stronger presence. It is a matter of degree.

Mr. SOLARZ. Yes, but the question is, how important, and how helpful it is.

Mr. CROCKER. Yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. What did you mean, Dr. Crocker, when you spoke in your testimony about the possible sporadic interdiction of the cape route by well-armed, littoral states. I was not aware of the fact that Mozambique or Angola, or eventually Namibia, had particularly good navies.

Mr. CROCKER. I think that we are talking here about a broader problem, which is the diffusion of quite sophisticated military power because of arms sales, ours and other people's, to two Third World states. It does not take much. A missile patrol boat is all it takes to knock a tanker out, and it might not even take that. This is not a severe problem of maintenance and acquisition for a Third World navy.

Mr. SOLARZ. Dr. Crocker and Dr. Price, how would you characterize the existing Soviet naval facilities, such as they are, in Africa? Do you consider them defensive, or do you consider them offensive, or do you consider them as mere examples of showing the flag? Do they serve any particularly useful military purposes, either way? What would be your assessment of the existing facilities which are available to the Soviets, and what are they?

Mr. PRICE. I am not an expert on the subject, but from my reading of people who are experts on it, it is my understanding that to the degree that the Soviets had more than simply some refurbishing, or visitation rights, essentially, in places like Mozambique on the eastern coast, their major facility was, of course, in Somali, which they were quite willing easily to give up, which may suggest the importance that it had to them, the ease with which they gave it up.

But my understanding from reading experts is that the purpose of that facility was essentially to resupply submarines, and that those submarines, in turn, are essentially deployed for defensive purposes, particularly to defend the Soviet heartland against seaborne ballistic missiles, which are introduced into the Indian Ocean through our Poseidon and Trident submarines.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Evans?

Mr. EVANS. I would like to press the witnesses a little bit on the question of what should we do, rather than to sit back and react. The question does not seem to be easily answered. My limited experience with Africa, they almost resent the money, because they interpret the money as being sent in order to keep our industrial economy going.

How would you react to the suggestion that since the social climate in the United States has changed considerably in the last 20 years or so, vis-a-vis blacks from outside, of perhaps a more effective way way would be to do what Russia has been doing in Chad, to a lesser extent, try to train in the United States, and then have them go back as ambassadors, and prevent the situation where we might have to have an armed confrontation to resist communism from the inside.

Mr. PRICE. I certainly think that that would be a good idea. We do do a good deal of that. There are many African students studying for professional positions, and technical positions in this country, and more of it would certainly be in order.

Mr. EVANS. Why aren't we doing it? If a conscious effort were made to expand the program, not choosing who could be sent here, but a real program

Mr. PRICE. Surely that would be helpful. In part, the political inhibitions of doing it, even in Africa, are very dicing, because if we do too much of it too visibly, we lay ourselves open to charges that are attempting a kind of intellectual neocolonialism, which is something we hear a lot. I am not arguing for that, and I am not saying that this is what is going on. What I am saying is, we have to introduce these things gradually, not in some sort of a massive Marshall plan for the minds of Africa.

Mr. EVANS. If that were done, it would be more successful.

Mr. SOLARZ. May I say that I would certainly support the effort to make it possible to bring a number of Africans to our country.

Mr. EVANS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOLARZ. We also recognize that education in the United States is not a sure-fire formula for producing friends in Africa. The leader of Ethiopia received his military training in the United States, and I remember the last time I was in Addis Ababa, I saw a big billboard in the center of town, showing an Ethiopian peasant being clubbed over the head by a rifle which had been supplied by Uncle Sam. In the English newspaper, the dateline of many articles was Moscow's,

one news service that they seem to subscribe to, Tass. Be that as it may, I think in general it is helpful to bring these people over.

Dr. Crocker, how do you react to the argument Dr. Price made that we have a significant interest in retaining access to critical mineral resources and oil from Africa, and that the overwhelming interest these African countries have is selling their materials to the West—as well as the record of their continued determination to make those resources available even when there are changes of regime in those countries that are not particularly friendly to us—indicate that we need not be overly concerned about the possibility that either internally or externally produced changes of government in Africa could result in a situation where we are denied access to resources we need for our economy?

Mr. CROCKER. I think that is a very important question, and I agree with the basic judgment that African States of any ideological stripe have an interest in selling their mineral resources, fuel, and nonfuel, for a basic reason that I think we must understand in this country. It is not because they are pragmatic and nice guys, it is because they have to keep governments going, and they keep governments going with the proceeds of their mineral exports. It is as simple as that.

Now, having said, the assumption that it makes no difference what kind of government is in office, is to argue that all governments are equally effective or ineffective in developing their minerals. I don't accept that assumption, and I doubt whether many Americans would. I don't think the record of socialist mineral development is likely to be as good as the record of capital mineral development. I think that we probably could see evidence of that if one took a serious look at it.

But more important even than that, which is an ideological statement of mine, is the notion that what is going in South Central Africa is disruption right now. We may think that the Cubans stabilized Angola, but the railroad is still not operating. I would view continuation of what is going on now as operating, in effect, as a deterrent to mineral output throughout the region, from Shaba down to the Northwestern Cape. It is deterring Western investments from coming in. It is messing up the infrastructure, the transport routes, and that is not in our interest. So there is a broader interest here.

Mr. SOLARZ. Dr. Price, do you want to comment on that?

Mr. PRICE. On the question of where our businesses can better get involved, where they are more secure in so-called capitalist than so-called Communist countries, I think that if one looks at the executives of the multinational corporations who are currently active abroad, one finds, perhaps, a very different perspective.

Countries which we call moderate, for example, in Africa, like Zambia and Nigeria are not capitalist, in fact. They have very substantial economic/nationalist policies, which get in the way of our businesses engaging in the kinds of activities that they would like.

If you look at the behavior of American multinational companies, it turns out that countries like Communist China, the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and even Cuba, are the kind of places that they would like to enter with technology agreements, and even for loan capital.

It is simply not a fact that Zambia is today under a moderate government, or even Nigeria, a particularly attractive place for American corporations to make very large-scale mineral investment.

Mrs. FENWICK. Zambia and Nigeria are not particularly pro-Western. Nigeria has just nationalized—

Mr. PRICE. That is exactly my point. If you compare the attitude of American businessmen, who are investing in Angola, or who are investing in Nigeria, and if you talk to the oil executives, they don't make a preference for Nigeria. In effect, some of them would prefer to be in Angola, they get a better deal.

Mrs. FENWICK. Yes; but there is no railroad.

Mr. PRICE. The reason that it is not running is because of the guerrillas who are supported by South Africa are disrupting them, not because the Soviet-oriented groups are disrupting.

Mr. SOLARZ. I just have one or two more questions.

Dr. Price, what is your response to the argument of Dr. Crocker that in the establishment of Soviet naval facilities in Africa, which if established, would give them an ability to effectively interdict shipping going through the Cape route, would not only enormously complicate the contingencies of military planning on the part of NATO, but would have political consequences or implications by virtue of the extent to which it would appear to the people of Western Europe to give the Soviets the opportunity to cut off valuable oil supplies to them. How do you respond to that?

Mr. PRICE. I think in your question you, in fact, covered most of the points that I would make in regard to the reality of the threats that these facilities would provide, because of the military technical constraints on their use compared to other alternative sources, and for the strategic reasons you mentioned.

I would just like to mention one further point, which nobody in the room has mentioned in regard to Soviet naval facilities on the African coast, and that is while the Soviet Union may need such bases, the United States does not. The naval capacity of the United States is quite sufficient to use its seaborne airpower to attack these Soviet bases. Of course, the United States has a very, very substantial land base at Diego Garcia, which can take on the entire air arsenal, right on up to B-52's, and from which these naval facilities could be attacked.

Mr. SOLARZ. Dr. Crocker, would you agree that we have an interest in preventing the Soviets from establishing military facilities in Africa, and we have an overwhelming interest in establishing such facilities ourselves?

Mr. CROCKER. I think the thrust of my testimony is that we do not need to feel very anxious about the search for particular airfields and ports that we can count on, because deep down, if we know anything about Africa, we know that we cannot count on them for longer than when the next coup is going to occur. That is the fundamental planning factor.

For that reason, it seems to me that you do need to be more self-sufficient of all littoral states. That is why Diego Garcia is such a good deal from our standpoint, and it is also why we should be putting more money than we are on logistic afloat support ships, and oilers, and things of that nature, and on air mobility forces, so that we do not have to be always wondering, 'Gee, if that government is overturned, we may have to go rescue it, otherwise we cannot get in there.'

I agree with the thrust of your question.

Mr. SOLARZ. If there are no other questions, let me simply take this opportunity to thank both of you. I think that this has been a most interesting, informative, and in many ways illuminating session this morning, and it has contributed significantly to a sharpening of the issues involved in terms of our military interests in Africa, and I want to thank both of you, gentlemen, for coming. I give you both an A.

The hearing is recessed.

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at 2 p.m., Monday, October 22, 1979.]

U.S. INTERESTS IN AFRICA

MONDAY, OCTOBER 22, 1979

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 3 p.m. in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Stephen J. Solarz (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. SOLARZ. The subcommittee will be called to order.

This is the fourth in a series of 10 hearings on U.S. interests in Africa. At this session, we will consider the issue of U.S. economic interests on the African Continent. Then on Wednesday, we will follow up today's analysis with a special hearing focusing on African oil and minerals.

The question of our economic interest in Africa is one which has long been neglected but has assumed increasing importance in recent years. At the present time, about 40 percent of our imported oil comes from African nations. In addition, Africa supplies sizable quantities of cobalt, manganese, copper, bauxite, coffee, cocoa, and other materials to the United States.

Unfortunately, American-African trade is characterized by gross imbalance, American exports to sub-Saharan Africa totaled only \$3.5 billion last year, while our imports from the same region were nearly \$10 billion. This year, our multibillion dollar trade deficit with Africa is expected to widen, given our continued dependence on increasingly expensive imported oil.

A large-scale expansion of American exports to Africa would increase employment opportunities for our own citizens, while providing needed goods for various African nations. At today's hearing, we will consider the causes and consequences of the U.S. trade deficit with Africa, as well as the prospect for increasing American exports.

At earlier hearings before the subcommittee, the issue was raised as to whether the United States has emphasized economic assistance at the expense of trade with Africa. In particular, at a hearing we held last month on Nigeria's return to civilian rule, two authorities on Nigeria disagreed strongly as to the extent to which future economic relations between that nation and the United States should be based on economic assistance as opposed to trade. At our hearing today, we will consider the relationship between American economic assistance and bilateral trade with Africa.

Another topic to be explored by our witnesses today is the subject of U.S. trade and investment with South Africa. Despite South Africa's

avowed policy of racial discrimination, our economic relations with South Africa constitute a disproportionately large share of our total trade and investment with the 52 African nations. In analyzing the nature and trends in the United States-South African economic relationship, we will weigh what impact, if any, that relationship holds for our economic involvement elsewhere in Africa.

I might add parenthetically at this point that sometime next spring, the subcommittee expects to commence a series of extensive hearings on the relationship between the United States and South Africa, and what future options are available to our countries in terms of how we deal most effectively with the continued existence of apartheid inside South Africa itself.

Our witnesses today are: Abraham Katz, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International Economic Policy and Research, and Prof. Ann Seidman of Clark University in Massachusetts.

The Department of Commerce, which sent a representative to accompany former Ambassador Andrew Young on his recent trade mission to Africa, is particularly well-suited to comment upon not only the nature and extent of our economic relations with Africa at this time, but also the reasons for our poor export position and the prospects and programs for changing that position.

Ann Seidman, who is a professor of economics, has been an officer of the African Studies Association, and a college teacher in Ghana and Tanzania. The author of numerous books on Africa, she has specialized in United States-African economic relations, with a particular focus on our economic involvement with South Africa.

Our first witness will be Mr. Katz.

Mr. Katz, we want you to feel free, if you wish, to summarize your testimony. It will be included as written in the record.

STATEMENT OF ABRAHAM KATZ, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF COMMERCE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY AND RESEARCH

Mr. KATZ. Thank you, Congressman Solarz.

First, let me introduce Sally Miller, to my right. She is the Department of Commerce's expert on Africa, and a source of strength to the entire executive branch in this area. I brought her along because I am sure there are going to be questions of both fact and policy that I may want to have her help me field.

I have submitted to you, and to the committee, this lengthy testimony, which is essentially an account of our position in Africa, both our trade position, and our investment position, as well as a brief account of some of the major economic policy factors, which affect those positions.

In addition, we gave you a statistical abstract covering exports, imports, investments, GSP statistics, as well as the position of the private banks in Africa.

What I will try to do in a few minutes, Mr. Chairman, is to summarize the essential parts of my testimony, and then try to answer, to the best of my ability, any questions that you have.

You quite rightly pointed out that the basic issue, certainly as far as my department is concerned, is the deficit that we have with Africa,

especially sub-Saharan Africa. The United States in 1978 exported some \$3.5 billion to the 47 markets of sub-Saharan Africa, and just to put this in perspective, that is roughly equivalent to U.S. exports to the Netherlands, Australia, or Brazil.

The figure represents a great increase over U.S. exports to the same area in 1970, in nominal terms, but our decline in market share is the most telling here. Our market share had been wavering between 9 and 11 percent, and we are down now to about 9 percent.

This year, through August, our exports total \$2.2 billion, so that we project a year-end total of \$3.3 billion. In other words, there will be a further decline of between 5 and 6 percent for 1978. The principal cause for this decline in our overall exports to sub-Saharan Africa is the particular situation in Nigeria.

In that country, we have witnessed a particularly precipitous decline in U.S. exports. The yearend figure for 1979 will probably barely exceed \$500 million. The Nigerians have instituted a preshipment inspection scheme for imports, a 100-percent import deposit requirement, tighter import licensing, and other import restrictions. What they are trying to do, obviously, is to develop their manufacturing industries and to eliminate imports to the extent possible to meet their consumption requirements.

In the process, I think that we have been very, very severely impacted, and we have made our views known to the Nigerians. Ambassador Young, particularly, made these views clear to the new Nigerian Government of President Shagari, and we expect that in 1980 the situation will improve, mainly because we have a couple of major projects going in Nigeria, which together total over one-half billion dollars, and the equipment for these projects should start flowing next year.

So we hope to turn that particular situation around, but the precipitous decline in Nigeria's imports from the United States, from somewhat under \$1 billion to \$500 million, is the basic reason for the drop in our overall exports to sub-Saharan Africa.

I should say here that there are two countries, and this is very evident from the table that we have given you, two countries which take the lion's share of our exports. Nigeria in 1978 took \$985 million, and South Africa took \$1.1 billion. So when you are talking about total exports of \$3.5 billion, you see what a great effect a country like Nigeria could have on our overall export performance in the continent.

Now, let me say a word about our import situation. You put your finger on it very aptly. It is characterized essentially by one word—oil. Crude petroleum accounted for \$5 billion of the nearly \$10 billion that the U.S. imported from sub-Saharan Africa in 1978, and the \$5 billion of nonoil imports consisted primarily of the more traditional commodities long associated with the tropics, and the much discussed mineral resources of the African Continent. They include sugar, tea, coffee, cashew, vanilla beans, cloves, rock lobsters, gold, platinum, copper, cobalt, copper-nickel, matte, aluminum, manganese, and ferroalloys.

Let me just put this somewhat in perspective. The United States now obtains 6.5 percent of its total imports from sub-Saharan Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa accounts for something around 2.3 percent of our total exports. We are, as you have said, in basic deficit.

Having characterized some of the basic numbers involved in our trade, let me just say a few words on the economic policy as it affects Africa. Here let me depart from the text to wax just a little bit philosophical, if I could use this ostentatious word.

The period immediately following the Second World War, which was characterized by the decolonization of Africa, also witnessed some groping for a concept of relationships between the developed countries on the one hand, and the underdeveloped on the other. There was a very strong body of opinion, especially in Europe and also in this country, that there should be a sort of vertical division of responsibilities with the United States being essentially responsible for Latin America, and Europe with the former European colonial powers being essentially responsible for Africa. In a sense, economic and commercial realities very strongly supported this basic approach.

There were some architects of the postwar policy of the international economic field which thought that this kind of a situation should, however, be attenuated. I think that very closely related to our European policy, our policy of support for the European community, there was developed a policy, if I could call it that, of trying to foster cross-Atlantic ties.

I use the word "cross-Atlantic" to indicate the desire that was expressed to the Europeans by some of our leading policymakers, which is especially true during the Kennedy-Johnson administrations, that we would like to see greater European involvement in Latin America, and we thought that it would be very good and very healthy from the point of view of all relationships with black Africa, if we were involved a little bit more in black Africa.

This approach was generally accepted, I would say, conceptually, and agreed to implicitly. In practice, however, it became clear that the old ties between the mother countries of Europe and the newly independent countries of black Africa, and the imperatives that we had in the Western Hemisphere of making a hemispheric system work, both of those considerations militated for a continued heavy presence or a dominating presence of the United States in Latin America, and of Europe in black Africa.

While these presences were attenuated to some extent, while we gave some aid to black Africa, while they extended some loans to Latin America, I think that it is safe to say that the basic patterns of the economic relationship did continue on a north-south basis.

One thing was accomplished in the course of the attempt to achieve a greater cross-Atlantic penetration, and that is, I think we succeeded largely in influencing the Europeans to loosen up on their preferential relationships with the countries of black Africa, which had been characterized by very closely knit, two-way preferential systems, originally the preferential system of the British Commonwealth, and of the French Union, which were inherited by the European community. These preferences now, by and large, work one way.

With some exceptions, U.S. firms can compete on a basis of official equality with European firms in African markets. European countries, and the European community still offer black African countries preferences in their internal markets, preferences, which they do not offer to Latin America and other developing countries.

They give those countries an edge because they feel a very special responsibility. But what they don't do, and they have not done for

some years, is insist on payment for these privileges in terms of preferences in the markets of the African countries.

I would say that this is a very important accomplishment, one that was dealt without great fanfare and publicity, and enables an American firm to go in there, and have basically the same tariff barriers, as faced by the German or the British competitor.

The question that remains to be asked is, why, then, is our market share in black Africa so small, and why is this share declining?

I would characterize the reason, Mr. Chairman, very briefly, as being really inherent in our own system, in our own way of doing business. American firms, generally, we have found, are after the big ticket item. They are after the large volume.

Doing business in black Africa rarely involves that kind of business opportunity, and the volumes are small. Above all, doing business in black Africa requires an enormous amount of patience, and investment for the future. This is not a characteristic that many of our large firms are overly endowed with.

We, in the Commerce Department, feel quite strongly, however, that as Africa develops, and Africa will develop, there will be increasing opportunities. We are going to require more and more of the tremendous resources that Africa has. I have ticked off a number of these in my earlier comments. Africa will obviously have much more in the way of resources with which to purchase our exports.

So, we think there is a future long-term, large market in Africa. We, in the Commerce Department, are quite dedicated to trying to turn the attention of the American business community to Africa by our various promotion and trade development activities. These will increase quite considerably in 1980.

We must recognize here, quite frankly, that the competition in terms of the opportunities in the other export markets certainly of the developed countries, but also of the developing countries of Latin America, just to mention Mexico as one of the outstanding examples, not to speak about the great market opportunities in our country, make it very, very difficult to convince American businessmen to spend the effort, and sometimes it is an enormous personal effort that is required, to develop this long-term market.

Now, part of the secret for the future development of this market—it is not a secret, but the key to it, I think, will be long-term direct investment. Here the activities of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation are critical. They have coverage of about \$1 billion. The activities of Ambassador Young in leading that mission to black Africa was an example of the kind of thing that will be required to get American firms involved and interested in opportunities of black Africa.

These techniques and devices are critical to establishing the long-term trading position of the United States in a continent, which we must remember has really been divided between the French and British influence for quite a number of years, and where there are very heavy existing commercial relationships.

We, in the Commerce Department, are quite dedicated to moving ahead and hoping to change the situation as best we can.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Katz' prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ABRAHAM KATZ, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE

MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, I AM PLEASED TO BE ABLE TO PRESENT TO YOU THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT'S ROLE IN EXPANDING U.S. ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL INVOLVEMENT WITH SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, AN AREA OF INCREASING INTEREST TO U.S. MANUFACTURERS, EXPORTERS, BANKERS, AND INVESTORS.

THE U.S. IN 1978 EXPORTED SOME \$3.5 BILLION TO THE 47 MARKETS OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA. IN PERSPECTIVE, THAT IS ROUGHLY EQUIVALENT TO U.S. EXPORTS TO THE NETHERLANDS, AUSTRALIA OR BRAZIL (\$3.7, \$3.5, AND \$3.0 BILLION RESPECTIVELY IN 1978). THAT FIGURE REPRESENTS A 266 PERCENT INCREASE OVER U.S. EXPORTS TO THAT SAME AREA IN 1970, WHEN OUR SHIPMENTS WERE ONLY \$1.3 BILLION.

THROUGH AUGUST OF THIS YEAR, OUR EXPORTS TOTALED \$2.2 BILLION TO THIS REGION, FOR A PROJECTED YEAR-END TOTAL OF \$3.3 BILLION, DOWN 5.8 PERCENT FROM 1978. THE PRINCIPAL CAUSE OF THAT DECLINE IS A \$335 MILLION DECLINE IN OUR SHIPMENTS TO NIGERIA THUS FAR THIS YEAR.

WHILE THE DOLLAR VALUE OF U.S. TRADE WITH THIS AREA HAS GROWN FASTER THAN INFLATION, THE GROWTH IN OUR EXPORT TRADE WITH SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA HAS NOT KEPT UP WITH THE EXPANSION OF U.S. EXPORTS SALES WORLDWIDE. AT THE START OF THE SEVENTIES, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA WAS THE DESTINATION OF 2.7 PERCENT OF U.S. EXPORTS (\$1.2 BILLION OUT OF \$43.2 BILLION). OUR EXPORTS TO THAT REGION IN 1978 REPRESENTED ONLY 2.3 PERCENT OF TOTAL U.S. EXPORTS OF \$143 BILLION.

IN A LARGER GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA IN 1977 WAS THE DESTINATION OF 3.3 PERCENT OF THE WORLD'S EXPORTS. IN DOLLAR TERMS, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA PURCHASED SLIGHTLY OVER \$33.5 BILLION OF THE ONE TRILLION PLUS THE WORLD COMMUNITY SOLD THAT YEAR.

THE FOURTEEN NATIONS WHICH THE IMF CLASSIFIES AS INDUSTRIALIZED SUPPLIED 76 PERCENT OF THOSE EXPORTS. JUST OVER 6 PERCENT OF THE \$33.5 BILLION WAS SHIPPED FROM ONE SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN COUNTRY TO ANOTHER.

IN THE KEEN COMPETITION FOR THE OVERALL SUB-SAHARAN MARKET, THE U.S. HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO RETAIN ITS SHARE OF THAT MARKET DURING THE SEVENTIES. THE U.S. SHARE HAS DECLINED FROM 11.6 PERCENT IN 1970 TO SLIGHTLY OVER 9 PERCENT IN 1977.

IN TERMS OF EMPLOYMENT THERE IS A ROUGH RATIO OF 40,000 JOBS TO EACH ONE BILLION DOLLARS OF EXPORT SALES. CONSEQUENTLY, SOME 136,000 AMERICAN WORKERS HAVE JOBS DIRECTLY SUPPORTED BY OUR EXPORT TRADE WITH AFRICA.

I WOULD LIKE TO SUBMIT AT THIS TIME TWO TABLES WHICH PROFILE THE COMPOSITION AND DESTINATION OF U.S. EXPORTS TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA. IN AN AVERAGE YEAR NEARLY TWO THIRDS OF U.S. SHIPMENTS TO THIS AREA ARE MADE TO NIGERIA AND SOUTH AFRICA. IN 1978 EACH COUNTRY PURCHASED APPROXIMATELY \$1 BILLION FROM THE U.S. (NIGERIA, \$985 MILLION; SOUTH AFRICA, \$1.1 BILLION). IN 1979 WE ARE WITNESSING A PRECIPITOUS DECLINE IN U.S. EXPORTS TO NIGERIA, WITH A YEAREND FIGURE BARELY EXCEEDING \$500 MILLION. THE REASONS FOR THIS ARE SEVERAL: THE INSTITUTION OF A PRESHIPMENT INSPECTION SCHEME FOR IMPORTS; A 100 PERCENT IMPORT DEPOSIT REQUIREMENT; TIGHTENED IMPORT LICENSING; AND HEIGHTENED IMPORT BANS. THE NIGERIANS ARE CONCERNED THAT THEY DEVELOP MANUFACTURING AND NOT CONTINUE TO RELY ON IMPORTS TO MEET THEIR CONSUMPTION REQUIREMENTS.

WE ARE MORE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT OUR TRADE PROSPECTS WITH NIGERIA FOR 1980. SOME OF THE EQUIPMENT FOR TWO RECENTLY ANNOUNCED MAJOR PROJECTS TOTALING TOGETHER OVER HALF A BILLION DOLLARS SHOULD START FLOWING NEXT YEAR. WE FEEL THAT THE NEW NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT SHAGARI WILL TAKE SERIOUSLY THE CONCERN EXPRESSED BY AMBASSADOR YOUNG THAT THE UNITED STATES AND ITS BUSINESSMEN DESIRE TO REDRESS THE GROWING TRADE IMBALANCE WITH NIGERIA. I WILL COME BACK TO THIS WHEN I GO INTO IMPORTS MORE FULLY.

OTHER COUNTRIES TO WHICH U.S. FIRMS HAVE BEEN EXPORTING INCLUDE THE TRADITIONAL U.S. MARKET OF LIBERIA, THE BRITISH DOMINATED MARKETS OF GHANA, KENYA, AND SUDAN; AND THE FRENCH DOMINATED MARKETS OF IVORY COAST, GABON, CAMEROON, AND SENEGAL.

THE CAPITAL NEEDS OF CERTAIN INDUSTRIES IN AFRICA AND THE COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE OF THE U.S. IN THESE FIELDS HAVE ENABLED THE U.S. TO ENTER SUCCESSFULLY A NUMBER OF AFRICAN MARKETS. I AM REFERRING PARTICULARLY TO THE MINING INDUSTRY WHICH IS THE PRINCIPAL DESTINATION OF U.S. EXPORTS TO ZAIRE, ZAMBIA, GUINEA, AND LIBERIA AND IN JUST THE PAST TWO YEARS HAS SPURRED A RAPID GROWTH IN U.S. EXPORTS TO NIGER.

AGRICULTURAL EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES, AIRCRAFT (BOTH COMMERCIAL AND GENERAL AVIATION), POWER GENERATING EQUIPMENT, ROAD AND RAIL TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT, AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS ARE ALSO KEY COMPONENTS OF OUR AFRICAN EXPORT TRADE. I MUST MENTION, HOWEVER, THAT THE AMERICAN FARMER SEEMS TO BE FAR AHEAD OF HIS INDUSTRIAL COUNTERPART IN HIS AWARENESS OF THE BENEFITS OF EXPORTING TO AFRICA. NEARLY ONE FIFTH OF OUR SHIPMENTS TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA ARE MADE UP OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS, SUCH AS WHEAT, CORN, RICE, TOBACCO, AND OIL SEEDS.

SHIFTING THE FOCUS TO THE IMPORT SIDE, IT IS CHARACTERIZED ESSENTIALLY BY ONE WORD: OIL. CRUDE PETROLEUM ACCOUNTED FOR \$5 BILLION OF THE NEARLY \$10 BILLION THE U.S. IMPORTED FROM SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA IN 1978. THE VOLUME AND EXPENSE OF THAT OIL IS THE PRINCIPAL REASON FOR THE TRADE DEFICITS WHICH THE U.S. HAS WITH NIGERIA (\$3.8 BILLION IN 1978, AND PROJECTED AT \$8 BILLION IN 1979); ANGOLA (\$.2 BILLION IN 1978 AND PROJECTED AT \$.2 BILLION IN 1979); AND GABON (DEFICIT OF \$.1 BILLION IN 1978 AND PROJECTED AT \$.3 BILLION IN 1979). I WILL NOT GO INTO THE SPECIFICS OF OIL, SINCE

I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU WILL BE HEARING FROM ENERGY AND MINERALS SPECIALISTS AT A SUBSEQUENT SESSION. I SIMPLY WOULD POINT OUT THAT NIGERIA IS THE SECOND LARGEST SUPPLIER AFTER SAUDI ARABIA OF CRUDE OIL TO THE UNITED STATES. THIS COUNTRY PURCHASES SOME 38 TO 40 PERCENT OF NIGERIA'S TOTAL CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION.

THE \$5 BILLION OF NON-OIL IMPORTS CONSISTS PRIMARILY OF THE MORE TRADITIONAL COMMODITIES LONG ASSOCIATED WITH THE TROPICS AND THE MUCH DISCUSSED MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE AFRICAN CONTINENT. COFFEE, SUGAR, TEA, CASHEWS, VANILLA BEANS, CLOVES AND ROCK LOBSTERS DOMINATE THE FOOD COMPONENTS. GOLD, PLATINUM, COPPER, COBALT, COPPER-NICKEL MATTE, ALUMINUM, MANGANESE, AND FERROALLOYS HEAD UP THE LIST OF MINERAL COMMODITIES. I HAVE AVAILABLE FOR THE COMMITTEE MORE DETAILED LISTINGS OF THE IMPORT FLOWS COVERING BOTH PRODUCTS AND SOURCES.

TO PUT ALL OF THIS IN A LITTLE BETTER PERSPECTIVE, THE U.S. NOW OBTAINS 6.5 PERCENT OF ITS TOTAL IMPORTS FROM SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA DIRECTLY. THAT PERCENTAGE IN 1970 WAS ONLY 2.5. PRICE INCREASES THROUGH THE TURBULENT SEVENTIES ARE THE PRINCIPAL CAUSE OF THE INCREASED IMPORT BILL. NO ONE NEEDS TO BE REMINDED OF THE SOARING PRICES OF OIL AND GOLD. BUT SIZABLE PRICE INCREASES HAVE ALSO BEEN LOGGED BY COBALT (\$6/POUND TO \$28/POUND); PLATINUM (\$156 TO \$370 AN OUNCE); COFFEE (50 CENTS TO 132 CENTS/POUND); AND COCOA (32 CENTS TO 156 CENTS/POUND). FEW IF ANY COMMODITIES FROM AFRICA OTHER THAN SUGAR AND COPPER SEEM TO HAVE INCREASED IN PRICE BY LESS THAN 100 PERCENT SINCE THE START OF THE DECADE.

THE PRICE AND QUALITY OF THE OIL THE UNITED STATES PURCHASES FROM NIGERIA MAKES THAT COUNTRY OUR PRINCIPAL IMPORT PARTNER IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA. IN FACT, PETROLEUM SO DOMINATES OUR PURCHASES FROM NIGERIA (AT AROUND 99 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL) THAT THE \$60 MILLION OF COCOA BEANS WHICH WE ALSO BUY FROM NIGERIA FREQUENTLY GETS OVERLOOKED. SOUTH AFRICA IS THE SECOND LARGEST SUPPLIER OF SUB-SAHARAN IMPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES, DUE LARGELY TO THAT COUNTRY'S WIDE RANGE OF MINERAL RESOURCES AND THE U.S. PENCHANT FOR PURCHASING KRUGER RAND GOLD COINS (\$650 MILLION) AND GEM DIAMONDS (\$578). THE OTHER MAJOR IMPORTS FROM OUR MAIN PARTNERS

IN THIS REGION ARE FROM ANGOLA, OIL; FROM THE IVORY COAST, COFFEE AND COCOA; FROM GHANA, COCOA AND ALUMINUM; FROM GABON, OIL AND MANGANESE; FROM LIBERIA, RUBBER AND IRON ORE; FROM ZAIRE, COBALT, COPPER AND INDUSTRIAL DIAMONDS; AND FROM ZAMBIA, COPPER.

AS YOU CAN SEE, OUR IMPORT TRADE WITH AFRICA IS HEAVILY COMMODITY ORIENTED. WE FULLY RECOGNIZE THAT THE COUNTRIES WHICH PRODUCE THESE COMMODITIES ARE HEAVILY, IF NOT EXCLUSIVELY, DEPENDENT ON THE EXPORT EARNINGS FROM THESE COMMODITIES TO FINANCE THEIR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF UNSTABLE COMMODITY PRICES AND MARKETS HAS NOT PROVED SIMPLE. THE EFFORT HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF LONG AND OFTEN HEATED DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE PRODUCING AND CONSUMING NATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF WHAT HAS COME TO BE CALLED THE NORTH SOUTH DIALOGUE. THE UNITED STATES AS THE WORLD'S SINGLE LARGEST CONSUMER OF MOST OF THESE PRODUCTS AS WELL AS A PRINCIPAL PRODUCER OF A NUMBER OF THEM HAS BEEN HEAVILY INVOLVED IN THE COMMODITY DISCUSSIONS.

WE HAVE BEEN A LONG TIME MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COFFEE AGREEMENT. SINCE 1976 WE HAVE BEEN A SIGNATORY TO THE INTERNATIONAL TIN AGREEMENT. PENDING SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT WE WILL BE A MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL SUGAR AGREEMENT. WE HAVE RECENTLY HELPED TO NEGOTIATE AN INTERNATIONAL RUBBER AGREEMENT, WHICH WILL SOON BE SENT TO THE CONGRESS FOR THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE AND FOR IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION BY BOTH HOUSES. WE ARE ALSO PARTICIPATING ACTIVELY IN THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS ON A NEW INTERNATIONAL COCOA AGREEMENT.

ON A NUMBER OF OTHER COMMODITIES OF IMPORTANCE TO AFRICA, THE DIALOGUE IS AT THE LEVEL OF DISCUSSION AS TO THE MOST DESIRABLE AND COST-EFFECTIVE APPROACH FOR POSSIBLE INTERGOVERNMENTAL ACTION. THE PRINCIPAL COMMODITY CONCERNED HERE IS COPPER, ALTHOUGH SIMILAR TALKS ARE ALSO IN PROCESS ON COTTON, HARD FIBERS, TEA, TROPICAL TIMBER AND VEGETABLE OILS AND OILSEEDS.

BEYOND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SINGLE COMMODITY AGREEMENTS, THE U.S. IS A MAJOR PARTICIPANT IN THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS TAKING PLACE ON THE QUESTION OF A COMMON FUND FOR A NUMBER OF COMMODITIES. SUCH A FUND WOULD HELP STABILIZE COMMODITY PRICES BY FINANCING BUFFER STOCKS, WHOSE COSTS WOULD BE BORNE BY POOLING THE CASH PORTION OF THE FINANCIAL RESOURCES OF EACH PARTICIPATING BUFFER STOCK AGREEMENT AND USING THE UNDERLYING PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS' GUARANTEES TO PERMIT THE COMMON FUND TO BORROW ADDITIONAL FUNDS COMMERCIALY. BEYOND THE STOCKING FUNCTION, THE FUND WOULD HAVE A FACILITY, BASED STRICTLY ON VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS, WHICH CAN

BE USED UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS FOR SUCH PURPOSES AS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND EFFORTS TO ENHANCE THE MARKETING PROSPECTS OF THE PRIMARY COMMODITIES.

TO ASSIST AMERICAN FIRMS EXPAND THEIR TRADE INVOLVEMENT WITH SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, COMMERCE IMPLEMENTS AN ACTIVE PROGRAM OF MARKETING INFORMATION DISSEMINATION, TRADE AND INVESTMENT COUNSELING OF BUSINESS, AND TARGETED TRADE PROMOTION. THE GOAL OF THESE EFFORTS IS TO MAKE U.S. BUSINESS MORE AWARE OF AND BETTER ABLE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE EXPORT OPPORTUNITIES OFFERED BY THE MARKETS OF THIS REGION. IN THIS EFFORT, COMMERCE IS JOINED BY THE EXPORT IMPORT BANK, THE OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION, AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

COMMERCE SEEKS TO INFORM THE U.S. BUSINESS COMMUNITY THROUGH VARIOUS COUNTRY TARGETED PUBLICATIONS SUCH AS OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORTS, ECONOMIC TRENDS REPORTS, AND COUNTRY SURVEYS. WE WILL ALSO GLADLY MAKE AVAILABLE COPIES OF PERTINENT UNCLASSIFIED EMBASSY REPORTS DEALING WITH PARTICULAR ASPECTS OF A COUNTRY'S ECONOMY OR REGULATORY STRUCTURE. WE COUNSEL INDIVIDUAL FIRMS REGARDING THE PROSPECTS FOR THEIR PARTICULAR PRODUCT OR THE PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT VENTURE. IN AN AVERAGE MONTH OUR AFRICAN STAFF HANDLES BETWEEN 400 AND 600 SUCH INQUIRIES FROM U.S. BUSINESS.

EACH YEAR, WE PLAN A VARIED TRADE PROMOTION PROGRAM TO INTRODUCE U.S. FIRMS AND THEIR PRODUCTS INTO THE ACTUAL AFRICAN MARKETPLACE. WE USE A VARIETY OF APPROACHES TO MEET DIFFERING MARKETING CONDI-

TIONS. I WOULD LIKE TO LEAVE WITH YOU A COPY OF THE CURRENT FISCAL YEAR PROGRAM AS WELL AS THOSE FOR THE PRECEDING YEAR.

WE ALSO SEEK TO PROVIDE U.S. BUSINESS WITH A RANGE OF COMMERCIAL SERVICES TO ADVISE THEM OF THEIR POTENTIAL CUSTOMERS (WORLD TRADE DATA REPORT, BONA FIDE REQUESTS, AGENT DISTRIBUTOR SERVICE) AND TO HELP THEM BECOME AWARE OF OVERSEAS SALES AND INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES (E.G., THROUGH THE TRADE OPPORTUNITIES PROGRAM AND BY PROVIDING INFORMATION ON FOREIGN GOVERNMENT TENDERS). WE ARE JUST NOW GEARING UP FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF THE WORLDWIDE INFORMATION AND TRADE SYSTEM (WITS) TO LINK THE EMBASSIES, THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, AND ITS DISTRICT OFFICES TO MAKE AVAILABLE A GREATER RANGE OF MARKETING DATA TO BOTH CUSTOMER AND SUPPLIER. NIGERIA IS BEING INCLUDED AMONG THE FIRST NINE PILOT COUNTRIES.

COMMERCE'S MAJOR PROJECTS STAFF ASSISTS LARGER U.S. FIRMS IN THEIR COMPETITION FOR "BIG TICKET" PROJECTS WHICH ARE OFTEN DEVELOPMENTAL IN NATURE. OUR OFFICE OF EXPORT MARKETING AWARENESS HAS ESTABLISHED A STAFF TO WORK DIRECTLY WITH MINORITY U.S. FIRMS IN COOPERATION WITH THE DEPARTMENT'S MINORITY BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT AGENCY TO HELP THESE FIRMS TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE DEPARTMENT'S EXPERTISE AS THEY SEEK TO EXPORT.

WE RECOGNIZE THAT TRADE IS INDEED A TWO WAY STREET. THE UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (EC) AND OTHER INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS GRANT AFRICAN AND OTHER DEVELOPING NATIONS PREFERRED

ACCESS TO THEIR MARKETS THROUGH GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCE (GSP) SCHEMES. THESE PROGRAMS AIM AT PROMOTING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BY FACILITATING EFFORTS OF THE DEVELOPING NATIONS TO MARKET THEIR EXPORTS.

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, HOWEVER, GOES FURTHER IN THIS REGARD AND, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE LOME CONVENTION, GRANTS DUTY-FREE ACCESS TO NEARLY ALL PRODUCTS EXPORTED TO IT BY 57 AFRICAN, CARIBBEAN AND PACIFIC NATIONS. THE COMMUNITY REGARDS THIS CONVENTION AS A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TOWARD FOSTERING GROWTH IN THESE NATIONS, MANY OF WHICH HAD BEEN EUROPEAN TERRITORIES BEFORE ACHIEVING INDEPENDENCE.

THE LOME CONVENTION, WHICH WILL BE RENEWED SHORTLY, DIFFERS FROM MANY OTHER PREFERENTIAL AGREEMENTS MAINTAINED BY THE EC IN THAT IT DOES NOT REQUIRE THE DEVELOPING NATIONS TO GRANT REVERSE PREFERENCES, I.E. PREFERENTIAL TRADE CONCESSIONS TO PRODUCTS THEY IMPORT FROM THE EC. THE UNITED STATES HAD LONG MAINTAINED THAT SUCH PREFERENCES WERE ILLEGAL UNDER THE GATT AND CONTRIBUTED NOTHING TO FOSTERING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND IN SOME CASES IMPEDED IT. OUR SUCCESS IN OPPOSING THESE PREFERENCES REMOVED A SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM FOR US IN VIEWING THE LOME CONVENTION AS A TOOL FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BENEFICIAL TO AFRICAN AND OTHER STATES.

THE U.S. IN THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 FULFILLED A KENNEDY ROUND PLEDGE TO ESTABLISH WITHIN THE U.S. A SPECIAL SYSTEM--THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES (GSP), FOR DUTY-FREE ENTRY INTO THE U.S. OF

SPECIFIED MANUFACTURED AND SEMI-MANUFACTURED GOODS FROM DESIGNATED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, WHICH INCLUDES MOST OF THOSE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA. MANY OF THE AFRICAN STATES HAVE SUCCESSFULLY TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THIS NEW U.S. PROVISION. SOME, SUCH AS IVORY COAST AND BOTSWANA, RESPONDED SO OVERWHELMINGLY THAT THEY LOST THE SPECIAL GSP PROVISION ON CERTAIN COMMODITIES ON THE GROUNDS OF ABSENCE OF COMPETITIVE NEED. IN 1978 OVER \$92 MILLION OF EXPORTS FROM SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA ENTERED THE U.S. UNDER THE GSP SYSTEM. UNFORTUNATELY, ANOTHER \$38 MILLION WAS ELIGIBLE FOR ENTRY, BUT FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REASONS WAS DECLARED INELIGIBLE. NEARLY HALF OF THE ELIGIBLE PRODUCTS WERE DENIED GSP ENTRY ON THE BASIS OF THE COMPETITIVE NEED CRITERIA.

IN SPECIAL RECOGNITION OF AFRICA'S DEVELOPING COUNTRY STATUS, THE U.S. DID NOT ASK THE SEVERAL AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS TO MAKE THE SAME RANGE OF TARIFF REDUCTIONS AS WAS REQUESTED OF THE FEC OR SEVERAL OF THE NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE RECENTLY CONCLUDED TOKYO ROUND OF TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (THE MTN). PERHAPS BECAUSE THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES EITHER DID NOT FULLY APPRECIATE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MTN OR FELT THAT THEY WOULD NOT RECEIVE AN ADEQUATE SHARE OF ITS BENEFITS, THE NUMBER OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES MEANINGFULLY PARTICIPATING WAS VERY SMALL. ONLY THREE (IVORY COAST, ZAIRE, AND SOUTH AFRICA) HAVE ACTUALLY AGREED TO SIGN TARIFF AGREEMENTS WITH THE UNITED STATES.

THE FUTURE EXPANSION OF U.S. EXPORTS TO AFRICA HINGES ON THE PROSPECTS FOR GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE REGION AND ON OUR ABILITY TO COMPETE MORE EFFECTIVELY WITH THE FORMER METROPOLE SUPPLIERS TO ENLARGE OUR SHARE OF THE OVERALL SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN MARKET OF SOME \$35 BILLION. U.S. GOODS AND SERVICES ARE NEEDED TO BUILD UP INFRASTRUCTURE, SPEED THE PACE OF INDUSTRIALIZATION, AND TRANSFORM AGRICULTURE; BUT AFRICAN COUNTRIES, FIRST, NEED TO GENERATE EXPORT EARNINGS TO FINANCE DEVELOPMENTAL IMPORTS. TRADE HAS ALWAYS BEEN FAR MORE IMPORTANT IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS THAN FOREIGN ASSISTANCE FLOWS. HOWEVER, AFRICAN NATIONS FACE EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS THAT LIMIT THEIR ABILITY TO CAPITALIZE ON THE BENEFITS FROM INCREASED INVOLVEMENT IN WORLD TRADE.

THE OPENNESS OF THE ECONOMIES OF THE REGION AND THEIR DEPENDENCE ON A SMALL RANGE OF COMMODITY OR MINERAL EXPORTS MAKE THEM HIGHLY SUSCEPTIBLE TO FLUCTUATING CONDITIONS IN THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES AND WORLD MARKETS, IN GENERAL. ECONOMIC FORECASTS FOR THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES OVER THE NEXT DECADE DO NOT BODE WELL FOR THE EVOLUTION OF AFRICAN TRADE. REAL GROWTH IN THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES IS EXPECTED TO BE SLOW, AT NO MORE THAN 4 PERCENT PER YEAR. IN ADDITION, THE PROBLEMS OF INFLATION, PROTECTIONIST PRESSURES, AND EXCHANGE RATE INSTABILITY MAY PERSIST UNLESS CURRENT CORRECTIVE MEASURES PROVE TO BE EFFECTIVE EARLY ON IN THE DECADE. THE COMBINATION OF THESE FACTORS MAY PRODUCE A SLOWDOWN IN DEMAND FOR PRIMARY PRODUCTS, FLUCTUATING PRICES AND RISING COSTS OF IMPORTS OF MANUFACTURES AND ENERGY PRODUCTS.

THE WORLD BANK RECENTLY FORECAST THAT GDP IN 1975 PRICES IN THE LOW INCOME COUNTRIES OF AFRICA WILL INCREASE BY ABOUT 3.8 PERCENT ANNUALLY BETWEEN 1980 AND 1990. WHILE THIS PROJECTION REPRESENTS AN IMPROVEMENT OVER REGIONAL PERFORMANCE DURING THE 1970-1976 PERIOD, IT IS WELL BELOW THE RATES OF GROWTH FORECAST FOR OTHER DEVELOPING AREAS. AFRICA IS MORE DEPENDENT ON EXPORTS OF PRIMARY PRODUCTS AND GROWTH OF THESE TYPES OF EXPORTS WILL BE SLOWER THAN GROWTH OF MANUFACTURED EXPORTS. SOME COUNTRIES SUCH AS IVORY COAST, CAMEROON, AND NIGER, WITH ITS RISING URANIUM EXPORTS, MAY BE ABLE TO WEATHER UNFAVORABLE CONDITIONS AND MAINTAIN STABLE GROWTH.

WHILE AFRICA'S EXTERNALLY GENERATED PROBLEMS ARE IMPRESSIVE, THE INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS THESE NATIONS FACE POSE EVEN GREATER OBSTACLES TO GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT. IN MANY COUNTRIES THE POPULATION GROWTH RATE EXCEEDS OR COMES CLOSE TO THE RATE OF GROWTH OF FOOD PRODUCTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, IN GENERAL. THE FRAGILE ECOLOGICAL BALANCE IN THE SAVANAH REGIONS PUTS EACH YEAR'S CROPS IN JEOPARDY. THEN THERE ARE THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF MONETARY AND FISCAL RELATIONS AS WELL AS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS. THE SHORTAGE OF SKILLED PERSONNEL ON ALL LEVELS AND FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS ARE HARSH REALITIES.

IN THIS LIGHT, WE MUST BE REALISTIC ABOUT THE EXPORT PROSPECTS, BUT WE SHOULD NOT OVERLOOK THE FACT THAT OPPORTUNITIES DO EXIST FOR U.S. FIRMS TO CAPTURE LARGER SHARES OF THE MARKETS IN THOSE COUNTRIES SUCH AS NIGERIA, THE IVORY COAST, NIGER AND CAMEROON,

AND POSSIBLY, ZAIRE AND ZAMBIA, IF MINERAL PRICES REVIVE AS EXPECTED. A PRICE REVIVAL WILL INCREASE DEMAND IN THESE COUNTRIES FOR CAPITAL GOODS FOR INDUSTRIAL AND AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS. TOO FREQUENTLY, AMERICAN EXPORTERS SEE ONLY WHAT IS EXPORTED FROM THE U.S. THEY SEE IVORY COAST, FOR EXAMPLE, AS A MARKET OF \$80 MILLION. THEY NEED TO REALIZE THAT IT IS INSTEAD A MARKET OF \$2 BILLION AND ADJUST THEIR MARKETING PLANS ACCORDINGLY.

THE FUNDAMENTAL POLICY OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TOWARD INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT IS TO NEITHER PROMOTE NOR DISCOURAGE INWARD OR OUTWARD INVESTMENT FLOWS OR ACTIVITIES. THIS POLICY REAFFIRMS OUR LONG-STANDING COMMITMENT TO A GENERALLY OPEN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM.

INVESTMENT FLOWS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES SUCH AS THOSE IN AFRICA, ARE A MATTER OF SPECIAL INTEREST. IT IS NOT THE INTENT OF THE U.S. POLICY TO PRECLUDE APPROPRIATE ASSISTANCE TO THOSE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WISHING TO ATTRACT FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT. THE PRINCIPAL ORGAN OF U.S. ASSISTANCE IN THIS AREA IS THE OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION (OPIC). OPIC'S 1978 LEGISLATION GIVES THAT ORGANIZATION A DEVELOPMENT MANDATE AND DIRECTS THAT THE CORPORATION'S RESOURCES BE DIRECTED TOWARD THOSE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WITH PER CAPITA INCOMES OF LESS THAN \$1,000 IN 1975, WITH PREFERENTIAL CONSIDERATION FOR THOSE LDC'S WITH PER CAPITA INCOMES IN THE \$250 TO \$500 RANGE. MOST OF THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES WOULD QUALIFY FOR THIS PREFERENTIAL CONSIDERATION FROM OPIC.

OPIC'S BASIC INSURANCE FUNCTION IS TO REDUCE THE RISK DISTORTION IN THE FUNCTIONING OF THE DIRECT INVESTMENT MARKETS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. BY REDUCING POLITICAL RISK THROUGH THE SALE OF INSURANCE, OPIC ALLOWS INVESTMENT DECISIONS WHICH SUPPORT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO BE MADE ON THE BASIS OF ECONOMIC FACTORS REFLECTING A MORE NORMAL RISK FUNCTION. OPIC'S FINANCE FUNCTION ASSISTS U.S. INVESTORS, PARTICULARLY IN DEVELOPMENTAL INVESTMENTS IN THE LOWER INCOME COUNTRIES. OPIC'S INVESTMENT PROMOTION EFFORTS ARE DIRECTED TOWARD LOWER INCOME LDC'S AND THE HIGHEST PRIORITY INVESTMENT TARGETS.

ASIDE FROM PROVIDING NEEDED JOBS IN THE RECIPIENT DEVELOPING COUNTRY, REDUCING THAT COUNTRY'S IMPORT BILL, AND EXPANDING THE BASE OF AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGY, DIRECT INVESTMENT FROM THE U.S. CAN CREATE JOBS AT HOME IN ADDITION TO GENERATING EARNINGS, AND CAN PROTECT U.S. ACCESS TO INDIVIDUAL MARKETS.

VARIOUS STUDIES HAVE SHOWN THAT NEARLY ONE QUARTER OF U.S. MANUFACTURED EXPORTS GO TO OVERSEAS AFFILIATES OF U.S. COMPANIES. FREQUENTLY, A HOST COUNTRY'S DEVELOPMENT GOALS REQUIRE THAT ONE INVEST IN LOCAL MANUFACTURING FACILITIES IF ONE IS TO REMAIN IN THAT MARKET; THIS APPROACH HAS BEEN FOLLOWED BY THE NIGERIANS DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS. LASTLY, U.S. INVESTMENTS OVERSEAS CONTINUE TO A POSITIVE FACTOR IN OUR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS POSITION, THROUGH EARNINGS, INTEREST AND DIVIDENDS.

WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO AFRICA, THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE'S BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (BEA) REPORTS THAT U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT IN ALL OF AFRICA ROSE IN 1978 TO A YEAR-END LEVEL OF \$5.4 BILLION. THAT FIGURE COMPRISES 3.2 PERCENT OF U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT WORLDWIDE, WHICH STOOD AT \$168.1 BILLION AT THE END OF LAST YEAR. THE FIGURE IN THE PREVIOUS YEAR FOR AFRICA WAS \$4.6 BILLION. TO PRESENT A SUB-SAHARAN INVESTMENT PICTURE, I MUST BACK UP A YEAR TO 1977, WHICH IS THE LATEST YEAR FOR WHICH BEA HAS INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY DATA.

FOR THAT YEAR, THE WORLDWIDE DIRECT INVESTMENT POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WAS \$148.8 BILLION AND THE CORRESPONDING SUB-SAHARAN FIGURE WAS \$3.6 BILLION, FOR A PERCENTAGE SHARE OF 2.4. U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THIS AREA IS A TENTH OF U.S. INVESTMENT IN CANADA (\$37.3 BILLION); LESS THAN HALF OF THAT IN BRAZIL (\$7.2 BILLION); AND ABOUT EQUAL TO THAT IN MEXICO (\$3.7 BILLION) OR ITALY (\$3.6 BILLION). MY STAFF HAS PREPARED TABLES PRESENTING THE AVAILABLE U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT DATA; THESE ARE AVAILABLE TO THE COMMITTEE.

THE SECTORAL FOCUS ON THAT INVESTMENT IS OVERWHELMINGLY PETROLEUM. TWO-THIRDS OF THE U.S. INVESTMENT IN BLACK AFRICA IS OIL-DIRECTED (\$2.1 BILLION OUT OF \$3.4 BILLION). ALTHOUGH ANNUAL SURVEYS AFTER 1975 DO NOT INCLUDE SPECIFIC OIL SECTOR INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA, INVESTMENT IN THAT SECTOR THAT YEAR TOTALED ANOTHER \$407 MILLION. THROUGHOUT THE SEVENTIES MANUFACTURING, AND NOT MINING, HAS RANKED AS THE SECOND LARGEST AREA OF U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT. THE YEAR-END

1978 FIGURE WAS \$917 MILLION. MINING AND SMELTING RANKED THIRD, WITH AN INVESTMENT EXPOSURE IN EXCESS OF \$700 MILLION IN BLACK AFRICA.

SEVEN COUNTRIES DOMINATE AS LOCATIONS OF U.S. INVESTMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: SOUTH AFRICA (\$2 BILLION); NIGERIA (\$383 MILLION); LIBERIA (\$340 MILLION); ZAMBIA (\$214 MILLION); GHANA (\$175 MILLION); AND ANGOLA AND GUINEA. THE ACTUAL TOTALS OF DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE LATTER ARE NOT PUBLISHED BY BEA TO AVOID DISCLOSURE OF DATA OF INDIVIDUAL COMPANIES.

U.S. INVESTMENT IN NIGERIA, WHILE IT HAS NOT RECOVERED FROM THE 1972 AND 1977 INDIGENIZATION DECREE COMPLIANCE, WILL SHORTLY RECEIVE A SUBSTANTIAL BOOST FROM THE PULLMAN-KELLOGG PARTICIPATION IN A NITROGENEOUS FERTILIZER COMPLEX WHICH WAS JUST RECENTLY AWARDED TO THE FIRM. A NUMBER OF OTHER MAJOR U.S. CORPORATIONS, INCLUDING FORD, DUPONT, AND DOW CHEMICAL, ARE ASSESSING THE NIGERIAN SITUATION. WE ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO IMPROVING BUSINESS RELATIONS WITH THE NEW NIGERIAN CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT.

I WOULD LIKE TO MENTION HERE ONE OF THE MECHANISMS WHICH WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO USE OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS TO PROMOTE THE DEVELOPMENT OF EXPANDED TRADE AND INVESTMENT TIES WITH NIGERIA. I AM REFERRING TO THE U.S.-NIGERIAN BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS. FOLLOWING ON THE EXCHANGE OF STATE VISITS IN 1977, THE HEADS OF STATE AGREED THAT SOME MANNER OF ON-GOING BILATERAL MECHANISM WAS NEEDED AT THE WORKING LEVEL TO CONTINUE THE HELPFUL DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. IN NOVEMBER 1977 THE FIRST SESSION OF THE TALKS CONVENED

IN LAGOS, THREE SUBSEQUENT SESSIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE AND WE HAVE THE ASSURANCE OF PRESIDENT SHAGARI THAT THE BILATERALS WILL CONTINUE.

THE ACTUAL TALKS CONSIST OF FOUR WORKING GROUPS. THE FIRST OF THESE DEALS EXCLUSIVELY WITH TRADE AND INVESTMENT, AND HAS PROVEN TO BE A MOST USEFUL FORUM FOR AIRING THE CONCERNS OF OUR GOVERNMENTS AND BUSINESSMEN ABOUT THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MORE POSITIVE BUSINESS CLIMATE BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE TALKS INCLUDE GREATER AWARENESS OF A MULTIPLE ENTRY VISA PROCEDURE; A MORE EXPEDITIOUS HANDLING OF VISA REQUESTS AND EXPATRIATE QUOTAS; THE ABILITY TO ESTABLISH LIAISON OFFICES IN NIGERIA FOR A PERIOD OF UP TO TWO YEARS TO ENABLE A FOREIGN INVESTOR TO ASSESS THE MARKET AND PROSPECTIVE PARTNERS MORE THOROUGHLY; AND THE RIGHT TO REINVEST LOCAL CURRENCY (NAIRA) EARNINGS TO GENERATE DIVIDENDS REMITTABLE IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE FROM APPROVED ENTERPRISES.

NEXT MONTH THE BILATERAL TALKS WHICH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS WITH NIGER WILL BE EXPANDED IN THIS, THE THIRD SESSION, TO ENCOMPASS OPPORTUNITIES FOR GREATER U.S. TRADE AND EXPANDED INVESTMENT IN THE RAPIDLY GROWING URANIUM BASED ECONOMY OF NIGER.

THE DATA ARE FAR LESS COMPREHENSIVE TO ADDRESS THE COMMITTEE'S INQUIRY ON INDIRECT OR PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT. IN AUGUST OF THIS YEAR, THE BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS REPORTED THAT SUCH HOLDINGS OF U.S. PRIVATE ASSETS OUTSIDE OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, JAPAN AND EUROPE TOTALED \$6.2 BILLION. WE ESTIMATE THAT U.S. PRIVATE

CITIZEN HOLDINGS OF SOUTH AFRICAN GOLD SHARES MAKE UP SOME \$2-2.3 BILLION OF THAT AMOUNT. WE DO NOT, HOWEVER, HAVE MORE DETAILED INFORMATION IN THIS REGARD.

THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT HAS PROVIDED US WITH THE INFORMATION THE COMMITTEE REQUESTED ON PRIVATE SECTOR LENDING TO AFRICA. THROUGH YEAR-END 1978, TOTAL PRIVATE SECTOR CLAIMS ON AFRICA WERE \$3.3 BILLION. THE LARGER PORTION OF THAT AMOUNT IS REPRESENTED BY CLAIMS HELD BY U.S. BANKS: \$2.6 BILLION. THE REMAINING \$648 MILLION IS MADE UP OF CLAIMS HELD BY NON-BANKING ENTERPRISES IN THE UNITED STATES. AGAIN, A CLEAR SUB-SAHARAN PICTURE IS NOT POSSIBLE. I DO, HOWEVER, HAVE THE AVAILABLE DATA HERE IN TABULAR FORM FOR THE COMMITTEE.

AFRICA'S RELATIVELY SMALL SHARES OF TOTAL U.S. TRADE AND INVESTMENT OBSCURE THE LONG-TERM SIGNIFICANCE OF AFRICAN RESOURCES AND MARKETS TO U.S. ECONOMIC INTERESTS. AS MORE THAN ONE OBSERVER HAS NOTED, THERE IS A BASIC INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS OF MODERN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION AND THE RESOURCE ENDOWMENT OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA. CERTAIN AREAS OF THIS REGION ARE MAJOR SOURCES OF CHROMIUM, MANGANESE, COBALT, PLATINUM GROUP METALS, VANADIUM, ANTIMONY, ASBESTOS, AND INDUSTRIAL DIAMONDS. THE FACT THAT THE OTHER MAJOR DEPOSITS OF SEVERAL OF THESE MINERALS ARE LOCATED IN THE SOVIET UNION ACCENTUATES THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING U.S. ACCESS TO AFRICAN SUPPLIES. OUR GOALS IN THIS AREA ARE NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE NEEDS AND OBJECTIVES OF AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS REQUIRES

EARNINGS FROM MINERAL AND RAW MATERIAL EXPORTS, AND THE U.S. AND OTHER INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS ARE AND WILL REMAIN THE MOST PROFITABLE MARKETS. MUTUAL BENEFITS WILL ACCRUE FROM PRODUCTION AND MARKETING ARRANGEMENTS WHICH ARE PROFITABLE AND EQUITABLE TO BOTH BUYERS AND SELLERS.

AS AFRICA DEVELOPS, THE VOLUME AND COMPOSITION OF ITS IMPORTS WILL SHIFT TOWARD THE GOODS AND SERVICES WHICH U.S. INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE STAND READY TO SUPPLY AT COMPETITIVE PRICES. AFRICA'S DEMAND FOR GRAINS, OIL SEEDS AND OTHER AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AS WELL AS CAPITAL GOODS WILL INCREASE. IN THE RUSH OF U.S. FIRMS TO CAPTURE LARGER SHARES OF THE MARKETS OF CHINA, JAPAN, THE SOVIET BLOC AND CERTAIN NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING NATIONS, THEY SHOULD NOT IGNORE AFRICA. THE PAYOFFS FROM DEVELOPING STRONGER COMMERCIAL TIES IN AFRICA MAY NOT BE IMMEDIATE. HOWEVER, OUR NEED TO ASSURE CONTINUED IMPROVEMENT IN OUR TRADE BALANCE OVER THE LONG RUN CALLS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF FAR-SIGHTED POLICIES WHICH WILL ALLOW U.S. BUSINESSES TO COMPETE EFFECTIVELY IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES AS THESE COUNTRIES DEVELOP A HIGHER CAPACITY TO PARTICIPATE IN WORLD TRADE. WE, IN THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ARE AWARE OF THE POTENTIAL AND CHALLENGES OF AFRICAN MARKETS AND WILL CONTINUE TO ALLOCATE RESOURCES TO ASSIST THE EFFORTS OF AMERICAN BUSINESSES INTERESTED IN AFRICAN OPPORTUNITIES.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you, Mr. Katz.
Ms. Seidman.

**STATEMENT OF ANN SEIDMAN, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS,
CLARK UNIVERSITY**

Ms. SEIDMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to focus on those questions that you sent to me in the mail. The latter half of my testimony relates mainly to statistics.

Actually, my comments here refer back to some of the implications of the statistical data, so I will pull that out when it is appropriate.

I actually took the questions that you asked, and tried to deal with them seriatim. The first one, then, was No. 5, and I would like to respond to that question, which was "What are the prospects and policy implications for American economic relations with South Africa?" by emphasizing that the U.S. firms' trade with, and investment in South Africa have played and continue to play a crucial role in strengthening the military industrial capacity of that country's oppressive, racist regime.

U.S. firms' direct investment in South Africa, a country with little more than 5 percent of the total population of the African Continent equals over half of the direct investments in the rest of Africa. It makes up about four-fifths of all investment in manufacturing on the entire continent.

Incidentally, I should say that it makes up over half of all investments if you exclude oil. We can discuss the data later.

U.S. firms' investment in manufacturing is particularly important in the strategic industrial sectors required to enable the white minority to retain its control over the black majority. These include transport where General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler have long built cars and trucks which facilitate the necessary mobility of the white population, and in particular the armed forces.

General Motors has actually admitted that its local subsidiaries continue to sell trucks to the military. U.S. firms like General Electric and ITT continue to contribute the necessary sophisticated technologies essential to electrify and increasingly automate the military industrial complex, reducing the need to upgrade blacks as the scarcity of skilled white workers has made itself felt.

U.S. firms provide the technologies that enable South Africa to enrich its own uranium, creating what many authorities consider to be the capacity to produce nuclear weapons.

Particularly important, several U.S. oil firms, including Standard Oil of California, Texaco, and Mobil, provide a major share of the oil refining capacity and ship in much of the crude oil essential to enable South Africa to keep its military industrial machinery moving, as well as to ship added amounts to the illegal regime of Rhodesia.

It is interesting that, although South Africa has no known oil deposits of its own, nevertheless, U.S. firms have built more oil refinery capacity there than in all the rest of Africa combined.

As the recession of the 1970's spread into South Africa, reducing the output in many sectors of manufacturing, U.S. banks played a

major role in mobilizing international funds borrowed by the South African regime to continue to import the necessary machinery and equipment for its military industrial growth, and of course as well, and military weapons in violation of the U.N. embargo.

Some of the banks, such as Chase Manhattan, have since said that they would no longer directly lend to the South African Government, but they nevertheless do still make loans to facilitate the continued sale of goods needed to further strengthen strategic sectors of the economy. To my knowledge, the Bank of America has not agreed to stop lending funds directly to the South African Government.

But the reality is that any funds loaned in any sector of South Africa, whether to the public, parastatal—that is the state corporations—or the private sectors, help the regime to finance its continued rule. Significantly, although the high price of gold has reduced the importance of borrowing, its outstanding debt is estimated to exceed \$11 billion, of which U.S. banks are said to have mobilized about a third. Incidentally, Mr. Katz's data show considerably less, but I think U.S. banks have mobilized a third through their overseas activities in the Eurocurrency markets, and so on, and of course that is not included, as I understand it, here. South Africa continues to borrow to retain its relationships with the international money markets in case of further need, at least that is what a number of experts seem to think.

It is a myth that U.S. firms can, through the illusory "Sullivan Principles," contribute to bettering the conditions of black workers in South Africa. It is ironic that what might be termed the "South Africa lobby" dissuaded Congress from monitoring the enforcement of those principles in South Africa. That, it seems to me, makes a joke of the idea that these companies are serious about implementing those principles. Those of us who have watched the difficulties of insuring affirmative action here in the United States know how much more difficult it is where the government, white unions—and that is almost all the unions of South Africa—and custom combine to thwart its voluntary enforcement.

Even more important, U.S. firms do not employ many black Africans. Altogether, they employ about 100,000 workers, less than 1 percent of the total. About half of these are white, skilled workers that handle their technologically sophisticated machinery, which the minority regime has eagerly encouraged them to introduce to reduce dependence on black labor.

In fact, U.S. firms' introduction of new technologies has actually reduced black employment in some sectors. For example, Texaco issued data purportingly showing that it had upgraded blacks in the 15 years, from 1962 to 1977, but when you look at their data carefully, it shows that although they increased production and sales in that period, Texaco actually reduced the total labor force by several hundreds, and reduced blacks as a percentage of the total force from 60 to about 40 percent. With black unemployment today in South Africa of about 2 million—about one out of four black workers—the role of the sophisticated technologies introduced by U.S. firms is particularly counterproductive.

It is even more ironic that General Motors has played a leading role in sponsoring the "Sullivan Principles," for it simultaneously is con-

tributing significantly to South Africa's military capacity designed to coerce the Africans into the status of a cheap labor reserve. General Motors itself has been designated by the South African regime as a National Keypoint Industry. Its white personnel, in times of emergency, is expected to participate in paramilitary commando units in order to relieve professional soldiers of the task of defending the plant.

This suggests that far more important than any possible contribution it might be making to improve workers' conditions, as far as the minority regime is concerned, is General Motors' strategic role in helping to build up the country's military industrial capacity.

I would like to emphasize that the "Sullivan Principles," in a sense, are a smokescreen behind which these U.S. companies are playing a much more important role, and making it possible for the South African minority to maintain its position of control.

In short, the policy implications of U.S. economic relations with South Africa, it seems to me, rest in their continued contribution to bolstering up a racist, minority regime, and this serves to make the people of the rest of Africa suspicious of our motives in any other part of independent Africa. I would like to underscore that, Mr. Chairman. It seems to me that it is very difficult for us to develop trade and investment in this vast continent if we are, in fact, simultaneously seen to be supporting the very regime which they all find an anathema.

We might recall that Nigeria nationalized British Petroleum's assets because it resented that country's involvement in providing oil to South Africa. It is not at all impossible that Nigeria and other independent states might take similar retaliatory actions against the United States, especially since the data that Mr. Katz shows us here, carrying up to 1979 data—which I was not able to get—shows that U.S. investment has increased in South Africa actually at an accelerated rate since the 1976 Soweto uprising.

This leads me to the next question, and question No. 6 seems to be missing, but question No. 7 is, "What are Africa's principal natural resources? How great is American dependence on them? Is this dependence declining or increasing?"

Africa is a vast storehouse of mineral wealth which to date has only been partially surveyed. Mr. Katz has already indicated the range of goods which Africa produces. One of the reasons why South Africa has become a primary source of minerals, aside from oil, for the United States is because it has been far more thoroughly surveyed than the other regions of the continent have been. U.S. firms, together with their British predecessors, have focused their attention on developing mines there. I think that over one quarter of U.S. investment in South Africa is in the mines.

However, there is an enormous potential in other parts of the continent which has only been partially revealed since almost 50 countries have attained independence. For example, just among the so-called Front Line States in the last two decades, extensive mineral resources have been discovered and are beginning to be developed. Tanzania is known to have iron ore, phosphates, and uranium. I understand the Federal Republic of Germany is negotiating to develop their newly discovered uranium deposits. Mozambique has iron ore, coal, and there are, I am told, possibilities that they may have oil and/or natural gas.

Botswana has been discovered to have some of the richest diamond mines and has copper-nickel deposits, as well as coal. Zambia, in addition to its well-known copper mines—it is one of the major copper exporters in the world—has lead, coal, and, I understand, has recently discovered uranium, too. Angola has a wide variety of mineral resources, including iron, diamonds, copper, and, most important, oil, currently being pumped out by the U.S. firm, Gulf.

There are, of course, untold agricultural resources in these relatively underpopulated regions, and these also are well illustrated by Mr. Katz' data: coffee, cotton, groundnuts, tea, tobacco, sugar, and more are or could be produced just inside the southern African Front Line States.

I will not take the time here to list all the minerals and agricultural resources available on the vast continent of Africa, an area about three times the size of the United States. I would guess that ongoing geological surveys will reveal that it contains almost all, if not all, the essential minerals necessary for the industrialized nations of the world.

As yet, American dependence on African minerals is not great, except as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, in the case of oil. Much has been made of the importance of chrome from South Africa and Rhodesia, but in fact my understanding is that chrome is available today from Turkey, as well as from the United States, although at a somewhat higher cost. Furthermore, the United States has extensive stock-piles, and it is very possible that new technologies are being introduced now that within a few years will make chrome almost unnecessary.

On the other hand, oil which remains of great importance to the United States, is being produced in increasing quantities in several parts of Africa. Mr. Katz has mentioned Nigeria, but Algeria, and Libya are also major suppliers of oil to the United States, although Nigeria produces as much as the other two countries together. In addition, Angola's oil wells operated by Gulf are capable of producing vast quantities and could become another major source of oil for the United States.

The United States also purchases significant amounts of coffee from a number of African States, and cocoa mainly from Ghana and Nigeria.

At present, U.S. dependence on African resources has been increasing rapidly, primarily with respect to oil. Of course, this point has been emphasized and I would like to come back later to some of the implications that has for our balance-of-payments situation.

Question No. 8, "Is Africa economically important to the United States, and why?" Africa has not been as economically important to the United States as has Latin America in the past, primarily as Mr. Katz has pointed out because of the past pattern of colonialism. Since African countries have attained independence, as the data shows, Africa has become rapidly more important both in terms of trade and in terms of investment.

However, the potential is far, far greater, especially if the independent African States are encouraged to industrialize as they would like to. For the United States clearly sells a lot more goods per capita to industrialized states than they do to primarily agricultural countries like those of independent Africa.

Today, when the balance of payments constitutes a major problem for the United States, a primary need is to find new markets for manufactured goods. Industrialized countries, with rising productivity and incomes, can and will buy more of the manufactured goods the United States can produce embodying new technologies, machinery, and equipment for new factories, and to increase productivity in agriculture and in the mines, smelters, and refineries.

As Mr. Katz's own analysis suggests, the reason for the decline in purchases by Nigeria of U.S. goods is because we have not in the past adequately been selling them these very items they want, which would help them to increase their manufacturing sectors. I think that that is true, as far as I know, of most of the independent African countries.

In relation to question No. 9, "How does Africa's commercial and economic potential compare with that of other regions?" Africa's commercial and economic potential has been curbed in the past by colonial policies which have restricted most countries to producing low-value raw materials and buying primarily luxury and semi-luxury items for the narrow high income groups associated with raw materials production.

If, on the other hand, African States can be encouraged to develop their industries to increase productivity in all sectors of their economies, they could over the next half-century emerge as an important industrial region—hence, as a growing area for U.S. investment and trade.

In relation to Question No. 10, in my opinion, the United States should encourage greater economic trade and investment with independent African States in order to help them to realize this potential. This necessitates encouraging them to develop as trading partners.

Picking up on the debate, which you mentioned earlier over aid as opposed to trade, I think that there is no question that the African countries would prefer to trade on a mutually beneficial basis as partners with the United States, rather than accepting aid. In fact, the evidence is that many of them are doing their best to restructure their economies to make this possible.

This leads me to question 11, "What problems have been placed in the way of U.S. trade and investment in Africa? Are these problems self-imposed, or imposed by African nations?"

In my experience of 8 years of teaching and doing research in African universities in west, east, and central Africa, I have been convinced that the African States are eager to expand trade and eager for U.S. investments, but within the framework of their own plans, their own approach. They are not eager to have it come on terms which will tend to reproduce the kind of colonial pattern of the past.

The biggest obstacles to that expansion of trade and expansion are the lack of understanding and willingness to assist African States realize their desired objectives, which in the long run would contribute to mutually beneficial trade relations with the United States, as well as other countries.

U.S. firms, in fact, have been investing outside of South Africa primarily only in extracting minerals, and purchasing crude agricultural produce at low prices, in a pattern all too reminiscent, from their point of view, of the colonial past. African States are convinced that

only by industrializing can they raise the living standards of the vast majority of their populations.

So they are dismayed when they see U.S. firms pouring investment into factories in South Africa. These very factories, then, sometimes process crude materials produced in the independent neighboring states. Or they sometimes produce machinery parts and equipment which the firms then seek to sell in independent African countries, instead of establishing the factories themselves in the independent countries.

U.S. firms have apparently been reluctant to invest in manufacturing industries to process locally produced raw materials in independent African countries. They have not built integrated industrial projects capable of contributing to balanced, integrated African economies. For the most part, what little investing they have done in the manufacturing sectors there has been in last stage assembly and processing of imported materials and parts, primarily to gain access to the narrow high-income markets that exist associated with the export sectors.

But, as the African governments have sought to emphasize, the lack of integrated industrial growth has left their economies dependent on the sale of their minerals and agricultural materials on an uncertain world market. When the prices of those exports fall, they cannot possibly buy from the industrial nations like the United States. As long as they remain dependent on the export of crude materials, they are unlikely to be able to expand as valuable trading partners.

U.S. businessmen have expressed a reluctance to invest in African countries where the state is playing a major role in the economy. This reluctance stems from a fundamental miscomprehension of the economic realities of the independent African countries.

There is no agency in the typical African country, Mr. Chairman, other than the state, which can undertake the process of restructuring the economy, investing in the basic industries needed to spread productivity and raise living standards of the mass of the population.

Colonialism deprived would-be entrepreneurs of the skills and capital necessary to build industries at a time when the relatively small size of viable units would have made their entry into manufacturing possible. Today, the vast size at which economies of scale come into play renders the capital costs prohibitive for individuals. Only the state can possibly play the essential role of planning and developing industrial growth.

Incidentally, this is just as true in South Africa as it is in the rest of Africa. It is a myth to say, as South African apologists frequently do, that South Africa's economy is characterized by free enterprise. On the contrary, it is a highly integrated military industrial complex dominated by seven powerful oligopolistic mining finance houses, closely tied with the state through parastatals, which have developed basic manufacturing industries.

I could spell this out, but I will not take your time to do it.

What is particularly reprehensible in the South African case is the state's open avowal of racist policies designed to keep the African majority in a state of semislavery, and the fact that its industrialization program is designed to create a foundation for the military might necessary for the white minority to continue its rule.

As the independent African countries try to industrialize to produce the goods and services required to meet the need of the vast majority of their citizens, they, too, will have to involve the state in the investment and regulation of the development of their economies.

For U.S. firms to abstain from investing in those circumstances in the independent countries, at the same time that they pour funds and advanced technologies into building up South Africa's military industrial capacity, appears to the independent African States to be rank hypocrisy.

The U.S. Government could help encourage U.S. firms to invest in industrialization programs in independent African States, while discouraging those investments in South Africa, in a number of ways, just to mention a few.

It could set up its consular advisory agencies. I understand that we have one in South Africa at present. It was suggested at the AID colloquium last January that we should move the consulate out of South Africa into a neighboring country, like Zambia, and presumably multiply the kinds of efforts suggested by the recent trip of Ambassador Young.

The United States could eliminate tax credits for firms investing in South African manufacturing in other sectors, and consider, in contrast, additional tax advantages for firms investing in independent African States, especially in manufacturing industries.

The United States could end all Export-Import Bank insurance and/or guarantees to firms shipping goods to South Africa, and seek new opportunities to provide credit, insurance, and guarantees especially for the sale of machinery and equipment to help independent African States to industrialize.

The United States could support proposals made in the discussions about a new economic order to achieve international trade stability for such exports as cocoa and copper. I understand from Mr. Katz, that we are doing that. It seems to me that we could redouble our efforts in that area, because truthfully if the countries could develop a stable income, then I think that they would like to import machinery and equipment to build their industrial sectors, so they could, in fact, become equal trading partners with the United States. So these kinds of support are perhaps much more important than other kinds of aid.

Incidentally, there is no reason why the United States should not, from the point of view of African countries, at least join in support with the majority of the U.N. members on an embargo on trade and investment in South Africa in the future. I hope that this committee, Mr. Chairman, will be able to take some leadership in this, and I wish you all success in doing so.

Incidentally, I would like to mention the meeting that took place in July of this year of the southern African Development Coordination Conference at Arusha, Tanzania. It seems to me that the proposals that conference made for increased coordinated transport projects are proposals that the United States could easily support, and would be more than welcome in so doing. Incidentally, this would constitute a large and expanding market for the sale of U.S. equipment related to the development of transport facilities.

In response to No. 12, the last question, "What are the policy implications of our dependence on energy resources from Africa?" The policy implications of our dependence on African energy sources, and particularly oil, in terms of economics alone, it seems to me, are of two kinds. There are, obviously, all kinds of political implications as well, but I know you will be looking at those at a later time.

First, it would be unwise, obviously, to continue as at present to thumb our nose at the independent African States by continuing to expand trade and investment with the racist regime of South Africa. This is particularly true in the case of the U.S. oil firms, which are playing such an important role in helping to keep open the oil supply lines to South Africa.

We have seen that Nigeria has nationalized British Petroleum's assets because of its continued trade with and refinery activities in South Africa. It is, to put it mildly, unwise to court similar actions vis-a-vis U.S. firms' investment in oil production on the Continent. If Nigeria, Algeria, and Libya alone were to decide not to sell oil to the United States, it would have serious implications which I do not need to elaborate here.

In this connection, it would seem particularly unwise to continue to withhold recognition from Angola, which is another potentially important source of oil for the United States. It seems unrealistic to insist that Angola has to first send away the Cuban technicians and military personnel—I am told by colleagues, that the latter, the military personnel are becoming less important, while the technical personnel are, in fact, being increased in number.

With South Africa rapidly, and unfortunately with United States and other Western firms' assistance, building up its military and industrial capacity, Angola must undoubtedly feel the necessity for the security which the Cuban troops in the past were able to provide. After all, as you are very aware, the South African troops did invade Angola, and use its vastly superior weaponry to conquer a major part of the Angolan territory. UNITA makes no secret of its reliance on South African military assistance.

But, if the United States were to end the flow of essential machinery and equipment, as well as oil, to South Africa, then I think Angola might well be able to be less fearful of its neighbor to the south. If the United States recognized Angola, which I understand Gulf Oil has for some years been urging, it might well be possible that Angola would feel sufficiently secure to reduce its dependence on outside military assistance.

In other words, I would like to argue, in terms of the oil possibilities, that we have a very real need to broaden our relationship with the independent African countries, and that does include, in my opinion, recognizing Angola.

The second set of policy implications relate to the U.S. balance-of-payments problems. It is clear that oil imports have played a big role in them. This has been reaffirmed by Mr. Katz.

The underdeveloped African countries which are shipping oil to the United States cannot, as yet, buy many of the sophisticated machines and equipment which the United States could sell them. But, as I have emphasized before, if they could industrialize, this might be possible.

This really just reinforces my argument that the U.S. Government should take whatever steps possible to encourage these states to industrialize.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Ms. Seidman's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ANN SEIDMAN, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS, CLARK UNIVERSITY

SOME STATISTICS ON U.S. TRADE AND INVESTMENTS IN AFRICA

1. U.S. trade with Africa has been growing very rapidly since nearly 50 African countries have attained independence in the last two decades. Total African exports to the United States in 1977 were \$17,024 million, some 31 times greater than in 1960. Total African imports were \$5,546 million, almost 7 times greater than in 1960. Of the rapidly growing exports to the United States, about three-fourths (76 percent) consisted of oil, mainly from Nigeria, Libya and Algeria (about half was oil from Nigeria).

African exports to the United States make up 11.6 percent of all U.S. imports and African imports from the United States make up about 4.6 percent of all U.S. exports. That is, the United States buys much more from Africa than it sells to them, although they have been buying a rapidly increasing amount.

2. U.S. investment in Africa has been growing since independence, as well. In Africa outside of South Africa, the U.S. investments totaled \$2,783 million in 1977, of which only \$266 million (9 percent) was in manufacturing, and \$1,520 million (54 percent) was in oil.

This makes up about 2.3 percent of total U.S. investments overseas, although U.S. investment in African manufacturing constitutes only 0.4 percent of all U.S. overseas manufacturing investment. U.S. investment in oil in independent African states constitutes only 4.9 percent of all overseas U.S. investment in oil.

3. The issue of U.S. jobs in relation to U.S. trade with Africa is difficult to judge. Since exports to independent African states have not grown as rapidly as imports from them, and total only about 4.6 percent, mostly manufactured goods, one probably could guesstimate that exports to Africa provide about 5 percent of all jobs associated with exports. On the other hand, since African independent countries provide about 7-8 percent of all U.S. imports simply as oil, a reduction of that trade could have a serious impact on the whole U.S. economy and, of course, jobs.

It might be added that if African states were to industrialize, they would probably constitute a better market for U.S. manufactured goods; industrialized states consume a higher percentage of U.S. exports than do less industrialized states.

4. The above statistics refer to Africa outside of South Africa. South African trade with the United States has also grown rapidly, but not as rapidly as independent Africa, and far less rapidly than Nigeria's trade. South Africa sold the U.S. \$1,269 million worth of goods in 1977, about 7.4 percent of all U.S. imports from the rest of Africa, about 20 percent of the goods (mostly oil) sold by Nigeria to the United States. South Africa bought about \$1,054 million from the United States, equal to about 19 percent of total independent African states' purchases, and about double Nigeria's purchases. The fact that South Africa is industrialized, however, has made South Africa a much more important customer, which supports the point made in the second paragraph of 3, above.

South Africa has been the most important area of U.S. investment, especially in the area of manufacturing; U.S. investment has contributed, directly, about 25 percent of foreign capital in South Africa's investments in manufacturing (and much more indirectly, i.e. through U.S. firms' foreign subsidiaries). Foreign capital provides about 40 percent of all investment in South African manufacturing.

Total U.S. investment in South Africa was \$1,791 million in 1977, about 1.5 percent of all U.S. overseas investment. Of this, U.S. direct investment in manufacturing makes up almost 40 percent, \$710 million, of the total. In contrast, U.S. investment in manufacturing in the rest of Africa makes up only \$266 million, 9 percent of the total (\$2,783 million). About 54 percent of U.S. investment in the rest of Africa is in oil.

U.S. investments in Nigeria, in particular, are concentrated in oil, which makes up 74 percent of total (the total U.S. investment in 1977 was \$335 million, about 18 percent of that in South Africa.) If U.S. investment in Nigerian manufacturing were increased to a level commensurate with that in South Africa, it would provide a major spur to Nigerian manufacturing production and might help to increase the U.S. market for manufactured goods there.

	1977 amount (millions)	Relation to 1966	Percent of all U.S. trade
Africa (excluding South Africa) trade with the United States:			
Exports.....	\$17,024	31 times greater.....	11.6
Of which oil countries.....	12,057		
Imports.....	5,546	6.9 times greater.....	4.6
South African trade with United States:			
Exports.....	1,269	11.7 times greater.....	.8
Imports.....	1,054	3.6 times greater.....	.8

¹ 76 percent.

South Africa's exports to the United States in 1977 totalled 20.8 percent of independent African exports to the United States; its imports constituted 110 percent of independent States exports to the United States.

U.S. INVESTMENTS IN AFRICA (EXCLUDING SOUTH AFRICA) AND IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1977, IN ABSOLUTE TERMS AND AS PERCENTAGE OF ALL U.S. INVESTMENTS ABROAD

	Amount (millions)	Percent of U.S. investments abroad
U.S. investments in:		
Africa (excluding South Africa).....	\$2,783	2.3
Of which manufacturing.....	266	.4
Of which oil.....	1,520	4.9
Nigeria:	335	.2
Of which manufacturing.....	41	.06
Of which oil.....	250	.8
South Africa.....	1,791	1.5
Of which manufacturing.....	710	1.0

Sources: Trade data from U.S. Statistical Abstract, 1978 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979); investment data from U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, August 1979.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Professor Seidman.

I wonder if either of you could give us some realistic appreciation of what needs to be done to address the existing trade imbalance with Africa, and of how effectively and how soon we could hope to address that problem.

Right now, according to the figures presented by Mr. Katz, we seem to be exporting \$3.5 billion worth of goods and services to Africa, whereas we are importing something on the order of \$10 billion, and our trade imbalance is about \$6.7 billion. Can we realistically hope to make progress toward closing that imbalance within the next 8 years, and if so, what would we need to do in order to be able to achieve that objective?

Mr. Katz, do you want to take a crack at it?

Mr. KATZ. Let me make a few remarks first.

I think we have to move toward regressing the balance, there is absolutely no doubt about that, simply because we must work on all fronts of our overall trade balance. This country can no longer afford the luxury of persistent and chronic trade imbalances.

We have to look at the specific quantities, and we have to look at the specified areas. As was pointed out to me, our trade imbalance with Nigeria of \$8 billion is not too far from our trade imbalance with Japan, which is \$9 billion.

Mr. SOLARZ. I am talking about our African, not our Asian trade figures. Specifically, what is the potential for closing that gap, and what can we do?

Mr. KATZ. The potential is, as I tried to indicate before, to continue slugging away at getting American firms out there, showing them what the opportunities are, increasing Eximbank financing, increasing OPIC involvement in Africa, and trying to take American firms by the hand and getting them to compete with the well-established Europeans.

I might say, in this endeavor, it is very important that we keep the basic numbers in mind, and that is that we have a very, very small involvement, in terms of percentage, in all of Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as in South Africa, that we cannot afford to unilaterally forego \$1 billion of trade anywhere, or \$1 billion worth of investment.

Mr. SOLARZ. If we did all these wonderful things that you are recommending, within the next 2 to 3 years, by how much could we realistically hope to increase our exports to Africa?

Mr. KATZ. We think that we can decrease the deficit with Africa in 1980, based on projections that we have already, by close to \$1 billion. Whether that can continue, I am not sure.

Mr. SOLARZ. That decrease would come, presumably, with increased exports.

Mr. KATZ. Essentially from increased exports in Nigeria. To the extent that we are successful in dealing with our energy problems, obviously this is going to have a very positive effect on our import side as well.

Mr. SOLARZ. That would be the short term projected decrease in the trade imbalance by \$1 billion, achieved by increasing our exports by roughly that amount. What do you see over the further near term, over the next 2, 3, 4, or 5 years?

Mr. KATZ. Over the further near-term, I see continued imports of oil, there is no doubt about that, and continued imports of raw materials, and a slower increase in our exports.

Mr. SOLARZ. Why will there be a slower increase in our exports?

Mr. KATZ. Simply because of the mastery of our own oil problem, and of our own requirements for minerals, which are greater than our ability to foster American enterprise interest in exports.

Mr. SOLARZ. How much is the Commerce Department spending on promotion of trade in Africa, in comparison to what it is spending on such activities in other parts of the world?

Mr. KATZ. Do you want to answer that?

STATEMENT OF SALLY MILLER, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Ms. MILLER. We are hoping to have a larger trade promotion program in fiscal year 1979 and fiscal year 1980 than we have had in the past couple of years. There has been a funding problem. Part of it has been our problem in getting U.S. companies involved.

The budget levels, I will have to get that for you, because I am not sure how it breaks down.

Mr. SOLARZ. Could you give us, for the record, a breakdown of everything we are spending on promotion of trade with Africa?

Mr. KATZ. By areas, is that what you want?

Mr. SOLARZ. Yes. By regions of the world.

Ms. SEDMAN. It would be very interesting, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me, to have them also break it down. My understanding is that there has been much more effort to promote trade and investment with South Africa, in than with the rest of the continent.

Ms. MILLER. That is not the case.

Mr. SOLARZ. Ladies and gentlemen, please, everyone will have a chance to talk.

If you would give us that breakdown, and then within Africa, if you could give us the further breakdown, to the extent that you can, of how much is related to a particular country.

[The information requested follows:]

U.S. TRADE WITH AFRICA

[Dollar amounts in millions]

	January-August 1979		1978		1977	
	Amount	Rank	Amount	Rank	Amount	Rank
EXPORTS						
Algeria	\$526.0	2	\$240.4	4	\$487.0	3
Angola	59.6	10	31.5	17	38.4	17
Benin	10.7	24	11.3	27	13.7	26
Botswana	2.6	37	2.3	41	2.1	41
Burundi	2.0	39	2.8	39	3.4	38
Cameroon	42.5	15	52.1	13	53.6	14
CAR	.2	45	.9	44	.8	43
Chad	2.6	37	5.9	32	8.2	32
Congo	9.8	26	8.8	30	12.3	29
Djibouti	6.0	31	4.2	36	2.6	40
Ethiopia	49.1	13	24.4	19	58.0	12
Gabon	15.2	22	96.6	10	29.6	19
Gambia	2.0	39	2.6	40	5.7	35
Ghana	54.9	12	124.8	7	145.5	5
Guinea	16.5	21	28.4	18	15.5	23
Ivory Coast	101.2	6	92.8	11	79.2	8
Kenya	39.5	16	137.7	6	76.9	11
Lesotho	3.1	34	4.9	34	3.7	37
Liberia	72.3	7	107.8	9	90.9	7
Madagascar	58.0	11	9.2	29	7.3	28
Malawi	2.7	36	4.8	35	2.7	39
Mali	4.6	32	5.9	32	6.8	34
Mauritania	4.1	33	8.3	31	17.9	21
Mauritius	9.5	27	12.1	26	9.0	30
Morocco	165.4	4	371.6	3	297.0	4
Mozambique	18.6	18	20.3	23	12.9	27
Namibia	6.2	30	10.3	28	17.1	22
Niger	17.9	19	21.5	20	8.4	31
Nigeria	360.7	3	985.4	2	958.3	2
Rhodesia	.6	42	1.0	43	.8	43
Rwanda	2.8	35	3.9	37	4.8	36
Senegal	17.8	20	48.3	14	36.3	18
Seychelles	.6	42	.3	45	.5	45
Sierra Leone	10.6	25	15.8	24	13.9	25
Somalia	7.9	29	20.5	22	58.0	12
South Africa	863.5	1	1,079.6	1	1,054.4	1
Sudan	63.6	9	156.8	5	87.1	9
Swaziland	1.4	41	1.1	42	1.6	42
Tanzania	27.8	17	48.3	14	38.7	16
Togo	12.3	23	14.2	25	23.1	20
Tunisia	110.8	5	111.3	8	82.4	10
Uganda	.4	44	3.0	38	14.2	24
Upper Volta	9.4	28	20.7	21	12.4	28
Zaire	70.9	8	82.6	12	113.9	6
Zambia	45.9	14	44.4	16	48.6	15
Total	2,909.8		4,081.3		4,065.2	

U.S. TRADE WITH AFRICA—Continued

(Dollar amounts in millions)

	January–August 1979		1978		1977	
	Amount	Rank	Amount	Rank	Amount	Rank
IMPORTS						
Algeria.....	\$2,881.6	2	\$3,481.6	2	\$3,269.8	2
Angola.....	197.2	6	226.9	5	312.3	4
Benin.....	.8	34	.4	36	0	45
Botswana.....	36.9	17	63.1	18	49.9	18
Burundi.....	16.9	24	29.5	24	26.5	24
Cameroon.....	92.3	10	76.0	16	38.0	21
CAR.....	4.1	29	6.8	31	3.6	33
Chad.....	0	41	0	42	.4	37
Congo.....	45.2	15	80.6	15	32.3	23
Djibouti.....	0	41	0	42	.4	37
Ethiopia.....	74.2	11	95.6	12	91.4	12
Gabon.....	201.3	5	182.5	8	229.4	7
Gambia.....	1.7	33	.2	40	.3	38
Ghana.....	165.3	8	214.0	7	214.1	8
Guinea.....	38.3	16	49.9	20	44.9	20
Ivory Coast.....	283.0	4	414.9	4	299.6	5
Kenya.....	29.7	21	50.8	19	91.9	13
Lesotho.....	0	41	.2	40	.2	40
Liberia.....	92.6	9	133.2	9	105.9	10
Madagascar.....	53.2	13	106.4	11	75.8	15
Malawi.....	14.8	25	10.7	30	17.7	28
Mali.....	.4	35	.4	36	.2	40
Mauritania.....	.2	37	.8	34	.2	40
Mauritius.....	19.7	23	23.5	25	21.2	26
Morocco.....	24.6	22	43.5	22	21.8	25
Mozambique.....	22.1	20	38.5	23	66.4	16
Namibia.....	2.2	32	4.5	31	7.4	32
Niger.....	0	41	1.0	33	15.1	29
Nigeria.....	4,715.8	1	4,713.6	1	6,152.8	1
Rhodesia.....	0	41	.3	39	49.3	19
Rwanda.....	7.4	27	47.8	21	33.8	22
Senegal.....	3.2	30	1.6	32	1.9	34
Seychelles.....	.2	37	.5	36	1.2	40
Sierra Leone.....	50.5	14	69.8	17	62.9	17
Somalia.....	.2	37	.4	36	1.0	35
South Africa.....	1,703.1	3	2,258.9	3	1,261.1	3
Sudan.....	11.7	26	13.7	29	17.8	27
Swaziland.....	4.7	28	14.3	28	13.3	30
Tanzania.....	36.7	18	80.8	14	79.7	14
Togo.....	2.9	31	14.8	27	.3	38
Tunisia.....	36.2	19	21.1	26	11.3	31
Uganda.....	.1	40	81.6	13	246.4	6
Upper Volta.....	.3	36	.6	35	.7	36
Zaire.....	187.7	7	224.9	6	172.5	9
Zambia.....	72.5	12	115.7	10	102.0	11
Total.....	11,142.5		12,995.9		13,246.2	

Source: FT 990, USDOC/Census.

FISCAL YEAR 1980 AFRICAN AREA PROMOTION EVENT SCHEDULE

Event	Date	Place
Trade seminar: Electrical energy equipment.....	October 1979.....	Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia.
Trade mission: NABM IOGA.....	November 1979.....	Nigeria.
Trade mission: Detroit IOGA: Automotive equipment.do.....	Nigeria, Liberia.
Trade mission: Industrial and agricultural chemicals.	January 1980.....	Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Gabon, Nigeria.
Trade mission: Timber industries equipment.....	February 1980.....	Gabon, Congo, Liberia, Cameroon.
Trade seminar: Telecommunications.....do.....	Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia.
Catalog show: Plastics equipment and supplies.....	March 1980.....	Nigeria, Kenya.
Trade seminar: Water resources.....	April 1980.....	Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia.
Catalog show: Educational equipment and supplies.do.....	Nigeria.
Trade mission: Illinois IOGA: Agricultural equipment.	May 1980.....	Nigeria, Kenya.
Trade mission: Water resources.....	June 1980.....	Nigeria.
Trade mission: Agribusiness equipment.....	September 1980.....	Nigeria, Kenya, Sudan.

AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES ELIGIBLE FOR GSP

Angola	Mali
Benin	Mauritania
Botswana	Mauritius
Burundi	Morocco
Cameroon	Mozambique
Cape Verde	Niger
Central African Empire	Rwanda
Chad	Sao Tome & Principe
Comoros	Senegal
Congo	Seychelles
Djibouti	Sierra Leone
Equatorial Guinea	Somalia
Ethiopia	Sudan
Gambia	Swaziland
Ghana	Tanzania
Guinea	Togo
Guinea Bissau	Tunisia
Ivory Coast	Upper Volta
Kenya	Zaire
Lesotho	Zambia
Liberia	British Indian Ocean Territory
Malagasy Republic	Saint Helena
Malawi	Western Sahara

GSP COMPETITIVE NEED LIMITATIONS ON AFRICAN COUNTRIES AS OF AUGUST 1979

156.40: Cocoa unsweetened and cocoa cake suitable for reduction to cocoa power—Ivory Coast.
 304.48: Sisal and henequen fibers processed but not spun—Kenya.
 522.71: Meerschaum, crude—Somalia.
 612.06: Unwrought copper—Zambia.

GSP IMPORTS FROM AFRICA—1978

Country	Total imports into the United States (millions)	GSP eligible	Competitive need exclusion	Adminis- tration exclusion	Total free
Algeria	3,481.6	1,360,883	0	1,360,883	0
Angola	226.9	632	0	632	0
Benin	4	9,080	0	6,921	1,159
Botswana	63.1	120,796	0	9,588	111,208
Burundi	29.5	0	0	0	0
Cameroon	76.0	2,981,035	0	244,931	2,736,104
CAE	6.8	56,830	0	56,830	0
Chad	(1)	0	0	0	0
Comorro	4	0	0	0	0
Congo	80.6	502,686	0	137,278	365,408
Djibouti	(1)	1,644	0	1,644	0
Equatorial Guinea	1	0	0	0	0
Ethiopia	95.6	1,900,853	0	48,573	1,852,280
Gabon	182.5	0	0	0	0
Gambia	2	122,218	0	122,218	0
Ghana	214.0	14,158,639	0	318,379	13,840,260
Guinea	49.9	7,686	0	7,686	0
Guinea Bissau	NL	8,213	0	0	8,213
Ivory Coast	414.9	74,103,687	31,777,142	336,705	41,989,840
Kenya	50.8	2,885,037	5,680	449,546	2,429,811
Lesotho	2	11,975	0	10,821	1,154
Liberia	133.2	445,341	0	14,194	431,147
Madagascar	106.4	4,156,632	1,321,683	192,570	2,732,379
Malawi	10.7	1,916,059	0	143,790	1,772,269
Mali	4	148,930	0	90,415	58,515
Mauritania	8	638,713	0	71,886	566,827
Mauritius	23.5	18,096,350	0	5,088,507	13,007,843
Morocco	43.5	6,419,170	0	274,743	6,144,427
Mozambique	38.5	2,626,581	0	1,064,360	1,562,221
Niger	1.9	6,008	0	2,999	3,009
Nigeria	4,713.6	6,473,263	0	6,473,263	0
Rawanda	47.8	2,536	0	1,751	785
Saint Helena	1	44,450	0	38,450	6,000
Sao Tome & Principe	NL	1,493	0	0	1,493
Seychelles	5	0	0	0	0
Senegal	1.6	111,614	0	52,769	58,845
Sierra Leone	69.8	168,346	0	54,273	114,073
Somalia	4	60,031	0	19,359	40,672
Sudan	13.7	34,959	0	3,360	31,579
Swaziland	14.3	14,205,346	0	6,511,274	7,694,072
Tanzania	80.8	5,483,724	0	5,483,724	236,350
Togo	14.8	40,183	0	12,632	27,551
Tunisia	21.1	2,583,892	0	9,193	2,574,699
Uganda	81.6	63,334	0	63,334	0
Upper Volta	6	27,066	0	11,574	15,492
Western Sahara	0	0	0	0	0
Zaire	224.9	4,892,580	0	4,322,909	569,671
Zambia	115.7	86,773,478	80,272,315	6,501,163	0
Total	10,733.7	253,822,000	113,300,000	39,616,000	100,985,000

1 Less than \$50,000.

2 2.4 percent eligible.

3 44.6 percent excluded for competitive need.

4 15.6 percent excluded for administrative reasons.

5 39.8 percent entered duty free.

U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, 1970-78

[In millions of U.S. dollars]

Country	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Algeria.....	66	60	49	(D)	69	47	50	50	NA
Angola.....	(D)	(D)	(D)	50	(D)	-105	-75	(D)	NA
Benin.....	2	2	1	-1	3	6	5	2	NA
Botswana.....	3	4	(D)	(D)	(D)	(D)	(D)	(D)	(D)
Burundi.....	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	-1	-1	-1	NA
Cameroon.....	5	6	7	7	8	12	16	(D)	NA
CAR.....	2	3	4	4	5	(D)	(D)	(D)	NA
Chad.....	2	2	2	4	3	(D)	(D)	(D)	NA
Congo.....	(D)	(D)	(D)	(D)	(D)	(D)	(D)	(D)	NA
Djibouti.....	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	NA
Equatorial Guinea.....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
Ethiopia.....	3	5	12	20	27	29	22	21	NA
Gabon.....	(D)	31	32	34	51	62	91	78	NA
Gambia.....	(1)	(1)	1	1	1	1	1	2	NA
Ghana.....	114	121	134	138	153	168	171	175	NA
Guinea.....	(D)	(D)	(D)	(D)	(D)	(D)	(D)	(D)	NA
Guinea-Bissau.....	(D)	(D)	(D)	(D)	(D)	(D)	(D)	(D)	NA
Ivory Coast.....	10	11	9	10	11	16	19	27	NA
Kenya.....	32	33	35	48	65	76	93	94	NA
Lesotho.....	0	1	4	3	3	3	3	4	NA
Liberia.....	147	153	164	209	259	334	324	341	340
Madagascar.....	28	37	38	36	33	30	27	(D)	NA
Malawi.....	2	2	1	2	2	3	3	4	NA
Mali.....	1	1	3	(D)	(D)	(D)	(D)	(D)	NA
Mauritania.....	2	2	(D)	16	16	16	16	7	NA
Mauritius.....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
Morocco.....	30	33	38	36	33	35	38	42	NA
Mozambique.....	9	13	(D)	(D)	2	2	2	2	NA
Namibia.....	2	2	5	7	9	11	14	(D)	NA
Niger.....	1	2	4	10	19	28	(D)	(D)	NA
Nigeria.....	337	487	527	458	238	535	346	335	383
Rhodesia.....	50	61	70	82	91	95	100	107	NA
Rwanda.....	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	1	2	(1)	1	NA
Senegal.....	(D)	34	31	34	31	23	19	11	NA
Seychelles.....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
Sierra Leone.....	5	5	5	4	5	4	5	(D)	NA
Somalia.....	2	1	1	4	7	(D)	14	18	NA
South Africa.....	778	875	941	1,167	1,463	1,582	1,668	1,791	1,994
Sudan.....	4	4	4	7	9	13	22	32	NA
Swaziland.....	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	NA
Tanzania.....	3	5	6	8	13	15	15	15	NA
Togo.....	15	15	16	14	(D)	(D)	9	8	NA
Tunisia.....	7	8	8	5	3	7	15	13	NA
Uganda.....	4	4	5	5	5	6	4	7	NA
Upper Volta.....	(1)	(1)	(1)	1	1	2	2	2	NA
Western Sahara.....	-4	-4	-4	-4	-4	-4	-4	-4	NA
Zaire.....	25	40	46	54	64	70	103	93	NA
Zambia.....	198	206	203	204	195	210	199	214	NA
Unallocated.....	2	(D)	2	3	5	5	5	5	NA
Other Africa (1978 only).....									* 2,215
Totals.....	2,097	2,418	2,676	2,815	2,833	3,468	3,478	3,568	* 5,878

Less than \$500,000.

* 1978 figures do include investments in Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt; these have been subtracted out for the years 1970-77.

Note: Contains an unspecified (D) amount from Algeria.

Source: USDOC/BEA.

[In millions of U.S. dollars]

	1976	1977	1978	1979
Total U.S. private sector claims on Africa:				
Total Africa	2,947	3,130	3,377	3,393
Ghana	17	40	41	2
Liberia	NA	322	328	354
South Africa	1,118	1,229	1,179	1,044
Zaire	143	123	196	183
Oil exporting ¹	1,468	628	749	776
Other	1,468	568	596	605
Claims on foreigners by banks in the United States:				
Total Africa	2,371	2,583	2,747	2,645
Ghana	17	34	36	18
Liberia	NA	227	233	243
Morocco	28	43	108	67
South Africa	1,005	1,129	1,072	951
Zaire	112	98	180	169
Oil exporting ¹	524	511	602	618
Other	550	421	401	409
Claims on foreigners by nonbanking enterprises in the United States:				
Total Africa	577	547	630	648
Ghana	NA	6	5	3
Liberia	NA	95	95	111
Morocco	11	21	17	16
South Africa	113	100	107	93
Zaire	31	25	16	14
Oil exporting ¹	394	117	147	158
Other		147	195	196

¹ Algeria, Libya, Nigeria and Gabon.

Source: Treasury Bulletin, September 1979, Capital Movements, sec. II, table CM 113, sec. V, table CM V2.

Selected data on U.S. direct investment position abroad, yearend 1978

	Million
All countries	\$168,081
Canada	37,280
Europe	69,669
Japan	4,963
Australia	6,368
Latin America	32,509
Africa	5,405
Middle East	2,105
Other Asia and Pacific	6,651

Source: Survey of Current Business, table 14, vol. 59, No. 8, Pt. 1 (August 79), p. 27.

SECTORIAL DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT IN AFRICA YEAREND 1978

[In millions of U.S. dollars]

	Africa	South Africa	Nigeria	Liberia
Total	5,405	1,994	383	340
Mining and smelting	1,545	(²)	*(¹)	(²)
Petroleum	2,092	(²)	262	110
Manufacturing	1,017	743	46	(²)
Utilities	90	2	3	76
Trade	381	230	49	6
Finance	175	(²)	16	(²)
Other	273	87	6	(²)

¹ Does not include South African figures.² Suppressed to avoid disclosure of data of.³ South African figure in 1973 was \$158,000,000.⁴ Less than \$500,000.⁵ South African figure in 1975 was \$407,000,000.

Source: IBID.

[In millions of dollars]

	1977	1978
Total.....	5,612	4,606
Canada.....	-248	-549
Europe.....	2,920	2,445
Japan.....	130	65
Australia, New Zealand.....	65	267
Latin America.....	2,422	2,109
Africa.....	-10	535
Middle East.....	478	209
Other Asia and Pacific.....	-90	-58

Source: IBID, tables 15 and 16, pp 28-29.

SECTORIAL DISTRIBUTION OF 1978 EQUITY AND INTERCOMPANY AMOUNT OUTFLOWS TO AFRICA

	Africa	South Africa	Nigeria	Liberia
Total.....	\$535	\$88	(D)	-\$1
Mining and smelting.....	¹ -4	(D)	0	(D)
Petroleum.....	¹ 424	(D)	(D)	6
Manufacturing.....	-12	-16	-\$3	(D)
Utilities.....	12	0	(D)	14
Trade.....	20	15	2	(C)
Finance.....	¹ -17	(D)	0	(D)
Other.....	¹ 23	(D)	(D)	(D)

¹ Less than \$500,000.

Note: Does not include South African figure.

Source: IBID, table 16, p. 29.

Soviet trade with Africa

[Value (millions of U.S. dollars)]

*Country and item***Algeria:**

Export total.....	\$128.0
Machinery, equipment, transport.....	63.8
Sawn timber.....	12.8
Cement.....	4.5
Ferrous metals.....	2.3
Heating elements (coal, wood).....	2.2
Sugar.....	1.2
Import total.....	74.4
Wines.....	71.0
Fruit juices.....	1.0

Angola:

Export total.....	69.3
Machinery, equipment, transport.....	57.1
Soap.....	1.7
Canned milk.....	1.6
Import total.....	13.9
Coffee.....	13.9

Benin:

Export total.....	7.7
Machinery, equipment, transport.....	5.1
Fish.....	1.9
Import total.....	0

Ivory Coast:

Export total.....	8.8
Fish.....	6.4
Import total.....	86.3
Cocoa Beans.....	75.5
Rare timber.....	9.1

Ghana :

Export total.....	7.0
Petrol and petrol products.....	4.1
Import total.....	158.6
Cocoa beans.....	155.0
Rare timber.....	3.6

Guinea :

Export total.....	30.0
Petrol and petrol products.....	12.8
Machinery, equipment, transport.....	8.8
Fish.....	3.0
Import total.....	39.0
Ores and metal concentrates.....	37.0
Oilseeds.....	1.2

Guinea-Bissau :

Export total.....	5.1
Machinery, equipment, transport.....	2.8
Petrol and petrol products.....	1.2
Import total.....	0

Zambia :

Export total.....	6.9
Machinery, equipment, transport.....	.1
Soap.....	.1
Import total.....	0

Cameroon :

Export total.....	5.6
Fish.....	3.6
Machinery, equipment, transport.....	1.7
Import total.....	25.4
Cocoa butter.....	11.9
Rare timber.....	6.5
Cocoa beans.....	4.1
Peanuts.....	2.3

Kenya :

Export total.....	.6
Medicines.....	.3
Import total.....	2.3
Ores and metal concentrates.....	2.0

Congo :

Export total.....	4.5
Fish.....	1.0
Machinery, equipment, transport.....	.9
Import total.....	4.2
Rare timber.....	4.2

Liberia :

Export total.....	3.2
Petrol and petrol products.....	1.45
Machinery, equipment, transport.....	1.3
Import total.....	14.6
Ships and ship equipment.....	13.6
Rare timber.....	1.0

Libya :

Export total.....	75.1
Machinery, equipment, transport.....	59.6
Cement.....	7.5
Textiles.....	1.9
Nonferrous metals.....	1.45
Import total.....	154.9
Fuels, mineral raw materials, metals.....	154.9

Madagascar :

Export total	1.7
Machinery, equipment, transport	1.45
Import total	2.0
Spices	1.9

Mali :

Export total	7.5
Machinery, equipment, transport	4.2
Import total	1.45
Peanuts	1.45

Morocco :

Export total	82.1
Petrol and petrol products	64.7
Timber	6.7
Machinery, equipment, transport	1.45
Import total	68.7
Fruit	59.0
Cork	5.9
Superphosphates	1.0

Mozambique :

Export total	25.2
Machinery, equipment transport	19.9
Fish	3.2
Import total	1.2
Concentrates of nonferrous metals	1.2

Nigeria :

Export total	109.3
Machinery, equipment transport	80.9
Import total	24.2
Cocoa beans	22.2

Rwanda :

Export total	1.6
Textiles	1.0
Import total	0

Senegal :

Export total	.4
Nonmetallic ores	.3
Import total	.6
Peanuts	.6

Sudan :

Export total	3.9
Textiles	1.3
Import total	22.8
Cotton	12.2
Peanuts	6.2
Oilseeds	4.4

Sierra Leone :

Export total	4.8
Fish	2.3
Cement	1.7
Import total	6.4
Cocoa beans	6.4

Tanzania :

Export total	9.0
Machinery, equipment, transport	7.2
Import total	4.9
Coffee	4.9

Togo:

Export total	2.8
Fish	2.6
Import total	7.7
Cocoa beans	7.7

Tunisia:

Export total	13.9
Cement	5.6
Sawn timber	4.2
Machinery, equipment, transport	2.2
Import total	5.5
Olive oil	4.6

Uganda:

Export total	2.3
Medicines	.4
Machinery, equipment, transport	.3
Import total	2.5
Coffee	2.5

E. Guinea:

Export total	3.2
Machinery, equipment, transport	2.8
Import total	7.0
Cocoa beans	7.0

Ethiopia:

Export total	93.1
Mach, equipment, transport	79.8
Import total	6.2
Coffee	5.9

All Africa:

Export total	706.3
Import total	734.9

Source: Russian trade data.

Exchange rate: 1 Ruble=\$1.45.

**BUREAU OF EXPORT DEVELOPMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE TRADE
PROMOTION PROGRAM, FISCAL YEAR 1979**

EUROPE—TOTAL COST, \$3.870 MILLION

Trade fairs/trade development offices: Cost, \$3,774 million; number of exhibits, 14.

Trade missions: Cost, \$75,000; number, 5.

Catalog shows: Cost, \$21,000; number, 14.

JAPAN—TOTAL COST, \$1.069

Trade fairs/trade development offices: Cost, \$0.616 million; number of exhibits, 6.

Boatique America: Cost, \$0.333 million.

Trade missions: Cost, \$130,000; number, 8.

OTHER FAR EAST—TOTAL COST, \$1.420 MILLION

Trade fairs/trade development offices: Cost, \$1.316 million; number of exhibits, 18.

Trade missions: Cost, \$60,000; number, 4.

Catalog shows: Cost, \$44,000; number, 8.

LATIN AMERICA—TOTAL COST, \$1.402 MILLION

Trade fairs/trade development offices: Cost, \$1.310 million; number of exhibits, 15.

Trade missions: Cost, \$75,000; number, 5.

Catalog shows: Cost, \$16,500; number, 3.

NEAR EAST—TOTAL COST, \$0.511 MILLION

Trade fairs/trade development offices: Cost, \$0.447 million; number of exhibits, 3.

Trade missions: Cost, \$64,000; number, 4.

AFRICA—TOTAL COST, \$0.198 MILLION

Trade fairs/trade development offices: Cost, \$0.1 million; number, 4.

Trade missions: Cost, \$90,000; number, 6.

Catalog shows: Cost, \$5,500; number, 1.

Synopsis

	<i>Million</i>
Europe -----	3, 870
Japan -----	1. 069
Other Far East -----	1. 420
Latin America -----	1. 402
Near East -----	. 511
Africa -----	. 198
Total -----	8. 470

Above figures include appropriated funds and business participant contributions.

Mr. SOLARZ. Can you tell us in which African countries the Commerce Department has commercial attachés?

Ms. MILLER. We don't have any yet.

Mr. SOLARZ. You don't have any?

Ms. MILLER. That is correct.

Mr. KATZ. That is part of the reorganization, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you have commercial attachés in South America?

Ms. MILLER. We don't have them anywhere. They are still Department of State employees.

Mr. SOLARZ. I see.

Mr. KATZ. That will be part of the reorganization.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you know in which African countries we have commercial attachés, regardless of which agency they are connected with?

Ms. MILLER. Liberia, Nigeria, Ghana. The position is not given a title in Kenya. We have a position in Zaire. The rest are commercial officers, not in the sense of being attachés. To give you an example, we have a commercial attaché in Nigeria, but the other six members of the economic commercial section, are economic commercial officers, and Commerce will not get those.

Mr. SOLARZ. What is the difference between a commercial attaché and an economic officer?

Ms. MILLER. An economic officer does more finance work, more balance of payments work. He performs certain functions such as foreign economic trend reports, whereas the commercial officer looks after trade promotions, trade missions, trade information services.

Mr. SOLARZ. Can you submit, for the record, a list of every country in Africa where we have a commercial attaché, and how many, and also list the ones where we don't have a commercial attaché? At the same time, give us a breakdown for all the other countries in the world where we have a commercial attaché and, if so, how many, so that we can get some comparative sense of what we are doing in Africa.

Would you at this point indicate whether in your judgment we have fewer commercial attachés in Africa, let us say, than in South America and Asia?

[The following was subsequently submitted for the record:]

LOCATION OF COMMERCIAL ATTACHÉS—WORLDWIDE

AFRICA

Ghana, Accra	Nigeria, Lagos
Ivory Coast, Abidjan	Zaire, Kinshasa

LATIN AMERICA

Argentina, Buenos Aires	Guatemala, Guatemala City
Bolivia, La Paz	Honduras, Tegucigalpa
Brazil, Brasilia	Mexico, Mexico City
Chile, Santiago	Panama, Panama City
Colombia, Bogotá	Peru, Lima
Costa Rica, San Jose	Uruguay, Montevideo
Dominican Republic, Santo Domingo	Venezuela, Caracas
Equador, Quito	

EAST ASIA

Australia, Canberra	New Zealand, Wellington
Indonesia, Jakarta	Philippines, Manila
Japan, Tokyo	Singapore, Singapore City
Korea, Seoul	Thailand, Bangkok
Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur	

EUROPE

Austria, Vienna	Poland, Warsaw
Belgium, Brussels	Portugal, Lisbon
Czechoslovakia, Prague	Romania, Bucharest
Denmark, Copenhagen	Spain, Madrid
Finland, Helsinki	Sweden, Stockholm
France, Paris	Switzerland, Bern
Greece, Athens	Turkey, Ankara
Hungary, Budapest	United Kingdom, London
Italy, Rome	U.S.S.R., Moscow
The Netherlands, The Hague	Yugoslavia, Belgrade
Norway, Oslo	

NEAR EAST

Algeria, Algiers	Iraq, Baghdad
Egypt, Cairo	Israel, Tel Aviv
India, New Delhi	Saudi Arabia, Jidda
Iran, Tehran	

Mr. KATZ. There is no doubt that we have far fewer. Let me be quite clear that the amount of Commerce's efforts, and this will be borne out by the statistics that we will give you in budget terms, on missions, and exhibits, and so forth, targeted on Africa are relatively small, simply because Commerce has been spending on the targets of opportunity, where our trade is largest, and where the potential for trade is largest.

Latin America has been a much larger area in terms of opportunity, as have half the developed countries of Europe and Asia, as well as some of the underdeveloped countries of Asia.

Mr. SOLARZ. One final question before I yield to my good friend from Michigan.

Do you have the latest figures on the increase in American trade in South Africa, on the one hand, in comparison to the rest of Africa, on the other?

Ms. MILLER. That is contained in the statistical packet, which we provided.

Mr. SOLARZ. What year are you talking about?

Mr. KATZ. Our latest year is 1978.

Mr. SOLARZ. The latest year is 1978 in which the figures were developed.

Mr. KATZ. Yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. In that year, the increase in American investment in South Africa was how much?

Ms. MILLER. It went up from \$1.8 billion to \$2 billion, so it was roughly a \$203 million increase.

Mr. SOLARZ. In investment?

Ms. MILLER. Yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. Was that book value?

Ms. MILLER. Yes, the year and book value, as our Bureau of Economic Analysis—

Mr. SOLARZ. In black Africa, what was it?

Ms. MILLER. I do not have it added up, but it is around \$3.8. I can give it to you.

Mr. SOLARZ. What about new investment, as distinguished from simply an increase in book value? Do you know how much new investment there was in black Africa as compared to South Africa?

Ms. MILLER. I know that it was \$88 million in South Africa, and I can get you the figures for black Africa.

Mr. SOLARZ. In new money 88 million?

Ms. MILLER. Right.

Mr. SOLARZ. New investment in black Africa in 1978 in comparison to 1977?

Ms. MILLER. Correct.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you know what that \$88 million was in?

Ms. MILLER. I will have to get the central breakdown.

Mr. SOLARZ. Could you give us a breakdown on that as well, for the record?

Ms. MILLER. Yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. Professor Seidman, you wanted to add something?

Ms. SEIDMAN. That is what I was going to suggest, that it should be broken down by sectors. Clearly if you look at U.S. investment in 1977 (the public does not have the 1978 figures), the greatest investment was in manufacturing. I want to emphasize that the sector aspect is important.

Mr. SOLARZ. What is the increase in American trade in South Africa, as compared to the increase in trade with black Africa?

Ms. MILLER. Actually, trade in South Africa went down in 1978, because of the export controls that were put on in February. This year we will see maybe \$100 million of improvement in that. It will be about \$1.2 billion at the end of the year.

Mr. SOLARZ. Is that exports?

Ms. MILLER. Yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. What was the increase for the rest of Africa?

Ms. MILLER. Exports have gone down this year.

Mr. KATZ. They have gone down from \$3.5 to \$3.3.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Wolpe.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to pursue, for a moment, with Professor Seidman some of the elements of the investment picture within South Africa.

I would like to have a clear understanding of how important is the American investment in South Africa to the South African economy?

Ms. SEIDMAN. First of all, U.S. direct investments through U.S. firms in the United States make up about 17 percent of all foreign investment in South Africa. We know that there is additional investment, but we do not have data on it because U.S. firms also invest in South Africa indirectly through branches in England and France, as well as Canada.

Mr. WOLPE. Could you give us some examples?

Ms. SEIDMAN. For example, France won a contract and is developing the Kohburg nuclear powerplant in South Africa through Francophone, and Westinghouse owns 15 percent of Francophone. But any investment associated with that in South Africa would not be considered American because it is through Francophone.

The U.S. firm affiliate Falconbridge in Canada has a lot of investments in South Africa. I believe the U.S. parent company is Superior Oil, but I am not sure. Anyway, it is indirectly a U.S. investment, and it is not included in the 17 percent.

You asked, what is the significance of U.S. investment there. U.S. investment in manufacturing is a much higher percentage of foreign investment. I should say that total foreign investment in South Africa makes up about 25 percent of all investment there, and it makes up about 40 percent of all investment in the manufacturing sector. Of this manufacturing investment, 25 percent is from the United States in direct terms.

In other words, U.S. investment in South Africa manufacturing is much more significant. In areas like oil, it is particularly significant because three U.S. firms, Standard Oil of California, Texaco, and Mobil, provide probably about half of the refining capacity of South Africa. Shell-BP supplies a considerable amount, and, of course, Shell-BP is predominantly British. Sosal provides some in cooperation with the South Africa refiners. An important involvement in that kind of a strategic industry is even more significant.

The same is true in transport, where U.S. firms like General Motors play a major role. In electrical equipment, General Electric is the biggest single electrical firm in South Africa, and although they have sold to a South African partner some of their consumer goods in South Africa, they nevertheless continue other activities, and continue to provide the technology, the managerial competence, and also finance. In fact they also receive a given percent, or so, of the profits produced, although they are no longer a majority shareholder.

Incidentally, the fact that they are no longer a majority shareholder, if I am not mistaken, also takes them out of the direct investment category. Is that right?

Ms. MILLER. They are listed as having a direct investment, if they have 10 percent of the equity.

Ms. SEIDMAN. So they would still be included in that.

In the area of computers, which is extremely important to the white minority, because of their ability to replace skilled, white workers without upgrading blacks, IBM plays a major role, both in the military and government sectors, in general, as well as in the private sectors.

Although the companies are not supposed to sell parts and equipment to the South African Government, the fact that the same computers are used in the private sector, which continue to get those parts and materials, mean that they can be shipped on to the public sector as well.

So that is the kind of role that they are playing, mostly in the more sophisticated, and advanced sectors of the economy.

Mr. WOLPE. The debate over the question of disinvestment in South Africa impinged very largely on the question of the impact that this would have on the black population of the country. Could you comment on your reaction to that question?

Ms. SEIDMAN. Well, in the first place, I think that it is important to emphasize the point that I was making before that U.S. investment, in fact, is already reducing employment by providing highly sophisticated technologies which tend to reduce employment among the blacks. The South African Government has been very eager for this because they want to reduce their dependence on black labor.

There are about 2 million unemployed in South Africa now among the black population, and those people get sent back, as I understand, where they do not have social welfare, or any of the other unemployment compensation, and so on. So they, essentially, face a very bleak future.

I don't think that the U.S. firms are making all that much contribution to employment. As I said, less than 100,000 people, less than 1 percent of the labor force is employed in U.S. firms, and about half of those are white. I don't have the exact data, and it would be nice if we had the exact data, but that is the best we can put together from the information available.

Mr. WOLPE. Is that 1 percent of the black population?

Ms. SEIDMAN. It is 1 percent of the total labor force.

Mr. WOLPE. Black and white?

Ms. SEIDMAN. Yes; but half of them are white.

Mr. WOLPE. Certainly.

Mr. SOLARZ. It seems to me, the other side of the coin is what impact disinvestment would have upon the white power structure established in South Africa; disinvestment would have a relatively limited impact on the black population, although it might have enormous impact psychologically and politically throughout South Africa.

To the extent that the investment constitutes only 17 percent of the total amount of foreign investment, which means that obviously it must constitute a much smaller percentage of the total investment, and to the extent that while we disinvest, the physical apparatus of our investment would presumably remain to be taken over by somebody else, isn't it true that the impact disinvestment on the white establishment in South Africa would be much more of a political and psychological nature than it would be of an economic nature?

In other words, can you argue in any meaningful sense that American disinvestment would significantly undermine the economic foundation?

Ms. SEIDMAN. I think, first of all, I want to reemphasize that while it is 17 percent in direct terms, it is probably considerably larger if we could get a handle on what the subsidiaries and affiliates invest there, and I don't have that data.

Second, it is 25 percent of the manufacturing sector, and there foreign investment does make up 40 percent of the foreign investment. So that becomes a more significant amount. But critically, it is invested in the key sectors, technologically in the most important ones to a minority regime which is trying, with an inadequate labor force of whites, to hang on to a fairly large country, and operate all the different things that they have to do there.

The military side alone is a demanding side, and they, incidentally, have only recently begun to recruit any blacks into the military. Then, they have to handle the management, supervisory positions et cetera, et cetera. So, computer technology, electrical equipment and machinery to automate transport, particularly airplane transport, as well as trucks, and so on, play an important role. We do not have precise figures on the exact percentage that U.S. firms represents, but they provide a much more significant percentage of technology, nuclear technology, and as I said, oil refinery is about half, or maybe more.

U.S. firms are much more significant there.

Mr. WOLPE. Are there any American firms that have responded to the growing awareness in this country to the potential political impact of disinvestment, that has responded by disinvestment?

Ms. SEIDMAN. Polaroid has, originally, as a result of the objections in this country to the South African Government's use of Polaroid, and Polaroid promised that they would not allow any of their products to be sold directly to the government. It turned out 6 years later that they had, in fact, sold directly to the government through a private sector firm.

Polaroid now, as I understand it, has agreed to withdraw, but I don't have precise information on what they have done or what the impact has been.

Incidentally, the United Nations General Assembly's position, as you know, is to say that there should be an end to future investment and trade. I think the trading element is an extremely important one, because what happens is that the firms with investments there import the parts and materials. For example, by law, automobile companies have to produce 60 percent of what they sell locally in cars, but they import the other third. That is the important one, that is the technologically sophisticated. Third, an end to those imports would have a major effect on the economy. I think complete embargo would stop the import of those kinds of items.

Mr. WOLPE. Could I turn to the Department of Commerce, and ask what your position is in regard to the legislation which would restrict new investment in South Africa?

Mr. KATZ. Mr. Chairman, up until now, my understanding is that the administration's position has been quite clear that it is up to individual firms to decide whether or not to invest. We see, as an administration—this is not a Department of Commerce issue—the role of American firms in South Africa as being a very positive one in terms of the welfare of that black community, and certainly of the labor force.

In terms strictly of trade, it is quite clear, if you just look at the numbers that have been cited, that our share of foreign investment in South Africa is roughly 15 to 17 percent. Our share of the total investment is about 3 percent. We will not achieve very much in terms of

disinvestment or reduction of investment in terms of impact on the South African economy. We have seen in the case of trade that other countries are quite ready to step in, where we have foregone certain opportunities.

Mr. WOLPE. Is it not true, if I may interrupt you for a moment, that the United States is in a little difficult position to encourage other countries to disinvest, since we are ourselves unwilling to do so?

Mr. KATZ. You can try to encourage other countries to disinvest, but we have also tried to encourage other countries to follow our example in trade, and if there is any lesson to be learned on the trade side, we have succeeded, as far as I can see, in handing some very, very nice contracts to our competitors, without affecting hardly at all their determination to increase all markets, including South Africa.

Mr. WOLPE. Professor Seidman, would you like to comment?

Ms. SEIDMAN. Yes, I would.

First of all, I would like to emphasize that I think the United States ought to, instead of taking the leadership as it has in the past in vetoing the United Nations proposal to embargo all trade with South Africa, support that kind of action by the United Nations. I think that if we did, the other countries would have a very hard time to vote against it. I suspect that this has been an important element in the fact that that proposal has been defeated there.

Second, I think that the Japanese, for example, have long had a prohibition against investment in South Africa. In fact, the Japanese have invested indirectly through firms in which the U.S. interests have been involved. For example, through General Motors, and General Motors' own shares in the Japanese automobile firm, and that firm then ships the parts and equipment to General Motors, and then they are assembled and sold in South Africa. If the United States were to stop that, it would reduce the Japanese involvement.

My own feeling is that the entire antiapartheid movements of the Federal Republic of Germany, Britain, and elsewhere would, in fact, be a lot strengthened there if governments might stop transnationals based there from carrying on their policies if the United States took a strong stand against it, and particularly if we were to take a stand in support of a United Nations' action.

I think myself that the amount of trade and investment in South Africa, while critical to the South African regime, is not critical to U.S. development, and if we want to see development in the rest of Africa, then we really would be much smarter, in the long term—and I think that the long term is what we ought to look at—to deal with those 50 or so independent African countries who would like to develop and could, in fact, provide a much larger market in the long run.

I did not have an opportunity, through my own fault, I guess, to respond to the chairman's question on how to deal with the balance of payments issue. But it seems to me that in the long run, we can have a much larger market for sales, if we can, in fact, convince the African countries that we really are trying to encourage their industrial development.

The data of the amount of trade we do in South Africa, which is industrialized, certainly shows that we do much more with South Africa, and if we were to help those countries to industrialize, then, in fact, we would find ourselves in a much better position, with a much larger market. They have a land area that, as I said, is 3 times the

size of the United States, and a population which is 20 times that of South Africa alone.

So it only makes good sense, in terms of the long-term position, that we end our support of the minority regime there, and win friends and develop a long-term policy relating to the rest of Africa. That would seem to be much more fruitful. In the long run, South Africa as a regime is not going to be able to stay there, and if we persist in supporting them, we are really cutting off a potential future.

Mr. WOLPE. I happen to share that view. What has been frustrating has been trying to get American firms to perceive what I would argue to be in their own economic self-interest, especially when our own Department of Commerce feels as it does.

Ms. SEIDMAN. Excuse me, but may I just mention that Gulf Oil, which has been working with Angola, has been taking a more positive approach to working with independent countries since they have their experience there. It seems to me that we ought to perhaps listen to a firm like Gulf Oil, when they make the point that they find Angola one of the more stable and best countries to work with that they have had, and if we recognized them, we would be better off.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you.

One last question related to financial institutions. Are the financial institutions that are in place, such as the Eximbank, adequately promoting the trade in Africa, or is there a need for a new financial institution?

Would you care to react to that?

Ms. SEIDMAN. I have not really given the question a whole lot of thought, but I certainly think the Export-Import Bank could be encouraged to do more than they have. I suspect that if we really did develop more effective consular agencies—I do think that consulates play an important role in trade promotions as well—if we worked on developing that, and providing funds through the various development banks that exist in Africa, which would more directly help to finance development programs, that they would then, themselves, provide larger markets. We might be able in that way, in the longer term, to contribute to more effective industrialization of Africa, and that would provide a larger market for the United States.

Mr. WOLPE. You made some reference earlier to U.S. bank involvement in African development. How have those U.S. bank loans affected development in Africa, compared to other regions of the world? I think that it would be interesting to get the Commerce Department's reaction to that. Do you have the data on that one?

Mr. KATZ. We have submitted it. It is the last page of the statistical material that we submitted, which contains the total U.S. private sector claim on Africa, and claims on foreigners by banks in the United States, and claims on foreigners by nonbanking enterprises in the United States.

Actually these numbers are small. I don't have the exact comparison with other areas. I can supply that. We are talking about rather small numbers. Here are some comparisons. Claims on foreigners reported by banks in the United States, Europe \$32 billion; Latin America and Caribbean \$58.3 billion; Asia \$27.9 billion; Africa \$2.6 billion. That shows you the order of magnitude, and that should not surprise anybody because it follows the patterns of trade and investment, which are relatively small for those countries.

Ms. SEIDMAN. Again, when you look at this page, your data as of 1979 shows that about one-third of U.S. private claims on Africa are for South Africa. Again, it seems to me that this is a balance that should be redressed.

Mr. SOLARZ. I just have a few more questions for both of you before we conclude the hearing.

Could you possibly let the committee know what product offers the greatest opportunity for an expansion of American exports to Africa?

Mr. KATZ. Mr. Chairman, as we try to point out in the testimony, essentially the big opportunities are on the big ticket items, and that is large projects for development. Incidentally, I might say that after oil, U.S. investment has been largest in manufacturing and not mining in black Africa.

If you look at the tables that we have given you, as far as equipment is concerned, which is of direct help to African development requirements, you have construction and mining equipment, TV, telephone and telegraph equipment, and lifting and hauling equipment, just to cite a few.

Throughout this list, you will see other elements of capital equipment, even though you can see a large number for automotive vehicles, a lot of this is heavy trucks to move things around in the bush, and so forth. Aircraft figured largely, and just one or two small orders can change the mix considerably in favor of aircraft.

In general, Mr. Chairman, we are talking about the basic muscle for economic development. That is what we can anticipate exporting in the future. I might say, however, that agricultural products will continue to be a fairly large component of our total exports to Africa. They seem to require more rather than less wheat with time.

Ms. SEIDMAN. I would like to emphasize again that it depends a lot on what happens in independent Africa, but if they are successful in restructuring their economies and developing industry, then I would think that a lot of industrial components would become important to them, and they would certainly continue to import from the United States for those things, if they could arrive at reasonable programs for doing so, and also adequate financing.

Incidentally, although it is true, as you say, oil is important in the rest of Africa, one of the things which I think is important to emphasize here is that most U.S. investment in mining is in southern Africa, and it is pretty high there. All of manufacturing investment in Africa, outside of South Africa, in 1977 was 266 million dollars' worth, and \$41 million of that was in Nigeria, whereas in South Africa, we invested some 710 million dollars' worth. This just spells out again, in another way, what I was trying to say.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Katz, on page 19 of your testimony, you have listed a whole series of minerals that we import from Africa, including manganese, cobalt, platinum group metals, vanadium, antimony, asbestos, and industrial diamonds. To what extent are there any substitutes for these minerals?

In other words, if for some reason we are denied access to any of the minerals on your list, are there any aspects of our economy which would grind to a halt for lack of those materials? Would the national security, in other words, be significantly impaired were any of these minerals, which we now import from Africa, no longer available from Africa?

Mr. KATZ. This is a difficult question, which we anticipated partly, but figured that our testimony on this would be far less authoritative than that of the Bureau of Mines, which is not here. We really cannot contribute very much to this.

We need the material, but the question is whether in extrimis you can develop substitutes, and other sources of supply.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you have any testimony or observations to make on what industries, what materials these minerals are currently utilized for, and from where else we also import them?

If you don't have it now, can you give us information concerning what other countries and regions of the world we import those minerals from; what percentage of the minerals we import from Africa, and what percentage we import from elsewhere; the extent to which, in the judgment of the Department, the use of these minerals is indispensable for any particular industry or any particular product; and the extent to which substitutes are or are not available.

As a bottom line, you could also indicate whether there are any particular products or industries which simply could not function without access not only to these minerals in general, but to the amount of that particular mineral, which we import from Africa.

You might also let us know, for the record, to what extent we have in our strategic stockpiles any or all of these minerals, and on the basis of current usage, how long it would take for us to exhaust our stockpiles for each particular mineral. For that, I think, we would be appreciative.

Do you have any judgment to make on how the economic/commercial potential of Africa compares in terms of the opportunities for American trade with other areas of the world?

Mr. KATZ. Mr. Chairman, I certainly do agree with what Professor Seidman said, to the extent that a country industrializes, it becomes a much better potential consumer. We have seen, obviously, with our partners in the other developed countries. But if you look at the characteristics of the other developing countries, you will note that a number of our leading trading partners were just a few years ago classified as less developed countries, and now we have to count Mexico as about our fifth major customer, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, Brazil, all of these are major customers of the United States.

Mr. Chairman, unfortunately, 20 of some 30 of the world's poorest countries are in Africa. If you are talking about the continent as a whole, with a few glaring exceptions, and we know what these exceptions are, and we have mentioned them before today, we are talking about an extremely impoverished area, one that will inexorably develop, but which will not become a major market for many years to come.

Mr. SOLARZ. Can you tell us to what extent the Soviet Union's and other Communist states' trade with Africa is increasing?

Mr. KATZ. I don't have figures on that, but they are readily available. I can submit them. As a matter of fact, the Central Intelligence Agency does submit a compendium on Soviet bloc trade.

Mr. SOLARZ. Could you make that available?

Mr. KATZ. We will get that for you.

It is increasing, yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you know, offhand, whether overall Soviet trade with Africa is greater than overall American trade with Africa?

Mr. KATZ. Offhand, no; I don't think that it is.

Mr. SOLARZ. Could you submit that for the record, and also give us the breakdown of the various products, and the sectors in which the Soviet Union is trading?

Mr. KATZ. Yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. We are talking right now not just about sub-Saharan Africa, but all of Africa.

Mr. KATZ. Mr. Chairman, due to a communications problem, I did not include in my testimony very much on Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. I did not realize that you were interested in the Maghreb as well. We have partially remedied this deficiency in our statistics, and we will give you revised statistics. Our statement did not include that.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, the writ of this committee runs from the Mediterranean ports to the cape, and it would be helpful if you updated your statistics to include Morocco.

Mr. KATZ. I will. If you have a moment, I might just say a word about both Tunisia and Morocco.

Mr. SOLARZ. I think that you can submit that for the record. The administration is about to make some announcements concerning Morocco, with which the chairman of this committee is in profound disagreement. I want to make sure that tomorrow's newspapers reflect my point of view, and not that of the administration. So, we will have to accept your analysis for the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

U.S. COMMERCIAL INTERESTS IN MOROCCO AND TUNISIA: STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD TO THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

U.S. commercial relations with the Maghreb states of Tunisia and Morocco have historically been friendly and stable. Ties to the former metropole remain strong, and the U.S. has normally ranked well behind French and other EC suppliers in these markets. Although bilateral trade is growing, it remains relatively modest, and heavily in the U.S. favor. In 1978, the U.S. ran favorable trade balances of \$328 million with Morocco and \$80 million with Tunisia. During the first nine months of 1979, U.S. trade with Morocco has dropped sharply from a year ago. U.S. exports to Morocco are off over 40 percent to \$181 million while U.S. imports from Morocco are down ten percent, to \$35 million. Meanwhile, U.S. exports to Tunisia are up nearly 95 percent to \$117 million, while imports from Tunisia are up 170 percent to \$47 million. The year-end balance should remain in the U.S. favor, though the surpluses will not be as great as in 1978.

The United States is Tunisia's fourth largest supplier and its fifth largest market. We supply about 20 percent of Tunisia's agricultural imports (principally cereals). Our major manufactured exports include textiles, transportation equipment and other machinery. Petroleum accounts for almost half of U.S. imports from Tunisia.

The U.S. supplies only 8 percent of Morocco's imports and takes less than 3 percent of its exports. Major U.S. exports are agricultural items and military equipment. Morocco tends to view the U.S. more as a competitor than as an important market, since the United States is a major exporter of two of Morocco's chief export items, phosphates and citrus fruit.

In both countries a substantial portion of U.S. imports represent AID-financed purchases. U.S. bilateral assistance is gradually being reduced and reoriented, and some changes in the commodity composition of U.S. imports will undoubtedly accompany this shift to purely commercial sales. To maintain and improve our position in these markets, the U.S. Government is encouraging the growth of American private sector involvement in these economies through Department of Commerce, Eximbank, and OPIC programs.

Morocco and Tunisia are small but growing beneficiaries of the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (USGSP). During the first three years of the program, U.S. imports from Morocco under GSP increased from \$3.78 million in 1976 to \$6.1 million in 1978; GSP imports from Tunisia increased from \$.9 million in 1976 to \$2.6 million in 1978.

The planned expansion of the European Communities to include Greece, Spain, and Portugal may offer opportunities for increasing U.S. commercial relations with Morocco and Tunisia. These new member states produce many items—citrus fruits, olives, wines, textiles—presently supplied to the EC by Tunisia and Morocco under preferential arrangements. Should the EC become self-sufficient or nearly so, in many of these commodities Tunisia and Morocco may turn to the U.S. in an effort to diversify their markets.

U.S. private investment in both Tunisia and Morocco is relatively limited. The direct investment position of U.S. firms in Tunisia is estimated at \$13 million and \$42 million in Morocco.¹ In both countries, U.S. representation is concentrated in light manufacturing, petroleum distribution and banking. Both countries actively seek additional U.S. private investment.

Mr. SOLARZ. We appreciate the fact that both of you were able to come. I think this hearing has been most helpful in giving the committee a better sense of our economic interests in Africa. We look forward to getting the additional material, for the record, that you have promised.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

¹ End of year 1977.

U.S. INTERESTS IN AFRICA ECONOMIC

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 24, 1979

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2:06 p.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Stephen J. Solarz (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. SOLARZ. The meeting of the subcommittee will come to order. Today's hearing is the fifth in a series of hearings the Subcommittee on Africa is holding on U.S. interests in Africa. Earlier this week the subcommittee heard testimony on overall U.S. economic interests in Africa. At this session, the subcommittee will focus on U.S. economic interests in Africa with respect to minerals and oil.

Africa is a continent of vast mineral and oil resources. According to a number of geological and mining specialists, Africa has large and varying quantities of nearly all the world's most valuable and critical minerals as well as substantial petroleum reserves. As the extent and quantity of these mineral and oil reserves have been discovered and developed, America's economic dependence on them has increased substantially.

In the mineral field, the United States is dependent on 13 of Africa's 20 most important and common minerals. Among these are chrome, manganese, industrial diamonds, cobalt, copper, and bauxite, and in most instances, these minerals are located in only a handful of African countries: Guinea, Zaire, South Africa, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, and Zambia.

In the petroleum field, America's reliance on African oil has risen sharply during the last decade as a result of oil cutbacks in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf area. Currently, Africa supplies America with over 30 percent of its imported oil, with Nigeria emerging as America's second largest single supplier of petroleum. In addition to petroleum, the United States receives increasing amounts of natural gas from Africa as well.

As America's reliance on Africa minerals and oil have grown, increasing attention has focused on the policy implications for the United States, should supplies of any of these mineral or petroleum resources be disrupted due to political strife or radical changes of government in Africa. In addition, some political commentators have noted that America's dependence on African oil and minerals has limited Ameri-

ca's ability to alter its foreign policy with certain African States for fear of jeopardizing American access to these critical minerals.

During today's hearing, I hope our witnesses will be able to provide us with information on exactly which minerals the United States imports from Africa, in what quantities, and how great America's reliance on these minerals has become. It would also be particularly helpful if the witness could address the extent to which there are alternatives to these minerals, and what the precise consequences to our country would be if any of these minerals were no longer available to us as a result of a political decision on the part of any or all of the African countries involved to withhold these minerals or petroleum resources from our country.

Our first witness today is Mr. Charles Eddy, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Energy and Minerals at the Department of Interior. Mr. Eddy is directly responsible for the Bureau of Mines and for non-fuel energy and mineral policy. Mr. Eddy will be accompanied today by Dr. John Morgan, Chief of Staff at the Bureau of Mines, plus several other mineral experts. Our second witness will be Prof. Morris Adelman, distinguished professor of economics at MIT and one of America's most knowledgeable experts on international oil policy.

Before we begin this hearing, I would like to take note of the fact that today we are joined by six members of the recently elected Ghanaian Parliament. Ghana, as most of you know, has just returned to civilian rule after a number of years under military leadership. We welcome our Ghanaian colleagues and congratulate them on their country's return to democratic rule.

I want you to know, gentlemen, that the decision on the part of your government to establish a civilian and democratic form of government has been a source of great gratification to the Members of the U.S. Congress and to the people of our country, and as a sister democracy, as the world's oldest democracy, we wish you very well in this democratic experiment on which you have embarked.

And I hope that this subcommittee, which has taken a deep and abiding interest in the cause of democracy on the African Continent, will be able to get the benefit of your own suggestions and recommendations as time goes by for ways in which our country can be helpful to your country in sustaining this great experiment in self-rule and democracy.

So we really are privileged to have you with us this afternoon, and we look forward to a very long and fruitful association between us. We both belong to what is unfortunately a small and seemingly, at times, dwindling number of democracies in the world. But while most countries perhaps don't share our commitment to democracy, I have no doubt that the form of Government we have represents the profoundest aspirations of the great majority of people throughout the world.

So we are delighted you could be with us.

Our first witness will be Mr. Eddy.

Mr. Eddy, your statement will be included in the record as it was prepared, and please feel free, if you would like, to summarize your testimony orally for us.

**STATEMENT OF CHARLES P. EDDY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR ENERGY AND MINERALS, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR**

Mr. EDDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to participate in your hearings and particularly to be here today with such a distinguished group in the audience.

Joining me is Dr. John Morgan, chief staff officer of the U.S. Bureau of Mines; and also accompanying me is Dr. Ebraham Shekarchi, chief of the Africa and Middle East Office of the Bureau of Mines.

I will highlight certain aspects of my testimony. In your request you asked a broad and comprehensive range of questions concerning African minerals. I have attempted to highlight some of the more important issues in the statement. I would be pleased to provide more detail and further analysis for the committee's record on any questions which are not satisfactorily covered today.

The questions regarding African minerals are, of course, so detailed and sweeping that to present a comprehensive picture is very difficult.

The mineral wealth of Africa is vast and ancient. It is the continent where man first began to mine, and as we moved into more modern times, the needs of the industrial world and the great ore discoveries in Africa have combined to place African nations in a preeminent position as mineral suppliers.

Table 1 of my testimony establishes an arbitrary cutoff of 25 percent for minerals where Africa is either supplying 25 percent of the current world output, or where it contains 25 percent of the world's reserves. This table is a simple snapshot of the picture in 1978. It doesn't attempt to analyze future demands or likely dependence on African sources, but I think as can be seen from that table, given the percentage of world reserve for these commodities, we will continue to look perhaps with increasing levels of dependence to Africa for mineral resources.

I would like to put up if we could, Dr. Shekarchi, the map of Africa where we have attempted to locate for you—and there is a copy, I believe, which may be more readable, Mr. Chairman, in your materials—illustrating the principal locations of these African minerals.

A glance at this map provides a view of the distribution. North Africa, of course, is rich in phosphates, petroleum, and natural gas. Along the west coast we have important sources of bauxite—in fact, the world's second largest producing region. Central and southern Africa contain extremely rich metal deposits, particularly copper, cobalt, chromium, and gold. South Africa is among the top world producers of chromite, manganese, gold, uranium, and a number of other key minerals. Zaire and Zambia together produce about 40 percent of the world's supply of cobalt.

Without a doubt, African nations occupy key position in world production of important minerals. In some cases, the United States is itself a major producer of these commodities. In other cases, an African country may be only one of several of our sources. But for a few vital commodities, the United States relies almost exclusively on African imports.

You asked us to address a number of mineral commodities and the relative importance and issues associated with them, and I would like to now focus on those commodities. We have put these in two categories, and in the first category of minerals appear those which at the moment do not appear to be of major policy concern to the United States for a series of reasons; primarily because the United States either produces these minerals itself in major quantities, because it imports the mineral from a diverse number of suppliers, or because of the potential for substitutability and recycling. In this category I would put phosphate, copper, bauxite, crocidilite asbestos, vanadium, and antimony. I will not go into any more detail on these particular commodities at this point but I would like to now move on to the second category which, for policy considerations, is distinctly different from the first.

In the second group we would put cobalt, chromium, manganese, the platinum group metals, and industrial diamonds. The United States does not produce any of these commodities in significant quantities, yet they all have essential uses in industries which are vital to both our general economy and to our national defense. Let me touch briefly on each of these.

In the case of cobalt, the United States has no domestic reserves. We have low grade resources in certain areas of the United States, and some research has been focused on the ability to produce these. We rely on imports almost exclusively, and domestic cobalt-bearing scrap accounts for only about 5 percent of our apparent consumption.

Although its dollar value relative to GNP is not large, cobalt is of critical importance. There is currently no known substitute for its use in high temperature parts of jets engines and turbines, and in cutting tools.

About 80 percent of our cobalt supply originates in Africa. This includes direct metal imports from Zaire and Zambia, as well as processed products transshipped through Belgium. Zaire and Zambia currently have about 40 percent of the world's cobalt reserves.

Next is chromium, where again we have no reserves, and our resources are considered to be insignificant. If we count domestic scrap recovery, the United States has a net import reliance of 91 percent for chromium.

It is of critical importance in stainless steel, heat-resisting alloys and plating. There is no substitute for its use in stainless steel, although there is significant potential for substitution for chromium in certain uses.

About one-half of our supply of chromium, in the form of chromite ores and increasingly ferrochromium is imported from South Africa. Our second largest supplier, though of decreasing significance, is the Soviet Union.

For manganese, we rely on imports of both manganese ore and ferromanganese to meet virtually all of our domestic needs. The chief use of manganese is in steel production, and there is currently no substitute.

Until recently, most of our imports were in ore form, one-half of which comes from Gabon and South Africa. However, ferromanganese imports now exceed our raw ore imports, approximately one-third of this coming from South Africa. Our other major ferromanganese supplier is France. South Africa and the Soviet Union both account for a

substantial portion of total manganese reserves and resources in the world. Among the market economies, South Africa's resources account for about 75 percent of world reserve and resources.

Similar situations in terms of reliance exist for the platinum group metals and for industrial diamonds. The United States has sizable platinum group resources, but they are underdeveloped and poorly defined. We currently import nearly all of our supplies, again chiefly from South Africa. The next largest supplier of platinum group metals is the Soviet Union which provided us about 19 percent of our 1978 imports. The demand for these metals increased 12 percent last year and is likely to continue increasing in the future based primarily on the use of platinum group metals as catalysts in automobile exhaust converters.

The final category, industrial diamonds, again shows heavy reliance on South Africa. Zaire produces over one-third of the world's supply of natural diamonds, and has more than 70 percent of the known world reserve. The Republic of South Africa, Ghana, and Botswana collectively produce another 20 percent of the supply and hold over 20 percent of the reserves.

Concern with increasing dependence on certain commodities, along with a number of issues related to domestic production of minerals, led President Carter to call for a Cabinet-level review of issues related to nonfuel mineral policy. A policy coordinating committee, chaired by Secretary of the Interior Andrus and comprised of 13 other Cabinet members, agency administrators, and Presidential advisers, was established, and was instructed to report to the President on major problems affecting nonfuel minerals.

Agency analysis was undertaken over about a 1-year period of time and we have now recently completed the problem analysis phase of the review. This was followed by extensive public hearings.

One of the principal issues identified in the review is that future supplies of several imported minerals critical to the United States and its allies are becoming less secure. Chromium, manganese, cobalt, and the platinum group metals are the commodities of greatest concern. Our questions about these mineral supplies stem from a combination of factors that are related to the concentration of source in central and southern Africa. These factors are summarized in table 2, which is included in the testimony, which shows our current consumption, our anticipated demand growth for these commodities over the next 6 years, sources, current world reserves, and substitutes and alternatives.

I would emphasize that this finding of dependence on minerals which are believed to be from increasingly insecure sources is based on a finding of the potential instability of this particular area of Africa. We did not undertake in the problem analysis phase a detailed assessment of the strategic and political risks associated with this dependence, nor is this an area where we in the Interior Department are qualified to make independent judgments.

I am sure you have heard many witnesses comment on the conditions affecting these countries that could result in disruptions, and we will not discuss that in this testimony.

The administration is now considering steps that might be appropriate to assess alternative policies to mitigate the risks of an interruption in the supply of these metals. This will in effect follow up

the problem analysis phase of the mineral policy review with an examination of potential policy actions.

While security of sources may be a particular problem in southern Africa, we also identified during the review several other situations that could affect our supply of minerals from the remainder of Africa. One factor which we believe was of growing concern is the continuing decline in minerals exploration in developing countries. While production itself has not dropped, it has been based primarily on reserves discovered historically, and if this trend continues, needed expansion of minerals production in developing countries may not take place over the longer term.

Another important factor identified in the review is the changing objectives of the new national minerals companies. Widespread nationalization of industries during the 1960's and the 1970's brought a number of new managers into the marketplace, managers who often operate under somewhat different rules than those usually followed by private mining companies. Social and economic benefits to the host country from mineral investment may take precedence over profits. For example, maintenance of full employment and a flow of hard currency earnings are often achieved by maintaining high levels of output even though a particular market may be depressed. For the United States, this may provide less expensive imports, but it does result in a policy dilemma, as it leaves domestic producers at a disadvantage.

As a final point, during the review we did note a number of deficiencies in the current process of the Federal Government for both reviewing and establishing nonfuel minerals policies. One of these is our early warning capabilities. Another is our policy coordination, and third are defects in our current data base and analytical capabilities. All these questions are being considered with possible policy actions to be examined as followup to our current and past analytical activities.

I would be pleased to keep you informed of the progress of the mineral policy review, and in addition, to provide you with any additional information that you would like for this record.

That concludes my remarks.

[Mr. Eddy's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES P. EDDY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, ENERGY AND MINERALS, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee on Africa, I appreciate this opportunity to participate in your hearings on African issues. Minerals are clearly a central topic in any examination of U.S. economic interests in Africa. While the fuel minerals are unquestionably vital, I will leave that topic to the Department of Energy. My testimony will focus instead on nonfuel minerals.

Joining me are Dr. John Morgan, Chief Staff Officer, Bureau of Mines; Dr. Hermann Enzer, Director, Office of Minerals Policy and Research Analysis; and Dr. Ebrahim Shekarchi, Chief of African and Middle East Area Office of the Bureau of Mines.

The mineral wealth of Africa is vast and ancient. It is the continent where man first began to mine. In more modern times, the needs of the industrial world and the great ore discoveries in Africa have combined to place certain African nations in a preeminent position as mineral suppliers.

As can be seen in the table on page 215, Africa accounts for more than 25 percent of either world output or reserves of 20 minerals. A glance at a map of Africa provides a view of how these minerals are distributed across the continent. Northern Africa is rich in phosphate, petroleum, and natural gas. Along the West Coast, Guinea is an important source of bauxite, in fact, the world's second largest pro-

ducer. Central and southern Africa contain extremely rich metal deposits, particularly copper, cobalt, chromium, and gold. South Africa is among the top world producers of chromite, manganese, gold, uranium and a number of other key minerals. Zaire and Zambia together produce about 40 percent of the world's supply of cobalt, a critical ingredient in jet engine and turbine manufacture.

AFRICAN MINERALS

[25 percent or more of world production or reserves]

Mineral	Percent of estimated 1978 world production	Percent of world reserves
Arsenic.....	8.0	25.0
Asbestos (crocidolite).....	100.0	100.0
Bauxite.....	15.0	30.0
Cesium.....		30.0
Chromium.....	40.0	97.0
Cobalt.....	66.0	40.0
Corundum.....	85.0	75.0
Diamond.....	65.0	90.0
Fluorspar.....	13.5	32.5
Gem stones.....	75.0	65.0
Germanium.....	30.0	22.0
Gold.....	57.0	48.0
Kyanite.....	35.0	5.0
Manganese.....	31.0	50.0
Phosphate.....	25.0	75.0
Platinum group.....	45.0	72.5
Tantalum.....	22.0	70.0
Uranium.....	29.0	32.0
Vanadium.....	41.0	49.0
Vermiculite.....	40.0	40.0

Source: Information provided by Bureau of Mines.

Without a doubt, African nations occupy key positions in world production of a number of important minerals. For some of these the United States itself is a major producer. In other cases, an African country may be only one of several sources from which the United States obtains supplies. But for a few vital mineral commodities, the United States relies almost exclusively on imports from Africa.

Let me address the nonfuel minerals commodities on which you asked us to focus. In the first group appear those minerals which the United States produces in major quantities or which it imports from a number of suppliers.

Phosphate.—With approximately 75 percent of the world's reserves, Morocco and South Africa will become increasingly important phosphate producers. Nevertheless, the United States is still by far the world's leading producer, exporting about 28 percent of our annual production. Although we expect to decrease export levels after 1985, we do not anticipate becoming reliant on imports during this century.

Copper.—The United States and Chile are the world's principal copper producers and each have roughly 20 percent of the world's reserves. The United States consumes mostly domestic copper, and its chief foreign suppliers are Canada, Chile and Peru.

Bauxite.—Although Guinea has enormous bauxite reserves and provides about one-quarter of the United States annual imports, Jamaica is our chief import source of bauxite and Australia is our chief import source of alumina. Both have very substantial reserves of these materials.

Crocidolite Asbestos.—South Africa is presently our only source for this type of asbestos, used asbestos cement products. However, chrysotile asbestos can be readily substituted for most purposes, with some loss in efficiencies but no significant effects on quality. Chrysotile asbestos is readily available from Canada.

Tanadium.—Vanadium is used chiefly as an alloying agent for iron and steel. The United States production satisfies 75 percent of current domestic demand, with the rest met in imports from South Africa, Chile and the Soviet Union. The United States reserves are quite small compared to those of South Africa, which has 49 percent of known reserves, and the Soviet Union, with 46 percent. Our domestic reserves should be sufficient for about 15 years at annual consumption levels. In addition, Australia and Chile have significant reserves.

Antimony.—Antimony is widely used as a flame retardant, and its use for this purpose appears to be growing. Nearly 70 percent of the antimony consumed in 1978 came from scrap. A number of countries supply us with metal, ore and oxide: Bolivia is one of the most important of these, along with China and South Africa.

In a distinctly different category are cobalt, chromium, manganese, the platinum-group metals, and industrial diamonds. The United States does not produce any of the first group and only minor quantities of the platinum group. Yet all of these have essential uses in industries vital to both our economy and to our national defense. Let me elaborate.

Cobalt.—The United States has no reserves of cobalt, although low-grade resources have been identified in the Midwest and Far West. We rely on imports almost exclusively, recycling only about 3 percent of our scrap.

Although its dollar value relative to the GNP is not large, cobalt is of critical importance. At present, there is no substitute for its use in high-temperature parts of jet engines and turbines, and in cutting tools.

About 80 percent of our supply originates in Africa. This figure includes cobalt metal imported directly from Zaire and Zambia, as well as processed products transhipped through Belgium. Zaire and Zambia have nearly 40 percent of the world's cobalt reserves.

Chromium.—The United States has no reserves of chromium, and our resources are considered insignificant. If we count domestic scrap recovery, the United States has a net import reliance of 91 percent.

Chromium is of critical importance in stainless steel, heat-resisting alloys, and plating. There is no substitute for its use in stainless steel.

About half of our supply of chromium—in the form of chromite ores and, increasingly, ferrochromium—is imported from South Africa. Our second largest supplier is the Soviet Union. About 40 percent of the world's supply originates in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, which contain virtually all of the world's chromium reserves.

Manganese.—We rely on imports of both manganese ore and ferromanganese to meet virtually all of our domestic needs. Its chief use is in steel production, for which it has no substitute.

Until recently, most of our imports were in ore form, half of which comes from Gabon and South Africa. However, ferromanganese imports now exceed raw ore imports. We now import nearly one-third from South Africa. Our other major ferromanganese supplier is France. South Africa and the Soviet Union account for a substantial portion of total manganese reserves and resources in the world. And among the market economy countries, South Africa's resources account for 75 percent.

Platinum-group metals.—Although the United States has sizable resources of the platinum-group metals, they are undeveloped and poorly defined. We import nearly all of our supplies, chiefly from South Africa. As with chromite, our next largest supplier is the Soviet Union, providing 19 percent of our imports in 1978. The demand for these metals in the United States increased by 42 percent last year, mainly because of their use as catalysts in automobile exhaust converters.

Industrial diamonds.—Zaire produces over one-third of the world's supply of natural diamonds and has more than 70 percent of the known world reserve. The Republic of South Africa, Ghana and Botswana collectively produce another 20 percent of the supply and hold over 20 percent of the world's reserve.

Of the two types of industrial diamonds, the U.S. produces large quantities of synthetic crushing bort. The other type can be synthesized, but it is inferior to the natural stone and thus limited in use. For diamond drilling—as in hard rock mining, for example—for diamond dies, and for most optical purposes, natural stones are either required or preferred.

Concern with increasing foreign dependence on certain commodities, along with a number of issues related to domestic production, led President Carter to call for a Cabinet-level review of issues related to nonfuel minerals policies. A Policy Coordinating Committee, chaired by Secretary of the Interior Andrus and comprised of 13 other Cabinet members, agency administrators, and Presidential advisors, is to report to the President on major problems affecting nonfuel minerals.

We have recently completed the problem analysis phase of the review, which included extensive public hearings. One of the principal issues is that future supplies of several imported minerals critical to the United States and its allies are becoming less secure. Chromium, manganese, cobalt, and the platinum-group metals are the commodities of greatest concern. Our questions about these mineral supplies stem from a combination of factors that are related to the concentration of source in central and southern Africa (see table on page 217).

INDICATIONS OF CURRENT AND POTENTIAL UNITED STATES DEPENDENCE ON CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN NATIONS AND THE U.S.S.R.

[All data is for 1978 unless otherwise indicated]

	Chromium (thousand short tons)	Cobalt (short tons)	Manganese (thousand short tons)	Platinum-group (thousand troy ounces)
U.S. consumption.....	590.....	9,433.....	1,415.....	2,318. ¹
Percent imported.....	92. ²	98. ²	91. ²
Anticipated demand growth:				
Annual rate to 1985.....	3.4 percent.....	2.9 percent.....	1.5 percent.....	4 percent.....
Expected 1985 demand.....	746.....	11,522.....	1,881.....	3,133.....
Import sources (1974-77 average):				
Chromite: South Africa 35 percent;				
U.S.S.R. 18 percent. Ferrochrome:				
South Africa 38 percent; Rhodesia				
23 percent ¹ ; South Africa				
World total 3,700,000; South Africa				
2,500,000; Rhodesia 1,100,000.				
Reserves.....				
World total 36,000,000; South Africa				
25,000,000; Rhodesia 10,000,000.				
Resources ³				
Nickel, zinc, cadmium, aluminum,				
cobalt, molybdenum, vanadium,				
and titanium in various uses with				
either higher cost or some sacrifice				
in performance standards.				
Substitutes and alternates.....				
Nickel, but only with a loss of effective-				
ness; platinum, tungsten, and ce-				
ramics in various uses.				
World total 1,600,000; Zaire 500,000;				
U.S.S.R. and Cuba				
World total 1,500,000; Zaire 1,000,000;				
U.S.S.R. and Cuba				
World total 600,000; U.S.S.R. and Cuba				
1,400,000.				
World total 6,000,000; South Africa				
2,200,000; Gabon 165,000; U.S.S.R.				
3,000,000.				
U.S.S.R. and South Africa account for				
more than 80 percent of identified				
world resources.				
No substitutes exist for major applica-				
tions.				
World total 2,800,000; South Africa				
2,000,000; U.S.S.R. 400,000; Rhodesia				
100,000.				
Gold, silver, and tungsten in electrical/				
electronic uses; improved engines or				
fuels could reduce use in emission				
control catalysts in autos.				

³ Excludes deep-sea resources of cobalt and manganese in the form of manganese nodules.

¹ Does not include approximately 1,000,000 oz of toll-refined secondary.
² Remainder of consumption supplied from recycled material or stocks.

Source: U.S. Bureau of Mines, Commodity Data Summaries, 1979.

I would emphasize at this point that we have not assessed the strategic and political risks associated with this dependence, nor is this an area where the Interior Department is qualified to make independent judgments. I am sure you have heard many witnesses comment on the conditions affecting these countries that could result in disruptions.

The Administration is now considering what steps might be appropriate to assess alternative policies to mitigate the risks of an interruption in the supplies of these metals.

While security of sources may be a particular problem in southern Africa, we also identified during the review several other situations that could affect our supplies of minerals from the remainder of Africa. One is the continuing decline in minerals exploration in developing countries. In the 1970's, expenditures on minerals exploration and development fell more sharply in the developing countries than in the developed countries. While production itself has not dropped, this expansion in capacity seems to be based on previous exploration and discovery by the international mining companies. But the developing countries are not exploring and providing new reserves. If this continues, needed expansion of minerals production in developing countries will not take place over the longer term.

Another problem identified in the Review is the changing objectives of the new national minerals companies. The widespread nationalization of extraction industries during the 1960's and 70's brought a number of new managers into the market, who often operate under different rules from those usually followed by private mining companies. Social and economic benefits to the host country from mineral investments may take precedence over profits. Maintaining full employment and hard currency earnings, for example, are often achieved by maintaining high levels of output in depressed markets. For the United States, this provides cheap imports, but results in a policy dilemma as it leaves domestic producers at a disadvantage.

The Nonfuel Minerals Policy Review also identified weaknesses in Government policy-making capabilities. Among these is the need for early warning of potential supply problems that might impose high costs on the United States economy, particularly if a disruption in a particular mineral market occurs.

To improve our early warning capabilities by taking account of these complex factors, our Office of Minerals Policy and Research Analysis is developing a Critical Minerals Index. A pilot study has already been completed (copies are available) and testing work is under way. When completed, the index will provide indications of the possible consequences if the supply of a particular mineral is interrupted. The index ranks minerals for a specified future time period after simultaneously accounting for the likelihood and cost of supply disruptions.

Let me conclude my remarks by noting that the interest of this Committee in African minerals is a timely one.

I will be pleased to continue to keep you informed of the progress of the Minerals Policy Review, and to provide you any additional information you would like for the record.

We would now be pleased to respond to any questions.

U.S. Bureau of Mines
October 22, 1979

AFRICA





MAP SHOWING PRINCIPAL RAILROADS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Eddy.
Professor Adelman?

**STATEMENT OF MORRIS A. ADELMAN, PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF
ECONOMICS AND ENERGY LABORATORY, MASSACHUSETTS IN-
STITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY**

Mr. ADELMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the invitation to appear and testify on the relation of African countries to the world oil market and U.S. oil supply.

I will read some portions of my testimony and undertake to stay within that 10-minute limit.

Mr. SOLARZ. Professor Adelman, I have already read your testimony, so while you are making your statement, if you will excuse me for just a minute, I have someone who is here to see me who has to return to Africa shortly. So I am just going to step outside for a few minutes. But why don't you proceed. I am already familiar with the gist of your testimony.

Mr. ADELMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Presumably, the chief interest of this committee is: What bearing can African oil supply have on this Nation's policy on African issues?

The short answer is: None.

The best way to see this is to assume that Nigeria, the biggest exporter, is so irked at the United States that they refuse to export to us. I hasten to add this is pure assumption. Then they would have to do a big, expensive shift, dumping 56 percent of their exports on the world market. The United States would lose 13 percent of our imports, 6 percent of our total oil supply, and we would pick up the same amount on the demoralized world market.

On balance, we would for a short time get the oil a bit more cheaply. Nigerian oil would go to other countries, while other light sweet crudes, well suited to the American market, would go to us from the Persian Gulf, and from other African countries, and from the North Sea.

Now suppose that all African countries boycotted the United States. The result would be not as much swapping, more subterfuge and diversion. It is easy to control the first voyage of an oil tanker, but once the oil is put into a storage tank, there is no telling where it will go.

But what if all these African countries not only boycott the United States but cut back their production by the amount they used to ship here? For the big three African producers, that would be a disaster none of their governments could survive. But however improbable the event, let us assume it. The whole consuming world might or might not have to endure a shortage of 5 percent of non-Communist world consumption. It all depends on whether the non-African countries with unused capacity expand production. If they do, there will be the cost of shuffling around a lot of oil to new users, and of storage between one movement and another.

Let us assume that the Persian Gulf producing countries do not expand production. Then all consumers are hurt equally. The so-called embargo of 1973-74 proved once again that there is no such thing as a selective boycott. In theory, if one country runs more short of oil supply than others, prices will rise more in that country; the higher prices will attract more supply until the percentage loss of supply is roughly equal everywhere. In fact, that is what happened 6 years ago. The United States suffered less than British and France. But we did not do as well as Japan, which was most import-dependent of all.

In short, if in our example Nigeria merely boycotts the United States, that will be a major nuisance to them and a small favor to us. If they actually cut back supply, they will do themselves great harm, ourselves none. If others join in the boycott, that means little; if others join in the cutback, the whole consuming world is hurt, the United States along with the rest.

Boycotts are a sham; cutbacks hurt. The latest evidence is still before our eyes. With Iran production down, the other allegedly moderate and supposedly friendly producers of the Persian Gulf have held back production to make prices nearly double these past 12 months.

Worry about access to African oil is groundless. Access is the biggest nonproblem in the book, except for access to money to pay for oil imports.

The world oil market is essentially one big pot. Few things are less important than how much nation A ships to nation B. The world industry's network of purchases and swaps is far greater than it used to be. The companies' organization reflects it. Crude procurement used to be a sideline. Now it is a major company responsibility.

Accordingly, the world market is a much more flexible organization, all the less reasons therefore, to worry about what happens in some one part of it.

Economists are accused, and usually with justice, of complicating life. For once, here is a contrary example. This country should do what is right, on which I offer no suggestions, and not worry about access to anybody's oil. If total supply is not reduced, there is no problem. If total world supply is reduced, all consuming nations are in trouble, the United States included.

That is the case today. Supply reductions are becoming our normal fate. The producing nations aim to maintain a chronic crude oil deficit. Commissioner Brunner of the European Economic Community calls this brinkmanship. Of course, it is consumers who are on the brink.

That concludes my oral testimony.

[Mr. Adelman's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MORRIS A. ADELMAN, PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND ENERGY LABORATORY, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I thank you for the invitation to appear and testify on the relation of African countries to the world oil market and United States oil supply.

Table 1 summarizes the picture. For each African country, it shows oil production: exports in total and to the United States; and its share in total United States imports, for the year 1977. More recent data are not yet available, but would not change the picture appreciably.

Presumably, the chief interest of this committee is: what bearing can African oil supply have on this nation's policy on African issues?

The short answer is: None.

The best way to see this is to assume that Nigeria, the biggest exporter, is so irked at the United States that they refuse to export to us. Then they would have to do a big expensive shift, dumping 56 percent of their exports on the world market. The United States would lose 13 percent of imports, 6 percent of total oil supply; we would pick up on the demoralized world market.

On balance, we would for a short time get the oil a bit more cheaply. Nigerian oil would go to other countries, while other light sweet crudes, well suited to the American market, would go to us from the Persian Gulf and from other African countries, and from the North Sea.

Now suppose that all African countries boycott the United States. The result would be: not as much swapping, more subterfuge and diversion. It is easy to control the first voyage of an oil tanker, but once the oil is put into a storage tank, there is no telling where it will go.

But what if all these African countries not only boycott the United States, but cut back their production by the amount they used to ship here? For the big three African producers that would be a disaster, none of their governments could survive. But however improbable the event, let us assume it. The whole consuming world might or might not have to endure a shortage of 2.3 million barrels daily, 5 percent of non-Communist world consumption. It all depends on whether the non-African countries with unused capacity expand production. If they do, there will be the cost of shuffling around a lot of oil to new users, and of storage between one movement and another.

But let us assume, that the Persian Gulf producing countries do not expand production. Then all consumers are hurt equally. The so-called "embargo" of 1973-74 proved, once again, that there is no such thing as a selective boycott. In theory, if one country runs more short of oil supply than others, prices will rise there and attract more supply (through one trick or another) until the percentage loss of supply is roughly equal everywhere. In fact, that is what happened six years ago. The United States suffered less than Britain and France. But we did not do as well as Japan, which was most import-dependent of all.

In short, if in our example, Nigeria merely boycotts the United States, that will be a major nuisance to them and a small favor to us. If they actually cut back supply, they will do themselves great harm, ourselves none. If others join in the boycott, that means little; if others join the cutback, the whole consuming world is hurt, the United States along with the rest.

Boycotts are a sham: cutbacks hurt. The latest evidence is still before our eyes. With Iran production down, the allegedly moderate and supposedly friendly producers of the Southern Persian Gulf have held back production to make prices nearly double these past twelve months.

Talk about "access" to African oil shows there is no thinking: "Access" is the biggest nonproblem in the book, except for access to money to pay for oil imports.

The world oil market is essentially one big pot. Few things are less important than how much nation A ships to nation B. Of course, crude oils are not perfectly substitutable for each other. A single refinery, built to process light sweet crudes, cannot move overnight to a heavy high sulfur crude without great cost and lower output. But such a crude can displace slightly lighter sweeter crudes in one place, which in turn displace slightly lighter sweeter crudes in another, and so on, until the affected refinery can adapt, not without some trouble and expense, to a slightly different feedstock.

As compared with six years ago, the world oil market is a much more efficient instrument for getting the right crude oil to the right place quickly. The producing companies have been expropriated. They used to design their refineries to process their own crude, and sold off the excess. They bought only small supplementary amounts. Today, the companies are refiners, who buy crude where they can find it. There are still some advantages to buying where you produce (for the account of the government-owner), but they are small, easily offset by a slightly lower price.

The world industry's network of purchases and swaps is far greater than it used to be, and the companies' organization reflects it. Crude procurement used to be a sideline; now it is a major company responsibility. Accordingly, the world market is a much more flexible organization. All the less reason, therefore, to worry about what happens in some one part of it.

Sudden changes and reductions and boycotts may be a burden and expense to a particular company, and their loud protests may be fully justified, but so far as concerns the supply to any given consuming country, the concern is minimal.

Economists are accused, and usually with justice, of complicating life. Here is a contrary example. This country should do what is right—on which I offer no suggestions—and not worry about "access" to anybody's oil. If total supply is not reduced, there is no problem. If total world supply is reduced, all consuming nations are in trouble, the United States included.

Of course, supply reductions are becoming our normal fate. The producing nations aim to maintain a chronic crude oil deficit. Commissioner Brunner of the European Economic Community calls this "brinkmanship". Of course, it's we who are on the brink, not they. Saudi Arabia has forbidden the United States to build its Strategic Petroleum Reserve, and we have duly suspended buying. That is the real worry, not fancies about "access" to anybody's oil.

OIL PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS, AFRICAN COUNTRIES, 1977

[In thousands of barrels daily]

Country	Production	Exports	Exports to United States	Exports to United States as percent of—	
				Total exports	Total U.S. imports
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Nigeria.....	2,097	2,030	1,130	55.7	13.2
Libya.....	2,064	1,943	704	36.2	8.2
Algeria.....	1,123	1,008	544	54.0	6.3
Gabon.....	222	202	35	17.3	(1)
Egypt.....	413	103	36	3.5	(1)
Angola.....	171	150	0	0	0
Tunisia.....	89	61	0	0	0
Zaire.....	23	17	0	0	0

¹ Less than ½ percent.

Source: (1), (2) DOE, International Petroleum Annual. (3) CIA (5) U.S. imports include both crude oil and products.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Adelman.

As penance for my tendency to abuse the prerogatives of the Chair by questioning far beyond the 5-minute period, we will begin our questioning today by yielding to the ranking minority member, and let him start off.

Mr. GOODLING. I am overwhelmed and caught by surprise, and a few other things.

First of all, I too, want to welcome the delegation from Ghana, and to congratulate you that you are going to join with us in this great experiment of having the people govern themselves. It isn't easy, but it sure is worth all the effort and all the troubles involved.

Professor Adelman, I would say your testimony also caught me by surprise. My chairman had an opportunity to read it. I suppose I was much more alarmist than you appear to be about this situation.

I notice at the end of your statement you say Saudi Arabia has forbidden the United States to build its strategic petroleum reserve, and we have duly suspended buying. That does scare me.

You said a little while ago you don't have any suggestions along one line. Do you have suggestions in relationship to this reserve?

Mr. ADELMAN. I would say we had better resume purchases and not try to buy anybody's goodwill because they can't be bought.

Mr. GOODLING. I suppose that would be my thought also.

I am very alarmed with the report that Mr. Eddy gave, because of course we have just gone through the throes of realizing that our foreign policy and our economic policy, everything, practically, is sort of held hostage to the oil that we need from sources that we do not control. And of course, your report is something that I have been trying to make my constituency understand in relationship to our dependence on Africa.

Do you have any suggestions, Mr. Eddy, on how we would go about not getting ourselves into the same bind that we now are in with relation to oil, importing 50 percent of the oil that we have to depend on—well, I don't know that we have to depend on that much, but we are so used to it—to keep our economy going?

Are we getting ourselves in the same bind, I suppose I am asking, with regard to these minerals as we have with our overdependence on oil imports, and what are alternatives?

Mr. EDDY. There are many opinions on that. One almost has to look on a commodity-by-commodity basis, and it is very difficult to generalize and say we are in the same situation for nonfuel minerals as we are for energy minerals. For many commodities we are close to or virtually self-sufficient domestically or we have a wide range of foreign suppliers; economically a much different situation than we have with petroleum.

Where we are dependent on a very limited number or one source for most of our supplies, the question of potential for disruption becomes much more paramount. Again, there are many views—and I am sure you have heard some of them in your hearings—as to whether or not the political situation in this particular part of Africa is such that disruptions might occur for one reason or another. I, from an agency that is concerned primarily with the minerals themselves, simply am not in a position to make those types of judgments.

Mr. GOODLING. What is our stockpiling practice?

Mr. EDDY. I will let Dr. Morgan touch on that briefly.

In response to your question, though, as to whether we ought to be doing more advanced planning, say, than the country did for petroleum, the Federal Government has never been a very good advance planner and we tend to react only in a crisis mode. I think we should here—

Mr. GOODLING. It sounds like you take your cue from the Congress.

Mr. EDDY. There are some commodities here that we ought to be concerned about, and what we are going to do now as the next step in the mineral policy review is to examine whether or not we ought to start putting some policies in place which will give us a better hedge than we now have against some of these potential risks that we are facing.

We do have a comprehensive strategic stockpile commodity policy which does take care of defense related needs, or the objective is to take care of defense related needs. That does not address, though, the broader economic questions, the civilian oriented industries that could be affected by a cutoff of one type or another. And I will let Dr. Morgan highlight very briefly what our overall policy is in the stockpile area.

Mr. GOODLING. Now, is he going to refer only to defense or stockpiling in general?

Mr. EDDY. Well, our current stockpile is strategic and defense oriented as opposed to use for more general economic purposes. In effect, we do not have an economic stockpile policy at the current time.

Mr. GOODLING. But you are developing one?

Mr. EDDY. That is one approach that could be taken, but no, there is not a policy under development at this time.

Mr. GOODLING. So a part of the result of our hearing might be to encourage such an approach?

Mr. SOLARZ. It is highly conceivable.

Dr. MORGAN. Sir, with respect to the strategic materials, I think the position of the United States was recognized as early as World War I, in a report of the War Industries Board by Bernard Baruch, in 1919, at the end of World War I. They pointed out the dependence of the United States on imports of manganese and chromium and materials such as that.

As a result, it took about 20 years before the Congress, in 1939, passed the Stockpiling Act, and they only appropriated about \$100 million prior to World War II, which led to the accumulation of a small quantity of materials, largely those which came from Southeast Asia, tin and rubber and some cordage fibers and so forth. Then, following World War II and the experience of shortages therein, the Congress reaffirmed the Stockpiling Act in 1946, and that act stayed on the books and was just recently amended in July of this year. Under that act, some 93 materials have been declared strategic and material, and 79 of these are metals and minerals, and the inventories that are on hand are valued at nearly \$12 billion, and of these, about \$11 billion are the metals and minerals.

Stockpile policy was based on meeting the deficits in an emergency, initially for a 5-year period. This was cut to a 3-year period in 1958. It was cut to a 1-year period in 1973. It was restored to a 3-year planning period in 1976 by President Ford. It was reaffirmed as a 3-year planning base in 1977 by President Carter. And the 3 years was clearly made a part of the law by the act that the Congress passed in July of this year.

So the fact that we have plans for enough for a 3-year war period is important, and that this is in the law.

Now, for some materials in the stockpile, there is far more than what would be needed for 3-year emergency. For others there are substantial deficits. Take cobalt that Mr. Eddy mentioned. The stockpile goal for a 3-year war period is about 85 million pounds, and there are only about 40 million pounds on hand.

You inquired about the economic situation. The Government has been alert to this, in certain quarters at least, because in 1974 there was a report by the Council on International Economic Policy, a Presidential agency, which identified 19 materials as being particularly important to the economy, and it includes most of those that Mr. Eddy mentioned, and some others. As a result, the Bureau of Mines and other agencies of Government, Commerce, the Federal Preparedness Agency, which more recently has become FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, have been watching these materials fairly closely, and we put out monthly reports covering Government stocks, industry stocks, and the situation around the world, so that people can follow them.

While the situation is not good for some of the materials, I think there is considerable alertness, not only for the national security needs of the country, but for the day to day industrial needs. For example, the Society of Automotive Engineers, where automotive uses take about 20 percent of our steel and even greater proportions of some of these strategic materials, they are very much on top of where these things come from and what should be done to substitute, and so forth.

The Government, under the Stockpile Act and under the normal work of the Geological Survey and the Bureau of Mines, both of which are under Mr. Eddy here, have long looked for marginal deposits in this country, and submarginal deposits, and we have developed methods, once the deposits are found, of beneficiating low grade materials and of making acceptable materials out of them. Take chromium, for example: there is some low grade chrome out in Montana. The Government bought substantial quantities which are not

in the strategic stockpile. These were sold a few years ago, and people are making ferrochromium and chromium refractions out of these materials. This is just one example.

Also, the Government has sponsored extensive research on recycling, so that the scrap materials from automobiles, for example, can be recovered and returned to beneficial use, not only saving the material, but also helping to tidy up the environment in the process. There has been considerable work along these lines.

So, as Mr. Eddy indicated very clearly, you have to look at each material. I think that the people who use these materials are pretty conscious of their current supply/demand situation.

Mr. GOODLING. Thank you.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Goodling.

Mr. Wolpe?

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to pursue this for a moment, precisely what would be contemplated if in fact there was, for example, a shortage of manganese. You indicated in your testimony, Mr. Eddy, that the chief use is in steel production, for which it has no substitute.

Precisely what would happen to the steel industry if, in fact, we suddenly were denied access to manganese?

Dr. MORGAN. Well, I don't think there would be a sudden stopping of supplies of anything because, as I indicated, we have been putting out these monthly reports whereby people are following these critical commodities. The annual consumption of manganese in this country in recent years has been running on the order, in manganese metal content, of about $1\frac{1}{2}$ million tons. Now, the private industry inventories are about three-quarter million tons, so they have a half year's supply at the current rate of use, clearly, in industry.

Now, the Government has 2.6 million tons in inventory, which is about a 2-year supply.

I would say that the first thing that would happen is that there would probably be action under the Export Administration Act to put in a monitoring system on exports to make sure that quantities that were in this country did not leave in a great quantity to a foreign market because, remember, as Mr. Adelman here just said, that as soon as you have a shortage in one place, the price goes up and somebody else will buy it.

Well, we have already on the books the Export Administration Act. The first step there would be to monitor. If there were an unusual outflow, the second step then would be an export control under the Export Administration Act, so at least the stocks in this country would be maintained here for use.

Mr. WOLPE. Carrying that just a step further to the ultimate problem of literally not having any manganese on hand, how would the steel industry adjust to that? Could it adjust? What would be the nature of the adjustment?

Dr. MORGAN. They would have to modify some of their blast furnace practices. At the present time, they use manganese fairly easily because an excess of manganese provides desirable qualities in the steel, and it serves as a desulfurizer in the steelmaking process, but by a little tighter control, they could use a little less. There is no magic solution in any of these things.

Now, there are other supplies of manganese in the world. I don't think we would be faced with an embargo of manganese from all sources in the world. There is manganese in Brazil, there's manganese in many other countries where I think deposits could be worked harder than are being worked today. In an extreme situation, there are low grade deposits of manganese in this country, in Aroostock County, Maine, and in the Cayuna Range of the Lake Superior iron ore range, and in the Far West there are manganese deposits that have been worked in time of emergency.

Mr. WOLPE. Would the economics of steelmaking make it profitable to go after those, in preference to simply altering the technology?

Dr. MORGAN. Well, they would have to do a little bit of both, but they only use about 12 pounds of manganese per ton of steel, so while nobody wants to pay more for anything, but if they had to pay a little more, it wouldn't affect the final cost of the steel too much, and I suspect that if there were a really serious problem, the Government, which has about 2-years' supply in the strategic stockpile, would use some for defense purposes. While the stockpile is not intended to be used for economic purposes, but certainly some of the steel goes to defense purposes; moreover, the Congress has indicated under the Defense Production Act that defense purposes include energy-related purposes. Therefore, the steel to make pipelines, the steel to make barges, the steel to make coal-conversion plants, and so forth, under the Defense Production Act, is defense-related according to the definition of Congress, and while I wouldn't want to presuppose what the President would do in an emergency situation, I would suspect that the next step would be a system of priorities under the Defense Production Act, and then a system of allocations under the Defense Production Act, and then a system of limited stockpile releases for defense purposes under the Defense Production Act, and then a program under title III of the Defense Production Act for supply expansion in strategically accessible countries and in this country.

We have looked at all of these things and are prepared to implement these actions when, as, and if the case would occur.

Mr. WOLPE. One question of Professor Adelman.

I did not come away as sanguine as my colleague, I think, from your testimony. If I understood you correctly, you are saying that while a boycott would not be of serious moment to the United States, that indeed a problem of general cutback in oil supply, your testimony was that that would have the effect of being spread equally to all consumers. I am not sure that that is a cause for comfort. I think that is precisely the problem we are in right now, which is a short supply worldwide, a controlled short supply, which leads, of course, to the issue of the proposal you made in other instances, of whether we are going to address that issue of that short supply vis-a-vis the power of the OPEC cartel.

Could you just lay out for the record briefly what you have offered as a way of beginning to deal with that power of the ability to withhold supplies?

Mr. ADELMAN. Well, Mr. Wolpe, I may save your time by saying it is rather late in the day to consider expedients of that kind. When I published the version of it about 4 years ago, I said time was not on our side, and indeed it was not.

The near-collapse of the Iranian industry is a piece of great good luck for the other producing countries and a piece of bad luck for the consumers. So long as Iran remains as shaky as it is, I think that the cartel is in excellent shape, and I don't look forward to any good news from Iran anytime in the near future.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mrs. Fenwick.

Mrs. FENWICK. What should we do about our vote?

Mr. SOLARZ. Why don't you proceed until a minute or two after the second bells, if you would like?

Mrs. FENWICK. OK.

You have devoted your testimony, Dr. Adelman, to oil, and the minerals are left out, but I would like, before we get to the minerals a little bit more, to ask a few questions of things that puzzle me.

Now, on page 3 of your testimony, the second paragraph refers to the cutback, if Nigeria merely boycotts the United States, that will be a major nuisance to them and a small favor to us.

Doesn't that disrupt the whole contract system? In other words, if country after country boycotts, the contracts that have been signed are null and void, and we know what happens on the spot market. When people try to go into the Rotterdam market to buy up deficiencies that have occurred in contract supply, isn't that a threat, or do you discount that because the expenses are so enormous?

Mr. ADELMAN. Well, the reason for high spot prices are the feared continuing shortage. People will pay almost anything—

Mrs. FENWICK. Desperate.

Mr. ADELMAN [continuing]. Because they are afraid of being caught, and if they have any place to put the oil, they will keep buying in any case.

What, in fact, Nigeria has done in recent months is to take oil away from companies operating there in order to sell it on the spot market and in what I call the contract market, which is midway between official prices and spot prices, and this they will do anytime it is to their advantage to do so.

You are quite right; it is very disruptive of contracts. Unfortunately, there isn't very much left to disrupt of the system of contracts.

Mrs. FENWICK. Well, I am puzzled by something else, which is that Gulf Oil, as I understand it, operated very happily under the protection of the Cubans in Angola, and according to your figures, they are producing, but we don't seem to buy any at all.

Mr. ADELMAN. That is because of the date, 1977. They resumed production on a larger scale, and they are shipping to this country today.

Mrs. FENWICK. I see, I see, because that was puzzling.

Then I have one more little puzzle in this whole business. Libya provides some 8.2 percent of our imports, and Algeria 6.3, which is confusing in a sense, because the discrepancy, as I understood your figures, the production of Libya is about twice that of Algeria.

Is it that we choose Libya in preference to Algeria, or is it that they choose us? I mean, what is the affinity there that produces a rather mild difference in the proportion of our imports, whereas the production is about double in Algeria what it is in Libya?

Mr. ADELMAN. I think it is mostly the results of the accidents of past history, that——

Mrs. FENWICK. Old business relationships?

Mr. ADELMAN. Old business relationships, precisely, and the force of habit.

Mrs. FENWICK. I see.

Mr. ADELMAN. A great deal of Libyan oil is still produced by American companies, and it was shipped to this country; Algerian oil, hardly any produced by Americans.

Mrs. FENWICK. I see.

Mr. SOLARZ. The subcommittee will recess for approximately 10 minutes while a vote is underway on the floor of the House. We will resume at about 3:10.

The meeting is recessed.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Mr. SOLARZ. The meeting of the subcommittee is called to order again.

Dr. Morgan, for the record, could you submit a chart listing all of the critical and strategic minerals on that list, I think you said of 93?

Mr. MORGAN. Ninety-three, yes, sir.

Mr. SOLARZ. The 93 minerals to which you referred should be grouped in such a way that the minerals which we import from Africa are in one cluster, perhaps at the beginning. In the same chart you should indicate the quantity of the mineral that we have utilized on an annual basis for the latest year for which figures are available of each item on that list; second, you should indicate the amount that we import of the item; third, the amount we import from Africa; fourth, the amount in the strategic reserve; fifth, the amounts that are in private stocks; sixth, how long it would take, assuming a cutoff were imposed of all imports of that item at the annual rate of usage which we are utilizing these minerals, how long it would take us to exhaust the available supply in the strategic reserve and in the private stocks.

I don't know if I indicated it previously, but there should be a separate list for the amount in the strategic reserve and the amount in the private stocks.

Mr. MORGAN. Yes, sir.¹

Mr. SOLARZ. It would also be helpful if you could give us another chart which would list all of the countries in Africa from which we import any of these critical or strategic minerals, and the precise mineral we import from each country, and the amount of our total imports of that mineral which we get from that country.

Mr. MORGAN. We have all of that, sir, and it will take just a little while to pull it together in that form, but we will do a good job and get it up to you as quickly as we can.

Mr. SOLARZ. And if you could also add to that a list of the available substitutes for those minerals, where such substitutes are known, and some information about their quantity and where they come from now.

¹ See appendix 2, p. 478.

I wonder if you could let us know in this list of critical and strategic materials that Mr. Eddy referred to in his testimony that were of particular significance, what the substitutes are, if any, for those minerals right now for the purposes of our hearing, and what the actual consequences of a cutoff would be.

For example, start with cobalt, which in Dr. Eddy's testimony, he indicates that there is no substitute for its use in high temperature parts of jet engines and turbines, and in cutting tools. Does this mean that we would be unable, assuming that our supplies of cobalt were cut off, to produce any more jet planes, or to repair jet planes that broke down? What would the actual consequences be?

Mr. MORGAN. Sir, here is a part of the hot side of a jet engine. That part is about 70 percent cobalt, 30 percent chromium.

Mr. SOLARZ. What do you mean by the hot side?

Mr. MORGAN. Well, this is where the hot gas is running about 1,800°, 1,900° F—

Mr. SOLARZ. Anyone have a match? [General laughter.]

Mr. MORGAN. That part is deflecting the hot gases through the blades of the turbine which is whirling around generating the force that drives the engine.

Mr. SOLARZ. Is it any accident that the item you gave me says here that this is produced by Austenal, Inc., a subsidiary of Howe Sound Co., with plants in, among other places, Dover, N.J., and New York, N.Y.

Mrs. FENWICK. Hear, hear.

Mr. SOLARZ. I knew the Bureau of Mines was politically sophisticated, but I didn't know it was that sophisticated.

Which borough in New York? Is it in Brooklyn, by any chance?

Mr. MORGAN. No, sir, that is pure happenstance, and I hope they are still in business because that part was made a number of years ago.

It would be very difficult to substitute in such a critical application, and cobalt is also in high temperature steam turbines that are generating electricity. In fact, we have for 20 years been going from 1,800° to about 1,900° F. The increased efficiency of aircraft, or the increased efficiency of electric power generation hinges on going to higher temperatures, and this has been a problem that has bothered the Atomic Energy Commission, the Space Agency, the Defense Department, at least for 20 years that I am personally aware of. So it would be very difficult to substitute materials.

Mr. SOLARZ. Would it be impossible?

Mr. MORGAN. Virtually, yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. How many years supply of cobalt do we have in the strategic reserve?

Mr. MORGAN. Well, at the current time we are using about 18 million pounds of cobalt a year in this country for all purposes, and there are 40 million pounds in the strategic reserve, and there's about 3 months supply in private industry. Therefore, with some conservation, if that 20 million use could be reduced to, say 15 or 14 million, we have 2 to 2½ years' supply clearly in the strategic stockpile.

Mr. SOLARZ. How much confidence do you have that within that period of time an adequate substitute could be developed?

Mr. MORGAN. I think it would be very difficult to have an adequate substitute for cobalt, per se. On the other hand, if I may elaborate

just a little bit, a few years ago cobalt was \$6.85 a pound. When they had the problem in Zaire, cobalt went up as high as \$40 a pound. Now, back when cobalt was \$6.85 a pound and nickel was \$2 to \$3 a pound, some cobalt in small quantity occurs along with nickel, but the people who mined the nickel generally did not extract the cobalt because the price ratio of \$6 to \$3 did not make it attractive. However, recently, nickel was a little soft at around \$2.85. It is up to \$3 again. But cobalt has been to \$40 and it is back to \$25. So, looking at \$25 cobalt as against \$3 nickel, there is a great interest in the nickel mining people of the world, in Canada, in New Caledonia, in New Guinea, and in this country, in Finland, and elsewhere to extract cobalt which is now economically extractable which was not before.

Furthermore, there is a mine in the West, the Blackbird Mine in Idaho which operated pursuant to a Government contract under that act that I described to you earlier, the Defense Production Act. It operated from the early 1950's to the early 1960's. That mine in a short period of time, probably about a year or two, could be brought back on stream, particularly if they had a guaranteed price.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, from where else do we import cobalt besides Zaire and Zambia?

Mr. MORGAN. Well, some comes from Canada, another source where it is recovered from nickel, and a small quantity from Finland, and some from New Caledonia and some from Botswana. Nickel, cobalt, and copper comes in in matte and is refined in this country in Louisiana.

Mr. SOLARZ. I think it would be helpful in this chart for each of the items on that list of critical and strategic materials if you could indicate how much we import from each country and what the percentage of our total production and utilization of cobalt comes from each country.

Mr. MORGAN. Yes, sir, we will be delighted to supply that.

Mr. SOLARZ. Now, what about chromium? It says in Mr. Eddy's testimony that chromium is of critical importance in stainless steel, heat-resisting alloys, and plating. There is no substitute for its use in stainless steel.

What does that mean in lay terms? If we were unable to import any chromium, how long would the available supplies in the strategic reserve and private industry last us, and then at that point what would happen?

Mr. MORGAN. All right, sir. Stainless steel. Here is a piece of a supersonic airplane with a stainless steel skin and an expanded stainless steel honeycomb which gives it strength and lightness. This is what they use in the greater-than-Mach 1 airplane. That stainless steel is probably 18 percent chromium and 6 percent nickel, and the rest iron.

We could play around a little bit with some of the stainless steels. We could have a stainless steel with somewhat less chromium and somewhat more nickel, but this would be a more expensive stainless steel. Actually, chromium is cheaper than the nickel when you look at the relative costs of the metal. The performance would probably not be as satisfactory if you had to take away much of it. Some of the cheaper stainless steels, like for tableware, knives, forks, and spoons

and that sort of stuff, wouldn't need to be stainless steel—you could substitute, go back to silver, silver-plated brass, any number of things.

Mr. SOLARZ. In terms of the national security, what are the most critical applications of stainless steel for which there would be no substitutes?

Mr. MORGAN. I would say high performance aircraft, both civilian and military, and corrosion resistant equipment in the chemical industry and in the electric generating industry and so forth; wherever you want resistance to high temperatures and corrosion you use the stainless steel.

Mr. SOLARZ. Are you saying that given existing technologies, that if we were completely cut off from access to both cobalt and chromium that we would be unable to manufacture additional jet aircraft for either military or civilian purposes?

Mr. MORGAN. For the hypothesis that you propound, I would have to answer yes, but I don't think that we would be completely cut off from cobalt and chromium because, one, there are other sources in the world outside of the United States; two, there are low grade domestic resources that, if it were a question of stopping the economy, or particularly, impeding the national defense, I think we would make actions such as we made in the Korean war period. Certainly, if I can just drop back to that a moment, and prior to the Korean war period, we depended on Communist China for about one-half of our tungsten, and in 2 years or so later we were producing twice as much tungsten in this country as we could use, simply because the Government guaranteed a price of \$63 a unit compared to the prior \$16 that we were giving to the Chinese. So heroic methods could be taken and there are possibilities of conservation. If you look at the automobile, all the chrome-plated bumpers, the chrome trim on the car, for example at a high price and a real shortage, you would have a wooden bumper on the front of your car and so on.

Mr. SOLARZ. So you are saying in effect, Dr. Morgan, that in the worst case scenario, postulating a cutoff of our existing sources of cobalt and chromium, that even under those circumstances we would probably be able, in a variety of different ways, to continue manufacturing jet aircraft.

Mr. MORGAN. Yes, sir. I think this country has first, vast resources at its own command domestically, and there are many resources in other parts of the world that we could call upon, and when you have a great scientific technology, there are possibilities of alternates, substitutes, and different design. I am not saying there wouldn't be problems in the economy, but if you look at this country, sir, we have 144 million motor vehicles for 220 million people. Now, you can go a couple of years without making any automobiles. We would still have plenty of automobiles, but we would have an awful lot of unemployment in Detroit and other places. One in every six jobs is dependent on automobiles in the economy, but still we would have plenty of automobiles.

Mr. SOLARZ. On the question of the availability of these minerals from Africa, are there any examples in recorded history in which any African country has ever refused to sell us minerals which they had the capacity to produce, or oil, for that matter?

Mr. MORGAN. Where they have refused to sell us? I know of no such example in the nonfuel minerals.

The example we always cite when we want to cite a cutoff of a nonfuel material is that in 1948 we were getting 40 percent of our chromium and one-third of our manganese from the U.S.S.R., and as a consequence of the Berlin blockade of 1948, by the time the Korean war started in mid-1950, we were getting from the U.S.S.R. no manganese or chromium. This is the best example of a deliberate cutoff to the United States of a strategic material.

Mr. SOLARZ. But has any African country ever engaged in a deliberate cutoff.

Mr. MORGAN. No, not that I know of. They have had problems internally with rebellion and problems with the railroad lines, problems with the ports, congestion and so forth, but not a deliberate cutoff. I cannot cite any.

Mr. SOLARZ. Which minerals that are critical to the national security do we import from South Africa, and how much of each one of those critical materials do we import from South Africa, as a percentage of our total use of that particular mineral?

Mr. MORGAN. We can supply a precise chart of those for the record. We have those percentages.

At the risk of further compounding the issue, though, I think if we are allied with Europe, and if we look to Japan to have a strong economy, that we have to consider not just the supplies to the United States, but the supplies to Europe and Japan which are even more heavily dependent upon Africa than are we for many of these materials.

Mr. SOLARZ. I was talking about South Africa.

Mr. MORGAN. South Africa itself.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, you can supply that for the record.

Mr. MORGAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOLARZ. One final question at this point.

Dr. Adelman, could you possibly explain in lay language that an economic dimwit like myself could appreciate, exactly why you believe that a decision by any of our African oil suppliers individually or collectively to engage in a selective boycott of the United States would not have an adverse impact on our ultimate ability to get the oil we need, or at a price we can pay for it?

Mr. ADELMAN. They would need to redirect it into the world oil market, and that would probably tend to demoralize prices there and make it all the easier for our companies to go in there and buy. They might very well buy the very same oil, but probably nobody would ever know. They would tend to buy oil of similar quality as best they could, but it would be a matter of some oil, jostling some oil away from some customers and to others, and aside from some inconvenience, that is all the effect we would suffer.

Mr. SOLARZ. You mean, for example, that a French oil company would buy more Nigerian oil than they actually needed and then resell it to an American oil company?

Mr. ADELMAN. Oh, that might be, or they might resell it to somebody else on the continent, and then North Sea oil, which is similar

quality, would be diverted to the United States. So it could take place at one or two removes.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, why would Nigeria be doing us a favor if they refused to sell us their oil which you seem to be suggesting in your testimony?

Mr. ADELMAN. I was taking a purely hypothetical possibility and saying what if? I don't mean to suggest that they are contemplating any such thing.

Mr. SOLARZ. I know that.

Mr. ADELMAN. If they were to do that, the amount involved is pretty large in relation to the amount that is normally sold at arm's length. It would tend to break prices, and therefore some American buyers would get some big bargains and on the whole, we would probably buy at lower prices.

I don't suggest that that is a good thing, particularly, for anybody, because the disruption, as Congresswoman Fenwick emphasized, would hurt everybody. But it is true that the average price would probably be lower.

Mr. SOLARZ. Yes, Mr. Goodling.

Mr. GOODLING. Just two thoughts.

No. 1, my chairman was asking a question, about whether you know if any African countries have or have not cut us off? I think that question will have to be answered in the future because formerly many of these minerals, or these countries where the minerals were, were controlled by our European allies. So we have a totally different picture now in relationship to whether they would or whether they wouldn't cut us off.

And the second observation, as I understood your testimony, Dr. Adelman, you indicated that the boycott wouldn't harm us, that the devastating thing is the cutback of production.

Mr. ADELMAN. That is precisely so.

Mr. GOODLING. So the boycott could actually be to our benefit, buying on the world market. But the cutback—

Mrs. FENWICK. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. GOODLING. Yes.

Mrs. FENWICK. That is just the point I thought you were making. In other words, it is a world pool of oil, and therefore when that diminishes, it hurts everybody, the cutback hurts everybody, but the boycott merely shifts the pool.

Mr. ADELMAN. That's right.

Mrs. FENWICK. But I would like to ask you and perhaps the other gentlemen, is that true of metal? I mean, I can see the point and it has proved itself to me in oil, but how about metal? Is there a world pool of metals in which the cutback would be the horror rather than the boycott?

Mr. EDDY. It is clearly more limited with some commodities. The range of substitutability or alternative sources just doesn't exist, as we pointed out in some of the tables we provided.

Mrs. FENWICK. Yes.

Mr. MORGAN. I think it is precisely as Mr. Eddy has indicated. However, most metals in a relative peacetime situation are traded worldwide, and it only takes a few cents per pound to move them anywhere; just as this oil moves from place to place, if copper is 4 or 5 cents higher

priced in Europe than here, the copper will be in Europe. If it is 4 or 5 cents higher here than in Europe, the copper will move here, unless there are controls; that is why we have to put an export control on some things if we do run into a shortage situation.

Mrs. FENWICK. How are Zambia and Zaire, how are they getting out their metals, with the Benguela Railroad all messed up?

Mr. MORGAN. We have a map of the transportation system here.

Let us call upon Dr. Shekarchi, our African expert who was over there recently who can tell us about the railroads.

Mr. SOLARZ. You may proceed.

Mr. SHEKARCHI. Look at the map of Africa where I have all of the railroads plotted. You can see that from Zaire and Zambia, where the copper belt is, they can get their material out by three ways. One, to the east through Dar Es Salaam, way down near the Tanzania border; to the west they can take it by the Benguela Railroad to Angola; and to the south, through South Africa, Rhodesia, and Botswana.

Now the question is what happens if one of these routes goes bad by one way or another, through bombing or through flood or something. They have managed to get their material out by an alternate route.

In some commodities, such as copper and cobalt, for instance, they have been able to fly them out of the country by airplane.

Mr. SOLARZ. Are any of you in a position to let us know whether the African oil-producing countries like Nigeria, Algeria, Libya, Gabon, and Angola are price setters or price followers?

Mr. MORGAN. We in the Bureau of Mines no longer follow petroleum. This responsibility was transferred to the Department of Energy in October 1977.

Mr. SOLARZ. Professor Adelman, do you have any information on that?

Mr. ADELMAN. In recent years they have certainly been price followers in that the important decisions get made by the Persian Gulf countries, but they have met in order to fix the premium, the quality, and the geographical premium on African oil. This worked pretty well for a time, but Libya and Algeria cheated on the Nigerians in 1977 for a time, but Libya and Algeria cheated on the Nigerian production and exports, and very serious financial difficulties for the Government of Nigeria.

Mr. SOLARZ. In what way did they cheat?

Mr. ADELMAN. By charging less.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do all of the African oil-producing countries belong to OPEC?

Mr. ADELMAN. No; Nigeria, Libya, Algeria, and Gabon all do. The others do not.

Mr. SOLARZ. What are the others?

Mr. ADELMAN. Egypt, Angola, and Tunisia on a very small scale.

Mr. SOLARZ. Why hasn't Angola joined OPEC?

Mr. ADELMAN. I don't know the particular reasons, but there is no incentive for them to do so. They enjoy the benefits of membership without paying the dues.

Mr. GOODLING. That is pretty good.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you have any indication of the extent to which there may be untapped oil reserves in Africa?

Mr. ADELMAN. There are undoubtedly large deposits that haven't yet been discovered, but the process of exploration has been quite a slow and sluggish one these last 6 years. The old system of concessions and even contracts has broken down, and the drilling programs have been, I won't say desultory, but they have not been very great.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, do you have any sense of the potential for additional oil production, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa?

Mr. ADELMAN. No, I cannot say that I do. That is a hot stove league type of discussion.

Mr. SOLARZ. What accounts for the fact that Nigeria is America's second largest supplier of crude oil after Saudi Arabia?

Mr. ADELMAN. Mostly the quality of the crudes, and of course, the geographical advantage.

Mr. SOLARZ. Does Nigeria charge the United States a higher price for its low sulfur crude oil than other suppliers of such oil charge the United States?

Mr. ADELMAN. Generally speaking, no, but there has been such chaos in the short-term market during 1979 that it is hard to make any defensible statement on that subject.

Mr. SOLARZ. Dr. Morgan, to what extent has the Soviet Union begun to compete with us for access to Africa's mineral resources? We know, of course, that they have commenced a rather substantial phosphate arrangement with Morocco. I think they are importing about 3½ billion dollars' worth of phosphates a year, but other than that, are they purchasing significant amounts of African minerals?

Mr. MORGAN. No, sir. The Soviet Union has 8½ million square miles of territory, which is a very vast area, and they have pursued a historical policy of virtual self-sufficiency, so that even though their costs of production may be considerably higher than in the Western World, they have pursued this policy of autarchy. They do buy some in Africa, but perhaps as the economy of the COMECON, the other countries allied with the U.S.S.R. expands, like Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and so forth, those countries would tend to buy some in Africa, but the U.S.S.R. by and large is an exporter of most mineral materials rather than an importer.

Mr. SOLARZ. To what extent are we in competition with our West European allies for African minerals?

Mr. MORGAN. They are far more dependent on supplies of minerals from elsewhere in the world, and particularly from Africa, than we, so that if you look at percentage dependence on almost any mineral material, Western Europe is largely an importer, and Japan, which has only 140,000 square miles, is an importer of nearly everything, and the Japanese economy has a steel production nearly as great as ours.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mrs. Fenwick?

Mrs. FENWICK. Yes. I just have one question. Did the bauxite arrangements with Guinea, with Russia discourage Africans in dealing with the U.S.S.R.? I understand they paid them about one-third of the world price. Is that correct?

Mr. MORGAN. I am not familiar with that situation. Let me ask Dr. Shekarchi if he has any information on it.

Mr. SHEKARCHI. Yes, they have arrangements with the Soviet Union.

Mrs. FENWICK. We were given some testimony at one of our hearings that at one time the Soviet Union had gone into Guinea to develop the bauxite, and it was discovered by the people of Guinea that they were paying one-third of the world price, and so they changed the arrangements.

Mr. SHEKARCHI. They have changed the arrangements, but they still are importing bauxite from Guinea.

Mrs. FENWICK. At the world price?

Mr. SHEKARCHI. The price I don't know.

Mrs. FENWICK. I see.

I wondered if that had had a discouraging impact.

Mr. SHEKARCHI. I do not have the price information.

Mr. SOLARZ. Is it true that the Soviet Union was importing bauxite from Guinea at one-third the world price?

Mr. SHEKARCHI. We have heard that, but we don't have the price structure, sir.

Mr. SOLARZ. Is there any way that you can see if that information can be found, and if so, we would like it for the record, because if true, it would be another indication of the peculiar kinds of financial arrangements our Soviet friends seem to work out with their African allies.

Mrs. FENWICK. Well, that was Ambassador Young's testimony. In fact, he spoke not only about the bauxite, but about the fishing off Angola which went 70 percent to Russia, 20 percent to Cubans, and 10 percent was left for the Angolans, and in his testimony before our committee, he said he didn't know of an American business that would get away with that kind of thing, and he mentioned the Guinea arrangement with bauxite in addition to the Angolan arrangements.

Mr. SOLARZ. Now, gentlemen, as you know, we import minerals and petroleum from a variety of different African States which have a variety of different political and economic systems. In general, have we found the so-called radical or Marxist or presumptively antiwestern African countries from whom we import minerals less or more reliable, or equally reliable suppliers of these minerals and petroleum as the more capitalist or western-oriented African States?

Is there, in terms of our access to these materials, any significant difference, depending on what kind of political system prevails in the country from which we import those materials?

Mr. EDDY. I don't think at this point, particularly in terms of the question you asked earlier, there have been any disruptions of availabilities. The problems have been more transportation-oriented, or short-term disruptions, at least in one case associated with the internal political situation.

Mr. SOLARZ. Where was that?

Mr. EDDY. Zaire.

Mr. SOLARZ. There have never been any disruptions due to the political character of the country involved, and I gather that there hasn't, in terms of our access to these minerals. If you look at the historic record, it hasn't made any difference whether you had a Marxist regime, a regime that is friendly to the Soviet Union or friendly to the United States, that if they have the materials, they are willing to sell them. Is that a fair statement?

Mr. ADELMAN. I think it is a fair statement on petroleum, yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. Is that true of the other minerals?

Mr. EDDY. At this point, yes.

One factor, though, that I think was pointed out in the testimony, and that is the question of exploration, willingness to invest in the potential for future production to meet both United States and world needs. Whether, say, U.S. companies or European companies are willing to go in and explore the potential reserves of a particular area may be very substantially influenced by the political situation in a particular country and where it stands on the relative scale of things.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you have any estimate of the investment that would be needed to fully develop and exploit the mineral resources of Namibia, once that country becomes independent?

And I gather it is a country that has vast and rich mineral resources which have largely been underdeveloped.

Mr. MORGAN. We can take a look, sir, and see if there are any estimates. Of course, so much hinges on the state of the world economy. Just a little while ago, copper was in excess supply, and African nations, and indeed, our own domestic producers here a year or so ago were having trouble selling copper. So therefore, unless the world economy picks up, there is not going to be too much development of any of these things.

Mr. SOLARZ. I'll tell you why I asked the question. I was in Namibia in January, and I spoke with I gather your counterpart at the bureau of mines there. I have forgotten the name of the fellow and his precise agency but he certainly seemed to be very knowledgeable. One of the points he made was that in order to fully develop the mineral potential of Namibia, you would need an investment of at least \$1 billion just to bring water to the areas of the country where these minerals are located. Given the magnitude of the investment that would be required, the official argued that even if SWAPO came to power in the context of a supervised election, it would have to adopt reasonable policies designed to facilitate and encourage foreign investment because that is the only way SWAPO could ever attract the kind of resources that would be necessary to enable them to take advantage of the wealth of their country.

It would be interesting to know whether that assessment can be corroborated.

Well, I have one final question for Mr. Eddy. You indicated in your testimony the administration is now considering what steps might be appropriate to assess alternative policies to mitigate the risks of an interruption in supply of these critical materials.

When do you think that analysis will be completed?

Mr. EDDY. Well, a judgment still must be made as to what will be done to follow up this analysis. There is a basic question of when we look at policy alternatives, are these problems important enough to warrant policy analysis. We would hope to have answered that within the next month.

What we are considering is basically a range of subjects that we have talked about today, everything from the potential for limited domestic incentives to encourage production of particular commodities through the wide range of, say, economic stockpiling. Whether we will actually look at these depends on some critical judgments that have to be made in the White House, as to whether we take this next step.

Mr. SOLARZ. I trust you will keep this subcommittee informed of the progress of that study.

Dr. MORGAN, we are going to have to leave in a few minutes for a vote, but one other question does occur to me. I gather among the list of critical and strategically significant minerals is the platinum group, and I wonder if you could let us know what particular products the platinum group of minerals are used for, the extent to which there are no substitutes available, and what the consequences would be if we weren't able to obtain platinum.

Mr. MORGAN. Do you wish me to do that now, sir?

Mr. SOLARZ. Yes; you can do it now. Later, you can supplement it for the record.

Mr. MORGAN. All right. Well, platinum, first, is a very important catalyst in all sorts of chemical reactions, and in particular, in petroleum refining. The hot vapors recombine to make the gasoline and the kerosene and the other material on these platinum catalysts, and there are large supplies of platinum in the refineries which have to be reworked. The catalyst is poisoned after awhile by other metals that are present in the oil, they have to take it out, rework it, purify it and so forth. Platinum catalysts are also used to purify automobile exhaust fumes.

Another important use of platinum is it is a high temperature resistant, corrosion resistant material. So in the chemical processing industries, in certain crucibles or in linings of certain very high temperature caustic tanks and so forth, platinum is used.

Now, when you consider platinum is \$400 an ounce at the present time, they don't use it unless they have a real reason.

Another important use of platinum, and an increasing one, is in jewelry and as a store of value, somewhat the function that is performed by gold. People who invest in precious metals also invest in platinum, so that coins and jewelry—

Mr. SOLARZ. What would happen if we weren't able to get any more platinum?

Are there substitutes?

Mr. MORGAN. There are catalysts which work perhaps not quite as well, but there are alumina catalysts which are made. The Bureau of Mines itself has worked on nickel catalysts. We could go to the stainless steels for some of this corrosion resistance. It wouldn't be quite as good in some of those applications. The people who want to invest in jewelry would have to invest in something else, and again, there are large platinum deposits in this country. At the present time, Johns Manville Corp. is investigating a large deposit in the Stillwater complex in Montana, which offers a promise if it were developed, in a few years of meeting about 40 percent or so of our palladium needs, and 10 or 20 percent of our platinum needs.

Mr. SOLARZ. It occurs to me that in that long chart I asked you to provide us with about these critical and strategic materials, it would be useful if one of the columns could also indicate the percentage of the exports of that country which consist of that particular mineral. This would give us some sense of the extent to which they are dependent on that for money which they need to run their economy. I suppose you

might also add the total amount that they receive for the export of that material, and what percentage it is of the gross national product or their total foreign exchange earnings or some other relevant economic criteria.

I think this has been a very useful hearing. We have been able to focus on some of these more esoteric but I think important aspects of our relationship with Africa. We will go to sleep tonight comfortable in the knowledge that even if worse comes to worst, we will be able to limp along for a few more years and that we can always substitute wooden planks for the bumpers on our cars.

Mrs. FENWICK. I do have one question I would like to ask, Mr. Chairman, if I may.

Is it not true that of course it would be easier and more desirable for a country, for our companies to go into those countries that were friendly rather than to go into those countries that have an unfriendly or incompatible system?

I mean, I think that is just commonsense, isn't it, despite the fact that history doesn't show that we have had any terrible disruptions? I would think it far more, that the stability and the friendliness of the country involved, all things being equal, would mean we would move to help or explore in those countries rather than in the others.

Would you accept that?

Mr. EDDY. I would think in the corporate planning sense, certainly that would be the leaning.

Mrs. FENWICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:52 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.]

U.S. INTERESTS IN AFRICA

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 25, 1979

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Stephen J. Solarz (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. SOLARZ. The hearing of the subcommittee is called to order.

We are continuing today our hearings on American interests in Africa and today we will be exploring the role of Africa in international organizations and how this impacts on U.S. interests in both these organizations and the world.

Insofar as the United States increasingly depends on a variety of international organizations for the implementation of its foreign policy, it may have an interest in improving relations with their African participants.

Our witnesses are Assistant Secretary of International Affairs, C. Fred Bergsten, from the Treasury Department, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Gerald Helman from the State Department, who will respectively discuss the role of African and American interests in economic and political international institutions.

Political scientists and other foreign policy analysts frequently note that interdependence is an increasingly common feature of international relations. This interdependence has become visible in many important contexts: In communications, trade, environmental protection, and energy and in the more fragmented and complex international political system of the 1970's. In the last two decades there has been a rapid increase in both the number and importance of international organizations to deal with the problems of interdependence. As a continent with more than 50 countries, Africa inevitably plays a large role in these new and expanding international institutions. U.S. representatives sit alongside African ones in such important international institutions as the United Nations and its specialized agencies, international trade and commodity negotiations, the Law of the Sea Conference and the International Monetary Fund.

Our first witness will be C. Fred Bergsten, whom, as I indicated, is the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs. Before assuming his present post he was a leading authority on United States-Third World relations, having published widely on this subject. His articles in *Foreign Policy*, "The Threat from the Third World," and "The Response to the Third World," provoked considerable interest and discussion.

Gerald Helman is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political and Multilateral Affairs and he will testify second.

Since Mr. Bergsten has to leave by 11 for a meeting, with Secretary of the Treasury Miller, we will hear his statement first and then after some questions, turn to Mr. Helman.

STATEMENT OF HON. C. FRED BERGSTEN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Mr. BERGSTEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I did prepare a written statement which detailed to some degree U.S. economic interests in Africa and our negotiating efforts with them. If I could, I would submit that for the record and simply in my oral statement address the questions that you raised for the hearings.

The first of those questions had to do with the role that African countries play in some of the key international economic negotiations, and I think the answer to that is that the Africans certainly do play a key role in international negotiations on some North-South issues.

The Africans, of course, are actively engaged in the whole range of international economic discussions. They hold a number of seats on the Board of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and, therefore, play an ongoing role in those institutions. Some of them were active in the GATT negotiations, some of them were participants in all of the international economic negotiations now underway in trying to reform, improve, restructure the international economic system.

There are in addition to that, some issues in which the African countries have played even a far greater role than their own economic weight per se might have suggested. A couple of examples are the Common Fund negotiations, which has been a centerpiece of the North-South dialog over the last few years, and the negotiation for a Law of the Sea Treaty. In those particular cases the African countries have played a major role because they have been able to maintain a unified position among themselves, because there have been a large number of them participating in these sessions and, therefore, their unity has given them a large weight in the negotiating process.

The fact that in those conferences there is a principle widely accepted of equitable geographical distribution which assures the Africans some key leadership position and the fact that some individual African representatives have been extremely able and extremely effective in influencing those negotiations themselves.

So it does differ in degree from institution to institution, negotiation to negotiation, but in all of them the Africans are certainly present and involved. In many of them they have played a very important role, one that in fact would go beyond the economic weight that one might think they would bear simply from looking at their GNP ratios and that kind of thing.

There are particularly some commodity issues in which the African countries have played an important role, commodity issues that are important to the United States because we depend on imports for a large share of our consumption of a number of key products, both agricultural products like coffee and cocoa and raw materials like copper, cobalt, manganese, as well as, of course, petroleum, a substantial share of which comes from Africa itself.

But in a number of those international commodity negotiations, particularly for cocoa, to some extent for coffee and copper, the African countries as major producers, have played a very important role and, therefore, have been extremely influential in the evolution of international policy.

Now, a second question you raised was related to the first, and that is the question of the unity of the African countries themselves.

To a large extent, the African countries have maintained unity in these international economic forums, and that has been an important source of their strength. It is not universally the case. In the Law of the Sea negotiations some economic differences in economic interest between landlocked countries and coastal countries has led to some differences of view, but on the whole the African countries have shared economic interests and, therefore, have tended to take similar positions.

In addition, they have a strong view, I think Mr. Helman will outline in more detail that unity is a very important source of their overall strength in multilateral organizations, and, therefore, they have tried to stick together wherever possible, but in negotiations like this Common Fund, like many of these commodity negotiations, they have stuck together very effectively, and that has provided an important source of strength to them in the negotiating process.

You also asked to what extent the African nations influence others and to what extent, therefore, their influence radiates out to even broader forums.

I think again, the answer, while it differs from issue to issue, is positive, that in many cases the African countries by maintaining unity, by taking positions which are shared by other developing countries, have in fact achieved a role greater again than their own particular economic strengths might have suggested.

This is certainly true in a number of the commodity negotiations, certainly true in the Common Fund negotiations whereby other developing countries have supported strongly the Africans desire for a strong second window, as it is called, in order to get African support for some of their interests in other parts of the negotiation. And because we believe that the Africans, as the poorest countries involved have a real need for a particular focus, particular benefits in the negotiations.

At the recent UNCTAD IV meeting in Manila somewhat the same issue might be observed. The Africans are generally among the poorest of the developing countries and, therefore, evoke a certain sympathy from the rest of the developing countries as well as the industrial countries, which led to an agreement on a special action program for least developed countries. So the Africans' interest and their ability to work together did enable them to gather support from a wider array of developing countries in trying to work out the overall outcome in some of these North-South forums.

Your fourth and final question put to me was the prospects for African countries forming effective cartels for nonfuel mineral raw materials, particular cobalt, in the future.

I think one has to break the issue down into two components. The first being those products in which African countries by themselves play a major role in or dominant role in the commodities market; and

second, in those markets which of those along with other producing countries may have the potential for action of that type.

In the first category of products where the African countries themselves are dominant, there really are only a couple, cobalt and chrome, with very different countries involved on the African side.

In the case of cobalt, Zaire is the world's dominant producer, producing about a third of the world's production by itself. Zambia is an additional factor. Morocco and a couple of other African countries have smaller shares.

But, to this point, there has been no indication of cartel or other kinds of collusive action for that particular product.

Zaire itself, given its historical background, has continued to produce and market most of its output through firms operating in the industrial countries. In addition, its own internal disruptions in recent years and its own need for maximizing revenue in the short run, I think, have together kept it from seeking to pursue exclusive action with any of the other producing countries.

At the same time, the economics of the situation have generated a quadrupling of the cobalt price just over the last 1½ years. After the Shaba disruptions of May 1978, there was a cutback in supply itself and an increased fear of future supply disruptions leading both producing and consuming countries around the world to stockpile at a much faster rate than they had, all of that leading to a much higher price than had been the case before.

However, at this point, I would not see any evidence of inclusive or cartel action involved in that and, therefore, would not regard that as a particular factor at the moment.

Nevertheless, it is clear that U.S. dependence on cobalt is very high. Cobalt imports in fact from sub-Saharan Africa produces 80 percent of our imports and we, therefore, must pay particular attention to those countries which are sources of supply, given the strategic importance of that particular product.

In the case of chrome, any cartel arrangements would have to include the cooperation of Rhodesia, South Africa, the Soviet Union—which is a kind of unlikely association of countries—and, therefore, I think not a real threat at the present time.

Now, there is another array of commodities in which African countries themselves are participants among the major suppliers. Phosphates is one where Morocco is in fact the dominant world supplier accounting for one-third of world trade. Several years ago, Morocco in fact was very successful in hiking prices sharply in what might be called a monopoly-type action.

It also sought to organize other producing countries to collude with it in that market and had some short-term success, but the U.S. producers actually took advantage of that situation to maintain prices a bit lower and the Moroccan prices did come back with a great increase in their market share and undercut the ability of the Moroccans and other foreign producers to maintain dominance of the market.

In some other commodities African countries are participants in producer associations which from time to time have tried to take advantage of world market situations to raise prices but without much lasting success. In the case of copper, Zaire and Zambia are members

of SIPAC. Guinea is a major producer along with Sierra Leone and Ghana of bauxite and are members of the International Bauxite Association.

A number of the African producers are members of the Cocoa Producers Alliance, and in several other commodities, coffee, tropical timber, tea, sisal, sugar, the African countries are either members of producer groups or members of commodity agreements between producing and consuming countries.

In some of those products the potential is there for collusive action, but up to this point, has been successfully exercised to only a limited extent, as in the case of phosphates and in the case of bauxite.

Nevertheless, I do think, Mr. Chairman, as we look to the long-run interests of this country in maintaining stable sources and pricing of a number of these primary products, we have to keep very much in mind that the producing countries rely so heavily on these products for their own economic strengths that they are going to do everything they can to maximize their earnings.

They really only have two choices for doing that. One is to work cooperatively with the consuming countries to try to negotiate international commodity agreements that will protect them against price destabilization and shortfalls in their earnings.

The other effort is to try to go the cartel route with the producers themselves working together to try to gouge the maximum they can out of the world market.

When you go back to 1973 and 1974 there was a widespread movement to cartelize producer markets in various commodity fields. One of the reasons for that was the effort to emulate OPEC.

Another was commodity markets were already very strong. I think a critical third reason was that the consumer countries were unwilling to discuss the probability of producer consumer cooperation to deal with commodity market problems. Therefore, not having a negotiating option or a collaboration option, the producers were left only with the opportunity, only with the option of trying to go it alone.

When the U.S. policy began to change in late 1975 and particularly under this administration, to negotiate producer-consumer arrangements to cooperate in the commodity markets, I think that gave the producing countries another option to try to work with the consumers cooperatively and, therefore, more effectively to achieve their commodity policy objectives.

So I think it is particularly important for the United States and other industrialized countries to continue the effort of the last 2 or 3 years to work constructively with the producing countries to develop a sugar agreement, a cocoa agreement, a coffee agreement, now a natural rubber agreement, make a tin agreement work, develop a Common Fund that meets the interests of both countries in order to channel these needs of the commodity producers in a constructive cooperative way rather than a cartel confrontational way, because I sincerely believe it will be one or the other.

Finally, I would point out that achieving that kind of policy and other kinds of policies that will help maintain a cooperative relationship between the United States and the African countries in the economic area require a lot of support from the Congress.

We have in front of the Congress now a sugar agreement which now for 2 years has failed to go through. There is a coffee agreement, which has not yet been implemented by congressional legislation. We hope to be able to negotiate commodity agreements in cocoa and perhaps one or two others in the near future which we would bring to the Congress.

Nevertheless, unless we can get prompt congressional ratification, our efforts to negotiate a cooperative arrangement with these countries in the commodity area will not be sustained. It will jeopardize and therefore will tend to force them back toward the confrontation option.

Cooperation with these countries, of course, goes well beyond commodities and I have detailed some of it in my statement. The African countries, being among the poorest of the developing countries, of course, need concessional aid more than any others. We extend a good deal of bilateral concessional aid to Africa, as you know, but the world's biggest concessional aid programs to Africa, those are the multilateral, IDA, which is by far the world's largest single source of concessional aid to Africa.

We are now hoping to join the African Development Bank and contribute to the African Development Fund. If the Congress were to pass the kind of restrictive amendments that did pass the House 1 month ago, if the Congress were to cut that funding substantially, then our efforts to work cooperatively with the Africans to supply help to their basic needs would be undercut.

So, I would conclude only with a plea for congressional support, wherever possible, of the kind of initiatives we have been undertaking, and I think an effort to deal cooperatively with the African countries in the commodities in the foreign assistance field and others, because of the very importance that they have in the international forums that you have so rightly asked about this in these hearings today.

[Mr. Bergsten's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. C. FRED BERGSTEN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE
TREASURY FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

U.S. ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND POLICIES IN AFRICA

Africa plays an increasingly important role in the global economic relations of the United States. Today I will outline briefly the growing economic interdependence between Africa and the United States, and discuss a number of ways the United States is assisting African countries to pursue their economic and social development objectives.

Africa is an extremely diverse region. There are, however, certain characteristics that most of its countries share: severe poverty, endemic hunger, curtailed lifespans marked by rampant disease, and massive illiteracy are the most prevalent.

Most of Africa belongs clearly within the "Fourth World" of least developed countries. It does not include any advanced developing countries, such as Brazil or Korea, whose rapid progress

has thrust them into the forefront of the "Third World" and enables them to play an increasingly important role in the global economy. Growth in real per capita GNP for sub-Saharan Africa has been consistently the lowest of any region, at less than 1 percent per year from 1975 thru 1977. Now the painstaking advances of many African countries during the last few years may well be partially or entirely erased by the escalating cost of their oil imports.

In addition, the economies of many African countries are characterized by serious structural problems:

- Near absence of basic infrastructure.
- Lack of economic diversification, which often perpetuates dependence on exports of a few primary commodities.
- Shortages of economic institutions and expertise.
- A bias against agriculture.
- Lingering suspicion and restriction of the private sector and foreign investment, often combined with an inordinate amount of bureaucratic red tape.

Combined with frequent political instability, these factors result in a shortage of investment capital, which in turn tends to perpetuate the vicious circle of slow growth and continued structural deficiencies.

The best way for the richer countries, including the United States, to help the African countries break this circle is through concessional assistance, including technical assistance. Such help can be extended both bilaterally and through such multilateral

development institutions as the International Development Association (IDA), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the African Development Fund and soon, we hope, the African Development Bank. In the charged atmosphere of African politics, the neutrality of institutions such as the World Bank Group enables them to assist not only the development of each country but regional cooperative efforts as well.

The United States has direct economic, humanitarian, and political interests in assuring a strong and viable Africa where poverty is reduced, the pace of economic growth improved, and serious financial problems avoided. A wide range of U.S. economic policies contributes to these objectives and enhances the positive effects of global concessional assistance to the nations of Africa. I would like to take this opportunity to comment specifically on U.S. economic interests in Africa, and the policies we have pursued to benefit the African nations. I will stress the areas where Congress itself needs to act, either now or within the next year or so, to play its full role in these efforts to enhance U.S. economic relations with Africa.

U.S. Economic Interests in Africa

U.S. policy toward Africa must be seen in the context of U.S. policy toward all developing countries, which seeks to promote U.S. interests toward that overall group of nations. The developing countries as a whole, including OPEC, are

becoming increasingly important to U.S. economic interests because:

- The United States sells more than one-third of its total exports to developing countries, equivalent to \$53 billion in 1978.
- More U.S. manufactured exports go to the developing countries than to Western Europe, Japan, and the nonmarket economies combined.
- Nearly half of U.S. industrial machinery, electrical machinery and aircraft exports go to LDCs.
- Developing nations account for 85 percent of U.S. imports of fuel and 30 percent of U.S. imports of other raw materials.
- Approximately one-fourth of U.S. direct investment abroad is absorbed by LDCs.

U.S. economic policies toward Africa reflect the importance of these interests, as well as our more specific interests in Africa:

- The African nations purchased nearly \$6 billion in U.S. exports and supplied almost \$17 billion in U.S. imports during 1978.
- The bulk of this trade is in energy: U.S. imports of fuels and lubricants from Africa amounted to \$12.5 billion last year, nearly 30 percent of our total energy imports.

- Libya, Algeria and Nigeria are important U.S. sources of energy. Since the Iranian unrest, Nigeria alone has accounted for 17 percent of total U.S. crude oil imports. Nigerian high quality low sulphur crude is particularly in demand by U.S. refiners because of its high gasoline component. Four other countries are minor energy producers: Angola, the Congo, Gabon, and Zaire. Much exploration is also taking place off the west coast of Africa between the Ivory Coast and Angola, with American companies actively involved.
- Other major imports from Africa include unfinished metals (\$1.8 billion) and agricultural commodities, mainly coffee and cocoa (\$1.5 billion).
- Africa supplies substantial shares of U.S. imports of a number of key commodities: almost one-fourth of U.S. coffee imports, more than half of our cocoa imports, one-fifth of U.S. tea supplies, one-fifth of our copper imports, more than one-third of our imports of precious metals (mainly gold), and 60 percent of our imports of industrial diamonds. Sub-Saharan Africa provides 80 percent of U.S. imports of cobalt and one-third of our processed manganese imports. South Africa alone supplies one-third of U.S. chromite imports, 75 percent of U.S. imports of processed chrome, and 40 percent of U.S. platinum imports. Guinea accounts for about 20 percent of U.S. imports of bauxite, and possesses the world's largest known reserves.

- On the export side, Africa takes one-eighth of U.S. wheat exports, one-fourth of our rice exports, one-fifth of our tallow exports, and a substantial amount of machinery and transport equipment (\$2.6 billion in 1978).
- Our major African markets are South Africa, Nigeria, and Egypt (about \$1 billion in U.S. exports to each country) which together account for half of our total exports to Africa. Major suppliers of goods to the U.S. market are Nigeria, Libya, and Algeria (\$3 to 6 billion each) for a combined share of nearly three-fourths of total U.S. imports from Africa.
- At year end 1978, U.S. direct investment in Africa (excluding South Africa) totaled \$3.4 billion, almost double the level of a decade earlier. This investment was concentrated in a few industries and a few countries. Direct investment in petroleum accounted for about 60 percent of the 1978 total, with mining and smelting accounting for another 15 percent and manufacturing investments 8 percent. About 60 percent of all direct investment in Africa (excluding South Africa) was located in four countries -- Egypt, Liberia, Libya and Nigeria.
- African countries also play a significant and expanding role in many economic and political multilateral forums. The United States has encountered both cooperation and opposition from various African countries at the World

Bank, IMF, MTN, commodity negotiations, and North/South conferences. Whether opposing or supporting our views, it is clear that African countries are now players. African countries control one-third of the votes in the United Nations General Assembly and have been making their influence felt.

All of these factors argue strongly for U.S. policies which take full account of African concerns and provide a sound basis for future economic and political cooperation. The United States has already undertaken a number of initiatives which directly benefit the African nations. I would like to summarize these efforts in five major areas: concessional aid, commodities, general trade policy, monetary affairs and energy policy.

Concessional Aid

The amount of U.S. assistance now going to Africa is substantial. It is also increasing, particularly that part which is channeled through the multilateral development banks.

In its most recent fiscal year, the World Bank Group approved 70 loans for sub-Saharan countries totalling more than \$1.2 billion -- up by \$130 million from the previous year and by more than \$300 million since 1976. Of the total amount approved last year, \$619 million (slightly more than half) was lent on highly concessional terms from IDA, the Bank's soft loan window.

IDA is by far the largest single source of concessional financing in the world for Africa. The United States is of course a major contributor to IDA, and I hope that Congress will in the near future finalize approval of the Administration's request for just under \$1.1 billion to complete our contributions to the fourth and fifth replenishments of that extremely important institution.

U.S. policy initiatives within the World Bank have pointed toward the most effective use of these resources, by shifting sectoral concentrations so as to place greater emphasis on lending which directly reaches the poor and helps meet basic human needs. Lending in support of agriculture and rural development now accounts for 31 percent of total lending in West Africa and 41 percent in East Africa. More attention is also being given to lending for water supply and sewage and for innovative projects to assist small-scale African enterprises. Africa also provides an example of the Bank's new energy program -- \$9 million to help develop the geothermal potential of the Rift Valley of Kenya.

In addition, we feel that the continued use of World Bank resources to support the development of economic infrastructure is particularly critical in the poorest developing countries, such as sub-Saharan Africa. These countries still need basic road and power projects. In view of the total focus of our bilateral assistance program on basic human needs, the development banks are the only mechanism through which we can contribute to these priority areas of African development.

Increasing amounts of U.S. assistance to Africa are also being channeled through the African Development Fund. This concessional lending facility was established in 1973 under the aegis of the African Development Bank, with financial support from non-regional developed countries. Last year, the Fund approved loans totalling \$186 million, up from \$142 million in 1977 and \$80 million in 1976.

During the recently negotiated replenishment agreement, the United States -- after extensive consultations with the Congress -- pledged \$125 million to the Fund's resources over the next three years. This was the first time for the United States to participate in a negotiated expansion of African Fund resources, as the previous Administration had elected not to contribute to the original funding of the ADF or its first replenishment in 1975. The African countries were extremely pleased with this pathbreaking U.S. contribution, which was announced personally by President Carter during his visit to Africa in early 1978 and which I had the personal pleasure to deliver to the Annual Meeting of the African Development Bank in Libreville later that year. I believe that U.S. economic and political interests in Africa will be significantly advanced by our participation in this uniquely African institution. The first year's installment of \$41.7 million has been included by both the House and Senate in the FY 1980 appropriation for Foreign Assistance and Related Programs, now in Conference.

In addition, the United States participated very actively during 1979 in international negotiations leading to the proposed expansion of membership of the African Development Bank. Under Charter provisions adopted when the Bank was established in 1964, membership has been limited to African countries. These charter provisions are now being amended to provide for membership by countries outside the region, including those from Western Europe, Canada, Japan, and the United States. When this process is completed, probably by January 1980, we expect to submit legislation to authorize (and subsequently appropriate) U.S. capital subscriptions of \$360 million.

This would give the United States a capital share of 5.68 percent of the Bank's total capital (\$6.3 billion) and 17.04 percent of the \$2.1 billion non-regional capital subscription. It would make the United States the largest single non-African member of the Bank, giving African countries a further tangible and highly visible signal of our commitment to promoting their growth and development -- through an institution which is thoroughly African, and which therefore is a major source of pride and interest throughout the Continent.

Commodity Policy

Price instability has long been a problem for both consumers and producers of key commodities. Recurring boom and bust cycles are detrimental to all nations:

- During periods of rapidly rising prices, they fuel inflationary tendencies in consuming countries. To the extent these price increases become embedded in wages, they can help perpetuate inflationary spirals.
- For producing countries heavily dependent upon commodity production and exports, excessive price volatility can lead to erratic investment and development in both the agricultural and raw materials sectors. It can also disrupt economies through large shifts in domestic employment, savings, tax revenues and foreign exchange earnings.

The fragile economic and social structures of African countries are probably the most susceptible to these disruptions; at the same time, they are least able to cope with the consequences thereof. More than most areas, therefore, Africa stands to benefit significantly from cooperative commodity policies between producing and consuming nations.

To help remedy this price volatility, the United States has supported, wherever feasible, the negotiation of stabilization agreements to dampen commodity price fluctuations. To ensure that such agreements balance the costs and benefits to all parties, we prefer stabilization arrangements which rely on buffer stocks, buying when prices are low and selling when prices are high. The United States belongs to the International Tin Agreement, and is seeking early ratification of the newly

negotiated Rubber Agreement, both of which rely on buffer stocks. The International Cocoa Agreement is now being renegotiated and, if negotiations are successful, will rely on buffer stocks to stabilize prices. The United States has also suggested a similar mechanism to stabilize copper prices.

Where buffer stocks are not feasible, agreements relying on national stocking and export quotas, while less desirable than buffer stock arrangements, can also be effective. Examples of this second type of stabilization agreement are the Sugar Agreement, the Coffee Agreement and the proposed Wheat Agreement. The United States either currently is a member, or plans to join, all three of these agreements.

Several African countries -- notably Cameroon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, and Nigeria -- have a vital interest in the Cocoa Agreement. Liberia has participated in the recent rubber negotiations and Nigeria is a member of the Tin Agreement. Membership in the Coffee Agreement, the largest of the existing agreements, includes a long list of African countries headed by Ivory Coast, Angola, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Zaire.

The Sugar Agreement, which is still in the process of ratification by the United States, has been joined by South Africa, Mauritius, Mozambique, and Swaziland, together with a number of smaller producers who are nevertheless heavily dependent on sugar exports.

Only two countries in Africa are major copper producers, but both Zaire and Zambia are leading exporters to Europe, Japan and the United States.

Of particular importance to Africa is the strong U.S. support for separate implementation of the Food Aid Convention, presently part of the International Wheat Agreement, under which donor countries commit to an increase in food aid. The United States has said it will unilaterally meet a new annual commitment of 4.5 million tons of grain, up from 1.9 million tons under the present agreement.

A number of other commodity arrangements are also under consideration to expand market opportunities through production and utilization research, market promotion, and the exchange of market information. Products for which such agreements may emerge are jute, tropical timber, hard fibers and tea. The last three commodities are of particular interest to Gabon, Kenya, and Tanzania.

The other major commodity initiative is the Common Fund. The United States believes that consolidating the assets of individual commodity agreements can make the individual agreements more efficient financially and save money for participating countries. The United States has supported a Common Fund which would pool the financial resources of agreements but which would not interfere with the operation of the agreements themselves, nor duplicate activities of the development banks.

The Common Fund Negotiations are entering the final stages and should be completed late this year or early in 1980. The United States would seek ratification in 1980 and entry into force would probably occur late next year or in 1981. We would expect to request an authorization for appropriation in FY 1981, accompanied by a request for an initial appropriation of \$1 million. A later appropriation of at least \$60 million would be sought, at a time and under terms yet to be negotiated.

Trade

Trade is one of the most important areas of U.S. economic interaction with developing countries. As members of the Fourth World, the majority of African nations remain largely dependent upon exports of agricultural and other raw materials, including energy, to earn the essential foreign exchange to pay for food and industrial imports crucial to their domestic needs and the development process. Access to foreign markets for their exports is therefore an important objective of the African nations. It will become even more important as their economies develop and trade expands.

The United States remains a strong proponent of open markets for the benefit of all nations. Our focus has been essentially three-fold:

- rejection of proposals to restrict U.S. imports from developing countries;

- continued preferential trading treatment in our market for developing countries; and
- active participation in the recently concluded Multilateral Trade Negotiations, which will significantly reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers to international trade for all countries.

U.S. trade statistics provide the clearest indication of the openness of our markets. Our imports of manufactured goods from the developing countries have grown from \$3 billion in 1970 to about \$24 billion in 1978. Developing countries now supply half of our imports of consumer goods and one-fourth of all our manufactured imports. The majority of African nations are not yet in a position to take advantage of these markets in the area of manufactured goods, although they will be over the longer term.

African access to the U.S. market through our system of generalized market preferences (GSP) is also in a nascent stage. Approximately \$125 million in African goods entered the United States under GSP in 1978. Ivory Coast, Ghana, and Mauritius were principal beneficiaries.

The U.S. system offers preferential duty-free access to products from developing countries on a competitive need basis. When a specific product from a country eligible for GSP becomes competitive in the U.S. market, that product reverts to normal tariff treatment on the grounds that special help is no longer needed -- and that its continuation would unfairly

hamper less competitive countries from getting an opportunity to enter the market. This policy is designed to especially benefit the developing nations which most need special access. It will directly benefit the African nations as they begin to produce and export manufactured and semi-manufactured goods, and as developing countries elsewhere "graduate" to MFN status.

At present, however, the vast majority of Africa's non-oil exports to the United States are primary commodities which already enter our markets duty free. Access for these products should remain unrestricted in the future. In addition, as a result of the MTN, industrial nations will make tariff cuts averaging more than 30 percent on over \$140 billion of our imports in coming years.

Finally, on the export side, the United States Export Import Bank and U.S. Public Law 480 and other bilateral concessional aid programs have given substantial assistance to U.S. exports destined for Africa. Eximbank exposure in Africa as of August 31, 1979, totalled \$3.1 billion. Bilateral U.S. concessional aid to Africa in fiscal year 1978 also totalled nearly \$600 million.

International Monetary Policy

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is the central monetary institution for the world economy and the principal source of official balance of payments financing for its members. The Fund is not an aid institution, and its

resources do not finance development projects. However, by promoting a sound, stable world economy and helping members implement corrective macroeconomic programs to deal with temporary payments problems, the IMF fosters the healthy world economic environment and the domestic economic stability essential for development. This is an important function for all member countries, including the African developing nations.

The IMF has recently strengthened its capacity to meet official balance of payments financing needs through increases in the amounts of Fund resources and members' access to these resources:

- The Supplementary Financing (Witteveen) Facility, of \$10 billion, for which the Congress voted last year a U.S. contribution of \$1.8 billion, is now in operation and will provide additional funds to countries experiencing severe payments problems. The first drawing under the SFF was made by an African country, Sudan, and Kenya has joined other countries making use of the facility.
- A fifty percent increase in IMF quotas scheduled for next year will be a timely addition to Fund resources. The quotas of African members will increase by nearly \$2 billion as a result.

- SDR allocations have also been resumed in an effort to promote the use of the SDR as an international reserve asset and to supplement other reserves. The African nations are scheduled to receive allocations of SDR 929 million (about \$1.2 billion) over the period 1979-1981.
- The Compensatory Financing Facility, a valuable source of balance of payments financing to many countries during the cyclical downturn of the mid-70's, has recently been liberalized substantially and accounts for a large proportion of current IMF financing for Africa, equivalent to approximately \$1.1 billion in outstanding drawings.
- A Trust Fund administered by the IMF, which provides concessional balance of payments loans to eligible countries, has extended \$797 million of financing to the poorest African countries.
- Further modification of the existing IMF facilities is under consideration. Over the coming months, the IMF Executive Board will consider extending the repayment period under the Extended Fund Facility from 8 to 10 years, and will study ways of lowering interest costs of the Supplementary Financing Facility.

Large shifts in current account balances will occur over the next two years, including a deterioration on the order of \$20 billion in the current account deficit of the developing countries as a group. While we do not expect a general financing

problem to arise for the developing countries as a group, some countries, including some in Africa, may experience balance of payments difficulty. The availability of IMF resources and programs in such instances will be an important source of stability and strength.

Energy Policy

Increased costs of energy have a particularly serious impact on the developing nations of Africa, which can least afford it. U.S. energy policy is two-fold in nature:

- (1) to improve domestic conservation, reduce oil imports, and increase alternative energy production; and
- (2) to improve international cooperation in energy and assist nations especially hurt by the increased cost of oil.

The United States has sought to alleviate the problems of the African nations and other LDCs through support of IMF credits to assist in meeting their short-term payment imbalances and World Bank loans to meet their development needs. More specifically to meet their energy problems in the longer run, the United States has supported the World Bank's expanded energy program.

In July 1977, the Bank Board approved a lending program which for the first time included oil and gas development projects. In January 1979, it expanded this program further to include exploration. While the World Bank has not as yet made any

loans to African nations under this program, an IFC loan for \$4 billion was extended to assist in further exploration and development of existing offshore oil fields in Zaire. Over the next two years, however, applications for petroleum projects totalling \$206 million are expected from 13 African countries, out of a total of 24 expected applications amounting to \$814 million worldwide.

Over the next five years, World Bank lending for oil, gas, coal and hydroelectric development is projected to total \$7.7 billion, or at least 15 percent of total Bank lending in five years. When these projects reach fruition, energy production equivalent to between 2 and 2.25 million barrels of oil a day should result, thus reducing the potential demand for OPEC oil. World Bank activities in the energy sector will thus help to improve materially the world energy supply and demand picture. Energy deficient countries in Africa can be expected to benefit significantly from this important new program.

Under its new energy program, our own Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) has also provided political risk coverage for an offshore oil exploration, development, and production project in Ghana. The first oil ever produced in Ghana is now flowing from this project's platform and is providing a significant share of the country's total needs. All these programs, of course, help our own energy situation

by improving the world's supply/demand balance as well as addressing directly a critical development bottleneck of most poor countries.

Conclusion

The United States thus has a wide array of major economic interests in Africa, and is pursuing a wide array of policies in pursuit of those interests. Our basic strategy is to work cooperatively with the African countries themselves to provide concessional assistance, through both bilateral and multilateral channels; to offer them access to our markets for goods, capital and technology wherever possible; and to maintain a general world economic environment conducive to economic growth and development.

The Congress has many opportunities to participate actively in this effort. It has already voted for trade liberalization which helps the African countries, and has supported maintenance of a strong IMF. Within the next few days, it needs to take its final vote on the Foreign Assistance Appropriations for FY 1980 -- including U.S. funding (without restrictive amendments) for the World Bank Group, the world's largest assistance channel for Africa, and the African Development Fund. The Administration will soon submit legislation for an increase in the U.S. quota in the IMF. Several commodity agreements of importance to African countries are pending in the Congress, or will be submitted next year. Also next year, the Administration will seek initial support for U.S. participation in the African Development Bank and probably the Common Fund. I look forward to continuing to work closely with the Congress, and particularly with this Committee, on all these issues.

OUTSTANDING IMF CREDITS TO AFRICA
AS OF JANUARY 31, 1979
(in millions of SDRs)

	TOTAL	CREDIT FACILITIES			GENERAL ACCOUNT			SPECIAL ACCOUNT			TOTAL	IMF
		PERCENT OF GNP	ORDINARY	NEW	CPY	FACILITY	CPY	TRUST	TRUST	TRUST		
			1978.1	1978.1	1978.1	1978.1	1978.1	1978.1	1978.1	1978.1		
TOTAL AFRICA	1,785.2											
OIL EXPORTING												
Algeria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Libya	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nigeria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Egypt	245.7	38.0	-	-	32.0	20.7	-	-	-	73.0	123.2	
South Africa	233.0	22.0	-	-	160.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	
OTHER AFRICA	1,307.2	255.0	-	-	626.9	296.2	-	-	-	12.8	495.8	
Benin	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Botswana	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Burundi	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cameroon	24.3	-	-	-	13.1	13.2	-	-	-	-	7.9	
Cote d'Ivoire	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24.5	
Central African Empire	6.4	-	-	-	4.2	6.3	-	-	-	-	9.4	
Chad	7.0	-	-	-	6.5	1.3	-	-	-	-	8.4	
Congo	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.5	
Cote d'Ivoire	31.1	4.6	-	-	6.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dahomey	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Democratic Republic of Congo	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ethiopia	18.0	-	-	-	18.0	-	-	-	-	-	17.6	
Gabon	15.0	15.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Gambia	5.3	0.6	-	-	4.5	-	-	-	-	-	2.9	
Ghana	31.1	26.1	-	-	1.1	2.2	-	-	-	-	20.6	
Guinea-Bissau	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Guinea	9.7	7.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15.4	
Kenya	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	21.3	
Lesotho	199.4	12.0	-	-	69.0	23.1	-	-	-	8.3	3.3	
Liberia	5.2	2.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18.9	
Madagascar	11.1	1.0	-	-	9.5	3.3	-	-	-	-	10.8	
Mali	6.4	1.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6.2	
Mauritania	16.0	4.7	-	-	6.5	6.8	-	-	-	-	7.1	
Mauritius	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Morocco	170.3	40.9	-	-	112.5	16.9	-	-	-	-	10.5	
Niger	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.4	
Rwanda	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sao Tome & Principe	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	22.2	
Senegal	38.8	-	-	-	31.0	17.8	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sierra Leone	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Somalia	22.5	2.6	-	-	12.5	7.4	-	-	-	-	10.4	
Sudan	110.8	6.5	-	-	54.0	31.3	-	-	-	7.3	46.9	
Tanzania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.9	
Togo	86.4	13.7	-	-	41.3	34.6	-	-	-	-	9.0	
Tunisia	24.0	-	-	-	24.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Uganda	36.2	-	-	-	25.0	5.2	-	-	-	-	5.4	
Upper Volta	175.9	8.8	-	-	82.7	61.4	-	-	-	-	46.8	
Zaire	269.3	134.7	-	-	101.9	20.7	-	-	-	-	10.0	

Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics

AFRICAN COUNTRIES INCLUDED INPROVISIONAL PROGRAM OF PETROLEUM PROJECTSTO BE PRESENTED TO THE BOARD IN THE NEXT TWO YEARS.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Project</u>	<u>Amount</u> <u>(millions of \$)</u>
<u>Pre-Development</u>		
Madagascar*	Exploration	5
Congo*	Technical Assistance	4
Yemen, PDR	Technical Assistance	5
Morocco	Oil Exploration	35
Liberia*	Pre-Development	3
Tanzania*	Oil/Gas Exploration	5
Yemen, A.R.	Oil Exploration	5
<u>Development</u>		
Chad 1/*	Oil Production	14
Egypt	Gas Distribution	30
Tunisia	Onshore Gas	10
Ivory Coast*	Oil Distribution	35
Benin*	Oil Development	10
Nigeria 1/*	Gas Pipeline	45
Total for Africa:		206
*Subtotal for Sub-Saharan Africa:		121

* Sub-Saharan countries

1/ Subject to changes in the political situation or decisions of government

Source: World Bank

September 11, 1979

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Bergsten.

On a proportionate basis, how much money has the United States been giving to Africa in fiscal 1979 through the World Bank and through the African Development Bank? In other words, we presumably can claim credit for a certain percentage of the total contribution which those different institutions made to Africa in 1979, and what do the totals come to?

Mr. BERGSTEN. If you pro rate our contributions in fiscal year 1979, for example, we probably contributed about \$300 million through IDA, the World Bank, the African Development Fund, for the African countries.

Mrs. FENWICK. About how much?

Mr. BERGSTEN. About \$300 million.

Mr. SOLARZ. Can you break that down?

Mr. BERGSTEN. I can give you tables for each of the institutions, how much of their lending goes to those countries, and then one can pro rate how much of the U.S. contribution to the institutions is going to African countries through these.

Mr. SOLARZ. Can you do that for the record for the last several years?

Mr. BERGSTEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOLARZ. And simultaneously, in your chart, compare it to the level of our bilateral assistance to Africa in total for, say, the last 5 years.

Mr. BERGSTEN. I would be glad to do that.¹

Mr. SOLARZ. If it is about \$300 million for the World Bank and African Development Bank, then it would be slightly less than the level of our bilateral assistance to Africa?

Mr. BERGSTEN. That is correct.

Mr. SOLARZ. You include Egypt under our bilateral assistance?

Mr. BERGSTEN. That is right. At the same time, I think it is essential to remember that our contributions to IDA and the World Bank are essential to trigger other country's contributions in those. We are now providing about \$1 out of every \$4 the countries put into these development institutions. If we didn't make our contribution they wouldn't make theirs. So one can only take direct credit for the amount I mentioned. That amount does lever about a 3-to-1 ratio from other countries and, therefore, sharply influences the overall total.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you have any sense of the per capita development contribution of the World Bank to Africa in comparison to what it gives to other parts of the world?

Mr. BERGSTEN. Yes, it is higher, substantially higher, on the per capita basis. I have a table—I don't believe I have it with me today—I have a table that indicates per capita World Bank contributions to each of its recipient countries and by far the highest numbers are for the African countries.

IDA, for example, gives more money in absolute terms to India than any other country, but on a per capita basis India in fact is one of the lowest recipients, whereas, many of the smaller African countries—I am remembering off the top of my head—\$6 or \$8 per capita from the World Bank. India would get 70 cents to \$1.

Mr. SOLARZ. If you could give us for the record a chart indicating for the last several years the World Bank and African Development

¹ See appendix 3.

Bank contributions to each individual African country, then if you could compare the World Bank contribution to Africa on a per capita and absolute basis, to what they give to other regions of the world, Asia, South America, the subcontinent.

Now, in these various international economic negotiations that we participated in, as well as the Law of the Sea Conference, do you see any relationship between the positions taken by African countries and our sort of overall foreign policy toward Africa?

In other words, are the positions the African countries take in your judgment pretty much a function of their perception and analysis of their interests in relationship to that particular issue, or is their position in any way modified by virtue of the extent to which they are appreciative or antagonistic toward general American foreign policy objectives on the continent, involving questions such as Rhodesia, South Africa, Namibia, that sort of thing?

Mr. BERGSTEN. Well, I think as I experienced it, their positions are a combination of those two elements. I indicated in my remarks before that I have seen that very clearly in the commodity field where their own interests in maximizing their return from commodities, commodity exports can push them in either of two directions: The confrontational direction or cooperative direction in that case.

Our stance, our policy, more directly in that particular area, rather than on the broader political issue, but those not being irrelevant, do go a long way to determine which path they would follow.

Mr. SOLARZ. Could you give us some examples of the way in which, say, the African foreign policy of the present administration, which has generally been more supportive of and sympathetic to African concerns than previous administrations has in fact translated itself into African attitudes on these commodities that are more cooperative than confrontational?

Mr. BERGSTEN. Yes, I think copper is a good case in point. If one goes back to 1973-75, there were very active efforts by the copper producing countries and their organization, SEPAC, including the Africans, to really take a confrontational approach, to cartelize or otherwise rig the world commodity market, the world copper market.

When U.S. policy in that area changed, with offers to negotiate first a producer-consumer forum and then to consider seriously an international copper agreement, one saw a marked diminution of their efforts on a producer only basis.

Now, it is hard for me to say how much that was an additional influence by overall U.S. policy toward the political issues in Africa but those certainly help push in the same direction a more cooperative outcome.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you see any relationship between our policy toward Southern Africa, the constellation of issues involved there, and the attitude these African countries take on international economic issues?

Mr. BERGSTEN. I think it is a hard relationship to define clearly. I personally have not been sufficiently involved in those negotiations before and after to be able to really give you an informed judgment. Probably others who have been in it for a longer period of time could do so.

Mr. SOLARZ. In the various international economic negotiations in which Africans are involved, as well as the Law of the Sea, do you see any significant differences between the attitudes and positions taken by the African countries in comparison to the attitudes and positions taken by other Third World countries from Asia, from Latin America, distinctive African attitudes and positions in comparison to Asian or Latin American positions?

Mr. BERGSTEN. Yes, I certainly do see distinctive differences which I would trace in large part to the difference in economic circumstances between Africa and Latin America, for example, with the Africans having much greater interest in concessional assistance programs, given the lower level of their development. The Latin Americans are more concerned with access to markets for export of goods and the import of private capital.

You do get a distinctive African approach to issues in undertaking conferences and even within the commodity field. In the discussion of Common Fund for example, it has been the Africans that have been most acutely interested in the so-called "second window". Because they have not had as strong a position in individual commodity markets, they have needed funding for diversification of their monocultural situations into a broader approach.

So there is a distinctive African position, as I indicated before, that has won support from other developing countries in some of these negotiations, but it certainly is a distinctive African stance.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mrs. Fenwick?

Mrs. FENWICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

There are a couple of things I wanted to ask you. I speak of commodities such as coffee, and cocoa, and sugar; the agreements seem to be more effective for the producer and indifferent to the effect on the consumer. There seem to be payments for sugar producers, for example, a floor on price so that it can't fall. But you hardly ever hear any talk about ceilings.

Mr. BERGSTEN. I would disagree with you on that.

Mrs. FENWICK. I am thinking of sugar, which we have just been through.

Mr. BERGSTEN. Well, when the administration came in and really revamped U.S. policy toward these international commodity agreements, we did so on the basis of a very balanced approach insisting that while we are quite prepared to negotiate international commodity agreements, and in fact, sought to do so wherever possible from a technical standpoint, they would have to be balanced and protect the interest of both producing and consuming countries, and we laid out in great detail what that meant in terms of adequate buffer stocks, which the United States would accumulate when the price dipped to protect the price floor, but have ready for release another ceiling when the prices rose.

We have just negotiated a natural rubber agreement on that basis. The sugar agreement includes very much that principle, with nationally owned stocks that would be released when prices rose to a certain level.

One can quarrel as to whether the price ranges are right, and that is, of course, the crucial issue one always comes to, whether it is coffee, or

cocoa, or sugar or any other product. But, we have promoted that principle of balance.

Mrs. FENWICK. When did this start? What was the date of this first copper negotiation which you seem to indicate was the first.

Mr. BERGSTEN. Well, it wasn't the first.

Mrs. FENWICK. When did the whole thing start?

Mr. BERGSTEN. Some of the copper talks began back in 1975.

Mrs. FENWICK. So, 4 years ago the copper talks, and they were not the first. When did the first one start?

Mr. BERGSTEN. Well, some of these commodity agreements go back some time. The tin agreement goes back into the late fifties and there was an earlier coffee agreement that began in the early 1960's, then collapsed really around 1970.

Mrs. FENWICK. The coffee was in the 1960's?

Mr. BERGSTEN. In 1963, I believe it began, it expired, became ineffective in 1970, then was renegotiated.

Mrs. FENWICK. I don't want to lean on that. I am worried about the tremendous debts these LDC's are building up and which Mr. Castro suggests should be canceled. I have worried about them some time, as you know. In the excellent Sahel aid plan there is no integration with lending institutions, private or public, to find out what is being borrowed by these countries, and surely that is part of the picture.

There is some cooperation—as Mrs. Butcher said, we send them our reports. But I wonder how often they get read. The point is that the welfare of these countries demands that we pay some attention to what they are building up in the way of debts. I think it would be better if we just gave them money and stopped all loans—concessional or otherwise. We should give them money for specific programs that would benefit the people of the country as a whole such as roads and dams and seed. One can feel the pressure for canceling the debts coming. There is no point in crippling them with debts they are never going to be able to pay.

There was one country, its entire exchange commodity it could sell was pledged to the debt. If we care about people, this ought to stop, and I don't know whether you are going to stop it but somebody ought to.

Mr. BERGSTEN. I would say in terms of new assistance to Africa, certainly the whole thrust of our efforts and the multilateral effort has been to extend it on either grant terms or very concessional terms.

Mrs. FENWICK. Why call it a loan? It makes bad blood and bad feeling. Whom do we love when we owe them money? Are other countries quite open in saying they wouldn't give their amounts if we didn't give 25 percent?

Mr. BERGSTEN. Oh, yes, in every one of the negotiations to replenish these multilateral institutions there is a tortuous negotiation and burden sharing, and it has been U.S. policy in every one of the institutions, in every one of the negotiations, to reduce our share, to get our share down—others, political, Japanese, German, and OPEC countries, to get those shares up and the bulk of the negotiations is of what those shares will be.

At the end of the day when we agree to come in with one-third, as in previous IDA replenishments, or one-quarter, roughly as well in this

one, that is essential cement to put it together. If we didn't agree to that share, the whole thing would literally collapse. I can testify to that from experience. There is a real multiplier effect. We have been able to get our share down and will continue to do so, but that is the stuff—

Mrs. FENWICK. We are 25, Europe 25?

Mr. BERGSTEN. Well, Germany alone now, let me take the pending IDA replenishments in the case in point, we will be somewhere around 27 probably, Germany will be up around 12, United Kingdom perhaps 10, France maybe 5-6, other Europeans the same. So Europe as a whole will be substantially more than the United States. Japan is coming up sharply, perhaps 14-15 percent of the total.

Mrs. FENWICK. OPEC?

Mr. BERGSTEN. OPEC is coming up. Not as much as it should be, but coming up. And I can give you a table if you would like.

Mrs. FENWICK. When you give us the information the chairman has requested, for each country and region, bilateral and multilateral, could you give us per capita figures as well, so we could know a little better what we are doing? In other words, if India gets \$1 billion, and that is 70 cents per head, I think it is more revealing.

Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you.

Mr. Bergsten, could you give us some idea of the impact of the increase in price of oil since 1973, in general, and the increase in the price of oil over the course of last year, in particular, on the economy of these African countries?

Mr. BERGSTEN. I would like to give you a piece of paper with the details on that longer run effect. The increase that has occurred just in the last 6 months has had an impact on all of the poorer developing countries, taken together, LDC's as they are called, on the order of \$3 or \$4 billion, of which a substantial part would be in Africa.

Again, I will break that down for you. I don't have that in front of me now, but it is certainly several billion dollars just over the last 6 months. That is an increase. I can quickly do it in my head. That is an increase from \$15 to \$20 billion roughly, \$12 to \$20 in the oil price, having gone up from \$2 to \$12 would have been, of course, manyfold more, roughly twice as much. So when you put it together, it would be \$10 billion or so over the last 5 or 6 years.

Mr. SOLARZ. I think the committee would be interested in your putting together some information for the record, which would give us some sense of the comparative impact of these oil price increases on Africa in relationship to the impact they have had on our own country, and on Western Europe and Japan, as well as the comparative impact which these increases have had on other parts of the developing world.

And if you could do that, in terms of the extent to which the increase in the price of oil since 1973 in general and then in the course of last year, in particular have consumed, percentages of the overall balance of payments deficit surplus of those countries, as well as the percentages of their gross national product, we, I think, would be able to get a sense of the extent to which there has been a differential impact, if any, on Africa in comparison to the developed world and the rest of the developing world.

You can submit that for the record?

Mr. BERGSTEN. I would be delighted to do that.

Mr. SOLARZ. Now, what do you think are the possibilities for the establishment of OPEC-like American cartels to restrict the supply or increase prices on various key minerals where they have a dominant position in the market?

Mr. BERGSTEN. Well, as I indicated, the only one, the only markets where African countries by themselves have dominant positions are cobalt and chrome and the cobalt—

Mrs. FENWICK. Vanilla, Madagascar.

Mr. BERGSTEN. I stand corrected. Vanilla. I haven't considered that.

The cobalt market certainly has all the characteristics of a market which could be controlled in the way you suggest. It has not been heretofore. There have not been, to my knowledge, any efforts to do it. But the underlying conditions for that kind of control do seem to exist and might at some point in the future be exercised. They have not been heretofore.

Mr. SOLARZ. Why not?

Mr. BERGSTEN. Partly, I think, because the major producing country, Zaire, is still in a very emerging state in terms of managing its own resources and has had internal supply disruptions which have dominated its concern about that mineral as well as copper; and because it has had such a crying short-term need for revenue that it has not really been able to take a longer run perspective.

In addition, there would be a requirement for at least some cooperation from countries outside the area, and how much that could be worked out, I am not sure. But any country that accounts for one-third of the world's production and a much higher share of world trade in a particular commodity like that, does have an opportunity.

I am not sure it is so much a cartel potential as it is a potential for dominance, but it is a single country in which OPEC is an effective cartel, because Saudi Arabia held the umbrella. The same with Brazil in coffee, the same for Morocco for a short period in phosphate, the same for the United States in wheat. Whatever one calls it, there is a potential there clearly for market control.

Chrome a bit more difficult, because the Soviet Union along with South Africa and Rhodesia are major factors. But again, a potential exists in market terms for some kind of restraint of supply that could disrupt markets.

Mr. SOLARZ. This would apply to cobalt and chrome?

Mr. BERGSTEN. Cobalt and chrome, although I think there are significant differences between them because in cobalt, supply is much more concentrated in a single country.

Mr. SOLARZ. As a realistic proposition none of the many minerals we import from Africa would lend themselves to the establishment of an OPEC-type cartel, even assuming the African countries were inclined to move in that direction?

Mr. BERGSTEN. In the other products, African countries are only several of a number of suppliers that would effectively have to coordinate. The most advanced case in that light has been in bauxite where the International Bauxite Association was formed in 1974. It

is a pretty clear emulation of OPEC and has had some success, led by the Jamaicans, in raising prices.

In fact, Guinea, a major factor in the bauxite market has to some extent undercut the efforts of IBA by increasing its market share. So in that instance, the African involvement has not so far been to support the outcome.

Mr. SOLARZ. Let me come back, if I might, to the impact of oil price increases on African countries. You will supply for the record the figures, but generally we know that the impact on Africa has been quite considerable and by and large very negative, largely because of the generally weak economic conditions to begin with.

Under those circumstances, why haven't the African countries been more outspoken and more forceful in their efforts to try to curb the OPEC cartel? I mean, God knows they have had a deleterious impact on the standard of living, the economics in our own country and we are shouting at the top of our lungs, perhaps with not much effect, about it.

You don't get any sense that Africa or other third world countries are joining in, and they seem to be suffering comparatively more than we are, how do you account for that?

Mr. BERGSTEN. Well, it is a major puzzle why all the developing countries, including the Africans, have not taken up the refrain that you suggest. There are several hypotheses as to why. One would be that to some extent, they view the OPEC countries as their colleagues in the developing world and they are for the most part developing countries.

In Africa, one has to remember that Nigeria is, of course, a major component of OPEC. has benefited mightily from the OPEC price rises and, therefore, has at least been one African country, a powerful one, vis-a-vis the others, in many senses, which has benefited from it, and that might serve to mute some of the comments that might otherwise be made.

I think there also has been a hope from many African and other developing countries that they would get some compensatory help from OPEC.

Mr. SOLARZ. Have they gotten any?

Mr. BERGSTEN. They have gotten quite small amounts. They have gotten some. The Arab-OPEC countries particularly have set up some assistance institutions, for example, but the compensation has been a very small share of the total.

Mr. SOLARZ. Let's assume somehow or other we could persuade most of the developing countries, and certainly the African developing countries that are not oil producers themselves, that they had a mutual interest with us in restraining these oil price increases in the future. If, on the merits we were able to persuade them of that, are there any practical steps or measures which we could get them to support which could have any impact on this situation, and is it really in a certain sense a nonissue in the sense that collectively there isn't much we can all do?

Mr. BERGSTEN. I don't think it is a nonissue even though I cannot point to tangible steps that we could ask them to take. The reason I think it is an issue is because the OPEC countries themselves are sensitive to political criticism of the developing countries. I think it has been a very important factor over the last 5 or 6 years in providing a

green light to the OPEC countries to continue to raise prices and restrain production.

So I think it would be extremely helpful to our efforts if we could get support from the developing countries. We have had some modest success in that regard over the last year or so, that recent UNCTAD meeting and subsequently at the IMF-World Bank meeting in Belgrade last month. There have been more vociferous comments.

Mr. SOLARZ. How fearful would the African countries and other developing countries be that if they were critical of OPEC they might find their oil supplies cut off?

Mr. BERGSTEN. I think they would have some fear of that with some OPEC suppliers that would be justified.

Mr. SOLARZ. Wouldn't they then be able to get oil from other suppliers or through the fluid international distributive system?

Mr. BERGSTEN. They would, although there would be some disruptions, maybe a little higher cost. And remember, one crude is not another crude if you have refineries or demand patterns that call for a particular kind of crude, it is not totally functional. Over time, you are right.

Mr. SOLARZ. The Middle Eastern oil producers, clearly the core of OPEC, the African countries have by and large always supported the Arab position in the United Nations on the Israel dispute. What do you think would happen if the African countries got together and said to Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Libya, and maybe now Iran—with a new more militant pro-Arab government—that unless they start behaving themselves better on pricing aspects of this thing, the African countries might no longer be prepared to automatically support their positions in various international agencies?

Mr. BERGSTEN. I suspect it would have an impact. They have done limited versions of that in the past and sought preferential pricing or other help from the OPEC countries. In some cases they have been able to get that. So I think there is some record that indicates that there would be a possibility for their reaping some benefits from that.

Mr. SOLARZ. In the Law of the Sea Conference, what position do the African States take in comparison to our own interests and our position in those negotiations?

Mr. BERGSTEN. I am not an expert on the details of that. But in broad terms we have had an interest in maximizing access to the resources of the seabeds, copper, nickel, manganese nodules, and wanted as open a system of access to the seabed minerals as possible.

The African countries being current producers of some of those same minerals, particularly copper and manganese, have resisted a system that would promise sharply increased world supply of those products, so there is a clash of interest and that has been one of the sticking points, in fact, I think it is the main sticking point, in bringing the Law of the Sea Treaty to a final stage.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mrs. Fenwick.

Mrs. FENWICK. No questions.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Bergsten, thank you very much for your testimony. It has been very helpful and you may go on your way.

Mrs. FENWICK. I might ask you one thing, if I may.

The rise in the price of gold, has that been a tremendous benefit to South Africa's economy?

Mr. BERGSTEN. Very substantial, both in terms of higher return on immediate sales, and providing incentive for increased production bringing new mines into play, keeping old mines in production. So it is quite a substantial benefit.

Mrs. FENWICK. Thank you.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much.

Mr. Helman, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF GERALD B. HELMAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Mr. HELMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have prepared a statement which I would like to submit for the record and simply make a few additional remarks to you and to some of the specific questions you have addressed to me.

Before turning to this, I would like, before Mr. Bergsten or while Mr. Bergsten is leaving, to second his plea to this committee that restrictive amendments not be attached to American contributions to various multilateral institutions. They limit our ability to assist others and to advance our own objectives in a very serious fashion, indeed.

In our remarks, Mr. Chairman, you underscored the importance of various multilateral institutions to the United States, to our ability to achieve significant political and economic and social objectives worldwide. Indeed, these multilateral institutions are becoming, I think, increasingly important in global diplomacy, in good measure because there are issues on the international agenda now which can be solved, if at all, or can be addressed if they are addressed at all, only in some sort of collective fashion in these types of institutions.

Many of these problems are really beyond the ability of any single country or even any group of countries, to deal with effectively.

When I mention the international institutions, I include not only the financial institutions, but groups such as the United Nations itself, its specialized agencies such as the World Health Organization, International Labor Organization, UNICEF, which is now working in Southeast Asia, the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees, and many others.

In these organizations it is important to understand that the African group plays a leading role, and I would like to dwell for a moment on how that leading role is expressed.

In a very real sense, nothing can be achieved of significance in most of these international institutions if the African group as a unit is opposed. Simple arithmetic is sufficient demonstration of that.

That doesn't mean that we can't achieve a good deal if there isn't active support, because on many issues African governments are sometimes split. They don't always agree on every issue that comes before these institutions.

It is important to understand that African governments increasingly appreciate the role they play in these organizations. They understand their need to maintain solidarity, and they effectively maintain that solidarity on a wide range of questions.

The need to work with them, then, on any matter of importance to us is very real, is very current, and that factor will be with us for a long time to come.

The reasons why African countries feel the need to maintain this kind of solidarity, this kind of group position in international institu-

tions, is fairly understandable, given the individual weakness of most African governments and their ready understanding that their strength, in fact, lies in unity.

In some sense, few African governments would be able to address foreign policy issues, major global issues of genuine consequence to each of them, if they had to act as a solo actor on the international scene. There are some African governments, of course, that would be capable of such action, but most of them would not be.

Consequently, they have found that through group action, through the accommodation of particular national interests to the interests of the group as a whole, they can best make certain that other governments, including the United States, understand and try and cooperate with them.

The issues that continue to move African governments and which, I think, evoke from them the strongest feeling, are those related to colonization and, now particularly, the issues of southern Africa. Three issues, of course, are Rhodesia, Namibia, and the general question of apartheid. The position that other countries take on these matters is a very real factor in determining how African governments react toward issues of importance to non-African governments.

In a very real sense, the actions of the African group can best be understood by an analogy to political parties, to political factions as they act in a parliament. There are tradeoffs, there are interests, and if other governments support issues of primary importance to African governments, then there will be a certain reciprocity.

I think that looking at a position of African governments and African groups in this fashion goes far to explain African positions on Middle Eastern questions: African positions, for example, on the oil question, if you will, and the African relationship to the nonaligned movement and its functions in the nonaligned movement.

There are two factors I would like to emphasize before closing my oral remarks. One is that one should not assume that African governments are going to take a consolidated position on all issues that come before multilateral institutions. For example, in the General Assembly a few weeks ago, there was a split in the African group when it came to the question of Kampuchean credentials.

There was a group of African governments that supported the ASEAN governments. I think, as a matter of fact, most African governments supported ASEAN on behalf of the credentials of Pol Pot.

There was another group of African governments that went along with the Cubans and Soviets and Vietnamese in support of the Heng Samrin group. Whatever the merits of these positions, they do demonstrate that the African group is not a monolith on all issues.

The second thing is that it is important that we not take African positions for granted. There will be tradeoffs. They have interests; they will want their interests to be recognized, understood, and obviously, if possible, accommodated.

We also have interests we do not want to be taken for granted and, consequently, what I am describing is a political process in which our mutual interests hopefully, on a wide variety of issues and institution of genuine importance to us, can be resolved, accommodated, in the interests of resolving these problems.

That is all I have to say.

[Mr. Helman's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GERALD B. HELMAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Over the past decade, the activities and policies of African nations have become an increasingly important factor in the work of a variety of multilateral institutions. The policies pursued by these African nations have been marked by a high degree of solidarity on many issues of particular significance to the United States. Consequently, it is important that we understand how this phenomenon came to pass, what motivates African governments, and how U.S. interests are affected.

The African role in multilateral institutions is, in good measure, a product of Africa's historical experience. It is perhaps ironic that the genesis of Africa's contemporary focus on international institutions can be derived from a multilateral event—the Congress of Berlin, held in 1885, which divided the African continent to suit colonial interests. The independent states that emerged during the 1960's and 1970's are by and large small in population, with few developed resources and without the traditional indices of wealth and power. This history suggests two strong reasons why it has been in the African interest to pursue their aims through multilateral institutions:

First, the Africans have long since learned that through solidarity they can have some political impact on issues of direct importance to them. With few exceptions, individual African states have little "clout" internationally. When combined, and when they use their voting strength, the African group constitute a factor which must be taken seriously into account by other governments, including the United States.

Second, only through multilateral institutions could African governments pursue some of those objectives of special importance to them. Foremost among these is decolonialization. Anticolonialism understandably was the unifying theme for newly independent nations and for those Africans still seeking independence.

In these circumstances it became important that the Africans master the skills of multilateral diplomacy. This they have done, and I believe it is accurate to say that, among the master diplomatists of the U.N. system, a number of African permanent representatives rank very high indeed.

Consequently, today we have a situation in which African nations comprise about one-third of a total membership of most multilateral institutions. In the United Nations, the African contingent is the largest regional grouping—52 nations out of a total U.N. membership of 152. The Africans constitute one-half of the nonaligned movement. Moreover, African objectives have become more diverse, both as colonial issues are solved and disappear, and as the complexity of modern political and economic life define and pose new issues.

Thus, Africans are turning increasingly to the United Nations, its specialized agencies, the nonaligned movement, and to a lesser extent, the IMF and World Bank to advance their national interests and to project Africa as a factor to reckon with in world affairs. These organizations—some operating by consensus, others on the basis of one country/one vote—provide the nations of Africa with leverage to negotiate on major international economic and political questions and thus to pursue their interests.

Although African states have correctly calculated that the weight of their number requires other countries to pay attention. We should, and we do, both because there is merit in much of what the Africans are saying and because to achieve our objectives, we must often have the cooperation of African states.

Up to now, I have been speaking of the African Group as if it is a monolith in the U.N. system. This is in fact too simple. How African states behave, how they vote, the extent to which they submerge national interests to group solidarity, depend very much on the issue and the stakes involved.

Certainly, on remaining colonial issues, the African states show determination and rock-hard solidarity. The issues involved in Southern African command the special attention of all African countries. At every opportunity, in almost every international forum, the nations of Africa press their goals insistently in condemning minority rule in Southern Africa and in calling for an end to the system of apartheid. African support for the concerns of other countries and regional groupings often turns on the support others accord them on Rhodesia and Namibia.

In recent years, the strong commitment of the Carter Administration to the solution of Southern Africa's problems has been an important factor in our improving relations with African states in multilateral institutions.

The relationship between African governments and the Middle Eastern question illustrates how complex the politics of multilateral institutions have become. Arab support on southern African issues has been solid over many years and has been matched by African support of the rights of Palestinians, including the establishment of a Palestinian state. Moreover, we should understand that the rhetoric of anti-colonialism has powerful resonance and has led Africans to equate their long struggle with the Palestinian Arab case against Israel.

African support for Palestinian statehood does not translate, however, into automatic opposition to the Middle East peace process or condemnation of Egypt and Israel. Once we move beyond the classic issues of decolonialism, African attitudes become more diverse. There are some African states (for example, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Angola) who follow the line advocated by the rejectionist Arabs. The majority of Africans, however, seem to believe that Egypt and Israel should be given the opportunity to make peace. There are some who agree that Camp David should be allowed to continue and be accorded a chance to succeed just as they support the Lancaster House and Contact Group efforts in Southern Africa. These variegated positions have had practical and important consequences.

At the World Health Assembly in June and in a variety of international meetings subsequently, it was the voting strength of the Africans which blocked Arab efforts to take punitive action against Egypt and Israel. The Africa Group in the Non-Aligned Movement joined with others to successfully block efforts at the Havana Summit to expel Egypt. After the Havana meeting, African Foreign Ministers managed to defeat Cuban/Arab effort in a meeting of the Non-Aligned Coordinating Bureau to reaffirm an earlier condemnation of Camp David.

Looking ahead, it is apparent that Africans increasingly are paying attention to North/South economic issues. They will play a major role in deciding how the world community acts to deal with issues of major economic consequence to the United States. Here, the African attitude is bound to be complex. One can detect a grudging admiration in the way in which OPEC states have dealt with the developing countries even though the rising price of oil has cruelly damaged the economies of the poorest countries. At the same time, pursuing their own self-interest, Africans increasingly point to low OPEC aid levels and lack of understanding by OPEC for Africa's desperate economic plight.

We may thus see a time when automatic African solidarity can only be assumed in an anti-colonial context. Despite the strong efforts of the OAU, the varied national interests of African states are bound to assert themselves increasingly in the post-colonial era.

Africans will not take on every issue coming before international bodies. Instead, they will defer to regional groupings on issues which do not directly effect them (e.g. Latin America), in the hope that others will reciprocate.

But they cannot be taken for granted by any country or regional grouping. Vietnam and Cuba learned this lesson when the UNGA, with African support and abstentions, voted to reverse the Havana summit position on Kampuchean representation and to seat the Pol Pot Government.

They will focus increasingly on economic issues particularly given their deep economic distress. Here, Africa is a central factor in the slowly developing South/North dialogue that will be a dramatic factor in world politics throughout our lifetime. The clashing interests of oil-importing and exporting LDC's will be a key element. But the South/North dialogue will encompass the entire range of relationships among nations of the Third World. That drama will be played out to a large extent in multilateral institutions.

Ultimately, it is important to recognize that our success in gaining the support of African countries for U.S. positions is likely to be determined primarily by the success of our policies on issues of central importance to African countries—i.e., Southern Africa, the Mideast, and the North/South dialogue over development. African attitudes toward us also will be influenced by their sense of U.S. strength and determination in the continuing global competition with the Soviet Union.

The Administration intends to build on the strong beginning made toward better relations with Africa. Our own history and national commitment to racial equality ensure American understanding for African aspirations. As we emerge into the post-colonial era, the bonds of Afro-American cooperation will grow in the U.N. and the multiplicity of international organizations that increasingly characterize our rapidly changing world. We all need these institutions as vehicles through which we can begin to cope with the vast global problems which are beyond the capabilities of any single state or region to deal with alone.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much.

Mr. HELMAN, roughly speaking, how many votes are cast on how many issues in each session of the General Assembly?

Mr. HELMAN. Well, into 150 or more.

Mr. SOLARZ. How many of those would you say are of particular critical importance to the United States; a dozen or more?

Mr. HELMAN. I would say probably not more than a dozen, two dozen votes; depends upon the criteria.

Mr. SOLARZ. What would be examples of some of those votes, say in the last annual session of the General Assembly?

Mr. HELMAN. In the last year, I think the vote on the Iraq resolution on Israel was of particular importance to us. There were several human rights issues of some importance to us. There was a Cyprus issue of some importance to us.

Mr. SOLARZ. Puerto Rico?

Mr. HELMAN. Puerto Rico—certain aspects of the Puerto Rican question did come up, but not as a direct issue. Several Middle East issues, of course, were also important.

Mr. SOLARZ. Could you submit for the record a list of the dozen or so most important issues that came up in the last session of the General Assembly and, as a matter of fact, perhaps submit also a list of the dozen or so most important issues for the last several sessions of the General Assembly, and inform us of how each African country voted on those issues, and then add it all up and let us know how Africa as a whole voted?

Mr. HELMAN. I would be happy to.

[The information referred to follows:]

IMPORTANT ISSUES PROFILE 1978

The profile compares the positions of the U.S. and other U.N. members on a selected group of multilateral issues of importance to us during the past year. While U.N. General Assembly resolutions are the chief element in the profile, other important meetings inside and outside the U.N. systems are reviewed if recorded votes are taken and if all, or nearly all, U.N. members participate. This year the profile contains votes from the U.N.-sponsored World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination since, even though the U.S. did not participate, the issues were of considerable concern to us.

Direct comparisons between the profile and those of previous years should not be made since the criteria used in the selection of issues and the extent of U.S. representations to other countries vary from year to year.

A. 33D U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1978—JANUARY 29, 1979, NEW YORK

101—Establishment of the United Nations Trust Fund for Chile: Establishes a voluntary fund for aid to "persons whose human rights have been violated by detention or imprisonment in Chile;" singles out Chile for this purpose without reference to the severe human rights problems existing among numerous other U.N. member states. (U.S. abstained) (33/174)

102—Review of the Implementation of the Recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its Tenth Special Session: Part A: "Military and Nuclear Collaboration with Israel:" Requests the Security Council to call on all states to refrain from supplying military goods of any nature whatsoever and to "end all transfer of nuclear equipment or fissionable material" to Israel; requests the Security Council to establish the necessary enforcement machinery. (U.S. voted No.). (33/71-A)

103—Procedural Vote on Resolution 33/71-A (see 102): Asked General Assembly to declare a resolution on "Military and Nuclear Collaboration with Israel" an "important question" within the meaning of Article 18, requiring a 2/3 majority. (U.S. voted Yes)

104—Acceleration of the Transfer of Real Resources to the Developing Countries: Urges all developed countries to exert "all their efforts" to attaining the

.7% ODA target, including such means as setting aside 1% of annual GNP increase for the purpose of augmenting ODA. (U.S. voted No) (33/136).

105—Assistance to the Palestinian People: PLO-sponsored resolution calling on the UNDP to consult with "specialized agencies and other organizations" in programs to improve conditions of the Palestinian people. (U.S. Voted No). (33/147)

106—International Relations in the Sphere of Information and mass communications: Affirms the need to establish a "new, more just and more effective world information and communication order" which is based on the "free circulation and wider and better balanced dissemination of information." (U.S. joined in consensus adoption) (33/115-B)

107—United Nations Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy: Calls for convening under U.N. auspices an international conference on the following energy sources: solar, geothermal, wind power, tidal power, wave power, and thermal gradient of the seas, biomass conversion, fuel-wood, tar sands, and hydro-power. (U.S. joined in consensus adoption). (33/148)

108—Activities of Foreign Economic and Other Interests Which are Impeding the Implementation of the Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People's in Southern Rhodesia and Namibia and in All Other Territories Under Colonial Domination and Efforts To Eliminate Colonialism, Apartheid, and Racial Discrimination in Southern Africa: "Strongly condemns" the U.S. and Israel, inter alia, for "collaboration" with South Africa. (U.S. voted No) (33/40)

109—Program Budget for the Biennium 1978-1979: (Vote A): Increased the amount \$996,372,900 appropriated by resolution 33/180A by the amount of \$93,740,600. (U.S. voted No) (33/205-A)

110—Budget for the Biennium 1978-1979 (Vote A): Increased the amount of \$985,913,300 appropriated by resolution 32/213A by the amount of \$10,459,600. (U.S. voted No) (33/180-A)

111—The situation in the Middle East: Condemns Israeli occupation of Arab territories and calls for a Geneva peace Conference with representation of all parties including the PLO. (U.S. Voted No) (33/29)

B. WORLD CONFERENCE TO COMBAT RACISM AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, AUGUST 14-25, 1978, GENEVA

112—Vote on Paragraph 18, Declaration and Program of Action: Condemned relations between Israel and South Africa and the "insidious propaganda by the Government of Israel and its Zionist and other supporters against the United Nations organs and against governments which have advocated firm action against apartheid." (U.S. did not participate).

113—Vote on Paragraph 19, Declaration and Program of Action: Accuses Israel of racial discrimination against Palestinian and other Arabs (U.S. did not participate).

Footnote: During 1978, UNESCO held its 20th biennial General Conference from October 24 to November 28. Although UNESCO does not record votes, votes of the U.S. and other like-minded states on three significant resolutions were recorded by U.S. Del:

Agenda Item 12: UNESCO Biennium Budget: Increased the Biennium program budget for the organization by 35%. 103-12 (U.S. Voted No).

Agenda Item 21: Jerusalem: Condemns the Israeli authorities for archaeological excavations in Jerusalem, "altering the character" of the city, and attempting to "Judaize" it. 67-24 (U.S. Israel, EC-9, Austria, Switzerland, the Nordic countries, Colombia, Paraguay, Honduras, Japan, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand). (U.S. voted No)

Agenda Item 62: Arab Occupied Territories: Accuses Israel of violating cultural and educational rights in the territories occupied by Israel since 1967 and calls on the Director General to "exercise full supervision" of educational and cultural institutions in the occupied territories. 56-6 (U.S., Israel, Australia, Canada, Honduras, and Paraguay)—26 (U.S. voted No.)

EXPLANATION OF TABLES

"Yes": Voted in favor of resolution adopted by consensus.

"No": Voted against.

"ABS": Abstained.

"ABT": Absent, nonparticipating, or nonmember.

"W": Withdrew from conference.

"*": Declined to participate in conference.

AF REGIONAL PROFILE

	UNGA										WCCRD		
	Chile 101	Israel		Resources 104	PLO 105	Information 106	Energy 107	Rhodesia 108	Budgets		Middle East 111	Par. 18 112	Par. 19 113
		102	103						109	110			
Angola	Yes	Yes	No	ABT	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABT	ABT	Yes	Yes	Yes
Benin	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABT	ABT
Botswana	Yes	Yes	ABT	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Burundi	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cameroun	Yes	Yes	ABS	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABS	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cape Verde Islands	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABT	ABT	Yes	ABT	ABT
Central African Empire	ABS	ABS	ABS	ABS	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABS	ABT	Yes	Yes	ABS	ABS
Chad	ABS	Yes	ABS	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABS	ABT	Yes	Yes	ABT	ABT
Comoros	ABT	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABT	ABT	ABT	ABT	ABT	ABT
Congo	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABT	Yes	Yes	ABT	ABT
Djibouti	ABT	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABT	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABT	ABT
Equatorial Guinea	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABT	ABT	ABT	ABT	ABT	ABT
Ethiopia	Yes	ABS	ABS	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Gabon	Yes	ABT	ABT	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABS	ABT	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Gambia	ABT	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABS	ABT	ABT	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ghana	Yes	ABS	ABS	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABS	ABT	ABT	Yes	ABT	ABT
Guinea	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Guinea Bissau	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABT	ABT
Ivory Coast	Yes	ABS	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABT	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABT	ABT
Kenya	Yes	ABS	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABS	Yes	Yes	ABS	ABS	Yes
Lesotho	Yes	ABS	ABS	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABS	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Liberia	ABT	ABS	ABS	Yes	Yes	ABS	ABT	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABT.
Madagascar	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABS.
Malawi	Yes	ABS	ABS	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABT.
Mali	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABT.
Mauritania	ABS	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABT.
Mauritius	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABT.
Mozambique	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes.
Niger	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes.
Nigeria	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes.
Rwanda	Yes	ABS	ABS	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes.
Sao Tome/Principe	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes.
Senegal	ABT	ABT	ABT	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes.
Seychelles	ABT	ABT	ABT	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes.
Sierra Leone	Yes	ABS	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABT.
Somalia	ABS	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes.
South Africa	ABT	ABT	ABT	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABT.
Sudan	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes.
Swaziland	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes.
Tanzania	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes.
Togo	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes.
Uganda	ABS	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes.
Upper Volta	ABS	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes.
Zaire	ABT	ABT	ABT	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes.
Zambia	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes.
United States	ABS	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes.

AF REGIONAL PROFILE PERCENTAGE BREAKDOWN, 33D UNGA
[In percent]

	Voting with United States	Voting with U.S.S.R.	Abstaining
101-----	0	71.0	29.0
102-----	0	62.0	28.0
103-----	4.4	57.7	37.9
104-----	0	12.0	88.0
105-----	3.0	77.0	20.0
108-----	0	51.0	49.0
111-----	0	82.0	18.0
112-----	(1)	47.0	53.0
113-----	(1)	47.0	53.0
		Yes	Absent or abstaining
On budget issues 109 and 110 the United States and the U.S.S.R. both voted no, while the African vote was divided as follows:			
109-----		71	29
110-----		82	18

¹ United States did not attend conference.

IMPORTANT ISSUES PROFILE 1977

The profile compares the positions of the U.S. and other countries on multi-lateral issues of importance to us. The U.N. General Assembly is the chief element in the profile but other important meetings inside and outside the U.N. system are also reviewed for inclusion if recorded votes are taken and if all or most U.N. members are in attendance. This year, in addition to the General Assembly, the profile includes two votes at the ILO General Conference which were instrumental in the U.S. decision to withdraw from that organization.

A. 63D ANNUAL ILO CONFERENCE, JUNE 1-22, 1977, GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

101—Conference Committee Report: Cited non-compliance with ILO conventions and statutes by communist countries (Committee report was rejected by ILO Conference, only the second time in ILO's history that this has occurred). (U.S. voted for the report)

102—Article 17 Amendment: Previously approved by the ILO Governing Body but rejected by the Conference, amendment would have allowed closer control over introduction of resolutions at ILO Conferences to reduce likelihood of introduction of contentious political issues not germane to ILO proceedings. (U.S. voted for)

NOTES

A. Positions shown are those taken by government representatives. Employer and worker representatives may have voted differently.

B. Abstentions and absentees were tantamount to "no" votes since they prevented attainment of a quorum.

Both motions were defeated by lack of quorum rather than by a straight vote.

B. ACTIVITY AT 32D U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY (ALL BALLOTINGS PLENARY, EXCEPT WHERE NOTED)

103—Economic Collaboration with South Africa: Calls for economic sanctions which Security Council alone may impose. (U.S. voted no) (32/105G)

104—Economic Relations between Israel and South Africa: Condemns Israel for its trade with South Africa though that trade amounted to less than 1% of South Africa's total world trade last year. (U.S. voted no) (32/105D)

105—Assistance to National Liberation Movements of South Africa: Calls for assistance to liberation movements seeking overthrow of legitimate government. (U.S. voted no) (32/105J)

106—Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa: Goes further than Security Council arms embargo; and calls on U.S. to obtain South Africa's accession to the non-Proliferation Treaty and acceptance of IAEA safeguards. (U.S. voted no) (32/105F)

107—Establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in South Asia: Calls for but, importantly, does not impose nuclear-free zone on regional member states. (U.S. voted yes) (32/83)

108—Vote on the 1978-79 Program Budget: Biennium budget totals \$986 million, an increase of \$196 million over 1976-77 without identification, reduction, or elimination of marginally effective programs. (U.S. abstained) (32/213A)

109—Question of Palestine: Calls for establishment of Secretariat for Palestinian Rights Committee; U.S. had opposed creation of Committee in 1975 because of its one-sided mandate and unrepresentative membership. (U.S. voted no) (32/40B)

110—Deferral of Establishment of a High Commissioner for Human Rights: A delay tactic pushed, in particular, by Cuba, decision refers consideration of High Commissioner proposal to the Commission on Human Rights. (U.S. voted no) (Committee 5 vote)

111—U.N. Role in Human Rights Issues: Expands focus of U.N. activities in human rights field to include collective, as well as individual rights. (U.S. abstained)

112—Common Fund: Clearly places blame for lack of progress in CF negotiations on developed countries. (U.S. abstained) (32/193)

113—Overview: Calls for establishment of a Committee of the Whole to meet intersessionally on North-South issues with oversight functions but without negotiating power. (U.S. voted yes) (32/174) (Adopted without vote)

114—Missing persons in Cyprus: Invites parties concerned to continue co-operating in the establishment of a joint committee to trace missing persons in Cyprus. (U.S. voted yes) (32/128) (Adopted without vote)

115—Safety of International Civil Aviation: Reaffirms condemnation of acts of aerial hijacking and appears to all states to accede to Tokyo, The Hague and Montreal Conventions. (U.S. voted yes) (38/2) (Adopted by consensus)

Mr. SOLARZ. I wonder, since I am sure you can probably generalize from that data without actually seeing it in front of you, on non-African issues that were of particular importance to use, issues that didn't directly engage Africa's economic interests, is it possible for you to give us at this point a characterization of how the Africans voted? Did they split down the middle; were they by and large generally supportive of our position; or were they by and large generally in opposition?

Mr. HELMAN. I think by and large in the General Assembly, most Africans would, in past General Assemblies, not be found voting on the same side of important issues as we vote. It is important to understand that.

Mr. SOLARZ. I am talking about non-African issues.

Mr. HELMAN. I would include non-African issues as well. A lot of these non-African issues, for example, are issues of particular importance to the Third World governments, and the African group would tend to join with the nonaligned governments and Third World governments in general.

Also on Middle Eastern questions, there has been over the years in the General Assembly a basic bargain between Arab governments and African governments, in which Arab governments have given unquestioned support to the black African position on southern Africa or anticolonial positions in general, and African governments by and large have given uncritical support to the Arab position on the Middle East.

Mr. SOLARZ. What about on Puerto Rico?

Mr. HELMAN. On Puerto Rico, in the Committee of 24, because Puerto Rico has been characterized as a colonial issue, you will find that most African governments have supported listing Puerto Rico as non-self-governing territory subject to the jurisdiction of the Committee of 24. They have not by and large agreed with our position.

I should add to that, though, among African diplomats I think we have found a growing understanding and substantial sympathy and some behind the scenes support for our position, but that has not always been expressed in the voting record.

Mr. SOLARZ. You indicate in your testimony that there were trade-offs in the United Nations and other multilateral institutions where we supported the concerns of other countries and they supported our concerns. Can you give us any examples involving the votes of African countries at the United Nations where you think they were inclined, they voted in such a way as to be helpful to our concerns as a result of things that we had done which were sympathetic to their concerns?

Mr. HELMAN. Let me give you two instances, one of which involved a vote the other day. One instance occurred at the World Health Assembly earlier this year where there was a concerted effort by Arab governments to expel Israel and, in one or two ways, to punish Egypt in the wake of the Camp David agreements and signing by Egypt and Israel of a peace treaty.

We are convinced, both from statements in public and private by African governments, that the support that this administration has given issues of genuine consequence to African governments, especially in southern Africa, led these African governments to be more sensitive to our interests with respect to these kinds of Middle Eastern questions. There is no doubt in our mind that without the strong support and the arithmetically essential support of most African governments, we would not have been able to turn back this effort to expel Israel from the WHO.

Mr. SOLARZ. It is quite clear that the primary political concern of the African countries has to do with the constellation of issues involving southern Africa. Would you say that is a fair assessment?

Mr. HELMAN. Yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. It is probably also fair to say that in the last few years, our diplomacy has generally been more sympathetic to that position than it has been in the past? Presumably one would hope that would generate some measure of good will on the part of the African countries with respect to our own diplomacy.

I would like to ask you whether, in those terms, you think a relevant distinction can be made between the extent to which our diplomatic support for efforts to achieve majority rule in southern Africa, has generated good will regarding economic issues of direct economic significance to African countries, such as the kind of issues we were speaking about previously with Mr. Bergsten, on the one hand, and regarding more political issues on the other, involving the Middle East, involving Puerto Rico, involving nuclear disarmament, in which the African countries don't have a direct economic interest, and in which often there may not be a direct political interest.

Now, do you see any difference in the extent to which our good will has produced actual movement on economic issues as opposed to political issues, or is that not a particularly relevant distinction?

Mr. HELMAN. It is obviously very hard to quantify. I think I can say that when we have something to say to African governments, the door is open, they listen to us. They obviously don't always agree with us, but that is quite a change over what it was several years ago, and that in itself is worth having because that gives rise to possibilities in the future.

But as I say, African governments are interested in trade-offs and in the economic field they are interested in trade-offs as well. And while we have good will with them, because I think they credit us with strong positive effort with respect to southern Africa, many Africans are going to ask themselves should they breakoff their relationship with Arab-OPEC countries in exchange for what?

I am not in a position to comment in any detail on the relationship between African governments and Arab-OPEC governments, but I think it is general knowledge that there has been some assistance actually given, and a great deal more promised. To the African governments trying to calculate costs and benefits, what would they get in

exchange if they were to express what I think many of them probably feel, that they are being made to suffer cruelly because of the price rises. What do they get in exchange for speaking out like that, for joining others in applying political pressure to OPEC governments?

There has got to be some benefit to them aside from rhetorical.

Mr. SOLARZ. One final question before I yield to Mrs. Fenwick.

From time to time allegations have been brought about a certain amount of vote-buying going on at the United Nations in which the votes of delegates are purchased in exchange for individual considerations. Such allegations have always been made about vote-buying at the OAU. In my recent trip to Morocco in August, the Moroccans contended quite vehemently one of the reasons they lost out at the OAU in the resolution on the Western Sahara was that up to seven or eight African heads of state had been bribed by I think the Libyans, the Algerians, to vote against the Moroccan position.

Do we have any evidence at all, any indication, any reason to believe that in fact the votes of African delegates have been purchased in that sense either at the United Nations or at OAU or any other international forum?

Mr. HELMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have heard similar rumors, reports with respect to the United Nations, to the OAU, to the nonaligned meeting in Havana, but I can't document them.

Mr. SOLARZ. Have we ever attempted to investigate?

Mr. HELMAN. I think a number of years ago we have, but I think our ability to develop information on that is very limited.

Mr. SOLARZ. What do you personally believe?

Mr. HELMAN. I think I could go only so far as to say that I suspect that in dealing with African governments benefits are suggested, relating not to bribes so much as to what can flow from cooperation nationally. And suggestions are made as to what the negative consequences of noncooperation would be.

Mr. SOLARZ. Bribing a country seems to be OK; that goes on all the time. The questions is whether you bribe diplomats.

Mr. HELMAN. Whether it has gotten down to the individual, I don't know. I have heard reports. Some of the reports have a good deal of credibility, but I can't comment.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mrs. Fenwick?

Mrs. FENWICK. I wonder if you could tell us which African nation supported the ASEAN position, the Pol Pot, and which supported the Cuban Heng Samrin.

Mr. HELMAN. I would have to submit that for the record.

Mrs. FENWICK. Could you?

[The information referred to follows:]

1976 KEY TO REGIONAL PROFILE

ACTIVITY AT NAM SUMMIT, COLOMBO, SRI LANKA

101—Puerto Rico: Called for self-determination and independence, and asked the Committee of 24 to recommend to the UNGA effective measures for decolonization.

102—Korea: Endorsed hard line, North Korean position on issue of reunification, and called for withdrawal of foreign troops.

ACTIVITY AT 31ST UNGA (ALL BALLOTINGS PLENARY, EXCEPT WHERE NOTED)

103—Korea: Action taken on friendly and hostile draft resolution prior to mutual withdrawal.

104—Guam: Strongly deprecated presence of U.S. military installations. (31/58)

CHANGES OF VOTE FROM COMMITTEE TO PLENARY

(1) was absent in committee vote

(2) voted in favor in committee

(3) abstained in committee

(4) voted against in committee

105—South Africa: Singled out 5 western countries (including the U.S.) as supplying weapons to South Africa. (31/6D)

106—South Africa: Strongly condemned collaboration between 5 western countries (including the U.S.) and South Africa in nuclear and military fields. (31/7)

107—South Africa: Condemned collaboration of 6 western countries (including the U.S.) with South Africa in economic, military, and nuclear fields. (31/33)

108—ENMOD: Established priority in committee for voting on draft friendly resolution.

109—ENMOD: Plenary vote on friendly resolution. (31/72)

110—NPT Review: Plenary vote on. (31/75)

111—CIEC: Noted with concern that most developed countries of CIEC had not shown necessary political will to achieve concrete results. (31/14)

112—IDS, NIEO, etc.: Linked IDS (to which we agreed) with CERDS and NIEO (with which we had entered strong reservations). (31/178)

113—Debt: Advocated rescheduling, and moratoria where appropriate, for all LDCs, regardless of individual situations. (31/158)

114—Questions of Palestine: We have refused to participate in the Committee's work since its inception due to its one-sided terms of reference and its unbalanced representation. (31/20)

115—Implementation of Program for Decade to Combat Racism: We continue not to participate in the Decade until the link between Zionism and racism is broken. (31/77)

116—Chile: Resolution did not take note of release of political prisoners. (31/124)

VOTES ON KEY BALLOTINGS IN BY AFRICAN COUNTRIES

	Identification No.											Factor
	10001	10002	10003	10004	10005	10006	10007	10008	10009	10010	10011	
Botswana	Yes	ABS	Yes	Yes	ABS	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	.273
Burundi	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	ABS	No	Yes	No	ABT	ABT	Yes	.111
Cameroun	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABS	Yes	No	Yes	No	ABT	ABT	Yes	.136
Cape Verde Islands	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	ABT	ABT	ABT	.125
Central African Republic	Yes	No	No	ABT	No	Yes	No	Yes	ABT	ABT	ABT	1.000
Chad	Yes	ABS	ABS	No	Yes	ABS	Yes	ABS	Yes	Yes	Yes	.273
Congo (Brazzaville)	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABT	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	.100
Benin	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	.091
Equatorial Guinea	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	ABS	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	.091
Ethiopia	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABS	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	.227
Gabon	Yes	No	ABS	ABS	ABS	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	.636
Gambia	Yes	No	No	ABS	ABS	Yes	ABT	Yes	ABT	ABT	ABS	.571
Ghana	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	ABS	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	.227
Guinea	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	.091
Ivory Coast	Yes	No	ABS	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	.682
Kenya	Yes	ABS	ABS	Yes	ABS	ABS	ABS	ABS	Yes	Yes	Yes	.455
Lesotho	Yes	No	ABS	ABS	ABS	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	.591
Liberia	Yes	No	ABS	ABS	ABS	Yes	No	Yes	ABT	ABT	ABT	.938
Madagascar	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	.091
Malawi	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	ABS	Yes	ABS	.818
Mali	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	.091
Mauritania	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	.091
Mauritius	Yes	No	ABS	No	ABS	Yes	ABS	Yes	ABT	ABT	ABT	.125
Mozambique	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	.500
Niger	Yes	No	ABS	No	Yes	No	ABS	ABS	Yes	Yes	Yes	.364
Nigeria	Yes	ABS	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	.136
Guinea-Bissau	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	.091
Rwanda	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	.091
Senegal	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	.091
Sierra Leone	Yes	No	ABS	Yes	ABS	No	ABS	ABS	Yes	Yes	Yes	.500
Somalia	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	ABS	ABS	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	.091
South Africa	ABT	ABT	ABT	ABT	ABT	ABT	ABT	ABT	ABT	ABT	ABT	.000
Sudan	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	.091
Swaziland	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	.727
Tanzania	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	.091
Togo	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABS	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	.227
Uganda	Yes	ABT	ABT	No	ABS	No	Yes	ABT	Yes	Yes	Yes	.188
Upper Volta	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABS	ABT	ABT	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	.389
Zaire	Yes	ABS	ABS	Yes	ABS	ABS	ABS	ABS	Yes	Yes	Yes	.455
Zambia	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABS	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	.227
Sao Tome	Yes	Yes	ABT	ABT	ABS	No	Yes	No	ABT	ABT	ABT	.143
Comoro Islands	Yes	ABT	Yes	ABT	Yes	No	Yes	ABT	Yes	Yes	Yes	.167
United States	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	1.000

1974 KEY BALLOTINGS

Palestine : Palestinian rights, No. 39 ; U.N. status for PLO, No. 40.

Cambodia : Priority for U.S.-supported resolution, No. 42 ; U.S.-supported resolution, No. 43 ; amendment of credentials committee report to exclude Khmer Republic, No. 119.

Korea : Friendly resolution in committee, No. 100 ; motion not to vote on hostile resolution in committee, No. 101 ; hostile resolution in committee, No. 102 ; friendly resolution in plenary, No. 130.

Charter of economic rights and duties : Various U.S.-sponsored amendments to text, No. 140, No. 141, No. 143, No. 147, No. 149 ; resolution in committee, No. 189.

1975 KEY BALLOTINGS

Transnational corporations, No. 1.

Korea : Committee hostile priority, No. 2 ; friendly, No. 8 ; hostile, No. 3—Plenary friendly, No. 6 ; hostile, No. 7.

Zionism-racism : Postponement, No. 4 ; resolution, No. 5.

Decolonization : Military bases, No. 9 ; report of special committee, No. 10 ; Samoa, etc., No. 11.

Breakdown of African votes on UNGA setting of Pol Pot Delegation for Kampuchea. Total vote—71 (U.S.)—35-34.

Yes—17 : (Chad, Comoros, Gabon, Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Togo, Upper Volta, Zaire).

No—11 : (Benin, Cape Verde, Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone).

Abstentions—11 : (Botswana, Burundi, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Malawi, Mali, Rwanda, Uganda, Cameroon, Tanzania, Zambia).
(U.S. voted yes.)

Mr. HELMAN. I think generally you would find that the governments more in the radical fringe of the African group would have supported Cuba and the Soviet Union.

Mrs. FENWICK. I think we could guess almost. I would like to know.

Mr. HELMAN. Libya, Ethiopia, I suppose.

Mrs. FENWICK. Mozambique?

Mr. HELMAN. Angola. I will check.

Mrs. FENWICK. Angola?

Mr. HELMAN. Yes.

Mrs. FENWICK. In other words, where the Cubans are you could pretty well tell they would?

Mr. HELMAN. Yes.

Mrs. FENWICK. I think that is interesting.

You ask what they might get in return for some clearer voice as to what the OPEC price-rises have done to them. What they might get is a drop in the price of oil if the OPEC countries really care that they might be attacked by the whole world, asking why they are doing this. That is what they might get.

But I suppose that is not direct enough and sure enough that is the problem.

Mr. HELMAN. I think that is probably too true.

Mrs. FENWICK. Probably one of the biggest—

Mr. HELMAN. After all, Libya is a member of the OAU.

Mrs. FENWICK. That is right.

Mr. HELMAN. Algeria is a member of the Organization of African Unity, as in Nigeria.

Mrs. FENWICK. The three of them?

Mr. HELMAN. That is right.

Mrs. FENWICK. I notice in your testimony something that turned up very clearly in a conversation with the Prime Minister of one of the nonaligned countries—not an African country—he was telling us what had happened to his people, 94 percent dependent for energy on oil, and the catastrophe it had imposed on the whole country. That was in the beginning of this interview, and he moved on to the next few topics, and the suggestion was, in fact not a suggestion, a statement, “We have a weapon; the oil of the OPEC countries,” and I said “How can you call it your weapon since it is turned so much, against you?”

And the answer was just what your testimony suggests. “Ah, but it really kills the developed countries. It really kills the European countries and America.”

Now, that is, I think, an element, isn't it, as you suggest in your testimony, it is an element. “We will get back at the big boys,” and I don't know how we are going to counter that. The next topic, of course, was, a little more transfer of resources. In other words, those countries which are developed had better hand over. It is a funny mixture of motives, isn't it?

Mr. HELMAN. Yes, I agree it is a funny mixture of motives. I think it is important to understand that African governments well appreciate what the issues are.

Mrs. FENWICK. I would like to point out this was not an African government.

Mr. HELMAN. No, but I think what you have told me about the non-aligned government I think would apply just as well.

Mrs. FENWICK. It was so horrid I wouldn't want the African countries to be slapped with that. It was not an African country.

Well, what do you see? How are we going to handle all of this? And I would like some opinion from you as to the effect of all these loans.

Mr. Bergsten didn't shown any immediate desire to stop loaning, I regret to say. We had this conversation earlier when I was on the Banking Committee—because it has been troubling me for some time, long before Mr. Castro spoke of it.

What is your opinion of that? Doesn't that contribute to bad will, Mr. Helman?

Mr. HELMAN. I think probably psychologically, politically, it does. It is a strongly held contention on the part of not only African governments but of nonaligned governments generally.

It is a matter that they insist continue on the international agenda of North/South issues, and something that in some fashion we will have to be addressing in years ahead.

Mrs. FENWICK. Wouldn't it be wiser to address their needs with gifts rather than loans?

I mean it is all a fantasy, in a way; if we are going to debase our currencies by spending what we haven't got, it might as well be a gift that does not incur ill will and resentment as a loan that does.

Of course, it would put the World Bank out of business. Might it be better to have one agency that was multinational and in which the African nations had their vote? They could then decide under what conditions and to what projects this money would be given. Wouldn't it be a sounder approach to the——

Mr. HELMAN. Mrs. Fenwick, my main problem in responding is I think I sympathize with a lot of what you say. I am not an expert, nor do I deal normally with these kinds of issues.

Mrs. FENWICK. Politically?

Mr. HELMAN. Politically there is no question.

Mrs. FENWICK. Politically there is no question of that. That is what I believe.

Thank you.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you.

Mr. Helman, what was the reaction of the African states to Ambassador Young's resignation?

Mr. HELMAN. I think I can probably best answer that by going back to my own personal association with Ambassador Young that dates to when he came into office back in 1977.

Mr. SOLARZ. Can you speak a little louder?

Mr. HELMAN. I am sorry. I think I can best answer that by addressing my own personal experience with Ambassador Young when he came into office back in 1977.

I received a remarkable education, I think, in both his contribution to American diplomacy and his relations with African governments and with Third World governments.

I have never in my experience observed someone who had so much immediate credibility with Third World governments and African governments in particular.

Mr. SOLARZ. What did you attribute that to?

Mr. HELMAN. I think I attributed that to two things. Both because he represented a series of policies which other governments, which African governments were persuaded marked a general departure—

Mr. SOLARZ. He personally or the government?

Mr. HELMAN. Both. But, he spoke for the President and second, I think there is a personal element here too and that is in his own life he had in a sense paid his dues on some of the same issues that were of deep concern to African governments. His contribution to American diplomacy in the Third World and to our African policy in particular is without parallel.

I think that what he has contributed has had and is having a continuing effect. I don't think African governments feel that now Andy has gone the policy has disappeared.

I hope they are persuaded, and I know Andy himself has sought to continue to persuade them that that policy is a policy of this administration and that Andy isn't losing interest, nor is he losing political authority with respect to many of these issues.

I have not seen any backlash in our African policy as a consequence of Andy's resignation. I suspect that individual African diplomats are concerned and worried as to what the consequences might be, but I think if they study what we have been doing since Andy left, they will see that there is a continuum and that we have not backed off.

Mr. SOLARZ. Why do you think a lot of African countries voted for the Zionism and racism resolution?

Mr. HELMAN. I think there were two factors. First, this goes back, of course, to 1967-1977, excuse me—I think in part it was a tradeoff between the Africans and the Arabs involving mutual support for issues of primary consequence to each.

I think the second element was that to Africans, racism is a cardinal issue, a cardinal problem, an issue on which they have taken an extraordinarily strong and determined stand because to them it equates with apartheid and with the whole history of colonialism in Africa, and I think that many Africans were misled into equating Zionism with racism.

I think that when someone suggests to many Africans that there is a situation in which one group of people is dominant or is occupying another group of people, and that there is some relationship of superior to inferior, it begins to be easy to equate with racism.

Mrs. FENWICK. This interests them because Arabs and Israelis are the same family, the semitic race. This question of colonialism never occurs to African nations about the Baltic countries, but Russia is occupying these small independent countries, members of the League of Nations. Have the Africans risen on that score?

Mr. HELMAN. No; they haven't.

Mrs. FENWICK. Of course not.

Well now, there is something more then; there is some irrationality.

Mr. HELMAN. There may well be.

Mr. SOLARZ. One final question.

Over the course of the last several years we have, I think, essentially tried two different approaches at the United Nations. One, embodied by Ambassador Moynihan, was a kind of tough and confrontational approach to the issues which came up in the United Nations in which we had differences with many Third World countries, and then under Ambassador Young we seemed to try a more conciliatory and compromising approach, in which we tried to avoid angry rhetoric at the United Nations on issues where we had differences with Third World countries, in terms of American objectives at the United Nations and elsewhere around the world.

Is it possible either of those two approaches was more productive than the other, or did it, in the final analysis, not make much difference?

Mr. HELMAN. It does make a difference. I think both approaches, in a sense, have their place. It is important for us to speak our minds on issues of importance to us. We should not let other groups of countries be in doubt as to what our convictions are and what our policies are.

Style, of course, is very important. A willingness to accommodate, to compromise is very important. One has to have a policy in order to do that.

Mr. SOLARZ. Obviously other countries, like other individuals, would prefer you not to tell them off to their face. That generates a certain amount of unpleasantness. On the other hand, in the world of international diplomacy, does a policy of avoiding rhetorical confrontations and explicitly describing and denouncing differences produce any difference in the voting behavior of the countries involved?

Mr. HELMAN. I think probably quite the contrary. It often will inspire others to vote against you out of spite on some issues.

Let me mention one thing, if I could. Policy changed not with Andy Young; the policy changed with William Scranton. I wanted to mention that because I admire Mr. Scranton very, very much.

Mr. SOLARZ. Go ahead.

Mr. HELMAN. Well, I simply wanted to say that that policy changed and style changed with William Scranton, and I think Andy picked

up from there and added a great deal more, but William Scranton did a great deal to change our position.

Mr. SOLARZ. A number of people have speculated the next Secretary General of the United Nations may be an African. To what extent do you think that is likely and, if it did happen, to what extent would it produce any change in the policy of the United Nations or Secretary General?

Mr. HELMAN. I have heard the same story, the same understanding, and I think two things:

With the Africans relying on the United Nations and its institutions as much as they do, and their being as dominant in terms of numbers as they are, it would not be surprising were the Africans to come forward with a candidate to replace Mr. Waldheim. I don't know when they will decide to do so. I don't know what Mr. Waldheim's plans are. It would not be a surprising development.

What effect it will have, I think, will depend very much upon the personality of the individual.

Secretaries General have tended to be stronger or weaker, depending upon their assessment of their political position vis-a-vis the major groupings of the United Nations. I think we will find an African personality playing the same role.

I should add this: The Africans in general have been insisting upon playing an increasingly important role consonant with their proportional representation in the bureaucracies of international institutions in general.

Mr. SOLARZ. I want to thank you very much. We may submit some additional questions for you to answer for the record.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

U.S. INTERESTS IN AFRICA

Political Trends in Africa: Socialism, Democracy, and Military Regimes

MONDAY, OCTOBER 29, 1979

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 3:35 p.m. in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Stephen J. Solarz (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. SOLARZ. The subcommittee is called to order.

Today, the Subcommittee on Africa is holding the seventh in a series of hearings on U.S. interests in Africa. In our session this afternoon, we will focus upon the political trends on the African Continent.

In the two decades since most African countries achieved independence, there have been pronounced shifts in the form of government maintained by many of these nations. Between 1960 and 1974, almost all English- and French-speaking African nations came to power with a constitutionally elected democratic government. For a variety of political and economic reasons, however, many of these democracies were replaced by military or authoritarian regimes.

This trend is illustrated in nations which have replaced multiparty political processes with military or single-party regimes. Recently, however, Nigeria, Ghana, and Upper Volta have reversed the trend for authoritarian and military regimes, and have adopted democratic systems of government.

One of the points we will examine today is whether the political experience of these three nations holds any special significance to the rest of the continent.

While the movement to democracy in West Africa constitutes a hopeful development, an analysis of African politics does not offer a one-dimensional. The number of military coups on the continent has not declined substantially. While Kenya, Gabon, Senegal, the Ivory Coast, and other nations have remained opposed to socialism, there is still a tendency throughout the continent to move away from capitalism and toward some type of socialist rule.

Today, we will be comparing and contrasting socialist, democratic, and military regimes in Africa. We will also be considering what implications African political trends hold for U.S. policy and whether

Western-style democracy has any relevance to developing countries in Africa.

To help us chart those trends, we will hear from three distinguished scholars who are familiar with the nuances of African politics.

Our first witness will be Prof. Richard Sklar, of the University of California at Los Angeles, who grew up in or near the district which I now represent, and who is Brooklyn's contribution to the world of African scholars. A professor of political science, and a member of the African Studies Center at UCLA, Professor Sklar served as a research fellow and faculty member at universities in Nigeria and Zambia. Last year, he gave our subcommittee the benefit of his wisdom on the question of U.S. private investment in South Africa.

Following Professor Sklar, we will hear from Prof. James Turner of Cornell University. An associate professor of Afro-American studies, Professor Turner has served since 1969 as Director of the African Studies and Research Center at Cornell.

Our third witness, whom I gather will be joining us shortly, will be Prof. Robert Rotberg, who teaches political science and history at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Professor Rotberg last testified before our subcommittee earlier this year on the issue of U.S. sanctions against Rhodesia.

Professor Sklar, why don't you lead off? If you like, you may feel free to summarize your testimony, or read it, as the case may be.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD SKLAR, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES

Mr. SKLAR. Thank you very much, Congressman Solarz.

Indeed, I am a spiritual constituent, having, in fact, gone to school, I think, within the boundaries of your district. There are so many people from Brooklyn who contribute so substantially and well to international politics in general that it is difficult to claim any particular distinction, even from that rather qualitative and exclusive group, although it is now, as I said, a rather large group.

I want to begin by commenting on a point you, yourself, made in introducing the subject. Ever since the onset of the independence era, since the end of the Second World War, during which time all but three, I believe, of the present members of the Organization for African Unity became independent, there has been a very substantial upheaval of politics and forms of government.

Most of the postcolonial states were constitutional and parliamentary in form, but most of these countries had governments that were designed by the colonial powers, and they were found by the African leaders to be unsatisfactory in many ways. Some of them had explosive defects harbored within their political forms. This was particularly the case with Nigeria and with Zaire.

As a result, during the 1960's, one after another of these countries replaced their inherited political forms by authoritarian and military forms of government, and many of the analysts and commentators on African politics then reached a hasty and premature conclusion. They decided that liberal and constitutional government was doomed in Africa, that we were about to begin an era of authoritarian rule. A

good many of the commentators and analysts went so far as to say that democratic government was not suited to African society.

These prophecies of doom and gloom have been falsified in Africa today. Liberal government and constitutional government has been revived in Africa on a grand scale. Nigeria, the largest African country, with 90 to 100 million people, approximately 20 percent of the entire African population, has chosen to reconstruct her political system upon foundations of constitutional liberty. Ghana has made a similar choice. I think that these events will have a tremendous impact upon political thought and practice throughout Africa.

However, most Western analysts and commentators really have not appreciated the significance of this event. One wonders if that lack of appreciation does not reflect a bias which screens out the democratic reality of African politics.

Mr. SOLARZ. I gather, Professor, that you are not referring to the article that I wrote for the Washington Post on exactly this point.

Mr. SKLAR. No; and I am pleased and not surprised to know that you wrote it, because it really cannot be stressed too forcefully. Ethnocentric bias is still a problem in our relations with Africa, and in our ability to interpret the realities of that society.

If we take the Nigerian example, it is really remarkable. After a bitter civil war, Nigeria gave the world a stunning example of Christian charity and rationality in reconciliation between victors and vanquished. The military government said that it would restore constitutional rule by 1976. When the head of state reneged on that promise, he was removed.

His successors proved to be exemplary constitutionalists. The all-civilian constitutional committee that they appointed produced a document which really belongs in the annals of constitutional thought. It is really an extraordinary document, which should be studied by students of constitutional history and contemporary constitutional thought. It was debated for a year in a debate that was focused by the notably free Nigerian press. The draft was then scrutinized by a constituent assembly, leading to free elections.

Now, I want to make this point. During the course of that debate, the question of party competition was very carefully studied, and the drafting committee and the constituent assembly rejected all non-competitive options in favor of freedom of association to compete for control of the government.

While there are restrictions against ethnic, religious, or sectional parties, there are no limitations on the number of parties which can be formed, and there are no ideological restrictions. This deeply considered decision in favor of liberty and competitive political democracy by Africa's largest country is one of the most significant political events in the current era.

In Africa today, I would say that it certainly ranks with the liberation movement in southern Africa as the two great events of contemporary African history.

In Ghana, we have had something of a similar development, where the struggle for political liberty was again richly rewarded, despite the severe hardships imposed by the economic conditions, and ambiguous attitudes on the part of military rulers.

The Ghanaian intelligentsia simply was not prepared to accept the idea of a form of representation that was not based upon political parties. It is interesting that there have been four military governments in Ghana since 1966, and three of them have been constitutionalist in principle rather than authoritarian; the regime which took over in June 1979, the one that executed the heads of three previous military regimes, did not interfere with Ghana's return to constitutional government based upon free and competitive elections.

Now, if we exclude the Mediterranean countries, consider that roughly one African out of every four now lives in a genuinely liberal democracy. The governments concerned, those that are based upon freedom of political association to compete with control of the state, are five in number, in addition to the two large countries, Ghana and Nigeria, include Botswana, the Gambia, and Mauritius.

Various other African countries have distinctively liberal features in their systems of government. Senegal, Upper Volta, Egypt, Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia, can be so described. As we know, the cause of African liberty has recently been bolstered by the creation of a Commission on Human Rights under the auspices of the OAU, to draw up a chapter of human rights.

The well-known overthrow of the three notorious tyrannies this year can be considered part of a general trend, and not an anomalous or an exceptional occurrence.

From political democracy, let me turn to the question of socialism, or the quest for democratic equality in economic life.

In Africa, of course, as elsewhere, people become Socialists for different reasons. Some, like Nyerere, Kaunda, and Nigeria's Aminu Kano, are deeply indignant at the spectacle of deprivation and injustice. Others, like Sekou Toure or the late Kwame Nkrumah, have doctrinal commitments, believing in central planning, and in state investment as the main method of economic development.

Still others, like Samora Machel and Mengistu Haile Mariam, become Socialists during the course of struggles which are revolutionary in nature, in which they are assisted by Socialist allies. These and other motivations are reinforced by widely accepted, and very plausible Socialist doctrines that attribute the underdevelopment of Africa to capitalist exploitation.

Despite the wide appeal of socialism in Africa, relatively few African countries are presently governed by regimes that actually discourage or prohibit private enterprise, and that adhere to specifically Socialist principles of economic organization. There are some 10 countries, I think, that are of that kind. All of these countries, the ones that specifically adhere to Socialist principles of economic organization, are admittedly one-party or military regimes that reject the basic principles of liberal or constitutional government. At the same time, the liberal democracies in Africa today, all without exception, have adopted capitalist strategies of economic development.

At this time, and for our purposes here, I want to emphasize the strong ties between liberalism and socialism in Africa. I want to emphasize that in two different ways.

First of all, with respect to Ghana and Nigeria, the newly elected Government of Ghana represents the tradition of Nkrumah's Conven-

tion People's Party. It appears to stand for Nkrumahism without dictatorship. By contrast, the newly elected Government of Nigeria is a center-right party, pro-capitalist in policy. But the socialist potential in Nigeria ought not to be underestimated.

Nigerian society is fractured by growing inequities, which may be attributed to early capitalist development, especially widespread poverty and disadvantage in the midst of great wealth and privilege.

Seventy percent of the labor force is engaged in farming, and yet the food import bill is staggering, some \$1 billion a year. The wealthy classes eat imported food, while the majority of the population is undernourished.

So there is an evident basis for class politics, and a class-based Socialist electoral victory 4 years hence would not be surprising. In the recent election, an avowed Socialist party swept the polls in Kano, Nigeria's largest state.

Furthermore, Nigeria's best known Socialist leader, Obafemi Awolowo, won handily in the wealthiest and most industrial section of the country, including Lagos.

It would be logical for the latent Socialist parties to combine before the next national election. The present leaders of these parties are as deeply committed to the principles of liberal government as are the leaders of the relatively conservative party which is now in power. So in Nigeria as elsewhere, liberal government could result in social revolution by means of ballots rather than bullets.

As to the second important link between liberalism and socialism, this is the movement for racial liberation in the southern part of the continent. In South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, capitalism is closely identified with white power and privilege. So the appeal of socialism and communism to the main body of the organized African liberation movement is only natural.

A few socially conservative dictatorships in Africa may be reluctant to support Socialist or Communist-inclined liberation movements. However, the liberal democracies in Africa do not exhibit any such reluctance. In Nigeria and Ghana, foreign policy is largely shaped by an alert public opinion. In each case, racial emancipation takes precedence over all considerations of political ideology.

For this reason, Nigerian liberals of capitalist persuasion have constantly supported Socialist revolutionaries in Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. Evidently, the leaders of thought in Nigeria expect the United States to look upon social revolutionaries in southern Africa as racial liberators.

For Nigerians and Ghanaians, this expectation has been and continues to be the acid test of American aims in Africa. By this test, the most glaring flaw in the African policy of the United States today is our Government's failure to respond to the manifest desire of the People's Republic of Angola for normal relations with the United States.

A Socialist or center-left government in Nigeria would not feel more strongly about this matter than does the present government of center-right complexion.

In the United States, analysts, commentators, public officials, and legislators readily perceive relationships between socialism and authoritarianism. There are, of course, many such relationships to per-

ceive in Africa or anywhere else. But it is not less important but more difficult for Americans to perceive relationships between socialism and liberalism. If the American Government fails to understand and respect the ties that bind liberalism and socialism in Africa, its relationship with Africa will remain, as it is today, essentially antagonistic.

[Mr. Sklar's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD L. SKLAR, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES

There are now 49 member states in the Organization of African Unity. All but three of them gained their independence during the past 30 years. The post-colonial governments were constitutional and parliamentary in form. For the most part, however, they had been designed by the colonial powers. Few African leaders were satisfied with these governmental systems. In some countries, notably Nigeria and Zaire, fatal defects in the structure of government gave rise to bitter conflicts.

During the 1960's one after another of the postcolonial governments were replaced by military regimes and other forms of authoritarian rule. Many political analysts and commentators then drew a dismal conclusion. They reckoned that democratic representation based upon freedom of speech and association would be abandoned in Africa. Forecasting a long era of authoritarian government, some analysts concluded that the practice of liberal democracy is not suited to African society.

Today in Africa, these prophecies of political gloom are being challenged. Liberal and limited government has been revived on a grand scale. Nigeria, the largest African country, with 90 to 100 million people, approximately 20 percent of the entire continental population, has chosen to reconstruct her political order upon foundations of constitutional liberty. Ghana has made a similar choice. These historic events are likely to have a considerable impact upon political thought and practice in many other countries. Yet Western analysts and commentators have been slow to appreciate their significance. Could it be that the democratic reality of African politics is routinely filtered out of American and European thought by a screen of conventional stereotypes about the nature of African societies?

The Nigerian achievement is truly remarkable. After a bitter civil war, Nigeria gave the world a stunning example of Christian charity and national reconciliation between victors and vanquished. The military government also pledged to restore civilian rule by 1976. When the Head of State repudiated that pledge to the nation, he was deposed. His successors then proved themselves to be exemplary constitutionalists. They appointed an all-civilian Constitution Drafting Committee instructed to propose a constitution that would create "a free democratic and lawful system of Government which guarantees fundamental human rights." (It should be noted that this emphasis on human rights was prior to the election of President Carter.)

The committee's two-volume report may one day be recognized as a milestone in the constitutional history of the 20th century. It was debated in public for a year, with the notably free Nigerian press taking a major part. The draft was then scrutinized and modified by a Constituent Assembly. At length a series of free elections were held, in July and August 1979, for state legislators, state governors, members of the Federal House of Representatives, Senators, and President of the Federal Republic.

During the course of this debate, the question of party competition was carefully examined. The Drafting Committee and Constituent Assembly rejected all noncompetitive options in favor of freedom of association to compete for control of the government. It is true that ethnic, religious, and strictly sectional parties have been prohibited. But there are no restrictions on political doctrine or ideology; nor are there any limitations on the number of parties that can be formed. This deeply considered decision in favor of liberty and competitive political democracy by Africa's largest country is one of the major political events of the current era.

In Ghana, too, the struggle for political liberty has been richly rewarded despite severe economic hardship and the ambiguous intentions of the military rulers. Faced with an attempt on the government without political parties, various nonpolitical groups and professional associations asserted their preference for

party politics. The influential Ghana Bar Association demanded "rule by a government popularly elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage and upon the principle of freedom of association and expression." Ghana had four military governments between 1966 and 1979. Three of them were constitutionalist, as opposed to authoritarian in principle and intent. Oddly, the Rawlings regime that took over in June 1979 and summarily executed the heads of all three previous military regimes, did not interfere with Ghana's return to constitutional government based upon free and competitive elections.

Excluding the Mediterranean countries, roughly one African out of every four now lives in a genuinely liberal democracy. The governments concerned—those that are based upon freedom of political association to compete for control of the state—are five in number; they are Botswana, The Gambia, and Mauritius, in addition to Ghana and Nigeria. Various other governments in Africa have distinct liberal features and tendencies: Senegal, Upper Volta, Egypt, Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia may be so described. The cause of liberty in Africa was boosted at the Monrovia meeting of the Organization of Africa Unity last July when the Heads of State established a committee to draw up an African Charter of Human Rights. The overthrow of three notorious tyrannies, in Uganda, Equatorial Guinea, and the Central African Republic, during the current years is symptomatic of a more general democratic trend.

From political democracy I turn to the question of socialism, or the quest for democratic equality in economic life. In Africa, as elsewhere, people become socialists for varied reasons. Some, like Nyerere, Kaunda, and Aminu Kano are deeply offended by social injustice; others, like Sekou Toure and the late Kwame Nkrumah, believe in the economic strategies of central planning and productive investment by the state; many, like Samora Machel and Mengistu Haile Mariam, became socialists during the course of revolutionary struggles in which they are assisted by socialist allies. These and other motivations are reinforced by widely accepted and very plausible socialist doctrines that attribute the underdevelopment of Africa to capitalist exploitation.

Despite the wide appeal of socialism in Africa, relatively few African countries are presently governed by regimes that actually discourage or prohibit private enterprise and adhere to specifically socialist principles of economic organization. So defined, the "socialist" regimes include Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Benin, Congo People's Republic, Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Somalia, and Ethiopia. All of them are either one-party or military regimes that reject the basic principles of liberal government. Conversely, the liberal democracies in Africa, without exception, have adopted capitalist strategies of economic development.

Yet there are significant links between liberal democracy and socialism in Africa, especially in Ghana and Nigeria. The newly elected government of Ghana represents the tradition of the Convention People's Party. It appears to stand for Nkrumahism without dictatorship. By contrast the newly elected Nigerian government is controlled by a pro-capitalist party of the center-right. However the socialist potential in Nigeria should not be underestimated. Nigerian society is fractured by the growing inequities of early capitalist development, especially widespread poverty and disadvantage in the midst of great wealth and privilege, 70 percent of the labor force is engaged in farming, yet the food import bill is staggering (some \$1 billion per year)—the wealthy classes eat imported food while a majority of the population is undernourished. There is an evident basis for class politics: a class-based socialist electoral victory five years hence would not be surprising. In the recent election, an avowed socialist party swept the polls in Kano, Nigeria's largest state. Furthermore, Nigeria's best-known socialist leader, Obafemi Awolowo, won handily in the wealthiest and most industrial section of the country, including Lagos. It would be logical for the left and socialist parties to combine before the next national election. The present leaders of these parties are as deeply committed to the principles of liberal government as the leaders of the relatively conservative party now in power. In Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa, liberal government could result in social revolution by means of ballots rather than bullets.

A second important link between liberal democracy and socialism in Africa is the movement for racial liberation in the southern part of the continent. In South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe capitalism is closely identified with white power and privilege. Hence the appeal of socialism and communism to the main body of the organized African liberation movement. A few socially conservative dictatorships in Africa may be reluctant to support socialist or communist-inclined liberation movements. However, the liberal democracies in Africa

do not exhibit any such reluctance. In Nigeria and Ghana, foreign policy is largely shaped by an alert public opinion. In each case, racial emancipation takes precedence over all considerations of political ideology.

For this reason, Nigerian liberals of capitalist persuasion have constantly supported socialist revolutionaries in Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. Evidently, leaders of thought in Nigeria expect the United States to look upon social revolutionaries in Southern Africa as racial liberators. For Nigerians and Ghanaians, this expectation has been and continues to be the acid test of American aims in Africa. By this test, the most glaring flaw in the African policy of the United States today is our government's failure to respond to the manifest desire of the People's Republic of Angola for normal relations with the United States. A socialist or center-left government in Nigeria would not feel more strongly about this matter than does the present government of center-right complexion.

In the United States, analysts, commentators, legislators, and public officials readily perceive relationships between socialism and authoritarianism. There are many such relationships to be perceived in Africa and elsewhere. It is no less important but more difficult for Americans to perceive relationships between socialism and liberalism. If the American government fails to understand and respect the ties that bind liberalism and socialism in Africa, its relationship with Africa will remain, as it is today, essentially antagonistic.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Professor Sklar, for a very thoughtful statement. I wish that some of our colleagues in the Congress, who frequently berate Africa for its indifference toward democracy and its lack of progress in dealing with the question of human rights, could read your testimony.

Our next witness will be Professor Turner.

Professor, I notice you have a rather substantial draft here of your prepared testimony. I want to assure you that it will be included in the record when it is printed.

I think that it would be helpful, if you could possibly summarize your testimony orally in about 10 minutes, so that we can have the maximum amount of time for questioning on the part of the members of the committee.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, I understand the difficulty in terms of the amount of time, but I would assure you that I would not extend my time beyond that my colleague has had.

I would also add that when I was first approached by this committee, I indicated unsurmountable difficulty in coming here on such short notice in view of any number of things that we are involved with, but that we struggled nonetheless under that duress to, in fact, be here at this committee.

I will attempt to summarize, to some extent, because I think that that fits more my style, and that, I think, is important.

Mr. SOLARZ. Did you get a letter of invitation from me to testify at this hearing?

Mr. TURNER. Most certainly.

Mr. SOLARZ. In that letter, which I addressed to you, as well as to the other witnesses, I think we indicated that in the interest of maximizing the exchange between the witnesses and the committee, we would ask you to orally summarize your testimony.

Mr. TURNER. There is no problem with that.

Mr. SOLARZ. Believe me, we appreciate the thought and the time that has gone into that study. But we have certain time constraints ourselves.

Mr. TURNER. I understand that. I live with that as well.

Mr. SOLARZ. Why don't you proceed.

STATEMENT OF JAMES TURNER, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, CORNELL UNIVERSITY

Mr. TURNER. I am very glad, obviously, for this opportunity.

I most appreciate that my colleague has been very gracious in deferring from any assumed relationship of his present position to his origins in Brooklyn, because that it first began to lead me to have some difficulties, having been born on Coney Island, raised in Bedford-Stuyvesant, and traversing much of Brooklyn, I did not know how I would respond to the chairman at this point.

I thought for a moment that I would have to say, well, we did escape over the Williamsburg Bridge to the public housing project on the Lower East-Side, and therefore I would be out of it.

Nevertheless, I am pleased, too, to have at least originated from that part of New York City that the chairman represents. But most of all, I am pleased to be here because I think there is something important to take note that as a African-American, participating in discussions relative to American foreign policy interests, I think it is also significant in view of the fact that our community has been, for some time, concerned about matters of policy, and particularly as they relate to Africa.

Though there is much discussion in the news about other areas of the globe involving the black community, any cursory analysis will display that over the last 10 to 15 years, Africa has become a particularly important concern. In that context, I am very pleased to be here.

There are, of course, several good ways to approach what are major political trends in Africa. It is also important to say, I think, that Africa is a complex place, and there are many things going on in Africa at the present time.

I have chosen, for purposes of my comments this afternoon, Mr. Chairman, to look at what are the relationships of political trends in Africa to the basis of its infrastructure and its political economy and, therefore, what significance that has for policy from the United States.

I think first of all I caution all of us to be very careful about the way in which we use terms that are so accustomed to ourselves, for example, capitalism and socialism.

I think that we have to be ever conscious that Africa is largely a peasant society. It is a society where roughly 90 to 95 percent of the human beings eke out their living in subsistence farming. That real historical material reality, which does not equate itself with the United States, is a different reality for those terms. I think that it is important for us to be aware of that.

The fundamental concern in Africa, the fundamental drive and concern in Africa is how to strike a relationship with the world economy, so that it is able to provide for its people the rising level of material welfare.

I would be in full harmony with Professor's Sklar's assessment that in the postindependence period in Africa, we saw, of course, the rise in nationalist movements that were largely concerned with the use of the kind of parliamentary, democratic procedure prominently repre-

sented in Europe. That was obvious because they came from appendage political relationships with those areas of the world.

We also, then, the emergency of something called the "one-party" system, and within the context of the one-party system, was a claim that it was both for African socialism, and it was also for democracy. A wide claim for such a rather limited political development.

Perhaps, with the exception of Tanzania, there is no real democratic development within the context of the one-party system, and I think that it is important to say that. Because while we are concerned with important developments in Africa, I don't think it does American political opinion much good to overlook those areas in which there would be genuine concerns.

One of the concerns is that the one-party system gave rise to really the dominance of politics of Africa by a rather narrow urban elite, the sort of intelligentsia of the country, largely represented by those who had been able to go to school in Europe and in the national universities.

I think that it is important to keep in mind that usually in most of these countries there is only one national university, perhaps with the exception of Nigeria, and in that there is a very narrow circumference of connection and ideas.

The military rose within that context, overthrowing civilian rule, often it was claimed because of rampant corruption, taking advantage of political office, but often it also rose from internal contradictions, conflict between those boys who had been in the military, and those who had gone to the university.

As a result of that, we had the rise of military governments in places like Nigeria and Ghana. Therefore, the removal of those governments is important.

I think that both Ghana and Nigeria are symbolic of the wide aspirations of black Africa. In a sense, you have the bounding of the one single, most important political power in Nigeria, and the bounding of the kind of traditional place of liberal thought and philosophy of social justice represented by the early political leaders, both in Nigeria and in Ghana, most particularly the late Kwame Nkrumah.

I say that particularly because there was in earlier American relationships with Africa a misunderstanding of what the role of people like Dr. Nkrumah were for. Now we are having the consequence of having to confront Mozambique, Angola, Benin, Ethiopia, and Somalia.

I think, therefore, it challenges us in this period to understand more clearly what is meant by socialism in Africa.

I think I would say that in large part, socialism has no dogmatic fit. It is, as I have tried to indicate in my paper, difficult to call it a Marxist-Leninist socialism, although there are those within Africa who call themselves Marxist-Leninist, or call themselves Marxist, or make some reference to that.

Perhaps with the exception of Ethiopia, most of them, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea now most dramatically, Benin as well, and certainly also Guinea-Bissau, where Amika Kabrau is, perhaps one of the inspirational leaders of this new group of Socialists in Africa, almost in all those places they say: "We are open and want a balanced relationship in the world economy. We want a relationship with the

West. We want to keep ourselves open for a relationship with the East, if we so choose."

The purpose here is to somehow balance between the two major powers, and maintain nonalignment. In that instance, I think that Julius K. Nyerere is the most dramatic example, and deserves, of course, U.S. support.

Also, socialism is attempted to be built in largely peasant societies, with very little industrial or material infrastructure and, therefore, are very much in need of both hard currency, as well as technology. Therefore, it is not a sham, Mr. Chairman, when they say they want to have relationships with the West.

I want to say that regardless of what tends to be offensive labels in the American political culture, they are nevertheless very sincere when they say that they want relationships with the West.

However, that brings me to what I would call a major trend in Africa, which is the internationalization of African policy. That is to say, Africa does not have the ability to any longer act as if it is outside of the broader world system. Perhaps this is no more dramatically being played out than in southern Africa.

Zimbabwe at this point is perhaps the most critical in southern Africa. Though it is a small country, it is significant in terms of its political position. That is to say, the concern for the Mediterranean, and the security of the Mediterranean by the two major powers.

Africans, in terms of African leadership, are concerned with the resolution of the situation in southern Africa. It seems to me here that there is a real challenge to U.S. policy to understand that the thrust for social development in Africa that would allow for a wide distribution of national resources through a predominantly peasant society is, in fact, hooked with, tied with the development of liberal democracy as well.

It is in that context that Nigeria does not have any serious problem with supporting Mozambique and Angola. Furthermore, it is the concern to see that all areas of Africa are not drawn into a renewed cold war struggle between the two major powers.

Therefore, it would seem that it becomes important to consider normalization of relationships with Angola, which all of the African countries support, strengthening the independence of Mozambique and encouraging the moves in places like the Republic of Guinea.

At the same time, I would say that American policy should be cautious about areas that are called liberal democracies, like Senegal, where there are still considerable human rights problems, and particularly political problems, limiting the scope of political participation.

I would say further that Nigeria is, in fact, a very dramatic and historic development, I agree with my colleague, but I think American policy ought to, at this time, take initiative with the new government, and to ask that government not to be insecure about opening itself up to populous and other broad-based political participation.

One of the unfortunate events of the military era was the restriction, and just before it went out of power, in fact, its assault against populous, village-level organizations which were largely cultural, but also intimidated and restricted many intellectuals who would have broadened the political spectrum.

Of course, my last consideration would be those dictatorships which have fallen. I think that that is most hopeful for Africa, and I would hope that U.S. policy could see it within its wisdom to take some initiative in Uganda in helping bring about stabilization, and supporting President Julius Nyerere, who is quite out on the limb there.

Thank you.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Professor Turner. I must say I am delighted to find out that you come from my district as well. But, in order to prove that you don't have to be born in Brooklyn, or in the 13th Congressional District, in order to appear before our committee, I will call upon the last witness, whom I trust does not come from Brooklyn, although I have to admit that I don't know.

Mrs. FENWICK. Jersey, maybe.

Mr. SOLARZ. It helps if you come from New Jersey also. You don't have to come from Brooklyn.

Mr. ROTBERG. It is prepared, Mr. Chairman, but it was prepared while flying from Africa and, therefore, is not before you.

Mr. SOLARZ. We will be happy to include in the record any formal statement you subsequently want to submit it.

If you could in 10 minutes, or so, sum up your views, we can get then into questions with the entire panel.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT ROTBERG, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

Mr. ROTBERG. Mr. Chairman, I will summarize the prepared statement I would have written, had I been in the United States.

Mr. Chairman, and distinguished Congresswoman, I regret to say that I have no ties to Brooklyn. I do bear out your thought that you could not have three in a row that happened to come from your district. In fact, I was born in New Jersey. [Laughter.]

But I regret to say, in this connection, from Essex County.

Mrs. FENWICK. I have two towns in Essex. [Laughter.]

Mr. ROTBERG. Mr. Chairman, nearly 15 years ago, Sir Arthur Lewis, the Nobel Prize winner, of St. Lucia and Princeton, wisely decried those who confused affection for and professional attachment to black Africa with an uncritical acceptance of African excuses for, and rationalization of one-party rule.

Sir Arthur was impatient with apologetics and concerned, for analytical and policy purposes, to assess the political and economic conditions of Africa accurately. This, I take it, is the subcommittee's task at this stage.

My own conclusions follow, and are based on an acquaintance of about 20 years. During those 20 years, the nations of black Africa have gone through several stages. They have won their independence. They used colonially inherited models of representative democracy to govern their new nations. They modified and discarded those models, endured coups and other military adventures, and only recently have begun a hesitant transition back toward forms of popularly responsive government.

At the same time, the partiality of most black Africa for ideological experimentation has been replaced by an increasing rejection of ideological formulas and rigidities, and by a new flexibility.

Most African states are authoritarian in character, and mildly socialistic in tone. There is but one African country that has maintained a multiparty, democratic tolerant status since its own independence. In that country, through no fault of its own, there has never been a change of government by the ballot box because there really has not been change of government.

So we have no model, as we do in the Caribbean, or other parts of the world, of actual transition via the ballot box from one type of government to another.

There are explanations, I think, for this lone exception. Those explanations are concentrated in terms of geography. Botswana has a peculiar relationship at the southern end of the continent. That country's unique status can also be explained by the nature of its leadership, by its social structure, which is profoundly nonequal in character, and by the economic management of the country, which thinks of itself capitalist, and practices a form of socialism like so many other African states.

As Professor Sklar has indicated, in the largest country in Africa there has been a recent shift back toward representative government. In several other countries, there have been decisive moves toward representative government, some of which are not yet concluded.

Now, these shifts may endure, but the general pattern of Africa and the experience of the last 20 years gives me little confidence that we can expect a rapid resumption in Africa of patterns of tolerance, of respect for individual freedom, of respect for a free press, or of anything approximating what we call human rights.

There will be little tolerance to opposition, and very little, I think, if the next 10 years are like the last 20 years, adherence to what we call the rule of law. We take many of these things for granted, and Africans do not.

We can expect, I think, the survival of truly representative government only in a few cases. Otherwise, the pattern has been and will continue to be, one, military rule by technocrats, most of whom are ideologically rather unsophisticated, which is all to the good in terms of American policy, I would suppose.

Second, there will be a continuation of one-party rule in which there will be greater or lesser degrees of internal dissent, and greater or lesser opportunities for the expression of political differences.

Third, arising either from category one or category two, there will be—I hope not, but I suspect that there will be—occasional cases of dictatorial despotism such as we have known recently, and had the good fortune to be relieved of only this year.

Fourth, I think that the pattern is that there is a movement away from the ideological extremes toward a vaguely socialistic center. Marxist adherents in practice rather than in rhetoric are few today, and are shrinking in number. Several regimes begin that way, but they soon become disenchanted with the results. This has a lesson for us in southern Africa as well.

Capitalism in any pure sense, free enterprise in any pure sense, nowhere exists in Africa today, not even in South Africa, and will not easily be revived as a system, even if anyone should want to revive it. I think the encouragement of truly mixed economies will continue to be the practice in Africa as it is in virtually all the Third World.

Within this general framework, I discern, one, a very few states that do more than pay lipservice to human rights in the fuller sense; two, the majority in number which honor human rights mostly in the breach; three, another group, which believes as does those of the second category, that ends justify virtually any means, and which are, therefore, quick to suspend constitutions, declare martial law, lock up oppositions, control the press; and violate the basic codes of behavior to which their constitutions and their own histories pay respect.

There are many reasons for this general appearance, not least of which is the failure of the colonial powers to transfer power over decades rather than weeks. We can also cite the glaring "winner take all" character of the original and subsequent political struggles, has applied a domination by elites rather than popular rule.

The massive size of most of the governments compared to the private sector in nearly all countries is the third factor, and spoils, therefore, are largely in the hands of the government. This is similar to the smaller countries of the Third World, the Caribbean particularly.

I, myself, do not believe, however, that a very good case can be made for the proposition that strong one-party rule is necessary for purposes of economic development. Certain authoritarian states have succeeded in developing their countries. Malawi, for instance, is one. Botswana, which has a long-lived democracy, is another, but is very different from Malawi in character. Benign autocracies like Zambia and Tanzania have done poorly; a comparable type of government practiced, let us say, in the Ivory Coast and Kenya, has demonstrated good results for its citizens.

Therefore, I say that it is not the nature of the government, or the structure of the government, but the quality of the vision of the leaders of the country, the nature of the strategic options chosen, luck, resources, and in many cases the attitudes of outside multilateral lending agencies which are important.

It is suggested that authoritarian states are in some fashion well suited to Africa. The fact that they are prevalent in no way implies that they are desirable, or well suited. Their existence has not implied stability, the absence of conflict, national integration, or any of the other improvements which strong governments are meant to bring, and I am very sorry to say, nor do the trains run on time in those parts of Africa.

Mr. SOLARZ. Sometimes they don't run at all as a result of unresolved conflicts.

Mr. ROTBERG. Absolutely.

These states are African in character. By that I mean they are strongly ethnic in the nature of their power distribution. Ethnicity is as important as any other trend we could follow in Africa today.

They are ideologically shallow. By that I am not making a normative comment by indicating that ideology is really not very important to the mass of Africans. In fact, there is a very strong tendency in Africa to enshrine the importance of an elite class, while being antagonistic in rhetoric to that elitism. That I think is common throughout the Third World.

There is everywhere a fear of dissent, and criticism, and both in the nonmilitary, and in some of the military states, an elevation of per-

sonal rule and personalities. There is little collective rule even in the popularly elected governments.

Africans can be said to tolerate strong rule, but whether they are somehow uniquely predisposed to it in terms of value, I doubt. Rather they have come to endure it, as has much of the Third World.

Rural dwellers, whether peasant or nonpeasant, in Africa find most governments relatively inconsequential. They found the colonial rulers rather boring and inconsequential, and they find the new rulers likewise. This is really a function of the way Africa has developed since the colonial period.

Only urban Africans intensely know the temper of their governments.

In terms of U.S. policy, it could be argued that democratic, popularly elected, tolerant governments are easier for the United States to deal with. But the facts imply an indifference. That is, it is the character of the bureaucracy, and the particular characters of the leaders at the top, rather the nature of the government, which is most important.

At the moment, at this particular period in African history, the experience of the political leaders of Africa and the leading cliques, plus bitter experience with the Soviets, and with the Cubans, and trends in world affairs generally, seem a more important determination than the nature of the government of Africa.

More important, too, is the influence and intervention of individual Americans and the policies of the U.S. executive as well as the legislative branches.

Most governments in Africa tend to follow the stronger ones, that is why Professor Sklar's emphasis on Nigeria is so important. Nigeria is a crucial leader in Africa, both because of its size and its resource base, and also because of the quality of its leadership over the last decade.

In addition to Nigeria, the frontline states are obviously important, and they have, in fact, developed a leadership which transcends the southern African trouble. The U.S. willingness to alter policies regarding the liberation of southern Africa has made possible, in my view, a profound rapprochement with the frontline states and Nigeria, and so has careful and painstaking diplomacy.

I do not think that we can expect consistent friendship from Africa. Our allies will change in Africa, and so will our needs and their needs. In general, however, an evenhanded, nonreactive posture will be respected and valued by all kinds of African regimes. Being nonreactive and evenhanded will prevent us, I think, from letting current attachments to authoritarian regimes stand in the way of good relations with their inevitable successors.

Thank you.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Professor Rotberg.

As a reward for her diligence, discipline, and determination in attending all of the subcommittee hearings, I am going to ask the gentlewoman from New Jersey to begin the questioning of the witnesses, rather than having to endure my prolonged interrogation.

Mrs. FENWICK. You are very kind. This is not an unprecedented kindness, but an unprecedented procedure. [Laughter.]

I have a number of questions for every single one of you. It has been extraordinarily interesting.

Professor Sklar spoke of the strong antidemocratic bias that we seem to have against the African nations, or worry concerning lack of sympathy on our efforts.

Isn't it better, perhaps, than the very strong bias of the African nations against the views of the United States in the United Nations? Doesn't that contribute to it; isn't that the reason for it, for any bias on our part?

It seems to me that two things are very interesting: Professor Turner spoke of the narrow elite that largely rules the population, the military or the university elite at the top of a very broad population. There is a fashion among them, as there is in this country or was, to believe that all these Socialist theories are more fashionable, and they automatically move toward them.

If one reads the report of the opposition to the election of Colombia to the Security Council of the United Nations, it seems now fashionable to oppose Colombia because it was supported by the United States. Yet, in talking to Africans, at the African-American Conference that took place in Virginia, you could see that every African nation expected the United States to come to them with help.

Why is our country broke? It is because of the hemorrhage of our money into the OPEC countries. It does not seem to occur to Africa to say to the Arab countries, "You must help us develop."

They join with the Arab countries, in support of Cuba as a candidate for the Security Council. But they never seem to turn to the Arab nations when they want development aid. How do you read that any one of you?

Mr. TURNER. Well, I think one thing, there is a growing sense of distance between the Africans and the Arab countries, first of all. That is to say, there is a shifting in the wind in the relationship between the Africans and the Arabs. From the point that the Arabs have this prominence in Africa, they are able to encourage and applaud uniform break of relations with Israel, but that was out of a certain expectation as well that relationships with the Arabs would pay off in terms of development and support in terms of helping the countries to solve some of their very serious material and technical problems.

Now, it is not being said, perhaps, but I think that one can discern from careful analysis that there is a shifting and somewhat of a discomfort among a number of African countries, particularly since the fuel problem has hit them in the same way. One goes to Africa, and to buy a gallon of petrol, it is \$2 or \$3.

I was recently in Zaire with a colleague, it was amazing that he had adjusted himself to getting up at 5 o'clock in the morning to drive his car to a gasoline station not far from the President's palace at 6 a.m., in order to get gasoline by 9 a.m.

The one thing that tends to hold that relationship together, the key thing in my mind, is the southern African problem. On that the Arab support is still vitally important to the Africans. That is not unrelated to your comment about this common expectation of the United States to keep everything balanced. It is there that the American policy could have the greatest effect.

Mrs. FENWICK. They make no bones about being in the Soviet camp rather than our own. They are not trying to be a sensible force that sometimes goes one way and sometimes the other. Their fight for Cuba and the Soviets in the United Nations puts them on the Soviet side all the time.

Mr. TURNER. Certainly, I think, President Neto's comments shortly before he died indicated in fact the desire and willingness, and the need to have a relationship with the United States to balance out the dependencies on the East.

In most cases, among those governments of which you speak, and I suppose you are referring to those like Angola, Ethiopia—Ethiopia, as I said, is a case on its own. But in Angola and in Mozambique, they are showing extraordinary pragmatism. In fact, I see under this pragmatism a quiet message to the United States: "Help us gain balance, while recognizing that we are, in fact, going to adopt the system."

Mrs. FENWICK. But we have given aid to many African countries, and that is not enough. There is something else that they want. They are still voting with the Soviet Union. I am really puzzled about it.

Also, is it wise that we continue to lend to these small countries? I think people who borrow hate those they borrow from. Would it not be better if we had joint ventures, private investment with some kind of support for the private investors, and give whatever we want to give, and stop lending.

Countries are crippled with debt. There was one African country that had to pledge its entire export balance to service its debt. This cannot be healthy for these small countries. Even in the Sahel, where there is a very good arrangement with AID, I asked them if they had considered the burden of debt which these countries were incurring. They said: "We send our reports." There is no meshing of the two—aid on one hand and private banks and Government lending on the other. Is that wise?

Mr. TURNER. I do not wish to dominate the debate. I would like to defer to my two colleagues.

Mrs. FENWICK. What do you think, Professor Rotberg?

Mr. ROTBERG. On this last point, I think you can make a very good case in terms of Africa. I hope you can make as good a case to your colleagues.

Mrs. FENWICK. It is very difficult. But I think that if we had a combination of grants and private investment, or joint ventures, for example, that would benefit all concerned. But if the rhetoric continues that we hear from the African countries that profits are evil, and capitalism is just the end, it is going to be very difficult to get private investment even on a joint venture basis.

Mr. ROTBERG. I think that this is absolutely right. On the other hand, I can hold out no hope that the rhetoric will ever end, because the rhetoric and the votes in the United Nations stem from entirely different ways of looking at the way in which one uses one's friendships in public. In private, one uses one's friendships differently. President Neto demonstrated that very effectively before his death.

I think also, given the instability of most of Africa, of a number of states, that it was foolish, and it continues to be foolish to expect to buy friendship with loans or aid. I think the policy which has been

followed assiduously in this administration of giving grants where needed, and not worrying terribly much, that, I think, has been much more effective, and it does eliminate the crippling problem of debt, which has critical consequences which are unfortunate for the United States.

However, the central problem of how to deal with the rhetoric, I think, comes largely through the experience of the African governments themselves. I think that there are bitterly historically committed Socialist countries which welcome private enterprise, and talk properly at the right time for it, such as Guinea, and so on.

I think where there are investment opportunities, private investors know how to set the risk values.

Mrs. FENWICK. But the bauxite in Guinea, the Soviets were paying one-third of the world price for it.

In other words, the experience of the country in trying to do any kind of joint venture with the Soviet Union has been more bitter than we have ever done. As witnesses have testified, the fishing off Angola was 70 percent for Russia, 20 percent for the Cubans, and 10 for the Angolans. It was Ambassador Young who gave that bit of information. I don't think that any capitalist country would ever dare do the same.

Mr. SKLAR. May I respond?

Your query was about American bias rather than bias from African spokesmen. What I tried to refer to was a screen of preconceptions that we have about African society. Many people do not think it likely that African people and African leaders value liberty as much as people in other parts of the world. We don't take into account the reality when it is thrust upon us.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger so often testified in Congress about our commitment to constitutional governments. Yet he was unable to maintain any kind of a relationship with the Nigerian Government, which was committed to the restoration of constitutional government. He never seemed to relate a clearly and emphatically constitutionalist military to the American interest in constitutionalism throughout the world.

Why is this? What is the source of this screen of bias? Perhaps there is an element of ethnocentrism in that, which would not be unprecedented in American foreign policy. It may be that it is a way of looking at the world in which we tend to see all issues as they relate to global competition, and countries which share our values, but may disagree with us on a particular question, as the Nigerian Government disagreed with us on the question of Angola, are seen as enemies rather than friends in dialog, and are, in fact, misinterpreted by the use of a preposterous terminology, this moderate versus radical.

Mr. SOLARZ. I think that you have made a very interesting point, because it seems to me that the complexity of our relationship with a variety of different African countries, each of which has a very different political system than the other, is something which by and large escapes the appreciation not only of the American people, but American political figures as well.

For example, you make a very good case that even though, for example, Kenya is considered in the popular mind to be much more

pro-Western than Mozambique, during the course of the last year, on matters of critical interest to our own country, Mozambique has been, in its own way, more significantly cooperative than Kenya. That has happened not because Kenya is hostile or opposed to our interests, but simply because we had, in the case of Mozambique, the enormously significant question of Zimbabwe, on which they were generally cooperative in the efforts to persuade the Patriotic Front to take a more conciliatory position with respect to the Anglo-American initiatives, and then the British diplomatic initiatives; whereas we had no really comparable mutual or diplomatic endeavor underway with Kenya.

So, while people think of Mozambique as a hostile country, and Kenya as a friendly country, the reality of the situation was that on this issue of really overriding importance, the Mozambicans were relatively cooperative.

Let me, if I may, proceed with a couple of questions of the panel.

First, in your respective judgments, what do you think the political and diplomatic consequences will be if it turns out that the nuclear explosion, which allegedly took place off the coast of Africa a month ago, turns out not only to have taken place, but to have been the responsibility of South Africa?

To put it a little differently, what do you think the political and diplomatic implications will be in Africa if the African countries come to the conclusion that South Africa is responsible for this, or that it does have nuclear weapons, regardless of whether such could be proven in a court of law?

Mr. SKLAR. I don't immediately see any special relationship between the acquisition of nuclear weapons and the general African strategy with relation to repression in South Africa.

The issue in South Africa has to do with the relationships between the communities in that country, and the attempt to prevent social change by means of force, essentially. Where such attempts are made, they produce continual opposition activity within South Africa itself, which can involve neighboring states, and such neighboring states simply have to develop strategies to enable them to do their duty to the liberation movement, without incurring risks which are unreasonable for their people.

Consequently, there may be certain strategic changes. But I don't think that African attitudes toward South Africa itself would be altered by any development in weaponry.

Mr. SOLARZ. The question is not whether their attitude would change. Clearly, it would not. But would their actions change? For example, could this result in an increased demand for some kind of sanctions against South Africa?

Would it make far less likely a willingness on the part of neighboring Africans to provide sanctuary and support to an emerging South African liberation movement out of fear that if South Africa has nuclear weapons, their capital cities might one day be vaporized if they cooperated with such liberation movements?

In those terms, or any other that you can think of, would this development have any consequences or not?

Mr. SKLAR. Not in my opinion. I really meant this to refer to your second question, not on the sanctions but on sanctuaries.

I think that the threat of nuclear reprisal, while much greater in scale, perhaps, than the existing threat, changes the magnitude of danger. But it does not essentially alter the necessity of a committed state such as Mozambique to provide such continued assistance as it is able to provide to an African liberation movement in South Africa.

Mr. TURNER. I would like to comment on this.

I would agree partly with my distinguished colleague from UCLA. I would think that in the immediate sense there is not going to be any real change in strategy, because the Africans do not have any capacity to do anything about it. But I think that it is going to make Nigeria tougher to deal with diplomatically. I think that Nigeria is going to become concerned about nuclear capacity in South Africa.

I think that Tanzanian politics, as far as their being forthcoming, and their cooperating with the United States, may be radicalized. I would feel that Mozambique is going to become uneasy.

I don't think that immediately it is going to shift anything in terms of strategy, but in terms of attitude, I am afraid that it would give credence to the growing argument that U.S. investment also increases the technomilitary infrastructure in South Africa that leads to the capacity of nuclear weaponry, and an indifferent American Government which is not closely monitoring South Africa.

I think that it will mess up the Namibian situation. I think that everybody will become uneasy, and the games will switch in some way. All the actors there will want more consideration, more assurance that some check is being put on South Africa.

The other part under the table thing is that sanctuaries, perhaps, will be forced, in some of the frontline states, to give support too. Although I think that this will be a very carefully guarded thing. No one will want any rash or unpredictable events taking place. But I think that we would be confronted with a changing attitude in that area, particularly if it could be tied to U.S. technology in any way.

The question of American plutonium in South Africa, as you know, is a big issue in the mind of some Africans.

Mr. SOLARZ. Professor Rotberg, do you have any comments on that?

Mr. ROTBERG. Yes. I was in South Africa when it was announced, and reacted with horror.

I think the African reaction, first of all, will be great fear, and horror. I think that the sanctions would, as you suggest, be overwhelming at that point.

I think the general powerlessness of Africa with regard to South Africa militarily is so debilitating from a foreign policy point of view that there would certainly be a demand for sanctions, and a demand, if it could be discovered what nations or technocracies had assisted South Africa in this development, or an attempt at reprisal.

I wanted to center on the Mozambican situation, because I don't think that we should, therefore, conclude that Mozambique would give greater assurance to liberation movements. In fact, the present nuclear capability, even though the South Africans have no one on whom to drop a bomb, or shoot a cannon, really, without destroying themselves, I think that there would be a degree of caution in Mozambique and Zambia in foreign policy which would be consonant with their present policies.

Mr. SOLARZ. While clearly we have a humanitarian and, one might say, a kind of ideological interest in the spread of democratic systems of government throughout Africa, and can take a humanitarian and political measure of satisfaction in the decision on the part of Nigeria, Ghana, and Upper Volta to move toward more democratic systems of government, I wonder if you could give us the benefit of your judgment about the extent to which, in any other ways, diplomatically, strategically, or otherwise, we have any kind of an interest in one form of government in Africa over another?

In other words, in terms of American interests other than our humanitarian and ideological interests, which I think are not insignificant, but in terms of other kinds of American interests, economic interests, military interests, strategic interests, does it really matter whether any particular African country is democratic, or based on a multiparty system, or a one-part system, or a scientific Socialist system, or a military regime?

As you look at the variety of experiences which they have had in Africa over the last few decades, do you see any pattern emerging where we find one system more congenial, cooperative, and constructive than another?

Mr. SKLAR. The pity of it all is that we appear to have been more comfortable with the dictatorships than with the constitutional governments. There is a vast gap in the reality of our policy and our rhetoric. We always point to Africa or Asia, and say: "Look at the gap between the reality and the rhetoric, they speak socialism, when in fact the reality is capitalism." We point the finger at somebody, and it is very possible that we suffer from the same gap.

We say that we really believe in certain values. Among these values is a constitutional government, with social and racial equality. We say that these are the values that we stand for. Yet, it is difficult to show that we have better relations with countries, in Africa at least, where the leadership exemplifies these values. We appear sometimes to have better relationships with the authoritarian dictatorships than we do with the more liberally inclined constitutional governments.

Mr. SOLARZ. Is that because of us or them, or both?

Mr. SKLAR. We have to be responsible for ourselves. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. I think I stated the facts correctly. For the reason, we have to look within ourselves.

Why should it be that we appear to relate that much more easily to authoritarian than to constitutional governments?

Mr. SOLARZ. One of the reasons that we asked you here is to help us understand that question. I am trying, in my own way, to get a better understanding of Africa.

You could argue, hypothetically, that if, in fact, we do have more congenial relationships with authoritarian than constitutional governments in Africa, it may be because on a whole range of foreign policy issues, which is basically how we interact with these countries, the authoritarian governments have been more disposed to support our point of view than some of the constitutionalist governments.

I am asking whether that could be one theoretical explanation. If that is not the explanation, then what is?

Mr. SKLAR. That probably is the explanation. That speaks volumes about our relations with many parts of the world.

Again, it goes back, I think, to the simplistic categorization of different countries, between those that are moderate and not fundamentally committed to basic social changes, and those which we claim to be radical.

We reject close relationships with the radicals. Look at Angola. The Angolan Government has been attempting now for a long time to establish good relations with the United States.

Mr. SOLARZ. Let me rephrase the question.

In what sense, if at all, is the United States better off if you now have a democratic system in Nigeria rather than a military regime?

In what sense, are we better off if there is now a democratic government in Ghana, replacing a military government?

Other than our general humanitarian and ideological embrace of democracy, are we worse off, or does it really matter in those terms?

Mr. ROTBERG. I don't believe that it matters, certainly not strategically. I don't think that it matters politically. What matters more is the ties we develop between particular individuals.

There are now three plus a few more constitutional governments in Africa, and there have not been many until recently. Therefore, in terms of choice, the question is premised on the fact that in virtually all of Africa there is authoritarian government. Therefore, we have had to choose between some authoritarian and not others. But I don't think that it does make any difference.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you see any difference in the foreign policy of what you would call a constitutional government as opposed to a military government, or a scientific-socialist government?

Mr. SKLAR. The foreign policy of a constitutionalist government is likely to fight us in more principled and determined ways than the others.

It is very difficult to discuss the subject in terms of American national interests, unless we might consider the definition of national interest very deeply. I think that it is in everybody's interest to have certain values on which this particular republic is supposed to be premised, recognized, and validated by the autonomous actions of other people. When it happens, we ought at least to recognize it.

It does not mean to say that these other people are going to agree with us, either about our commitment to certain types of economic relationships, or about the perception of the government of the day in this country about what is desirable or undesirable in international politics.

Mr. TURNER. There is a comment that I would like to make in regard to this question. I think that it becomes important within the American context to know what we mean by moderate and radical. It seems to me that when we are talking about radical behavior, we are not so much talking about how these people behave in the international arena in terms of their policies toward the United States.

I think, as the chairman rightly pointed out, it would be hardput for us to ignore what Mozambique's role has been, for example, or Tanzania. I am not sure that American treatment of either of those countries fully demonstrates the importance of what they have been to the United States. I think that that is important.

However, where we get hung up is on their attitude toward their own country internally, and as it affects, perhaps, economic interests, which is really, I think, what is the key here.

While the governments of Mozambique and Tanzania, and Angola, more so, have indicated that they want foreign investment, but they want it on terms that take into consideration their world view. I am not sure that the economic terms of exchange would be any different in terms of what the repatriation would be. I think that there would be a repatriation of profits, but we don't have enough yet to model it.

On the other hand, it seems to me that the constitutionalist government as well as to the parliamentary government, and the military government, are not in any way uniquely distinguished in their attitude toward the United States. I think their internal investment arrangements with Western economic interests is what is significant in terms of this question.

Mr. SOLARZ. How relevant, in your respective judgment, will the recent experiences of Nigeria, Ghana, and Upper Volta be in terms of encouraging the spread of democracy elsewhere in Africa?

Is it likely to have a significant impact, or will it basically be confined to the borders of those countries?

Mr. ROTBERG. Nigeria is absolutely important in that sense, because if the Nigerian Presidential model succeeds, I think we can look forward to other African military states opting for that kind of transition, and other African states shifting in that direction.

I don't think that the Ghanaian model has any relevance, particularly, because it is part of a very rapidly changing scenario.

Mr. SOLARZ. Is it your judgment that people all over Africa are watching the Nigerian experiment very closely, and what happens there will have a significant impact on political attitudes elsewhere in Africa, in terms of the desirability of that form of government in their own countries?

Mr. ROTBERG. Let me just say one thing. It certainly will have an impact upon elites who are watching. I don't think that most people in general will pay a great deal of attention to it.

Mr. SKLAR. I really think it will have an immense impact on thought and practice. So many of the existing African states are so resource poor, and so small, their options are really so limited, that action taken by a country like Nigeria, where the leadership has a real range of alternatives—they could have chosen anything—must have a great impact on their political thinking and, I would think, on practice.

I believe that it was the systematic Nigerian move away from an authoritarian to a liberal government, without any buts and ifs, which had a great influence in Ghana itself. There are several other developments throughout Africa which indicate that this influence is likely to be pervasive.

Mr. SOLARZ. Could you at all comment on the degree of political freedom within such countries as Tanzania and Zambia, where they only have one political party, but where the argument has been made that there is a significant measure of political competition, and even criticism, which is permitted within the framework of that one party?

How do you assess the degree of political freedom and liberty in those countries?

Mr. TURNER. I would want to caution, if I may, against looking at Africa with too much of a unity. I would agree with my colleagues that Nigeria will have an important impact on Africa, but I think that impact is likely to be more narrowly fixed within the West African

capitals. I don't think that it is going to change, for example, much in Guinea, or in Ethiopia, or in Mozambique and Angola, the places that we have difficulty with.

On the one hand, I think what is going to be more important is that if the government in Nigeria is able to handle rational national planning it will be more successful than others in cutting down on the elite/mass gap, and dealing with problems of poverty, comprehensive rule development, raising up the health level.

Again, I think that it becomes important as to whether or not U.S. policy helps to encourage that.

One of the problems in capitals that are the closest to the West is that they suffer from the balance of payment and debt services, that are nearly bankrupting them, and keeping them in dependent relationships with the West, while, in fact, there is less growth in the rural areas. In fact, there is serious slippage in terms of declining conditions in the rural areas. So, I would think that this is what is going to be watched in the Nigerian situation. It depends on how we help there with technical assistance and grants.

The other question, in terms of Tanzania and Zambia, I think that to the extent that the Zambians and the Tanzanians have to be concerned about not having embarrassing political issues raised, they are somewhat more restrictive of their political participation than, let us say, Nigeria, and Nigeria may support this. The Nigerian example, I think, would be significant, and I think that it will act itself out in its own way.

I think that we are going to see that in Zambia, the predominant party has pretty well restricted the opposition. Tanzania has had less restriction on opposition because it has a more inclusive, more participatory system in terms of involving lower levels of organizations. Again, the question of participation has to be seen in its own context.

One could say that Tanzania is more liberal, and Zambia is less liberal than Tanzania.

Mr. ROTBERG. If one takes as a litmus test freedom of assembly, freedom to dissent, a free press, and things like that, one finds in looking very closely that Tanzania is vigorously authoritarian. There is no difference between a military government and Tanzania inside the country in terms of the fact that there has not been a free press in Tanzania. There is very little toleration of dissent, and no toleration of freedom of assembly, to speak of.

On the other hand, in the ruling party there are elections to approve candidates against each other. There is some participation in that sense. But the political party caucus is controlled by the executive, so participation is fairly far removed.

Zambia is more of a hybrid in my view. In Zambia, certainly dissent is more tolerated because the elite is larger, and the urban class is enormously larger. Forty percent of Zambia is urbanized. It is the most highly urbanized Third World country, other than island states that I can think of offhand.

The press, although government owned, is, in fact, remarkably free. Investigatory journalism is not encouraged, but there is a certain amount of investigation despite that. There is, curiously, though less than in Tanzania, the election within the party sham. In the recent

election, the central committee of the party refused to let the ones who won the preliminary election, or some of those, including prominent people, stand in the final election. They were prevented from competing in the final runoff.

Therefore, the case for participation is clearly mixed. The caucus of the United National Independence Party in parliament does nothing except take orders. Therefore, although Zambia, certainly on a continuum, has far less authoritarianism than Tanzania, it has far more than Botswana. We hope that the Nigerian case as it unfolds will also demonstrate that. I also think the Gambia is a very special place. In Senegal there has never been much open dissent, but it is sneaking back in.

I, myself, would urge the subcommittee to look at the actual quality of the free press.

One point, which is interesting, is that labor unions were closed in Tanzania many years ago by the President. Zambia pays a certain amount of lip service to union rights, but less and less.

Mr. SOLARZ. I have several more questions, but I will defer to Mrs. Fenwick.

Mrs. FENWICK. I would like to hear a little bit more about the hope for more democratic governments. I remember something years ago that Mr. Nehru said. He said that he was very much against, according to the Vice President of the Asian Development Bank, and who quoted this to me—I was not a confidante of President Nehru, I am sorry to say. He told me that he was talking to Nehru about progress, and Nehru said: "In a rural society, what do you mean by progress?" He answered himself: "In a rural, agricultural community, progress is when you give a man who has a wooden plow the opportunity to get himself a metal one."

I wonder, in listening to the representatives of Africa, if that is true in there. A Nigerian I met spoke very interestingly about the elections. He was disappointed that Mr. Awolowo had not been elected because he had campaigned for this kind of development in the agricultural sector and he is the only African I have heard of who does. The others speak of the marvel of a great big, new fertilizer plant, using petroleum, and totally ignoring the Chinese experience of using the same soil for 6,000 years.

I wondered, are you hopeful, or has the elite been trained for modern ways only?

Mr. SKLAR. I think that your connection with Mr. Awolowo, is interesting. Among the five presidential candidates, Mr. Awolowo was one of the two who were distinctly socialist. His emphasis was on what he called integrated rural development, rather than socialism, because socialism may not work in the agricultural sphere anyhow. That is a major problem, as Professor Turner has pointed out, because the vast majority of the people are engaged in rural pursuits. It is enormously difficult, in fact impossible to build socialism on agricultural foundations.

So none of the major socialist leaders are really preoccupied with that any longer. For a long time, Julius Nyerere was, indeed. Villagization is over. Socialist agriculture appears to have been put on the back burner for the time being, at least. There is no attempt any longer

to build social villages in Tanzania. There is now a rethinking of Tanzanian socialism.

The interesting thing about Awolowo is his idea that integrated agricultural development as well as employment, and free education, lead to a welfare state. His thinking has been for a good 15 years essentially socialist, and that is why it is important for those of us who are concerned about the progress of liberal democracy in Africa, to understand the relationship between liberal and Socialist evolvement. This is an excellent example.

Mrs. FENWICK. It does continue to be mystifying. Colombia, I don't know, I am not an expert on Latin America, but it seems to me that there is more free press, more free expression, more free speech than there is in Cuba. Yet, they seem to be opting for Cuba rather than Colombia.

Mr. SKLAR. My point is quite the opposite. There is always something new out of Africa. What I am trying to say is that trends being as they are, if as I believe the new Nigerian liberal government is not going to be able to solve the major social problems of that society, one can expect a Socialist movement to be increasingly potent, and I think eventually electorally successful.

The Socialist movement that emerges in Nigeria may well be libertarian as well as Socialist. That, of course, is something new, but who are we to say that it is impossible?

Mr. SOLARZ. If I may ask one or two questions at this point.

What would you say have been the implications of independence in Africa for the great mass of subsistence farmers in various African countries? I am not talking about the elite, or those politically engaged, but rather the subsistence farmers that Professor Turner indicated constitute the overwhelming majority of the African population.

Have there been any concrete consequences which have flowed from independence?

Mr. ROTBERG. Mr. Chairman, over the years I have tried to look at that, starting from the premise which I believe is very clear in Africa that among conservative people, African subsistence farmers are the most conservative in the world. That is why I find Professor Sklar's very profound comment widely optimistic.

I think real incomes have fallen virtually everywhere in Africa at the subsistence level. Independence has, in fact, resulted in the shifting of resources into the urban areas, as well as a shifting of humans to the urban areas. I want to make this as sweeping as possible. Every African government has, despite lipservice to the problem, neglected the problem of the rural underprivileged, including Botswana.

Mr. SOLARZ. Yes, but how much of that decline in the real standard of living in the rural areas is due to the departure of the colonial powers, or to the achievement of independence, and how much of it is due to factors which have nothing to do with that?

Mr. ROTBERG. That is a very profound question, and I will try to oversimplify the answer. In my view, it has been due to the realities of politics that power shifted at the end of the colonial era into the urban areas, where ethnically mobilized voters were available. That ethnic mobilization resulted in a response to the needs of urban middle-class and elite.

There is one exception to all this, to my bleak analysis of Africa in the agricultural sector, or $1\frac{1}{2}$ exceptions.

One exception is Malawi, with an avowedly authoritarian government based on the weakest connection to constitutionality. The President of Malawi has recognized the relevance of turning his subsistence farmers into agrobusinesses at the smaller level. He has done so with extraordinary efficiency, while human rights have been swept away, and religious groups prevented from practicing their religion, and so on.

The half exception might be Kenya, but that is a very special and complicated case.

Mr. SOLARZ. Professor Turner, or Professor Sklar, do you care to respond to the question about what has happened to the great mass of rural population in Africa? Are they better off, or are they worse off? What, if any, have been the implications of independence for them?

Or, do they just go on leading their lives as if nothing happened?

I remember once I read a fascinating book—I don't know whether you have had a chance to read this—called "Diary of a Man in Despair." It is a terribly moving book. It is the diary of a German aristocrat who saw and recognized the moral horror of Nazism, and reported in his diary what was happening to his country as a result of Hitler's rule. In the course of the book, he describes a trip which he took to the Soviet Union in 1934, and he remarked that 17 years after the revolution, he went to villages in the hinterland of the Soviet Union, where they not only did not know that a revolution had taken place, but they did not even know that the First World War had been fought.

I wonder, extrapolating from that, to what extent are there people in the rural areas of Africa who don't know that independence has taken place? Has independence had any meaning and, if so, what has it been for these people?

Mr. SKLAR. Perhaps the greatest meaning has been, really, in terms of self-respect and morale. As for the awareness of the great majority of ordinary people in the country of political processes, I will only hazard a comment on the basis of experience and observation.

My observations have been primarily in Nigeria, and to a lesser extent in parts of East Africa. In these countries, I feel that the people are very aware of political change, and very insistent in their demands upon the government and extremely critical.

No one should underestimate the awareness of the African rural population, nor the ability of the rural population, in particular, to make an impact upon government.

The difference between governments in Africa and many other countries that are nonindustrial countries, is that by and large Africa does not have the scourge of landlordism. One does not find, apart from the settler states and prerevolution Ethiopia, a landed oligarchy. As a result, there is no fetter upon the population of a political and social type, and peasant farmers as well as the urban workers, and the rural workers, and the professional people, and business people, all these people make their impacts upon government policy.

The extent of these impacts, I think, are documented by social science beyond any question.

Now, as far as the quality of life in the rural areas, I don't think that anybody would claim that African countries, with an exception here or there, have taken steps which begin to reverse the terms of trade, which do go against the rural producers. That is an enormous problem.

There are some strategies in some countries, Malawi is one, but I don't think anyone really knows what to do. But the population participates regularly in the debate. I think that that is the case in most countries. It is the case in some Socialist countries, not only democracies, and it ought not to be overlooked.

MR. SOLARZ. On the basis of your respective experiences in observing political and economic development in Africa, is it possible to say, with the multitude of different political and economic systems that exist in Africa, that any of them constitutes a more effective model for economic development?

In other words, let us assume that Zimbabwe gets its independence as a result of the London conference, and they hold elections, and a new government comes in. The new government summons you to Salisbury to advise them on what kind of economic system they should establish in their country based on what you have seen elsewhere in Africa.

Obviously, all leaders have their own ideas, but if you were called under those circumstances, could you say that a particular system seems to work better than other kinds of systems, or would such a generalization really be impossible?

MR. TURNER. I would think that this would be a difficult generalization to work up. I think, in all honesty, it probably reflects more our own individual biases than it does our wisdom or academic acumen.

I will attempt to express mine. I think biases are honorable. It is dishonorable when we try to argue that they don't operate in what we say.

I think that I would like to say, leaving part of the last question. What one of the interesting things about the literature I read, and in discussions with some of my colleagues that are now involved in something called "Peasant Studies," is that what has happened in Africa is somewhat remarkable, in the way in which rather quiet, sort of idle lives, simple lives, have been swept into political events, and political forces of a world magnitude.

I think that we find that peasant people have had a renewed sense of concept of destiny in themselves in large national entities. I think that things that are going on, for example, in the desert with the Polisarios, is really radicalizing the lives of those peasants in Ethiopia as well.

But the gnawing problem is that there has not been any measurable material change. What does that mean for Africa, as there is this rising expectation, and greater politization of the peasants?

I would say to encourage those countries that are on the road to mixed economies. I would encourage them to be truly mixed.

MRS. FENWICK. Which are those?

MR. TURNER. We mentioned some of them earlier. Kenya has been mentioned. The Ivory Coast has been mentioned. I think, probably, I would not qualify Ivory Coast as a mixed economy as such. But Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Guinea, I would encourage those countries to

move toward a mixed economic planning. But I also think that countries like Mozambique are hopeful, Mr. Chairman. I think that in my opinion Mozambique unites rather dramatically the tendencies that my colleague spoke about, of the linking of the liberal tradition with socialist ideas.

Mrs. FENWICK. Would the chairman yield?

Mr. SOLARZ. Certainly.

Mrs. FENWICK. There are 40,000 political prisoners in Mozambique, mostly black, and they have a very thriving trade with South Africa. I don't see much hope in the import of all these arms for, I suppose, the patriotic front in Zimbabwe. I don't think that that is very hopeful.

Mr. TURNER. I was really trying, at this point, to deal with their involvement of peanuts in a rural community, in things like health and disease control, development of some systems of education, schooling at the village level, and involving the village community in discussions about decisions that will affect their lives, attempting to create a greater sense of political involvement and self-reliance on the part of village and rural communities. I was speaking within that context.

There are contradictions, clearly, in Mozambique. Mozambique, as you say, has this relationship with South Africa, but it serves also its own national interest of receiving a payment in gold at very much less than what is the market price in reselling it.

There is the problem of what was largely a rural based political movement, which by its estimation came to power quicker than it expected. How does it deal with a city like Mokuu in terms of bringing it under its control.

Mr. SOLARZ. Does anyone else want to respond to the question about the most appropriate model?

Mr. ROTBERG. I think that the advice that one would give to the government of Zimbabwe, if and when it asked for it, would take these following things into account:

One, any form of government which would maximize real political participation, would maximize the formation of interest groups as ways of dealing with the over-arching power of government. Any form of government which would maximize the interplay of ideas through a free press, and encourage exchange. Any form of government which would prevent and limit the government from controlling the spoils of victory, and shifting those spoils of victory to one ethnic group, or one privileged group, or class group.

The only model for this, Nigeria aside, because we don't know what will happen, and Nigeria is much more complex than Zimbabwe, the only model is Botswana where an election was held 1 week ago, which by all accounts was absolutely free—free elections are rare in Africa—where the peculiar leadership of the country—it does not matter whether it is a parliamentary system or a Presidential system—but either maximizes political participation—

Mr. SOLARZ. Let me rephrase the question. It seems to me that there are three overriding interests which virtually every African country shares, and other interests as well, but let me phrase the question in terms of those three:

One: Minimize the ethnic conflict within the country;

Two: Promote economic growth within the country; and

Three: Try to assure some measure of equitability in the distribution of economic resources within the country.

Now, concerning those three objectives, do you think, generally speaking, that an African country is better off with a one-party totalitarian government, or with a constitutional or parliamentary form of government that employs as its economic model the kind of economy where it may control the few key sectors of the economy, but where private trade and enterprise is otherwise permitted?

Mr. ROTBERG. The Government of Botswana, which is not a good model, because Botswana has certain peculiarities, nevertheless has pioneered over 13 years in Africa an extraordinary relationship between free enterprise and highly socialistic approaches to the mining companies, the governing of mining companies, and the prevention of exploitation.

In terms of the things you raise, Mr. Chairman, the things which I agree that a new country like Zimbabwe would want to maximize, I think our experience shows that there is greater opportunity to maximize them under parliamentary or presidential forms of democratic government, where it is, in fact, parliamentary and presidential as we know it, because most African governments are not.

Therefore, it is no use to say, "Have a constitutional form of government, but don't obey your constitution." It does not make any sense. One would rather say: "Have a benign military government as the original Nigerian military government."

Mr. SOLARZ. What about the argument that I have heard some people make that in societies where you have a couple of hundred different tribal groups, where political allegiance tends to run more to the tribe than anything, permitting a multiparty system only exacerbates the conflict, because while you are organized on an ethnic or tribal basis, a multi-party system facilitates a conflict which could otherwise be suppressed if there were a more authoritarian form of government.

Is there any merit to that argument on the basis of your experience in Africa?

Mr. SKLAR. The evidence appears to be that for the most part repression will lead to rebellion. Where people do not have the opportunity to compete freely for influence and control of their government, then they are forced to revolution and the shambles.

I would be reticent to give advice on a matter of value. Therefore, I would give very strictly limited advice on that matter.

If a Socialist inclined government were to take power in Zimbabwe, and if I were asked, then I would say that political liberty, as Professor Rotberg indicated, is not inconsistent with the achievement of Socialist government. I say, as a matter of judgment, that a dictatorship based upon single-party ideas might well make it much more difficult to accomplish the goals that the people in charge have in mind.

Mr. SOLARZ. I have one final question which deals with an issue which may well confront Congress and this country within the next few weeks, and that has to do with Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

What if it should turn out that the London Conference falls apart, or is unsuccessful in achieving a peaceful transition to an internation-

ally acceptable form of majority rule in that country, but it should also turn out that Bishop Muzorewa accepts the constitution which has been proposed by Great Britain, and indicates his intention to accept—as I gather he has, more or less—the proposals put forward by Great Britain for arrangements, of a political-military nature in the interim?

What if, as a result of that, Britain lifts sanctions? Under those circumstances, what do you think we ought to do? Do you think that it would be appropriate for us at that point to lift sanctions as well on the grounds that the new constitution does not have the blocking mechanism and the white monopoly in the civil service, et cetera, that the previous constitution had? Or, would you say that, given what will undoubtedly be continued African opposition to the lifting of sanctions, and because of our interest in better relations with Africa, it would still be unwise to lift sanctions? What advice would you give us?

Mr. TURNER. I would like to apologize for always referring to the previous question, but I like very much, Mr. Chairman, your criteria for measuring effectiveness of development of political organization, and I think that they merit more careful consideration, because I seriously think that looking at it from the point of view of a one-party or multiparty system is not efficient in Africa.

I think that we need to look more at what is the consideration around the kind of things that you have mentioned, which does involve ideology, which does involve program, and perhaps involve modes of organization. I think that we need to look more carefully at Mozambique.

When we look at the question of attempting to break down ethnic, or as we call them, tribal groups, I think that Mozambique is promising.

In terms of the question of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, I think the way things stand, if those talks were to break down, clearly the basis would seem to be around the question of the minority population, and what allocations are made there and are not. If Bishop Muzorewa does come forward, and does agree, and the Patriotic Front finds that it is not able to get an acceptable arrangement that is not going to change the situation, I think the lifting of sanctions opens up the Pandora's box for a wider internationalization that I spoke to earlier, which will worry everyone in Africa.

If the U.S. Government were to follow suit, and remove sanctions, I think that that would be a poor way to pay frontline states like Tanzania, Mozambique, and Zambia. I think that we will have to take the initiative there for continuing to hold an even side, and attempting to resolve, perhaps under an American initiative, the issues that may have broken the conference.

Mr. SOLARZ. Professor Sklar?

Mr. SKLAR. I think that the lifting of sanctions would be extremely symbolic. It would indicate acceptance, and acceptance could mean acceptance of a widening of the war. The war will not go away. Much more significant to me than the sanctions would be the attempt to renew negotiations. To get the negotiations to resume.

Mr. SOLARZ. I think that we have to recognize the fact that this is the last attempt for peace. I frankly cannot imagine any viable pos-

sibility of resuming negotiations in the wake of the London Conference's fall, except to negotiate the terms of surrender.

I think that if this does not work, it is an all-out war. I just don't see that the political climate for negotiation would be ripe for any kind of American, or for that matter under those circumstances British initiatives, following the collapse of the Conference.

Mrs. FENWICK. Why do you say, an all-out war. If Mozambique, Zambia, and other countries no longer continue to funnel arms into the area, if they considered that the proposal was reasonable, and Muzorewa accepted the constitution, and the British Commissioner would be there, and British supervision of the elections. If all those things were done, wouldn't that strike the neighboring states as reasonable? Why do we think that they are going to continue to funnel arms, and continue the fight.

Mr. SKLAR. In response to this observation, I personally do not think that either Mozambique or Zambia will abandon their support until there is an agreement. I think that Zambia has paid a terrible price.

Mrs. FENWICK. But, if the Patriotic Front is unreasonable, what are they fighting for? If they have a supervised election, and agree to accept whoever comes to power, what are they fighting for, unless it is naked power? Up until now, it was a terrible constitution. It was an outrageous situation. I think that the reasonable thing has been to oppose it. But in the event that all of these things take place, why would the border countries continue to furnish the Patriotic Front with arms?

Mr. SKLAR. My guess is that the neighboring states will insist upon a reasonable position from the Patriotic Front, and that the position of the Patriotic Front will not be unreasonable. In other words, there will be a basis which will be defensible, in which case there may be an escalation of the war, and the cost to them will be enormous. It is terrifying to think of it. I still do not believe that the frontline countries, particularly Zambia under Kaunda, will abandon the guerrilla warfare.

Mr. SOLARZ. On what basis could we justify maintaining sanctions against what would become an apparently genuinely multiracial, multiparty democratic society, one of the handful in Africa, while at the same time permitting trade, investment, and everything else with a few dozen African countries which do not have multiparty democracies.

Mr. SKLAR. I can see three bases, and maybe none of them are valid, but I see three bases. We would lose our leverage, and make no real step toward ending the war. The second one is that we ought to be an honest broker and, oddly in this particular case, the maintenance of the status quo may well be a condition of being able to act as an honest broker. Third, our commitments on the United Nations Participation Act, I think perhaps we ought to be guided in our policy by our commitments to the United Nations.

Mr. SOLARZ. I regret to say that if under the hypothetical situation that I mentioned Congress were to be persuaded not to lift sanctions, more persuasive arguments than that will have to be devised.

I can say, in all candor, that if the British conference collapses, and the British cannot bring the parties together, there is not anybody who

is going to be persuaded that there is now a possibility that we will be able to bring the parties together. I think people will come to the conclusion that there really is no viable possibility of a negotiated agreement.

The second point is that as a consequence to that, there is no longer an argument for maintaining leverage. Leverage for what? Leverage for a negotiated agreement that no one thinks is possible any longer would not make much sense.

Insofar as the United Nations Participation Act is concerned, clearly lifting the sanctions in the absence of a Security Council resolution permitting that, would be a violation of our charter obligation. The fact of the matter is, out of 100 reasons for imposing sanctions, that ranked in the eyes of the Congress and the American people maybe 97th, because rightly or wrongly, for better or for worse, the credibility of the United Nations in this Congress and in this country is zero. It is 10° below zero because of all the irrational and nonproductive things that the United Nations has done.

I think there are a lot of useful things that the United Nations has done. But it is very interesting, as a matter of fact, if you look at the debate in the Congress over the sanctions last spring, that there was hardly a Member who pointed to our obligation to the United Nations as a basis for maintaining sanctions, because they are recognized that this carries no weight around here.

Mr. SKLAR. May I say one thing. I think that we need infinite patience on the Zimbabwe question. We just have to stick with it, and not give up, if this round breaks down.

Mrs. FENWICK. What are we fighting for? Stick with it for what?

I am prepared to stick with it if I can be sure that those people are going to get a decent break. I think that the proposed constitution does that. I see no reasons against it. What I am afraid we are getting to is power. The people are not really interested in getting a free election.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mrs. Fenwick, let me say this. It is a very interesting point. I am sorry, in a way, that you had to leave the conference Saturday before the afternoon session, because the representatives of the Patriotic Front spoke about the London Conference, and they made a point, which I must say I thought had a lot of merit to it.

They have accepted the constitution, and they have put forward their own proposals for the interim period, and I was struck by the fact that what they are proposing, on the face of it, appears to be eminently equitable.

For example, whereas in the context of the Anglo-American proposal, they insisted, and I think unfortunately we agreed, that the armed forces of the new state had to be based on the army of the Patriotic Front, they have now dropped that.

What they are saying is, in the interim period, the army and the police should be made up equally of elements of both the forces and the police of the existing regime, and the forces and the police of the Patriotic Front, so that neither side has an advantage over the other.

They argue that under the terms of the British proposal, the British send in a Governor, who, in effect, has all legislative and executive authority, and the existing army and the existing police remain intact, and come under the supervision of the British Government.

There may be some merit to their argument that it would be unfair to ask the existing regime to go into an election in which our army, and our police would provide the basis of security. It is unfair to ask us to go into an election where the army and police of the existing regime provide the basis for security.

They say, we have been fighting these people for almost a decade now, yet we are asked to go into an election where they are going to be the ones responsible. To be sure, there will be a British Governor on top, but the reality will be what goes on in the rural areas, where the existing army and police will be.

Mrs. FENWICK. There were elections before. I agree that they were a fraud because of the constitution. But from the point of view of the observers, they did not, as far as I know, apply pressure.

Mr. SOLARZ. Without wanting to take the side of the Patriotic Front, because I am not an advocate of the Patriotic Front or of Bishop Muzorewa, I think that the Patriotic Front would make this one distinction. They would say that there is a big difference between treating fairly the candidates of parties that are basically committed to the status quo, and how the candidates of the Patriotic Front would be treated, when at best they are going to be viewed with great suspicion, and at worst, with tremendous hostility by the army, the police, and the existing regime; because these people will know that if Mugabe, Nkomo, and those people win the election, it is not going to go well for them.

They made another point, which I thought at least was worthy of consideration. They said: "Suppose we win the election. Suppose it turns out that we, at that point, would obviously want to change the existing order, and we then go to General Walls, and tell him, 'Sorry, general, the game is up. We want you to resign, and we want the officers to resign.' Are they going to agree to do that, or are they going to say: 'Buzz off, we are going to stay where we are.'"

I don't know that will turn out to be true necessarily, but those concerns are legitimate enough so that their position is entitled to consideration. As I look at the proposals that they have put on the table, those proposals seem designed not to give them an advantage over the bishop, but rather to provide a basis for an equitable transition in which neither side has an advantage over the other.

Mrs. FENWICK. But it is not unreasonable to expect that people who have been fighting each other as bitterly as those two armies have, should get together in an army that is going to be merged, and objective, and are going to be watching an election with calm.

I would think that it would be far better to have the elections entirely supervised by outside observers.

Mr. SOLARZ. This is, in a way, the proposal of the Patriotic Front. They want the United Nations to come in.

In any case, we are not doing the negotiations.

Professor Rotberg, what do you think we ought to do, if the bishop accepts the constitution, and the British lift sanctions?

Mr. ROTBERG. I think that you have identified the area of reality. I think that there is a role for the United States. There is a role in the sanctions question, the most important of which, in my view, is to realize first of all that in addition to who supervises the elections, is the crucial issue of timing.

Lord Carrington has put forward, in my view, the absurd proposal that there should be 2 months between day one and election. It is perfectly reasonable for the Patriotic Front to resist this. It is perfectly reasonable, I think, for the U.S. Congress to lift sanctions if the result is an agreed upon constitution, but not if it is a transition which does not make it possible for the Patriotic Front to compete fairly.

I think that it is perfectly reasonable for the Congress to say: "We will lift sanctions after the elections, when we see how the elections have been held, and that includes permitting all sides a free chance to campaign and vote."

It is arguable that the Patriotic Front or the other side will somehow be prevented from competing. I testified before you in March on the same score, that it is very important to insure that all sides have access to the ballot box. That is the reason to be cautious on the lifting of sanctions. It is a good argument not to lift sanctions as fast as the British refuse to renew sanctions.

One other point, because I think that it is of concern, there are United Nations troop delegations which could join in with the British troops, which the British have not offered, and there would obviously be a role for a congressionally mandated appropriation of funds to help defray those expenses which would be acceptable. I think, to the Patriotic Front, to the Muzorewa government, and to Britain.

Our influence has been very helpful so far. It could be very useful with Mozambique and Zambia on this point. Because as has been indicated, there is a test of reasonableness, and Zambia and Mozambique will lean over very far backwards to believe in something that is reasonable. That is why it is so crucial that the British Government does not get too hung up on the 2-month rule, and on a British Government recolonization, which I am all in favor of in this conflict, but a recolonization with some power.

Mr. SOLARZ. But it may be that the conference collapses because neither side will agree to what the British recommend. I see that the Bishop has accepted the British proposal with one significant reservation, which is that he does not step down as prime minister, which is a very important part of their proposal.

I guess I come back to the same question. If they are unable to reach agreement over the interim arrangement, but they do implement the constitution which appears to provide for genuine majority rule, the white minority is not given disproportionate power at it was in the first constitution, and the British, who have the primary responsibility, lift sanctions—under those circumstances, how could we justify to our colleagues in Congress a decision not to lift sanctions?

Mr. TURNER. I think that precisely the point that you have made is the point that needs to be made. The Patriotic Front has raised the question of their agreement to the constitution, but what will be the method of power sharing, power balancing. I would disagree with your premise that if, in fact, these discussions break down there is no alternative. I would remind you that during the last visit of Mr. Smith, he said in more than one place that Britain was a spent power—it is perhaps crass, but that was his judgment—that it was the United States who was going to be essential from here on in.

I would say that, in fact, it is important for us to exercise what leverage we can now to see that Mr. Smith, and General Walt are

made to be more forthcoming in these agreements. I think that our leverage, if there should be a breakdown, would still be considerable. I think that the argument has to be made from the point of view that, in fact, to do anything else is to lead wider spheres of conflict, and perhaps of an international sort that we do not find acceptable.

Mrs. FENWICK. What are you talking about, what international conflict?

Mr. TURNER. I think that if we go back to the battlefield, the war will continue pretty much as it has been. At that point, if we are, in effect, to lift sanctions and, therefore, seem to be siding with the British, Smith, Muzorewa, and the others, that will then leave us no hand in containing the situation to escalate on the other side as well.

Mrs. FENWICK. What kind of international war are you afraid of? What kind of international problem do you project?

Mr. TURNER. My feeling is that what would happen would be that the conflict would get hotter. The magnitude of participation of outside forces would become greater.

Mrs. FENWICK. Do you mean that Cubans would go in?

Mr. TURNER. I don't know that.

Mrs. FENWICK. What are you suggesting?

Mr. TURNER. What I am suggesting is that arms would come, and would continue to come, would come at a greater magnitude, particularly if it seems as if the advantage could weigh with Mr. Smith and Mr. Muzorewa. That simply seems to be the issue in my judgment.

The Patriotic Front has asked for a fair arrangement, where they might share in the power, in order that there may be a checkmate situation. So they would have some way to assure their participation in the elections in the country.

Mr. SOLARZ. I want to thank each of the witnesses for very thoughtful testimony. I think that it has been a very helpful contribution to the consideration of American interests in Africa. I only hope that the London Conference succeeds, or no doubt we will confront these vexing questions later in the month.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:45 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

U.S. INTERESTS IN AFRICA

Western European Interests in Africa

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1979

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2:05 p.m. in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Stephen J. Solarz (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. SOLARZ. The hearing of the subcommittee will come to order.

Today, we are beginning the ninth in a series of hearings on U.S. interests in Africa.¹ During the previous hearings, we have examined in detail the full range of U.S. political, economic, and military interests in Africa. The subcommittee has also heard extensive testimony on Soviet and Cuban interests in Africa.

In this session, the subcommittee will hear testimony on the interests of the four Western countries which have had so much to do with the colonization and decolonization of Africa over the past 100 years. Although these four countries—France, Belgium, England, and Portugal—have now granted independence to virtually all their colonial possessions in Africa, their interests and influence have not waned significantly.

A close examination of the interrelationship between these countries and their former colonial possessions would probably indicate that within their former colonial territories, these four countries remain the most significant trading partners, the largest source of foreign investment, the principal aid donors, the main supplier of development technicians and in some instances the leading provider of military equipment and security assistance.

This is particularly true of France, which continues to play a major political, economic and security assistance role in many of its former territories. Today, for example, France has more technicians and advisers in Africa than it did in 1960 when it granted independence to most of its African possessions. Moreover, it dominates the commercial activities in many of its former territories and on occasion intervenes militarily to support pro-French governments. While the influence and interest of Britain, Belgium, and Portugal appear to be weaker, they continue to retain varying trade, commercial, political, and security links in their former territories.

¹ The eighth in this series was held jointly with the Subcommittee on International Organizations on Oct. 31, and will be printed separately.

During today's hearing, the subcommittee hopes to gain a better appreciation of the overall political, economic, military, and security interests of the four Western European countries in Africa, how these interests have changed over the nearly two decades since most African States gained their independence and how African States view the continued role and influence of these metropolitan powers.

The subcommittee will also be interested in finding out how the interests of these European countries differ or coincide with those of the United States.

Today's witnesses are: Dr. Ruth Schachter Morgenthau, Adlai Stevenson professor of international relations at Brandeis University. Unfortunately, I never took a course with her when I was there, but that lamentable lapse, notwithstanding, Dr. Morgenthau is a recognized expert on French-speaking Africa and has testified before this committee on at least three occasions in the past. Dr. Morgenthau will talk about French policies in Africa and let us in on the secret of how the French can manage to get away with things which, if we did them, would bring the wrath of Africa, and the world, upon us.

Our second witness is Dr. Patrick O'Meara, professor of government and director of the African studies program at Indiana University. Professor O'Meara has written several books on Rhodesia and Southern Africa and testified before this committee earlier this year when it examined the question of retaining Rhodesian sanctions. Professor O'Meara will talk about British interests in Africa.

Maybe he will give us a clue in on what the British are going to do in the next 2 days in London with respect to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

Our final witness today will be Dr. Jorge Braga de Macedo, assistant professor of economics at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University and also at the Economic Growth Center at Yale University.

I have known many people who have gotten degrees from both. You are the only one I know who teaches simultaneously at both.

Professor Macedo will discuss Portugal's policies and interests in Africa.

Since Brandeis comes first in the hearts and minds, if not in the country at least with the chairman of the subcommittee, we will ask Dr. Morgenthau to begin the testimony.

STATEMENT OF RUTH SCHACHTER MORGENTHAU, ADLAI STEVENSON PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY

MS. MORGENTHAU. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am honored to be here and in speaking about French Africa, let me start by saying that France has created contemporary structures of trade and contact, military access and access to raw materials which leaders of many industrialized countries regard with some amazement and envy.

At the same time, France appears to have enjoyed a certain immunity from criticism in such bodies as the OAU or the U.N. in spite of the fact that they have sold very large amounts of arms to South Africa and in spite of the fact that they have interfered directly in the internal affairs of a variety of African Governments within the immediate past.

France has somehow escaped much public notice for such contradictory acts as simultaneously assisting militarily Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, and Senegal, which are, in fact, involved on various sides in the Saharan war at the present time.

So France has done some quite remarkable things in contemporary Africa and has managed to make the most out of previous colonial connections in ways which I think to a degree, distinguishes French policy from the policies of some of the other European ex-colonial powers.

Mr. SOLARZ. Pardon me for interrupting, but I cannot help but observe that it might make sense for us to contract out on foreign policy on Iran and Israel at the present moment. Maybe we could contract out our African foreign policy to France.

Ms. MORGENTHAU. Maybe we can talk about that later, but I do not know if we want to contract our foreign policy to France.

Mr. SOLARZ. Maybe not. Before you are finished, I hope you will let us in on the secret of this strange, perhaps remarkable, success in carrying water on 17 shoulders simultaneously.

Ms. MORGENTHAU. I am not sure I can give the secret. I can ask some questions about it, and about some of the unique features of French policy in Africa.

First of all, their ex-colonies are a vast area. I am not sure the vastness of the area is really realized in this part of the world. It is more than a quarter of the total African continent that is, in fact, ex-French colonies.

Although the population density is low, the actual number of countries is very large. In fact, 19 of the newly independent African countries were ruled by France until fairly recently.

The area of some of those individual countries is extraordinarily large. If you look at either Niger or Chad, each one alone is the size of France and Germany combined. It is a vast area, and French influence, in part, because of the low density of population, continues to be very strong on matters of security and credit, spare parts, share of trade, technology, concepts of management, language, institutions, and practices.

The imprint of French rule remains very strong in this entire area. I would argue that this is partly because, after nominal independence, there was a transition period in which the invisible structures of the empire remained exceedingly strong, and then, as those structures were beginning to wane, most of the area received independence in 1960.

This transition period resulted in a very sharp, new incentive for France to renew those contacts and to reactivate the network. That new incentive came in the changing economic balance in the world which accompanied the rise of OPEC.

The shift in the relative pricing of most raw materials which took place during that period of time actively renewed French interest in Africa and reinforced France's desire to aggressively reach out and reinforce its policy. So politically, economically, strategically, France cultivates African States as part, not of an ex-colonial policy, but as a contemporary global policy; as part both of its European policy and of its international global policy.

And, at the same time, France seeks to parcel out the costs carried over from the colonial period as widely as possible. It seeks to keep as exclusive a hold on the plums of that experience as it can.

Mr. SOLARZ. In other words, it's a heads we win, tails you lose proposition?

Ms. MORGENTHAU. Precisely.

Furthermore, "we" is largely defined. France since the fifties, has carefully pursued a policy of trying to get access to some of the other parts of Africa to which it did not have access in the colonial period.

Nigeria, Zaire, Ruanda, Burundi, Southern Africa, France has aggressively reached for points of contact in those areas and French interests seek opportunities to enter, invest, trade, explore, communicate and be involved in what French officials and French businessmen regard as the richer parts of Africa and contradictions like being on various sides of controversies do not appear to cause any hesitation in that policy.

This new, fresh African policy is built upon a number of steps which are really very interesting because they come out of the French tradition of emphasis on culture. French language and culture have a place in the policy of Francophonie, and Francophonie, speaking French in Belgium, Ruanda, Burundi, Zaire, French-speaking Canada, Belgium as well as Quebec, and the French have held a number of meetings of the Francophonic States. They were meetings that touched upon the conception that there was a Commonwealth à la Francaise.

Francophone began with De Gaulle. It allowed a certain distance from the colonial labels, a reposing of the labels through which contacts could be made. It was a relatively elastic concept.

It balanced publicly a very acceptable way the fact at the same time France maintains the largest non-Communist military force in Africa. France has a very strong military presence in relation to other colonies in Africa. It has a network of military cooperation agreements and delivers arms and training and stations troops. It has access to ports, airports, overflight air rights in Africa as part of its inheritance in the colonial period and a network of new treaties signed after independence.

So while the military treaties were going on quietly, Francophone was a big public policy pursued by France. It grew from Zaire, Rwanda, and Burundi to what later became Franco-African meetings. The latest took place in Kigali this spring. It was the sixth meeting. It attracted 22 countries—19 more came.

Twenty-two countries is half the total number of African countries, newly independent African countries, and the Franco-African conference was, in part, a springboard of a French groping toward a fresh formula launched by President Giscard d'Estaing, a tricontinental dialog, not Franco-African, but a tricontinental continent including Europe, Africa, and the Arab States.

Mr. SOLARZ. For some strange reason it leaves out the United States.

Ms. MORGENTHAU. I think there is very definitely some strangeness in that. The grand idea behind the tricontinental concept is the dialog to allow France to dilute the limits set by the terms of the present politicized confrontation between Europe and the Arab States—on the one hand, between developed and developing states, which takes

place in the U.N. On the other hand, in between France and those whom it seeks out for special relationships.

So this approach caps a hierarchy of steps for French policymakers in Africa, steps which are designed to allow France to benefit as much as possible from having as many allies as it was able to carry over from its method of decolonization in the parts of Africa where it colonized.

The core of this group, therefore, is a form of colonies.

I must make some very rapid and rough generalizations about them. The largest amount of the former French colonies became independent, both as poor and weak states, but they are very numerous and it is France's policy within an organization like the U.N. or an organization like the OAU, to try to be able to count on the benevolent attitude of many of these former colonies since in the OAU or the U.N., a number of decisions are taken by consensus. The fact that there is a core of African States that entertains friendly and benevolent relationships with France counts for a great deal and helps account for the immunity that France enjoys, an immunity that I recall hearing President Nyerere wonder about when he had reviewed over the facts of the arms deal in South Africa.

I have mentioned that the present French policy in Africa dates back to the fifties and to the fact that many French officials and businessmen felt that they had been left with the poor parts of Africa.

French policy during the colonial era was one in which there was such closeness of budgeting between state and private enterprises in Africa that the high bill that the French had on the state budget had a parallel by the reasonably solid profits to be found for French businessmen on the private side of the ledger.

Relatively little was done in most parts of French rural Africa. There are, of course, degrees about this and more modernizing in fact exists in a country like Senegal or the Ivory Coast or Algeria or Morocco than in most of the other French-speaking African territories during the colonial era.

The modernizing, in fact, in French rule, if one looks at the total area, is relatively slight. It was a peculiar pattern of rule, very costly, which was carried on with something of a myth of assimilation that never took place.

The results were that administrators in newly independent African States were paid at a scale comparable to the French scale of salaries. The administrative side of the state budgets in many of the newly independent states were very costly. The capacity of many of the newly independent states to entertain independence after they became independent was very limited, given the poverty.

I must point out that so many states became independent because of what President Sangor termed a policy of "balkanization," of dividing former federations which accompanied French desire to avoid a second front during the war in Algeria. Otherwise, there might have been a big West African Federation, a big Equatorial Federation, the way there is a big Nigeria today.

But during the Nigerian it was a deliberate, rapidly taken decision to break up the French West Africa and Equatorial Federations into what is a total of 14 states in effect.

So the weakness and the poverty of many of the states in part is directly related to that very decision.

So not very much was invested. The Algerian connection was a primary one. It still, in many ways, is a primary one, and I would observe that it may be that the French are quite pleased to be able to share some of the cost of arms delivery in Morocco. They are intent in trying to share the costs that they have carried over from the colonial period as widely as possible.

I see I am taking more time than I should, so let me continue briefly and then you can ask me what you want.

There are the costs of the drought, the costs of underdeveloped and undeveloped agriculture which directly relates to the kind of economic policy followed by the French in that the French have tried to share out with the largest number of donor states through the mechanism of a consultative group related to the OECD.

There are the costs of development which the French have tried, to a considerable degree, to use through the Treaty of Rome, and then the Lome Treaty agreements, as a condition for transfer on terms that they prefer to the European Economic Community and they have enlarged their special trading connection with the former colonies into the ACP state framework, related to the Lome Treaty.

You will note Japan and the United States are left out of that particular pattern.

Then there is finally the access to what are regarded by the French as the most economic, the most desirable enterprises in Africa that become daily more economically desirable as the world market price of raw material changes.

I am talking about found or suspected oil sources, although those are quite limited; about other sources of raw material in Africa.

There, I think, one needs to observe that France has supported its enterprises in maintaining a policy that maximizes French control and French access to the benefits from these enterprises and shares out the right to invest in them on conditions that only are considered to be favorable by those who control the French holdings.

I close, therefore, by mentioning two recent events in Africa. One is the coincidence of French direct intervention, somewhat ungracefully, in the Central African Federation just around the time that the deposed Emperor Bokassa was trying to negotiate some Libyan support for himself.

If I could very briefly mention a personal anecdote that I was a part of, this was—I was discussing this with my husband as I left Boston. We spent Christmas Eve in the early seventies landing in Arlit, which is a uranium mine in northern Niger in the Sahara. We were the first Americans to land at Arlit.

We were met, curiously enough, by Joyeux Noel. It was Christmas.

The then-President Hamani Diori had sent us there. We were the first Americans. This is the early seventies. Niger had become independent in 1960. So it is a dozen years since independence. The American Ambassadors had never been there. No American personnel had ever been there, but the President was a personal friend and he sent us right down there. He wanted us to see it.

We saw the mine. We saw the French country clubs, the swimming pool, the separate French facility with Vichy water and French wine and all the goodies of French life there at Arlit and we were very

aware of the fact that our real host was the Nigerian Governor of the region who had never swum in the swimming pool, who had never been at the country club and whose daily contact was with people who were suffering from the drought.

The direct contrast involved in that particular experience remains strongly with me. So does the fact that I recognized an extraordinary coincidence in the fact that the coup against President Diori, which took place some time after that, took place in spite of the fact that there were French advisers, and so forth, who had all gone hunting or something on the ground that the coup they had taken against him was just when there was a draft agreement with Esso Minerals, which is Exxon, on the table of his desk waiting to be dealt with, an agreement which if it had been signed might have been regarded by the French Atomic Energy Commission as a distinct threat to its right to govern access to uranium in the Sahara.

That is really all I have to say, Mr. Chairman. It is a unique policy, an extraordinary policy, with layers of considerable complexity. From an African perspective, the weaknesses rooted in the colonial era are painful and the necessary economic dimensions for political independence are far from present at the time, the indivisible structures.

[Ms. Morgenthau's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RUTH SCHACHTER MORGENTHAU, ADLAI STEVENSON
PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY

CURRENT FRENCH POLICY

TOWARDS AFRICA

In Africa, France has created contemporary structures of trade and contact, military access and access to raw materials which leaders of many industrialized countries regard with some envy. At the same time, France has enjoyed a certain immunity from criticism, in such bodies as the OAU or the UN, in spite of selling large amounts of strategic arms to South Africa and intervening directly in the internal affairs of several African states, most recently in the Central African Republic. France has somehow escaped much public notice for such contradictory acts as simultaneously assisting militarily Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, and Senegal, involved on various sides of the Saharan war. France has managed to make the most out of previous colonial connections, in ways which distinguish its present African policy from Belgium or Britain, Portugal or Spain.

I shall speak of some unique features of the French impact on Africa; and of some characteristics of the nineteen new African states over which France had ruled. Their area is vast; more than a quarter of the continent; though the population density is low, the fourteen former French colonies of West and Equatorial Africa do not have more than two-thirds of the present population of Nigeria. Yet of these, Niger or Mali alone are each larger in area than France and Germany combined.

French influence continues to be great. France exercises considerable control over foreign exchange and credit, and over military security. It controls spare parts and has a preponderant share of trade. Though perhaps less in the states which parted in anger, like Algeria or Guinea, French technology and concepts of management, its institutions, language and practices, remain very influential. After the disappearance of official French colonial rule there remain invisible structures of empire, and these persist.

The invisible structures are based on formal and informal relations between Frenchmen and Africans: financial, economic, cultural and social. Strategic and intelligence information flows along the network between Paris and the French speaking African states. Small issues as well as large ones are regulated in this invisible system - matters of health and wealth, scholarship, exchanges and diplomatic visits; or such questions as where to harbor Emperor Bokassa after France organized a coup against him. The invisible structures persist.

However, circumstances change. New resource and energy needs, the rise of OPEC, renew French interest in the African connection. While the current French African policy builds on the colonial past, it also aggressively reaches out to other areas, particularly to African countries having rich resources. Politically, economically, strategically, France

cultivates African states as part of its global policy. At the same time, France seeks to parcel out any costs to its allies, in Europe and beyond, even while doing its best to keep as exclusive a hold as possible on possible concrete benefits.

In Nigeria, Zaire, Ruanda, and Burundi, even in Southern Africa, in any country where current circumstances might shake up established ways of doing business, French interests seek opportunities to enter, invest, trade, explore and communicate. Present French African policy is sometimes inconsistent, but the policy makers are not troubled by contradictions like promising, several times, not to sell arms to South Africa, and selling large amounts.

* * * *

France has the largest non-Communist foreign military force on the African continent. Military cooperation agreements with many former colonies resulted in delivery of some arms and training assistance, some stationing in Africa of French troops and access for France to African communications facilities, ports, airports, and overflight rights. Joint Franco-African maneuvers take place. All this allows the arrival of reinforcement from France as circumstances require. Though military intervention by France in Africa is hardly popular at home, in the past two to three years France has

intervened militarily in Tchad, Zaire, Mauritania, and the Central African Republic.

The French language and culture have a place in the new policy. "Francophonie" was a favorite of General de Gaulle's; the formula brought together France, much of its former empire, and the ex-colonies of Belgium, as well as Quebec. The formula reached out to include Canada, dissolved the purely imperial label, and sought to bring about a Commonwealth a la Française, once also a favorite ambition of President Senghor of Senegal. These meetings allowed informal exploration of ties which later led to agreements having what were perceived as mutually beneficial economic consequences, or mutual defense agreements.

"Francophonie" meetings drew in Zaire, Ruanda, and Burundi, whose governments also accepted invitations to the Franco-African summit meetings. In May, 1979, the Sixth Franco-African Conference took place in Kigali, Ruanda. Twenty-two African states were present, almost half the total number in Africa. It is an informal structure which allows new connections, and discusses a wide political and economic agenda. There, French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing began exploring how to enlarge the Eurafrikan dialogue into a 'Tricontinental' one, to include Europe, Africa, and the Arab states, all somewhat

connected to the Mediterranean world. The grand idea behind such a dialogue is to allow France to dilute the limits set by the terms of the present politicized confrontation between Europe and the Arab states, between the developed and developing states, and above all, between France and those it seeks out for special relationships.

This approach caps a hierarchy of steps French policy makers take to benefit as much as possible from having so many allies in Africa. The core of this group are former colonies which are mostly poor and weak; but they are numerous. Within such global structures as the UN, or regional structures like the OAU, each vote counts, and decisions frequently are made by consensus.

* * * *

The present French policy in Africa dates back to the 'fifties and the Jeanneney Report. French businessmen and political rulers were convinced the British and the Belgian colonizers had managed to take over the richest areas of Africa, and to leave the France with the poor ones. Indeed, in the colonial era, most French colonies cost the French treasury money. It must be added that the peculiar subsidized mercantilist system France maintained in the colonies, also brought solid profits to favored French business. Thus the French state subsidized the French

private sector, a practice furthered in part by privileged deals favored by French mixed enterprises uniting the governmental and the private sectors. Much of the money the French state 'lost' in colonial Africa, brought individual French enterprises handsome returns; while precious little remained behind in many parts of French ruled Africa.

The modernizing impact of French rule was relatively slight in the majority of the former French colonies. The French empire was highly centralized, and Governors General as well as French administrators were directly responsible to Paris. It was not unusual, in the poorer colonies, for Governors to start building public works before there were credits; to intervene directly and decisively, and expect Paris to pay the costs. This was part of the French imperial tradition, and the many Frenchmen who came out of it did not simply fade away at African independence. Many sought new posts, but remained willing supporters of the 'invisible' imperial structures that persisted after independence. After independence, French personnel advise and teach, consult and manage, in greater numbers in tropical Africa, than before independence.

The French ruled tropical African states (sixteen separate nations now) received relatively little attention or resources from France during the colonial era, at least in part because in the French strategy of development the economic interests

of colonial Africa were strictly subordinate to those of France. During the colonial era the French did little to exploit African minerals, for example; did little about the fact that Guinea had perhaps the world's largest reserves of bauxite, or that Gabon and Niger had uranium deposits. Interest in the mineral resources or hydroelectric potential of the former African colonies began to rise sharply in Europe, only when the needs for raw materials grew and the cost of energy rose in the world economy.

Indeed, black Africa under French rule, larger than all of Europe minus the Soviet Union, but with a population smaller than that of France alone, was always something of a colonial stepchild. Decolonization began largely to keep it from becoming a second front during the war in Algeria - hence, the French policy of "balkanization" into fourteen separate states, of what previously had been ruled as two large African Federations, French West Africa and Equatorial Africa.

The Algerian connection is still a primary one from the French standpoint - more important than the connection to Morocco, or to Mauretania. Does this help explain why France is not unhappy to see the United States interest itself in Morocco's military costs? Sharing out the costs of maintaining its African responsibilities was a policy objective carried over from the imperial period into contemporary

French-African policy.

* * * *

Separate independence came to territories previously part of interdependent federations. They were totally unprepared for the costs. Most of the black African states formerly ruled by France, were born in appalling poverty, with unbalanced administrative budgets swelled from the exaggerated administrative costs resulting from the myths of French colonial policy of assimilation. Eagerly, France seeks to share out the more uneconomic development and relief costs in its former colonies among an even wider group, including the United States and Canada, as well as Japan. Through the device of the Club du Sahel, and the sounding board of the OECD, donors are widely solicited for aid projects in the poorest Sahelian countries.

The poorer states were near collapse after separate independence, from inability to carry the inherited recurrent administrative costs. The governing groups, in Mali and Tchad, for example, grappled with economic forces out of their control, tried many ways to extract the crops from the villagers to feed the city dwellers, and in the process unwittingly adopted policies which discouraged agriculture further.

It must be made clear that the drought in the Sahel of the early 'seventies, can only partly be ascribed to climatic causes. Quadrupling oil prices and inflation were causes as well. Furthermore, French colonial policy had shamefully neglected African agriculture, and the colonial economic policy operated in ways that emptied out the villages, and gave rural Africans incentives to plant for the export markets and the money economy rather than for survival. When after independence France shifted its policy away from imperial mercantilism and abandoned artificial price supports above the world market price for African export crops, such as peanuts, the French African economies received a shock. The food crops they had imported from overseas cost more than villagers earned from the export crops they had been urged to plant under the colonizers.

As the French withdrew budgetary supports, some African leaders found themselves insecure enough to be willing to concede more and more in return for less and less. Many began to quarrel with each other. There were little border wars, between upper Volta and Mali; Benin and Niger, for example. They were too weak to cooperate.

The resulting African weaknesses attracted the interest of stronger neighbors; of north African powers in the Saharan resources, or of Nigeria interested in marketing prospects and in counter-balancing Libyan interests. Many

borders became trouble spots, and the prospect of mineral resources, of uranium or phosphates, for example, where previously only desert had been seen, attracted incursions by neighbors inside Africa, and superpower attention.

* * * *

As the French government sought to stabilize its former colonies, while sharing out the costs, a changing perception of Africa's economic future helped the process along. Some Western European powers began to see Africa as a priority area; as markets and producers for European needs; as a reservoir for vital resources. This perception set the way for the European Common Market countries (before Britain entered) to accept the French conditions for associating its former colonies. The process began with the treaty of Rome. Over a period of more than a decade, France passed to its Common Market allies many of the public costs for maintaining privileged trade and investment, and privileged banking and currency relations with many of its former colonies. It shared, through the European Development Fund, some of the related development costs. After France's costs were taken over, it was willing to share some access.

The Lomé Convention guarantees preferential treatment in Europe to the manufactured exports of the associated African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states. Although

these are, for the time being, quite limited, it is likely that they will grow. Some observers believe Africans might become offshore producers of consumer goods for the Europeans. The Convention also sets up aid plans and cooperative processes on trade, on a program stabilizing earnings from exported commodities (STABEX), on treatment of foreign companies, payments, and movements of capital.

The Lomé Convention represents a fresh departure, a structural change that reinforced, to some degree, both African and European cohesion. Lomé substitutes "Eurafrican" links for the earlier more fragmenting imperial ones. Meanwhile, of course, the Lomé Convention was designed to discourage non-European industrial nations from trading or entry in the former colonies, even though the African nations themselves have insisted on their right to open their doors to the highest bidders - be they from east, west, or middle east. The difference with past practice is that the Lomé agreements end the exclusive limits set around individual European empires and set up a single system embracing somewhat more than all of them put together.

* * * *

Meanwhile, however, at the level of separate strategic industries, French interests did their best to keep their share of markets and resources, and to extract the maximum possible fee for access. Therefore, French interests are

very cautious about possible foreign partners for prospectively prosperous African enterprises, like the uranium deposits whose value multiplied, the possible oil reserves; the copper, bauxite, phosphates. French interests fight to maintain an exclusive over these resources, to ration out participation in ways that do not threaten but rather maximize French holdings.

It is not unusual to find a sudden use of the French military presence, to maintain their exclusive hold, and to depose an African ruler who chooses to make another choice of foreign economic partners. This show of power is usually kept as discreet as possible; the realities of hegemony are pleasant to the French public but the costs are not; the power is used as frugally as possible, but it is used. The well-known events surrounding the fall of Emperor Bokassa give an example of what can happen, though the surrounding publicity with its revelation of unsavory mix between private favors and public expense, proved embarrassing.

I can give another example, from direct experience. In the early 'seventies, as personal guests of the then President, Hamani Diori, my husband and I were the first Americans to actually touch down at Arlit, the uranium mine which the French had created in the Sahara of Niger. Our small Niger-government plane, a twin engine Cessna given to Niger by

President Kennedy, was piloted by one of the rare Nigerien pilots. It arrived at Arlit on Christmas Eve. We were received by a courteous but puzzled General Noel, the Frenchman in charge of the operation. Bulldozers brushed aside the relics of a stone age culture and possibly of visits by Roman soldiers, and uncovered fossils showing a Sahara with water. In General Noel's world, wine and Vichy water, salads and fruit were flown in from the Paris market; he and his French colleagues swam in the swimming pool of the French country club in the desert.

However, the Nigerien Governor had never swum there. Arlit was a state within a state. The regional Governor lived in a world quite separate from the French universe created to mine the desert. Niger was one of the states worst hit by the 'drought', and in the Governor's world, people were hungry.

The French regarded Niger's uranium deposits as theirs; they took entry fees from Japanese and German interests, and gave a hard time to possible American investors. They tried to keep out anyone who might become a genuine threat. I find it hard to believe it was an accidental coincidence, that the French 'advisors' chose to ignore their military arrangements with President Hamani Diori, and disappeared while a coup against him conveniently took place, just as a

convention giving Esso Minerals (Exxon) access to a uranium concession was on his desk.

* * * *

These are some of the unique features of contemporary French policy in Africa. They give French policy makers a decided advantage.

From an African perspective, the weaknesses rooted in the colonial era are painful. The necessary economic dimensions for political independence are hard to achieve. And the invisible structures of empire are heavy.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much for some very thoughtful testimony. I must say that you lend some substance to the suggestion that has been made from time to time that we ought to consider a swap between NATO and the Warsaw Pact whereby we would trade them France in exchange for Romania, but that is a subject for another hearing, and another show.

Professor O'Meara?

STATEMENT OF PATRICK O'MEARA, DIRECTOR OF AFRICAN STUDIES PROGRAM, INDIANA UNIVERSITY

Mr. O'MEARA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you and the members of the subcommittee for allowing me the opportunity to speak before you today regarding this important issue.

The main focus of my testimony will be on British foreign policy in regard to southern Africa over the past 5 to 10 years.

This will, of necessity, also involve an examination of British relations with Nigeria, the frontline states, the Commonwealth and toward the United States.

British policy toward Africa received a new impetus with the appointment of Dr. David Owen as Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in 1977. The most serious concern given to Africa and the more activist role played by Britain was not simply due to David Owen's appointment, but to the fact that he moved with the full approval of Prime Minister James Callaghan and of the Cabinet.

All of these actors were responding to important determinants such as: One, the policy directives of the Carter administration and, in particular, of its Africa team, including Andrew Young and Donald McHenry with whom David Owen shared a basic consensus on goals, if not on style.

The American approach was invaluable in strengthening Owen's position within the Cabinet and American muscle became an important element in joint United States and British negotiations with South Africa and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

Callaghan's tenure as Foreign Secretary may be characterized as less decisive toward southern Africa when compared to the active involvement of David Owen, but it must be seen in a different historical context.

Two, the intensification of the guerrilla war in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

Three, the 1976 Soweto riots and the need to resolve the Namibian impasse. The changes in foreign policy directions were a direct result of events in southern Africa itself.

Black, urban unrest and repression within South Africa were making it much more difficult for Britain and the United States to ignore international demands for effective measures, including the possibility of sanctions against South Africa.

Four, Nigeria's foreign policy offensive against South Africa. In a speech to the Young Fabians during the Labour Conference in October 1977 entitled "Britain's New Course in Africa," David Owen pointed out an important policy direction in terms of British national interest. In 1976, trade in each direction with South Africa was worth more than 600 million pounds, approximately \$1.2 billion.

In the same year, more than 1.3 billion pounds, \$2.6 billion worth of British exports went to black Africa, twice as much as to South Africa. In particular, he emphasized that Nigeria was now not only Britain's leading partner on the continent but one of the fastest-growing British markets anywhere in the world.

As part of its new foreign policy in 1977, Nigeria began to use its economic importance to try to compel its trading partners to change their relationship with South Africa by its decision to give foreign firms a choice of either trading with them or with South Africa.

Nigeria was now becoming Britain's biggest trading partner on the continent, moving ahead of South Africa, and thus its foreign policy offensives were of considerable significance.

David Owen's approach differs with that of the current Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, in that he sought a lasting transformation in southern Africa. I quote from a speech:

Economic commonsense should now put everyone in Britain, businessmen, trade unionists, the politically sensitive and aware as well as committed churchgoers, clearly on the side of those who are prepared to make some sacrifice to see evolutionary change in South Africa.

Lord Carrington and Mrs. Thatcher are more concerned with the immediate process of resolving crisis and demonstrating shorter range, pragmatic approaches to the problems involved.

Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Prior to the Commonwealth meeting, Mrs. Thatcher gave clear indication that she was ready to recognize the internal Zimbabwe-Rhodesian settlement. Mrs. Thatcher was under heavy pressure from the rightwing of her party in both the House of Commons and the House of Lords to end sanctions and give the Muzorewa government legal recognition.

On the other hand, there were general concerns that the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia issue would cause a major upheaval at the August Commonwealth meeting in Lusaka and jeopardize Britain's ties with Nigeria.

Lord Harlech had consulted with Government leaders in Nigeria, Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana, Malawi, Angola, and Mozambique and found that there was a recognition that the internal settlement had brought about changes in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, but at the same time, these Governments made it clear that they objected to the internal Rhodesian Constitution and insisted that a solution should come from Britain, which was the legally responsible authority for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

Countries such as Zambia and Tanzania warned of dire consequences to the cohesion of the Commonwealth if recognition were accorded to the Muzorewa regime. In his announcement of the proposed British plan following the Lusaka meeting, Lord Carrington made no mention of U.S. participation.

While the Labour government and the Carter administration had jointly drawn up the defunct Angola-American plan in this new initiative, British Government officials indicated that the United States would be consulted but that the plan was solely British.

The emphasis was on the fact that this was a British problem to be handled by the British Government.

President Carter's refusal to succumb to domestic U.S. pressures for premature recognition of the Muzorewa government and the lift-

ing of sanctions has largely been vindicated by the relative success of the Lancaster House Conference to this point.

It should also be emphasized that the U.S. involvement in the proposed development fund for Zimbabwe and the assistance of the Commonwealth Secretariat helped to break a major deadlock and save the conference.

Mrs. Thatcher's decisiveness and pragmatism, and her ability to control the more conservative members of her own party, such as Julian Amery, are some major factors. "President Kaunda, who has had his disappointments with Sir Alec Douglas-Hume, Edward Heath, Harold Wilson, and James Callaghan, said that he was left in no doubt that he was dealing with a British Prime Minister capable of handling the Rhodesian issue." This is from the *Observer*, August 12, 1979.

In the past, the Conservatives were able to precipitate new directions in British policy toward Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, such as the Pearce Commission in 1971. This decisiveness is partly due to the fact that they have fewer constituencies to satisfy than Labour, and partly to the general phenomenon that the right, as in the case possibly of Charles De Gaulle, is frequently capable of resolute and direct action in the settling of crises.

Mrs. Thatcher's realistic appraisal of the severity of the situation immediately prior to the Lusaka meetings, admittedly with considerable prodding by African nations, called for a bold reversal of her position, and she was confident enough of her control of her party to make such a move.

The Commonwealth and the frontline states. In the 35 years since the first Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting in London in 1944, the organization has faced, and survived, several major challenges. These have included the Suez crisis, the departure of South Africa from the Commonwealth, the Rhodesian UDI, the question of sale of arms to South Africa in 1970-71 when the Conservative British Government considered supplying arms to South Africa, and finally the most recent crisis of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, weathered by Mrs. Thatcher at Lusaka.

The fact that Mrs. Thatcher was able to receive endorsement from the 39 countries at the conference for her Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Lancaster House meeting was remarkable because of the unanimity reached, despite overwhelming odds, and at the same time, it was an indication of the continuing importance of the Commonwealth as a body.

The subcommittee consisting of Zambia, Tanzania, Nigeria, Jamaica, and Australia, and the Commonwealth Secretary General Shiridath S. Ramphal, played a decisive role in formulating the original agreement as well as at vital subsequent stages of the talks in London.

Britain has now also developed a close working relationship with the frontline states who have proved to be valuable allies over the problem areas of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and Namibia. Their cooperation must, indeed, be seen as a significant achievement in the much broader context of the growing Soviet presence in Africa.

It is to be hoped that this special relationship will be a lasting one. Britain has come a long way, often following the American lead, from

the days when Sir Alec Douglas-Hume, Callaghan's predecessor as Foreign Secretary, was critical of President Kenneth Kaunda, and especially of President Nyerere, whom he, at one time, accused of having his country come under Chinese control.

The importance of Nigeria. Until the mid-1960's, the major part of Britain's overseas trade was with South Africa and a substantial portion of its investment was in southern Africa. The vital Cape Sea route and the strategic importance of South Africa's minerals, as well as kith and kin arguments, were all interconnected with trade and investment.

The strategic importance of the Cape and the significance of South Africa's minerals are still emphasized, particularly by the rightwing of the Conservative Party, but both Britain and the United States now have a new set of priorities. The production of oil by Nigeria, which started in 1958, has changed the overall trading pattern.

Nigeria is now the 10th largest oil producer in the world and its extensive spending has led to its becoming Britain's ninth largest market. Immediately before the Lusaka meeting, the Nigerian Government nationalized British Petroleum's 20 percent equity interest in Nigeria's largest oil production company as well as BP's 60 percent interest in BP Nigeria, Ltd., a marketing company.

The Nigerian Government said it would compensate BP for the nationalization. The Nigerians had previously cut BP off from the right to buy 100,000 barrels a day of Nigerian Government-owned oil supplies because it said BP had allowed tankers that docked in South Africa to pick up Nigerian crude oil.

The nationalization, according to Nigeria, was necessary because BP was shipping North Sea oil to South Africa and using Nigerian oil to replace it and they opposed this subterfuge.

Clearly, Nigeria was using the oil weapon in an effort to influence British policy in southern Africa, especially on the eve of the Commonwealth Conference. Nationalization and the flow of oil have clear, long-term implications for future British and United States-Nigerian relations.

It must be recognized that apartheid is an emotive issue with Nigerians and that any government, including the present civilian government, will pursue a hard line on southern Africa. Such factors will continue to have a significant influence on British policy.

It should be noted that, especially in the case of Conservative, British policy has consistently reflected British economic interests and needs. Popular support for policy has been strongest when British economic interests have been threatened. In simpler terms, trade and oil thus will lead to a fundamental reordering of Britain's African policy.

Britain and the use of sanctions. Different British governments have, at least on paper, been committed to implementing an arms embargo against South Africa, since the boycott was first recommended by the U.N. Security Council in 1964.

When the Labour government was returned to power in 1974, it stated that the arms embargo would be reimposed more strictly after it had been relaxed by the outgoing Conservative government elected in 1970. However, in 1976, it appeared that some strategic materials were being exported from Britain to South Africa through loopholes in the 1970 customs and excise export of goods control order.

Sophisticated tropospheric communications equipment had been sold to the South African Arms Bureau by Marconi Communications System, Ltd. There is also evidence that other British military equipment was supplied to South Africa through third countries.

The Conservatives have always been hesitant in threatening the use of sanctions. However, in a recent address to the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce, the new British Ambassador to South Africa, Mr. J. H. G. Leahy said that Britain had to weigh its trade and investment interests in South Africa against those in other parts of the world.

Leahy maintained that, while Britain did not like sanctions,

I should be misleading you if I were to give you a cast-iron guarantee that we shall not, in any circumstances, feel obliged to go along with sanctions of some sort.

Sanctions might be avoided if South Africa were willing, particularly in the Namibian context, "to help us help it." Leahy also emphasized Britain's special involvement with Nigeria.

The British Government now seems at least willing to consider the possibility of sanctions instead of emphasizing less drastic means to persuade South Africa to modify its position on Namibia or bring about changes to apartheid.

In a little over 20 years, Britain has shifted from a colonial power relationship to a postindependence era of diplomatic engagement with its former African dependencies. It clearly continues to value its individual linkages with these nations as well as corporate involvement through the Commonwealth.

Britain will have to make hard choices in the future between black Africa and South Africa and both the Labour and Conservative Parties appear on the threshold of new policy directions in this regard.

Important choices will have to be made if conditions deteriorate in South Africa. Britain will also have to play a key role in aiding the new nation of Zimbabwe and facilitating international assistance for rebuilding the war-torn adjacent states.

British foreign policy will continue to involve the United States and a number of factors and variables, among these:

(1) The relative importance of different constituencies within Britain itself.

(2) Prevailing stability or political unrest within key African nations, such as Nigeria.

(3) Conditions in South Africa, particularly in regard to black urban unrest and questions of British investments in trade.

(4) Relations with the Commonwealth.

(5) The special relationship between the United States and Britain, which will change according to White House incumbents, initiatives by key officials, and Republican-Labour, Republican-Conservative, Democrat-Labour, Democrat-Conservative permutations.

What does appear constant is an increasing commitment by these two powers to an equitable solution for blacks in southern Africa. British influence and American diplomatic skills and resources will thus continue to be important forces for the foreseeable future.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Professor.

Our next witness will be Dr. Macedo. I am probably going to have to leave for a series of votes in about 10 minutes, so if you could possibly try to summarize your testimony in that period of time and then we will briefly recess the hearings for the vote, and then resume.

**STATEMENT OF JORGE BRAGA DE MACEDO, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR,
WOODROW WILSON SCHOOL, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH CENTER, YALE UNIVERSITY**

Mr. MACEDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very pleased to be able to give some views on our problem that may not have the same dimension as the two earlier testimonies, given the fact that the importance of Portugal within Europe has always been more marginal than France and Britain, but nevertheless, of some significance, as I will try to show. And, following your suggestion, I will only make the main points.

The first problem, and the first major difference, is the length during which Portugal has stayed in Africa. In fact, the round figure of 500 years comes very close to the truth, and the former President of Angola last January, 5 months before his tragic death in Moscow, referred exactly to this inheritance.

He talked about the 500 years of coexistence, an expression very similar to the one that was used before the 1974 revolution by the earlier witnesses. This was to see how deep that feeling is.

I am emphasizing this point, because the achievements of Portuguese policies since the revolution are minor. That is an outstanding characteristic of them.

They are minor largely on problems relating to the Portuguese side. Repeatedly, the leaders of the five nations which speak Portuguese have attempted to get some attention, some cooperation, from Portugal. Sometimes with African nations, like Mozambique, still having a colonial mentality. They have tried, have shown in various ways, like in helping Portugal to become a member of the Security Council in the U.N. and then in the selection of Ambassadors have shown interest in the cooperation of the Portuguese, possibly to compensate for other more recent influences.

The Portuguese have, in general, not been able to respond. The rest of my statement will be an analysis of why that is, an attempt to show that, even though that has not been the case in the last 4 years, this is not the reason why the Portuguese should not be relevant for U.S. foreign policy.

Putting the paradox in the following way, there may not be a policy of Portugal with respect to Africa, but that does not mean the Portuguese presence in Africa is not relevant for the United States.

I can, very briefly, describe this as a syndrome of parallel diplomacy in Portugal. Portugal went through a very dramatic decolonization that has traumatized the population a great deal because it was conducted by the very defenders of the colonial situation, the armed forces.

Therefore, the diplomacy has been conducted with at least three objectives in mind.

The first objective has been an attempt at gaining acceptance into the EC. That has been the most vocal. Then there is the overhang of the revolutionary period that emphasizes the Third World solidarity of Portugal, the nonalignment of Portugal. This has led to numerous envoys to Africa's emphasizing this aspect.

Suddenly, the international connections of the ruling party, the Socialist Party, with Socialist internationalism. Another important consideration, I draw your attention to the recent meeting in Portugal of the Socialist Internationale. While the frontline was, in fact, accepted by that organization against its former policy and by the influence, clearly the influence of the Socialist Party.

I fear that I will not be able to develop this point as much as possible. Let me try to conclude by pointing to the fact that foreign policy, even though it is generally considered as a more elegant activity than domestic policy, has societal roots in countries, mainly in the European countries. But I would make the statement in general as increasingly important to take into account in the analysis of international relations.

This, in the case of Portugal and its relation with the former African colonies, seems to me to be the crucial point—the societal roots of foreign policy are there.

The errors of policy that go against these roots are irrelevant. These are the points that I would like to conclude my statement with, the fact that the Portuguese relations with Africa are counterintuitive from the point of view as compared to others, France, the Soviet Union, and so forth, should not be a reason for those relationships to be ignored.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Macedo's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JORGE BRAGA DE MACEDO, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, WOODROW WILSON SCHOOL, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, ECONOMIC GROWTH CENTER, YALE UNIVERSITY

PORTUGAL AND AFRICA SINCE THE 1974 REVOLUTION

Introduction

Portugal was the first and last European colonial power. The peculiarity of her overseas expansion was most visible in Africa, even though the preservation of colonial frontiers in Brazil had also been singular. The principle of effective colonization, adopted at the Berlin Conference in 1885, was bitterly resisted, and Portugal delayed a systematic economic exploitation of colonial resources almost until the decolonization pressures of the postwar period. The accelerating economic development of the two major African colonies, Angola and Mozambique, in the 50's and 60's, was accompanied by substantial migration of Portuguese settlers. After 1961 it was also accompanied by an increasing military effort against nationalist movements.

The ideology of Portugal as a multicontinental nation led to an absolute refusal to discuss independence. Even with nationalist leaders of the stature of Amilcar Cabral. Even when the military situation was unsustainable like in Guinea-Bissau.

Portuguese decolonization in the aftermath of the military coup of April 25, 1974 was also dramatically peculiar. The Portuguese Armed Forces were unable to resist an accelerated deterioration in their operational capability during the process. Indeed, the independence of Angola in November 1975 coincided with the reversal of the procommunist stance of the Revolution and the attempt at establishing Western democratic order in Portugal. Accordingly, the most conspicuous objective of foreign policy since then has been European integration.

The foregoing overview leads to question not only if there is at present a Portuguese African policy but also what its relevance for U.S. foreign policy might be.

Perhaps paradoxically, the affirmative answer to the second question does not hinge on an affirmative answer to the first.

It can, in fact, be argued that Portuguese relations with Africa are relevant for the U.S. because they seem counter-intuitive. They point to the resilience of "five hundred year of coexistence", as the late Dr. Agostinho Neto, President of Angola, put it in January 1979. This resilience is particularly remarkable when the regimes are ideologically opposed and the capabilities and achievements are minor. Indeed, to assess the recent effect of Soviet or Cuban expansion in Africa, where the ideologies are similar and the capabilities and achievements are evident, and of the appropriate response of the U.S., the last four years of Portuguese relation with Africa are almost like a controlled experiment.

In that regard, it is analytically convenient to distinguish not only between former Portuguese colonies and other African countries, but also among the former. In fact, the notion of a Community of Portuguese speaking African countries, belonging to both the colonial and post colonial Portuguese rhetoric, is not very useful. There has been only one informal meeting of the leaders of the five former colonies in Luanda in June 1979 and the question of the relations with Portugal, if discussed, was not mentioned in the final communique.

From a global view point, the major distinction is between the "front line" states, Angola and Mozambique, and the others, Cape-Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and Sao Tome e Principe. This distinction also holds for the nature of the relationships with Portugal, described as excellent by the leaders of the

small equatorial states and acknowledgely more strained for the two others, where the stakes are also much higher.

In the sequel, after we describe the relation between domestic politics and decolonization, we will review the achievements and problems in bilateral relationships using the distinctions drawn above.

I. Domestic Politics and Decolonization

During most of 1975, Portugal was subject to a military rule of conflicting ideological allegiances. Against the overhang of conservative to mildly liberal officers, personified in junta members Galvao de Melo, J. Silverio Marques and A. Spinola, emerged orthodox Soviet followers, like junta member Rosa Coutinho and prime minister Vasco Goncalves, together with Maoist-populists like operational commander Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho and nonaligned eurocommunists like Revolutionary Council member Melo Antunes. Only the leftist civilian political parties, furthermore, were able to provide a social support base. Thus the Communist Party supported Goncalves, the Popular Democratic Union (a Marxist group with strength in the Lisbon industrial area and the Alentejo) supported Otelo and the Socialist Party, with many a rightist tactical follower, supported Melo Antunes.

Decolonization of Mozambique and Angola proceeded during the power struggle between these groups, whilst the independence of Guinea-Bissau followed smoothly after Spinola's declaration of intent on self-determination on July 27, 1974, and the approval of Law 7/74.

The trauma of decolonization was inversely proportional to the degree of military control the Portuguese armed forces had in April 1974.

Minor in Guinea-Bissau, where the control was virtually non-existent, it was larger in Mozambique, where the South was largely under control until 1973 and overwhelming in Angola where the struggle between the three liberation movements had given a particularly favorable position to the colonial army.

It is also interesting to note that the degree of Portuguese military control was in turn proportional to the size of the settler's population and, furthermore, to the degree of economic prosperity of the territory.

The importance of these differences is that the power struggle in Portugal prevented the colonial army from having any role in the decolonization. This incapacity had most severe consequences where the role of the colonial army was most relevant, namely in Angola. The independence agreement signed in Alvor, Portugal, in January 1975 implied an attempt at reconciling the three liberation movements, which would have required a strong effort in Luanda, the capital where the allegiance to the Neto fraction of the MPLA was virtually total. In the summer of 1975, the MPLA took over Luanda, which led to a massive exodus of the settlers, and the Angolan civil war became a war between the colonial capital and the hinterland, which was controlled by the Alliance of Zaire-backed FNLA and South-Africa-backed UNITA. Luanda was already surrounded by the alliance when it was defeated by Cuban Troops with Soviet equipment, in the eve of independence on November 11, 1975. Portugal's bewilderment at the fate of the most prosperous colony was obscured both by a refugee problem of enormous proportions and by the attempted coup of November 25 and its aftermath. Thus whilst Brazil was one of the first non-communist nations to recognize the Luanda government,

Portugal was one of the last European nations to do so.

As Portugal was moving toward Western Democracy in early 1976, foreign policy suffered another reversal. The non-aligned rhetoric was entirely abandoned by the Socialist Party and parties to its right and the electoral slogan "Europe is with us" was used both to seek entrance into the EEC and to obtain economic aid from the EEC, the U.S. and Japan.

The major feature of foreign policy in the post decolonization period is thus the constraint imposed by the balance of payments deficit and European integration, both of which led the government to emphasize the western type economic and political characteristics at the expense of the African dimension. Africa thus became the only outlet for revolutionary spirit. The consequence of this projection into foreign policy of the domestic political struggle can be described as the "syndrome of parallel diplomacies". Special messengers from the Prime Minister or the President of the Republic to former colonies have been at least as important as the institutional channel of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Such messengers have invariably been ideologically to the left of the successive Ministers of Foreign Affairs. In fact, the resignation of Dr. Medeiros Ferreira, in October 1977, a major blow to the 1st. government of Dr. Soares, was a direct consequence of the special messengers of the Prime Minister.

Furthermore, the special messengers of Dr. Soares had a different purpose from those of the President of the Republic, General Eanes. In the first instance the main objective was to enhance the African dimension of the Socialist International, and was, at least initially, affected by

the views of Senegal's president Senghor.

In the second instance it signalled the increased intervention of the President of the Republic in foreign policy, on a purely national basis, but with a more non-aligned emphasis than the one prevailing amongst the Diplomatic establishment.

2, Cape-Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Sao Tome

The relations of these small states with Portugal are largely determined by their need for external aid and their difficult relations with more powerful neighbors. S. Tome has feared excessive influence of Gabon, which is said to have been behind two attempted coups on President Pinto da Costa. Guinea-Bissau, linked through the ruling PAIGC to Cape Verde, has faced a bitter dispute over territorial waters with Guinea-Conakry. Military cooperation with the Soviet-Union is based on the origin of most of the military hardware and commercial agreements therewith have proved disappointing. Some trade relations with Brazil and Mozambique notwithstanding, there have been repeated statements by President Luis Cabral, the brother of Amilcar, about the predominance of the links with Portugal. The implementation by Portugal of the various cooperation agreements that she has signed with these countries has been slow. Nevertheless, they lobbied actively in the UN for the election of Portugal to the Security Council in October 1978 instead of Malta, the candidate of the nonaligned movement to which they belong.

Luis Cabral visited Portugal in January 1978, Avistides Pereira, President of Guinea Bissau visited in January 1979 and Pinto da Costa visited in October 1979. Eanes, toured Guinea Bissau in February 1979.

The first meeting of the foreign ministers of Angola and Portugal, from which the decision to establish relations emerged, took place in Cape Verde in September 1976 and the first meeting between the Presidents of the Republic of those two countries took place in Bissau the following June. The success of the meeting between Eanes and Neto has led to refer to the "Spirit of Bissau", whenever improved relations between Portugal and Angola are sought.

3. Angola

The decolonization of Angola has been the most dramatic throughout. In May 1974 Costa Gomes, number two of the military Junta, and former military commander of Angola, stated that he believed she would "remain Portuguese". In the summer of 1974, Spínola attempted to concentrate upon himself the decolonization of Angola and this is said to have accelerated his replacement by more leftist Costa Gomes after the coup of September 28, 1974. The passivity of Portuguese troops during the transition period that quickly became a civil war was resented by the three liberation movements and the settlers alike, if for different reasons. The main supporter of the MPLA-Neto in Portugal was always the Communist Party, rather than the Socialists. The Angolan government has resented that, since independence, Portugal should allow anti MPLA activities by UNITA, FNLA and FLEC in the territory.

On the Portuguese side, the problems of Portuguese prisoners there and Angolan refugees in Portugal have hindered better relations. On the financial side the nationalization by Angola of banks and other

enterprises belonging to the Portuguese state involves settlements of about 10 billion dollars; on which the Angolans have refused to negotiate.

After the May 1977 attempted coup of Nito Alves, however, Neto's policy shifted toward the West and a "General Cooperation Agreement" was signed in Bissau in June 1978. The ratification by the Portuguese Parliament was substantially delayed, despite frequent pressures by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Paulo Jorge. The commercial agreement of January 1979, signed during the visit to Luanda of the Portuguese Minister of Trade, also has had problems of implementation. In fact, the first meeting of the Luso-Angolan committee created in the Bissau agreement took place over one year after it was signed and little progress was made.

The death of Dr. Neto in Moscow on September 11--at a moment when even his relations with UNITA seemed to be improving--makes further progress harder to predict. Nevertheless, President Eduardo dos Santos has recently sent a message to Eanes, thanking him for his presence at the funeral which has been interpreted as signalling interest in continuous relations. Eanes has, however, cancelled his projected trip to Africa, and to Angola in particular, largely because of the upcoming Portuguese elections of December 2.

4. Mozambique

Relations with Mozambique have generally been considered as the most strained. This is attributed by the Portuguese to Samora Machel's anti-western and pro-Soviet stance (it is the only former colony with a Soviet military base) and by the Mozambicans to Portugal's continued colonial

mentality. Frelimo has entertained regular relations with the Portuguese Communist Party and with some of the military involved in the Lusaka agreement of the Summer of 1974 where its legitimacy was recognized. Mozambique was the Portuguese colony where the cultural influence of South African and Rhodesian-type regimes was strongest. Aside from the border war with Rhodesia, possibly helped by white Mozambicans, there is a rival group, FUMO, operating in Portugal. Another aspect that is considered relevant is that Machel himself had minimal cultural ties with Portugal during the colonial period.

Accordingly, "parallel diplomacies" are strongest in the case of Mozambique. At the moment, the situation is that intergovernmental relations broke down in early 1978 when a Portuguese citizen was executed during the stay of a Portuguese delegation there, but numerous presidential envoys have since then succeeded in freeing some Portuguese prisoners and halting the flow of refugees, many of them Asians, to Portugal. At the moment the envoy there is Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho himself, who is a native of Mozambique.

The financial settlements involve the debts of the Hidroelectrica do Cahora Bassa, the 85 percent Portuguese holding corporation of the huge dam on the Zambeze, selling electricity to South Africa. Work had begun in 1969 and was completed in April 1977.

The compensation of unrecovered debts to the Portuguese state banks nationalized in January 1978 is another unresolved issue.

Nevertheless, Mozambique appointed her third ambassador (after Tanzania and the U.N) to Portugal and a recent mission to Portugal

stressed the appreciation of the Popular Republic for the new Portuguese Prime Minister, Ms. Pintassilgo, and deplored the lack of interest of Portugal. Machel is the only leader of a former colony who never met with the Portuguese President of the Republic.

5. Conclusion: Societal Roots of Foreign Policy

The achievements of the policy of Portugal toward Africa have been minor and the capabilities she has used for that purpose have been far less than the revealed needs and furthermore conducted through "ad hoc" channels. African policy--like public policy in general--has been seriously hindered by governments with an average turnover of 6 months and by the severe domestic economic difficulties.

African policy has often been discussed by lumping together all of the former colonies and considering relations therewith as an "alternative" to the European integration which will preserve "Portuguese Socialism" and its links to the Third World. This rhetoric is, of course, formally similar to the Europe vs Africa dilemma associated with the former regime. The Socialist party, on the other hand, has looked at Africa in terms of the spread of the Socialist International. In a meeting of this organization in Lisbon two weeks ago, the policy of the front line sides was endorsed, in a significant victory for the Portuguese Vice President Dr. Soares.

The quick reintegration of the refugees from Africa, namely in retail trade and intensive agriculture, has not erased the trauma of decolonization. Despite requests for skilled labor and people with African

experience by the governments of all five states, there have been few candidates. This may show doubts about the ability of the Portuguese government to protect them as much as suspicion of the Marxist regimes of the new states.

Nevertheless, the interest for African affairs in the Portuguese media is far larger than in comparable European countries and, beyond strong personal ties between individuals now in power, it seems warranted to state that relations between Portugal and Africa have been and will continue to be a societal root of foreign policy for all parties involved. The relevance of these roots is probably more salient in a small country of emigration like Portugal than for a large country of immigration like Angola but it is enduring in both. In fact, Portugal's lasting achievements in Africa have scarcely been grounded on consistent policies and rather on the observed capability of the Portuguese to adapt to the African context.

To sum up, evidence of the last four years points to the ultimate irrelevance of a foreign policy divorced from its societal roots. And, upon reflection, this may not be as counter-intuitive as it seems.

Jorge Braga de Macedo

Mr. SOLARZ. I want to thank you very much for summarizing so effectively.

We have three votes coming up now. My guess is two of them are 5-minute votes about 10 minutes left on the first. It is now approximately 3 o'clock. I imagine we will resume the hearing between 3:20 and 3:25. Hopefully, we will conclude by 4, at which time Secretary Vance is briefing us on the latest developments in Iran.

So I will now recess the hearing and be back as soon as we finish.
[A brief recess was taken.]

Mr. SOLARZ. The hearing is called to order. Martial law is declared and the witnesses will answer as directed by the chairman.

Ms. Morgenthau.

Ms. MORGENTHAU. Sir?

Mr. SOLARZ. Can you answer the \$64,000 question, which is, how, in fact, have the French managed to get away with policies and actions in Africa which, if they had been promulgated or implemented by the United States, would have brought the wrath of Africa and the world down upon us?

You indicated, for example, that there were several recent examples of French military intervention in Africa. I cannot imagine that if the Marines had been sent in to depose the Emperor Bokassa that it would have been as indifferently greeted as the French military involvement in that situation.

So, how do you account for this?

Ms. MORGENTHAU. It is very hard to give a single straight answer.

In a number of the coups in which the French have been involved, they have done their best to try to be in the position of being called in by what is a legitimate government, but clearly there was no sign of that in the case of the Central African Republic.

I think that the device—I suppose the key is knowledge. To go back, to really try to answer your question, knowledge of a lot of people about a lot of networks, about a lot of specific factors of what different groups of people want, in knowing whom to call in order to get support. How to get support, how to legitimize something as outrageous as that.

They did this, you know, at least in part by getting the African judges to investigate the incident with the children in the Central African Republic.

This was a group of judges—the chairman of which was a Senegalese—which came out with a report which showed a degree of violation of human rights, of the population of the Central African Republic that kind of became a justification in a sense for this type of action.

Mr. SOLARZ. Let me take another aspect of it. We have a fairly substantial volume of trade with South Africa, but we have not, at least consciously, permitted the sale of any American arms to South Africa since President Kennedy established the unilateral embargo on the shipment of arms to South Africa in 1961.

France was actually selling arms, at least until the U.N. embargo, and presumably after that.

One has the sense in Africa that our relationship with South Africa comes in for much more criticism than France's economic relationship with South Africa, which includes the sale of arms which presumably

would be a matter of far greater political significance than some of the more benign forms of trade with which we engage.

Now, how do you account for that? Is it simply because we are a superpower?

Ms. MORGANTHAU. I think certainly the fact that we are a superpower is a part of it so that we are a target for other than African criticism. We are a target for a global pattern of criticism.

But, in addition, I think for example, I am thinking of the meetings. We do not cultivate friends as carefully, or as assiduously as I think the French have done. We do not have quite as many people to do the kind of homework which would lead to having a network of solid friends in Third World countries.

We squander our ability to do this all the time. That network of core states that the French are able to count on really can, and does, act in a very effective way on France's behalf at crunch votes in the OAU and U.N.

We have never tried to cultivate that group of states, for example.

Mr. SOLARZ. Could you possibly briefly characterize current French policy toward the Western Sahara, particularly in terms of the sale of French arms to Morocco?

Do you know if they have a policy of providing such arms, or not providing such arms?

Ms. MORGANTHAU. I have not looked at the latest data, but as far as I know, the French have military agreements and/or relationships or involvements including the sale of arms with Algeria, Morocco, Senegal, and Mauritania.

Now, the degree and actual content of this involvement varies, but with all four, it was whose planes were being used. It was French planes that were being used when the Moroccans intervened in Zaire, for example.

That was just about a year or so, a year, year and a half ago, was it not?

There is military interconnection dating to the colonial period. That involvement is still there.

Mr. SOLARZ. Have the Communist countries complained about the presence of French troops in Africa in the same way that the West has complained about the presence of Cuban troops in Africa?

Ms. MORGANTHAU. I have not noticed the same amount of interest in French military involvement. It is an interesting point.

Again, the question of who is a superpower and who is not has something to do with it.

Mr. SOLARZ. Cuba is not a superpower yet.

Ms. MORGANTHAU. No, that is right.

Mr. SOLARZ. What do you think accounts for the fact that the presence of Cuban troops in Africa is the cause of such great consternation in the West while the presence of French troops in Africa does not appear as you put it, to be a cause of great consternation in the East?

Ms. MORGANTHAU. I have said that I thought that we have not cultivated our relations with the French-speaking African States. I think that there has been, for some period of time, a feeling that France is in our ballpark so we do not need to worry so much when they do things like that.

Mr. SOLARZ. I wonder if each of you could very briefly respond from the perspective of the former colonial countries about which you spoke today in response to this question. To what extent do French, Portuguese, and British interests in Africa coincide and to what extent do they diverge?

We can start with France.

Ms. MORGANTHAU. I think that the coincidence comes through the European Economic Community and the Lome agreement.

The French have managed—Portuguese is out of that, or in it—out of it?—until now, but it seems to me there is a moment, no doubt, one of the core outer countries. But the French have, simultaneously, I think, made changes in their European and African policy and there is an intimate interconnection in the way in which they have brought the steps together.

So that from the Rome agreement to the Lome agreement, and all the subagreements including elements, atomic energy, strategic minerals, and access of investment and foreign exchange questions, and so on, have been part of a network of economic treaties bringing into a single relationship with the involving European Economic Community, the Associated African, Caribbean, and Pacific States.

When Britain joined the Common Market, I would say, is the watershed of the reperception in Britain of the significance for a united European community of all of Africa, including its former colonies and keeping a special European sphere of priority for Africa is something that Britain and Belgium and France and Germany all agree on.

So that there has been progressively built out of the small irritations and conflicts from the colonial period, a new conception of the relationship with Africa, in which the agreement is, keep America out; keep Japan under control. This is our sphere for trading with foreign vesting. It is our offshore producer of consumer goods for European consumers.

They say, for example, you can hear it at economic conferences, Latin America is the offshore producer of consumer goods for the United States, Africa is on the way to becoming the offshore producer of consumer goods for Europe in the next stage of industrialization.

Since there is a phase of straight assertion of economic nationalism which is involved in, but on a more continental, or semicontinental still, which is involved in the building of the European Economic Community in relation to us and other competitors.

I think that is how it has come together.

Mr. O'MEARA. I would like to look at it from a slightly different angle from Professor Morgenthau's. A lot depends on the specifics of the relationships. I think that, today, Nigeria is in a very different position from, let us say, a small African nation like Lesotho. We are dealing with power relationships with Britain and its former colonial dependencies. This is a very important point that we should be clear about. There are obvious rewards from Britain to areas that are favored. I am always interested to see the kind of support that is given to a country like Malawi, where the British like the development that has taken place.

There is a certain feeling that investments will have a return. This is another example of a conservative African State.

The question of the kinds of cultural dimension that Professor Morgenthau referred to earlier, the French relationship, I think, is absent, to a large extent. I think that there are ties, but not at the profound level referred to in terms of France.

I would like to state that there are punitive dimensions; possibly ones that might be explored later. The reference I made to the Conservatives with Alex Douglas-Hume in terms of the Tanzanian nationalization, the Tanzanian question of the Chinese linkage versus the kinds of relationships with Malawi.

Mr. SOLARZ. To what extent and in which way do British and American interests coincide in Africa, and to what extent, and in what way, do they diverge?

Mr. O'MEARA. The divergence of British and American—I think that where I have tried to deal with this is the southern African area I would say that I would like to put forward the idea that there would be a convergence; there has been a strong convergence with British and U.S. interests.

I think, in terms of oil, we might find different policies emerging because this becomes a much more crucial factor in regard to Nigeria.

Mr. SOLARZ. Let me follow up on one point here.

What accounts for the fact that, unlike the French, who seem to send troops here, there and everywhere in Africa, the British have apparently refrained from doing so.

Why are they much more reluctant to use military force in the implementation of their African foreign policy than the French?

Mr. O'MEARA. This is an interesting question. One asks that question in terms of Rhodesia itself after the UDI.

Mr. SOLARZ. Even now, they are hiding behind the skirts of the Commonwealth. One finds it hard to believe that the French would act similarly.

Mr. O'MEARA. In a moment, I will bow to Professor Morgenthau.

One thing, we must not see Britain as a major power any longer. It is an important power, but we would be deluding ourselves in saying it is a major military power.

Mr. SOLARZ. France is hardly a superpower either.

Mr. O'MEARA. That is true, but Britain is also involved in Northern Ireland. That is a significant factor. They hesitate to deploy troops.

Mr. SOLARZ. Maybe you can reflect for the record and submit an answer. I think it is an interesting question. Maybe it is the trauma of Suez. I do not know.

Ms. MORGENTHAU. I think it is British budgetary practices, which are quite different. They tried to run their colonies with the idea of each top on its own bottom as opposed to expenditures out of a central treasury.

They do not have a line of credit easily available and the way in which they operate, the way the French budgetary practices and French governmental ways of allocating resources allocate, Napoleon left his mark in the way of centralized budgetary practices and I think you can see it reflected in the speed with which—and then De Gaulle revived it—the money is available for these rapid, almost precipitous engagements here, there, and everywhere.

Mr. SOLARZ. Professor Macedo?

Mr. MACEDO. I believe that there is a shortrun divergence but there are possibilities of a longrun convergence between the interests of the United States and the interests of Portugal.

As far as Africa is concerned, the shortrun divergence comes from the fact, as I mentioned, Portugal is now very much interested in joining the EC and when she does so, it will be a marginal part in the EC. Therefore, the weight of the EC policy, which was referred to earlier, will probably be most important and I share Professor Morgenthau's position that Europe will attempt, in fact, to keep an area of influence there, even though I would have more doubts about the implications for South America that you mentioned.

In the long run, however, a good historical evidence will be brought to bear. Portugal has had for eight centuries as an independent nation, the policies of compensating its small bargaining power with its neighbors and would spend by alliances with a neighbor further away in the historical case of England.

The policies of the former regime which correspond to a geopolitical interest which is obvious in the Azores.

Portugal, rather than having a minor part will wish to diversify somewhat and play the Atlantic dimension to a greater degree.

It has tried to do so with Brazil.

Brazil, of course, has visions of its own, and therefore, the alliance may not be as easy as with a country with global concerns, like the United States, and that sounds in the medium-to-long-run—medium-to-long-run here means it has a lot to do with the domestic situation in Portugal and the United States and in Europe that there will be a convergence.

Mr. SOLARZ. Could you each briefly compare the local concern in France, Britain, and Portugal about Cuban troops in Africa with the level of concern about those troops in our own country. Would you say it pretty much parallels U.S. concern, or is it of greater or lesser degree? What accounts for the differences, if there are any, of the level of concern about the Cuban presence in Africa.

Ms. MORGANTHAU. First of all, let me say that there is a great convergence between French and American policy in Africa in the long run. I would not make that argument, nor would I say that there is a tremendous long-term convergence between United States and European policy in Africa on many concrete issues.

I am talking now not so much on political as economic. That is one thing.

In relation to Cuba, I think the French have been very concerned. The French, I think, have been very concerned.

Above all, perhaps even more than the French, some of the French-speaking African States have been particularly concerned. It is hardly possible to have a conversation with President Senghor without this issue being raised. He feels very strongly about it and is very concerned about the Cuban presence in West Africa.

Mr. SOLARZ. Given the French presence all over Africa, on what basis do they complain about the Cuban presence?

Ms. MORGANTHAU. I think for a country like Senegal, the pretty well open invitation for the French to reinforce their presence in Senegal is directly related to their concern about the Cuban presence there.

A number of the moderate, French-speaking African States in all meetings on the African Continent raise this issue as a major worry for themselves. They are aware that just a few troops can make a tremendous difference and in the case of Senegal, they were very concerned about the small Cuban presence in the West African area and wanted it counterbalanced in one way or the other, so there is a certain sharing of concern on the part of a number of African States and they have communicated this to the French and, in fact, have invited the French to have more of a presence there.

Mr. SOLARZ. You would say that the French concern certainly parallels our own?

Ms. MORGANTHAU. Yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. What is the British position, Professor O'Meara?

Mr. O'MEARA. There is not substantial divergence with the British position, but it is important to note that the Conservatives, particularly the rightwing of the Conservative Party, is extremely distressed about this presence, and I think that the Conservatives would probably have a harder line on the Cuban presence than, let us say, David Owen.

Mr. SOLARZ. How would you account for the fact that the Conservatives appear not to have much interest in active American participation in the diplomatic initiative on Zimbabwe-Rhodesia while Labour was clutching the America's coattails on this question?

Mr. O'MEARA. I think it is a different context. As I mentioned in my testimony, Lord Harlech became very aware on his travels in Africa that there was a concern to have Britain as a major power, resolving what is a British problem.

I also think that the Anglo-American plan, as I use it in my testimony, the term defunct—it was a defunct plan. There was a need for a new initiative. I would see it in those terms.

It was a new context.

Mr. SOLARZ. Professor Macedo?

Mr. MACEDO. There is a major difference that one has to take into account when making that comparison, which is the level of attention that exists is measured by the media between Portugal and the United States in respect to Africa. There is great interest in the media in Portugal for Africa, as given in my testimony.

Given that to consider, there is less concern. There is less concern for one interesting reason. Most people think that this will be something that the Cubans will regret on a horizon that is for a country like Portugal a relative one. Maybe not for the United States.

The attention is greater, so you have a greater diversity, but I think there is less concern in that sense.

Mr. SOLARZ. Jonas Savimbi was in my office a few days ago and he said he spoke four or five different African languages, which, he argued, was one source of his appeal to the people in the bush. He also said that the now deceased President Neto spoke only Portuguese and was unable to converse with the Angolan people, in any of their own languages. Is that true?

Mr. MACEDO. Dr. Neto spoke in Bakongo, Kimbundu, and Ovinbundu. Kimbundu is a language that originates in the periphery of Luanda. Even though it was absolutely dominant in Luanda proper,

there was no mystery that everybody in Luanda accepted Neto, its minor language from the viewpoint of the country, of the Bakongo tribe, the language of which he spoke and he is the leader of that tribe.

Two-thirds of the population of Angola, a very large part of the area.

The other third language is Bakongo. Laberto was only once.

Mr. SOLARZ. When Neto spoke to the Angolan people, what language did he use?

Mr. MACEDO. There, in spite of the admiration I have for his political skills and military endurance, he likes to exaggerate, I think. I would say he spoke Urnbundo.

This does not give him the possibility to speak to all or even as many people in Angola as the other. It is not true that he only spoke Portuguese.

Mr. SOLARZ. One other question on a historical point. Did South Africa come to the aid of UNITA before Cuba came the aid of the MPLA, or was it the other way around?

Mr. MACEDO. There is some dispute on this matter. It is my own personal evidence that there were Cuban advisers in Angola, many of them friends of people in the MPLA that was there before independence.

It seems also that the date of departure of the first convoy was early November and, therefore, very close to arriving at the time of independence.

I believe that the help that South Africa gave to UNITA predates that. But again, the reason I think that—I have probably told you that—it really is a case that he toured Europe and tried to show how the Zaire pressure and military pressure, or the potential military pressure of the Soviet Union, given the division of the MPLA itself, which was really the crucial aspect.

As I say in my testimony at the time, there were three MPLA's which would lead to an internationalization of the Angolan problem. He tried to get European cooperation. I do not know if you have had the time, or had some effectiveness here. I do not believe so.

And threw himself, if I may be allowed to use his expression, and threw himself in the hands of South Africa in desperation. It may have predated that. We cannot quite make the argument for the reason, I think, is quite important.

Zambimbi was the leader that was aware of nationalization early on, and he knew the difficult situation of the MPLA and how Neto was a minority. This was of course, shown again, in 1977 when he made his attempt.

Mr. SOLARZ. In spite of that, you still think that South African troops arrived in Angola before the Cuban troops?

Mr. MACEDO. Let me be more incisive to have the details straight.

What he is talking about the Cuban arrival is first, how quick and efficient it was in terms of its military technology. Also, how, in fact, homogeneous it was, because it seems that, in fact, the Cubans were experts in the equipment they had.

With the case of both the UNITA, cum South Africa and South Africa cum northern column, the importance of Portuguese settlers that had, in some way, been endeared to UNITA, thinking of still staying.

Many of those had military expertise. It is crucial.

It is more shocking when we know more about the Cuban experience, because it was a homogeneous group that came from the outside.

The commander, just to give you a simple example in the northern column, which I think is relevant, one of the best colonels in the Portuguese Army, was the commander in chief of the FNL column and he arrived at the doors just at the moment when the troops were deployed. It was a very close thing.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Gray.

Mr. GRAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Because of my late arrival and because of the full committee meeting, I will not ask any further questions. I will be reading the testimony as well as the questions that have been asked by our distinguished chairman.

Thank you very much.

Mr. SOLARZ. It was good to have you with us, with questions or without.

One final question, because we do have a briefing with Secretary Vance coming up on Iran. What accounts for the fact that the former Portuguese colonies. I think, without exception, appear to have what may be termed Marxist governments whereas the former French and British colonies by and large, maybe with one or two exceptions, have not produced Marxist-oriented governments.

Is that overall generalization a fair one?

Mr. O'MEARA. It depends on how you describe it. The Tanzanian approach is a form of African socialism that differs greatly from the Kenyan political model.

We cannot make an umbrella statement.

Ms. MORGENTHAU. Marxism was the political language of African nationalism in most of Western Equatorial Africa.

Mr. SOLARZ. I am not sure what the proper phrase is. Surely, conceptually, there is a distinction between Angola and Mozambique.

I gather Cape Verde on the one hand and even Zambia, or even Tanzania on the other.

Ms. MORGENTHAU. I was thinking about Algeria, Guinea, Mali, even Congo.

Here state capitalism, using the language of Marxism, prevails and the first political language, even of President Nufet, was learned in Communist study groups which were maintained by French Communists of the popular French front era.

What happened was the necessities of running nearly independent African States that made the actual foreign policy moves different afterward than what we would expect. There was no Cuban presence and the foreign policy models were different, but I would expect that the African nationalism, to take the step ahead, even Angola where there is a presence, heavy presence, of Cuban troops.

Underneath the Marxist language I think is often a straightforward nationalist position.

Mr. MACEDO. I also believe that an important level, the insistence on the Marxist-Leninist rhetoric in the new independent countries of Portugal is qualitatively different from brands of African socialism which have been even proposed by somebody like Zingora.

I think the reason has to do with the fact that the decolonization of the Portuguese colonies took place after 15 years of liberation wars and

that it lead to a much greater assimilation of a need for an ideology to sustain, as it were an emerging nation-state.

But the most important point, which is the one I insist upon in my statement, that the unique case of the Western decolonization where it was the armed forces that, in a sudden reversal of the ideology from a conservative point of view—I will also say Maoist-Populist point of view, given the strength of reversal, led itself to the decolonization process and therefore did not remain in control.

That crucially accounts for the fact that the country became monolithical contrary to other countries because the colonization of the British and French, even the Belgians, was more under control.

Mr. SOLARZ. One other thing. Do you have any idea if the French are in fact complying with the arms embargo against South Africa?

Ms. MORGANTHAU. I do not have recent information. I would hate to make a straightforward statement, but I have not heard of a violation.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you know if they are completing existing contracts, or have they terminated those as well?

Ms. MORGANTHAU. I would rather not make a statement.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, I want to thank all of you very much for your testimony. This has really been a useful addition to the hearings, and it has been helpful to get the perspective.

We now have an amendment by Mr. Bauman of Maryland to stop economic aid to Iran.

Mr. GRAY. And military aid.

Mr. SOLARZ. I do not believe they are getting any economic aid. That has not stopped the gentleman from offering such amendments in the past and there is no reason for him to stop now.

I want to thank you all very much for coming here. The subcommittee is in recess.

[Thereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

U.S. INTERESTS IN AFRICA

The Attitudes of the American Public and Opinion Leaders Toward Africa

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1979

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2:45 p.m. in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Stephen J. Solarz (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. SOLARZ. The meeting of the subcommittee will come to order.

Today the Subcommittee on Africa is holding the 10th and final hearing on U.S. interests in Africa. Our session today concerns the attitudes of the American public and opinion leaders toward Africa.

I believe there is a growing awareness among elected officials and other citizens of our country about the importance of Africa. As the source of roughly 40 percent of our imported oil, as a continent whose countries constitute an undeniably important part of various international organizations, Africa merits an increasing share of the attention of the American people. Furthermore, the rapidly rising number of refugees throughout Africa and the pressing problems of poverty on the African Continent require the sustained attention and a humanitarian response by the United States.

Traditionally, Africa has received a disproportionately low share of America's foreign aid. In examining today the beliefs and perceptions which shape American public and elite opinion toward Africa, we will consider whether the American people would support a greater commitment by our Nation to the economic assistance of African nations.

We will also consider how the American people view our policy toward South Africa and whether they would support tougher measures by our Government in opposition to the apartheid system. In this connection we would like to know whether the lavishly and secretly financed attempt by the South African Government to influence U.S. opinion has had any significant effect on the way our citizens feel about South Africa's racial politics.

We are also interested in determining whether the attitudes of the American people toward Africa will be changed for the better due to Nigeria's adoption of a democratic system very much like our own; and the removal from power of three tyrants in Equatorial Guinea, Uganda, and the Central African Empire.

Our witnesses today are William J. Foltz of the Council on Foreign Relations; J. Daniel O'Flaherty of the Carnegie Endowment; and Arthur W. Lewis of the International Communication Agency.

Mr. Foltz, who is a professor of political science at Yale University, directs the Africa project at the Council on Foreign Relations. Earlier this year, he and the Council on Foreign Relations published a study of council members on U.S. policy toward Africa. Professor Foltz will be speaking today about American public and opinion leaders' attitudes toward Africa.

Mr. O'Flaherty, a former staff member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment, where he helped to conduct a study of American attitudes toward South Africa. At today's hearing, Mr. O'Flaherty will be discussing how the American foreign policy community and the American public view South Africa.

Mr. Lewis, who is the director for African Affairs at the International Communication Agency, has worked for ICA or its predecessor agencies in Zambia, Ethiopia, and Nigeria. The ICA administers the educational and cultural exchange programs and U.S. public diplomacy efforts in countries where we have diplomatic missions. Mr. Lewis will be testifying today concerning how African political leaders react to American perceptions of Africa.

Our first witness, then, will be Professor Foltz. Professor, perhaps you can summarize your testimony if you think that would be appropriate. If not you can read it, but in any event it will be included in the record in full.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM J. FOLTZ, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, YALE UNIVERSITY, DIRECTOR, AFRICA PROJECT AT THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Mr. FOLTZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me attempt very briefly to sketch in the general outline of American public opinion on Africa and on U.S. policy toward Africa.

I will try to draw not only on the survey that you mentioned, but also on some of the principal national surveys that have been conducted over the last few years.

Africa, I am afraid, has not been an area of pressing concern for most Americans. Only about 4 percent of Americans, queried a year ago, included Africa amongst the two or three biggest foreign policy problems facing us; but some 17 percent of the sample of American leaders put Africa in that category.

Most Americans, and that includes many of those who are generally interested in foreign affairs, lack detailed information about Africa and do not have firmly anchored views on African questions.

There is still a lot of stereotyping in the way Americans view Africa, but I believe that the prevalence of such inaccurate stereotypes, often drawn from the works of Edgar Rice Burroughs in the past, have declined over the past 20 years, as many more Americans have worked in Africa, visited it, and perhaps even studied Africa in schools.

Still, I think it is important to emphasize that America as a whole remains uncertain in its own mind about Africa issues, and its opinions are far from fixed. Americans tend to view African issues through the lenses of their general political ideologies, the way they think about politics as a whole. The better educated people are, the more systematic their ideological approach toward Africa is likely to be.

To put it just a little bit crudely, if you know how a person, how an American, reacts to domestic racial issues like busing, for example, or affirmative action; or how he reacts to domestic economic issues, like Government spending, you know a lot about how he is going to react to issues of African policy.

Similarly, one finds when one looks at aggregate statistics, that Carter voters differ from Ford voters; Democrats differ from Republicans; and within each party liberals differ from conservatives in a pretty predictable manner with regard to African issues. In each case the former group is more likely to think that Africa is important; to favor black African nationalism, and to disapprove of white rule in Southern Africa.

Since people vote their general ideologies at the polls, their vote is likely to have some effect on African policy.

If we look for a moment at those Americans who are best educated and who have thought most about international affairs, one finds that such—if one can call them this—elite Americans firmly support America's continued involvement in Africa; they do not want to see us turn our back on African problems, nor do they think that we ought to just turn Africa over to our European allies, as we did for so many years in the past. They believe, on the contrary, whenever it is possible we should follow the lead of respected African leaders and believe we should support many of the principles articulated by the Organization for African Unity.

They think, for example, that we should aid the development of autonomous black Africa States, whatever their domestic political philosophy, or external alliances might look like in the short run. They think, also, that the United States ought to be willing to pay more for African primary products, even if this may raise the cost of a few items to American consumers.

But there are some limits to such general pro-African sentiments. Once cold war issues and national and economic interests are raised, some of that pro-African sentiment gets attenuated. People for example feel at one and the same time that Africans should have the right to choose their own external alliances, but they also feel that the United States ought to oppose any attempt by the Soviet Union to win African States to their side.

They may feel that we should help African States in economic terms, but they also feel that U.S. policy ought to favor those governments which promote free enterprise and that we should support, above all, American investments and economic interests in Africa.

When Americans think or read about Africa today, they are often concerned about what the Soviets and the Cubans are up to there. I think Americans are much more used to thinking about Soviet, or perhaps Cuban problems in the world than they are about African prob-

lems. When they put the two together, the Soviet dimension tends to drive out the African considerations in their mind very frequently.

When I asked, for example, my elite sample how well the U.S. interests were faring in Africa now, almost three-quarters thought that they were faring badly. The same percentage thought that Soviet interests were faring well. A very healthy majority agreed with the proposition that any Soviet or Cuban victory in Africa is a defeat for America's national interest; and that is a stronger percentage than turned up when a similar question was asked 3 years earlier.

I think it is important to note, however, that thoughtful Americans do not jump automatically to the assumption that all Africans in revolt against the established order are tools of Moscow. By a very large margin those I surveyed judged that revolutionary forces in Africa are usually nationalistic, rather than being controlled by Communist powers. That is, again, quite a change over what Americans in the past have thought.

What I think we can see in such a pattern of responses is a basic and increasing American sympathy for authentic African nationalism, but the real fear that the Soviets and Cubans may drive out authentic nationalism and thereby harm America's interests.

South Africa presents a particularly difficult set of issues for Americans, and not surprisingly the way Americans think about their own racial issues affects the way they think about South Africa.

But one important point today about American attitudes toward South Africa—and this is on the basis of every responsible study that I have been able to track down—is that Americans profoundly disapprove of South Africa's racial policies, and only a small minority of the most conservative Americans think that the United States should maintain supportive economic and political relations with South Africa or, in other words, treat it just like any other country.

Of those who have an opinion on the matter, a substantial majority of the American public believe that the United States and its allies should put pressure on South Africa to give blacks greater civil and political rights. There is strong agreement that American corporations operating in South Africa ought to put pressure on the South African Government to change its ways.

Beyond that, however, consensus begins to evaporate, once sterner measures are contemplated. There is not, at present at least, any consensus that Americans ought to be prepared to pay a significant price to bring about change in South Africa, however much they may sympathize with the plight of blacks under that repressive regime.

Interestingly, the well-educated and the wealthy who tend to be strongest in their expressions of principled outrage at apartheid, seem less likely than less privileged Americans to be willing to take strong action to back up those same principles. The strongest support for stern measures, including prohibition of new investment in South Africa and a sharp cutback in trade, comes from blue-collar workers, labor union members, and black Americans, not from the best off who express their principles most consistently.

To me this suggests that within the United States there may well be a substantial body of opinions, as yet ill-organized and ill-articulated that may be even more supportive of African nationalist goals and

more willing to see the United States take action on their behalf than many of us have suspected. Within that group, one would certainly have to count much of America's black population.

We do not know all that much as a whole about the opinions of American blacks on African issues, though I think that some studies now under way, like that of my colleague, Philip White of Yale, will soon remedy that.

Quickly, to summarize what we can cull from many scattered surveys. I think it is clear that with regard to Africa, black Americans share the attitudes of the rest of their countrymen of similar socioeconomic backgrounds; but there is one big difference. Blacks consistently assign a much higher priority to African issues than do whites. They care about Africa and about Africans. As yet, this opinion is not well organized; it is perhaps a prepolitical opinion in many ways, but the concern is there, waiting to be organized, and it may be very powerful.

As the subcommittee is well aware, public opinion does not directly determine policy, nor perhaps should it. It influences policy indirectly through the ballot box.

American opinion on poorly understood issues, like those involving Africa, is also not fixed forever, as I have emphasized. Dramatic events in Africa, another massacre of students by the South African police, or maybe a major Soviet incursion into Zimbabwe, for instance, could have a major effect on American opinion. So, too, could thoughtful national leadership.

I think for any such leadership to succeed in rallying opinion it will have to deal explicitly both with the sympathy that most thoughtful Americans feel for autonomous African nationalism, and also with their fears that Soviet or Cuban activities in Africa are a threat to American interests. Thoughtful and consistent explanation of a policy that encouraged African nationalism as a way of countering or preempting Soviet and Cuban aggression might well, I should think, receive widespread support from American public opinion.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Foltz' prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM J. FOLTZ, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, YALE UNIVERSITY, AND DIRECTOR, AFRICA PROJECT AT THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INC.

I shall attempt briefly to sketch in the general outlines of American public opinion on Africa and on United States policy toward Africa. In doing so, I shall draw on material from the principal national surveys conducted by various polling organizations and on a survey of well-educated Americans particularly familiar with international issues which I recently conducted for the Council on Foreign Relations. Copies of that survey have been made available to members of the Subcommittee, Mr. Chairman, and you may wish to include the text in the record.

Africa has not been an area of pressing concern for most Americans. Only 4 percent of Americans queried a year ago included Africa among the two or three biggest foreign policy problems facing us. However, 17 percent of a sample of American leaders put Africa in that category. Most Americans, including most of those with strong general interests in foreign affairs, lack detailed information about Africa and do not have firmly anchored views on African questions. Almost half the elite group that I sampled said that their views on Africa were less firm than their views on other parts of the world, and only about 15 percent said their views on Africa were particularly firm. Without firm grounding for

their views, people react to events in terms of more familiar ideas. For many Americans, African issues evoke stereotypes of jungles, wild animals and primitive tribes. The prevalence of such inaccurate Tarzan imagery has declined over the last twenty years, as many more Americans have studied Africa in schools and visited and worked in Africa. (One need only compare references to Africa in the Congressional Record today with those that occurred in the early 1960s to see how inaccurate stereotypes have diminished.) Still, America remains uncertain about African issues, and its opinions are far from fixed.

Americans view African issues through the lenses of their general political ideologies, and the better educated and more politically aware they are, the more their ideologies influence their views of Africa. Americans do not like to think of themselves as an ideological people; nevertheless, the influence is there. To put it crudely, if you know how a person reacts to domestic racial issues like busing or affirmative action, and how he reacts to domestic economic issues like government spending, you will have a pretty good idea of how he will react to issues of African policy. (Also, if you know a Congressman's ADA or ACA rating, you can predict his voting on African issues with considerable accuracy.) Likewise, in the aggregate, Carter voters differ from Ford voters, Democrats differ from Republicans, and within each party, liberals differ from conservatives in a predictable manner with regard to African issues. In each case, the former group is more likely to think Africa important, to favor black African nationalism, and to disapprove of white rule in southern Africa. Since these differences turn up at the polls, Americans who care about African issues should be aware that they can affect policy by the way they cast their ballots.

Let me concentrate for a moment on those Americans who are best educated and have thought most about international affairs, not because theirs are the only valid opinions, but because their views are likely to have a strong policy impact and to influence the views of others. On the whole, such elite Americans support America's continued involvement in Africa. They do not want to see us turn our back on African problems, nor do they think we should just follow the lead of our European allies on African issues—as we did for so many years. Rather, they believe that whenever it is possible we should follow the lead of respected African leaders. They think the United States should support many of the principal goals articulated by the Organization of African Unity. For example, they believe that we should aid the development of autonomous black American states, whatever their domestic political philosophy and external alliances may be, and that the United States should be willing to pay more for African primary products, even if this raises the costs of some items of the U.S. consumer.

Such generally liberal, pro-African sentiments have their limits, however, once cold-war issues and national economic interests are thought to be involved. Many of the same individuals who feel that we should respect African countries' autonomy in choosing their external alliances also feel that the U.S. should vigorously oppose any attempt by the Soviet Union to expand its sphere of influence in Africa. By large margins, they also feel that the U.S. should defend the upholders of Western values in Africa against radical nationalists and marxists. On the economic side, these same educated and concerned Americans temper their endorsement of African autonomy with the strong recommendation that U.S. policy ought to favor those governments which promote free enterprise. Not surprisingly, they overwhelmingly endorse the idea that American policy ought to promote American investment and economic interests in Africa. As you might expect, people's ideology strongly influences the way they view such issues.

When Americans think or read about Africa today, they are often concerned about what the Soviets and Cubans are up to there. Most Americans are more used to thinking about the Soviet threat in international politics than they are to following the subtleties of African issues. Perhaps for that reason, when Americans—including the generally well-educated and concerned groups that I have surveyed—perceive a Soviet dimension to African issues, that dimension tends to drive out other considerations. Increasingly, Americans are tending to see African issues in East-West terms, and they are concerned about what they think they see. When I asked my elite sample how well the United States' interests were faring in Africa now, almost three-quarters thought they were faring badly: the same percentage thought that Soviet interests were faring well. A healthy majority agreed with the proposition that "any Soviet or Cuban

victory in Africa is a defeat for America's national interest," whereas a similar question put three years earlier evoked much less anxiety about Soviet gains.

It is important to note, however, that thoughtful Americans do not jump automatically to the assumption that all Africans in revolt against the established order are tools of Moscow. By a very large margin, those I surveyed judged that revolutionary forces in Africa are usually nationalistic, rather than controlled by communist powers.

What I think can be seen in such a pattern of responses—and this is consistent with what other surveys have shown—is a basic and increasing American sympathy for "authentic" African nationalism, but a real fear that the Soviets and Cubans may drive out "authentic" nationalism and thereby harm America's interests. The sympathy is there, but so is the fear.

South Africa presents a particularly troubling set of issues for Americans, and not surprisingly, the way Americans think about their own racial issues has a strong effect on the way they think about South Africa. Nevertheless, it can be stated categorically, on the basis of many different studies, that all but the most conservative Americans profoundly disapprove of South Africa's racial policies. Among those with strong interests in international affairs, only a small minority of the most conservative think the United States should maintain supportive economic and political relations with South Africa and treat it like any other country. Of those who have an opinion on the matter, a substantial majority of a cross-section of the American public and an overwhelming majority of the well-educated who are concerned about foreign policy issues think that the U.S. and its allies should pressure South Africa to give blacks greater civil rights. There is strong agreement that American corporations operating in South Africa ought to put pressure on the South African government to change its ways. Beyond that, however, consensus begins to evaporate once sterner measures are contemplated. There is not, at present, any consensus that Americans ought to be prepared to pay a significant price to bring about change in South Africa—however much Americans may sympathize with the plight of blacks under that repressive regime. Interestingly, the well-educated and wealthy, who tend to be strongest in their expressions of principled outrage at apartheid, seem less likely than less privileged Americans to be willing to take strong action to back up their principles. Strongest support for stern measures, including prohibition of new investment in South Africa and a sharp cutback in trade, comes from blue-collar workers and labor union members.

This last point suggests that there may be within the United States a substantial body of opinion, as yet ill-organized and ill-articulated, that may be even more supportive of African nationalist goals and more willing to see the United States take action on their behalf, than most people have suspected. Within that group, one would have to count much of America's black population. We as yet know little about the opinions of American blacks as a whole on African issues, though I expect that studies under way by scholars like my colleague Philip White at Yale will soon remedy that. Quickly to summarize what can be culled from many scattered surveys, I think it is clear that with regard to Africa, black Americans share the attitudes of the rest of their countrymen of similar socioeconomic backgrounds. They differ on one major point, however. Blacks consistently assign a much higher priority to African issues than do whites. They care about Africa and about Africans. As yet this opinion is poorly organized and reveals the inconsistencies to be expected of a group that on the whole has been denied access to higher education and enriching experience abroad. But the concern is there, waiting to be organized and expressed in a politically relevant form.

As the Subcommittee is well aware, public opinion does not directly determine foreign policy, nor should it. Public opinion influences policy indirectly through the ballot box, and even ill-articulated opinion has an influence because it often expresses a general ideological orientation which can be followed by elected officials. American opinion on poorly understood issues, like those involving Africa, is not fixed forever. Dramatic events in Africa—another massacre of students by the South African police or a major Soviet incursion in Zimbabwe, for instance—could have a major effect on American opinion. So, too, could thoughtful national leadership. For any such leadership to succeed in rallying opinion, it will have to deal explicitly both with the sympathy most thoughtful Americans feel for autonomous African nationalism and with their fears that Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa are a threat to American interests. Thoughtful and consist-

ent explanation of a policy that encouraged African nationalism so as to counter or preempt Soviet aggression might well receive widespread support from American public opinion.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Professor Foltz. The next witness will be Mr. O'Flaherty.

**STATEMENT OF J. DANIEL O'FLAHERTY, SENIOR ASSOCIATE,
THE CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE**

Mr. O'FLAHERTY. Mr. Chairman, for the record I submitted two documents that resulted from the Carnegie Study on South Africa, and I have a brief statement summarizing those, which I would like to present.

Between the spring of 1978 and the summer of 1979, the Carnegie Endowment undertook a study of attitudes in this country toward South Africa. In addition to myself, the study was conducted by two other individuals who were at the time on the staff of the Carnegie Endowment, James E. Baker, who has now returned to the Department of State, and John de St. Jorre, who has returned to the Observer in London.

The study consisted of two main parts. One was a nationwide public opinion poll and the other was a series of indepth interviews with a selection of individuals in the foreign policy community who deal directly or indirectly with South Africa.

The public opinion poll, conducted by Response Analysis Corp. of Princeton, N.J., was done in February or March of this year, and is thought to be the most thorough survey ever taken of attitudes toward South Africa. Three features dominate public opinion toward South Africa: a profound dislike of the present system in that country, a general feeling that the United States should do something about it, and a strong reluctance to get militarily involved.

Despite a predictably low level of knowledge about Africa and South Africa on the part of the general public, we feel that these are relatively stable features of American public opinion. Africa itself, as Professor Foltz has pointed out, ranks far down on the scale of geographic interests to the general public. It is, however, the area of major interest for black respondents.

When the general public was asked, "What comes to your mind when you think about Africa and the people who live there," there were two main impressions: underdevelopment, including memories of Tarzan movies, missionaries and the like, and racial tensions. Roughly two-thirds of the general public have an image of South Africa and have formed an opinion about that country. Although the image of South Africa corresponds generally to the image of Africa as a whole, racial tensions replace underdevelopment as the most cited theme. The negative stereotype of primitive natives was far less prevalent, and Soviet-Cuban activities were not mentioned voluntarily in an open-ended question asked about South Africa.

An overwhelming majority of the American public has a highly unfavorable image of South Africa. This assessment is shared by all elements of American society. In response to a brief description of the status quo in South Africa, 86 percent of the respondents said that

they thought it was an unjustified system, and 56 percent believed that the whites of South Africa are not justified in using force to preserve their position.

The public, therefore, does not believe that the South African Government's homeland policy is a reasonable solution to the country's racial problems.

In addition, they believe that blacks are justified in using nonviolent means to improve their situation. Moreover, the poll found that the public rejects three of the major arguments used by the South African Government to justify the status quo: The public does not agree that if blacks had political control the result would be economic chaos, nor do they believe that if the blacks were to take over, the whites will either be killed or driven from the country.

In addition, although a plurality feel that a black government might be heavily influenced by the Communists, they reject that as a justification for continued white rule.

A clear majority of 53 to 35 percent of the public thinks that the United States should do something to get the South African Government to change its racial policy. This is a generally shared perception though, predictably, it is more intensely held by black Americans. The strongest opposition to doing something is found among Jewish and Republican respondents, even though a majority of those groups do favor action.

The public gave a strong endorsement to the outline of current American policy toward South Africa, as expressed by Vice President Mondale in his 1977 meeting with Prime Minister Vorster; that is, the appeal for the elimination of racial discrimination, universal participation in national elections, and the initiation of internal negotiations in South Africa. These questions were posed without the respondents being told in advance that they represented official U.S. policy.

The public views South Africa as a country which violates our sense of right and wrong, and it is in that context that their policy preferences emerge. On the basis of this poll it is not possible to rank South Africa among the foreign policy concerns of the public—that is to say, it is not possible to rank it vis-a-vis other concerns—but it is possible to say that the relatively low interest in Africa is offset by a clear perception that South Africa violates our standards, and that the United States should try to do something about it.

When asked in general terms—that is without specific relationships to South Africa—whether the United States should limit trade with those countries which do things that violate our sense of right and wrong, 59 percent say yes, as opposed to 26 percent who say no. When asked if the United States should go along with a United Nations resolution calling on all countries to cut off trade with South Africa, 46 percent say yes, as opposed to 33 percent who say no.

As previously mentioned, our respondents felt that the United States should do something to get the white South African Government to change its racial policies. Of those that said we should not, there was no one who felt that we should support the South African Government. Among those who believe that the United States should do something to bring about changes in South Africa, there was majority support for official public statements condemning apartheid and for

giving money and moral support to black organizations in South Africa who are trying to bring about peaceful change.

There was plurality support for cutting down trade and restricting investment, and an overwhelming rejection of support for black organizations in South Africa that are willing to use violence.

In response to questions about contingencies that might take place in South Africa, increasing internal violence, Soviet support of black insurgents, or direct Soviet involvement, the public clearly preferred no military involvement; and at a much lower level of support, more respondents argued for supporting whites rather than blacks in these contingencies.

It was interesting to us that approximately 10 percent of the respondents volunteered that the United States should try to play a mediating role, even though that was not one of the options presented.

The poll clearly suggests that popular attitudes are not dominated either by a resurgence of cold war themes, or a continuation of the post-Vietnam spirit of nonintervention, and that there was a real tension between the desire to affect events in other parts of the world, and the desire not to become directly involved. While the public is clearly sensitive to issues involving actions by the Soviet Union or its allies, in no instance did these issues decisively shape the public's general orientation to the situation in South Africa.

The second part of the Carnegie Endowment study of attitudes toward South Africa consisted of indepth interviews with more than 80 Americans who have either operating responsibility, influence, or a specialist knowledge in the field. These interviews indicated a clear consensus that the United States should exert pressure on the South African regime to change its racial policies.

This is striking because it coexists with a feeling that in the wake of Vietnam the United States may possess neither the domestic political will, nor the practical ability to determine events in other countries.

Traditional measures of the national interest—strategic, economic, and diplomatic concerns—carry surprisingly little weight when it comes to South Africa in the minds of the foreign policy community that we surveyed. In the words of one respondent, "You have to distinguish between national interests which are vital, and those which are nice to have. In terms of vital interests, I do not know of any in South Africa." Moreover, the majority do not regard the Soviet Union, despite its efforts, as capable of making lasting and significant gains by exploiting conflict in South Africa.

Nevertheless, we found a shared belief that the United States does indeed have a significant stake in what happens in South Africa, and it is seen as ranking high on the foreign policy agenda. The reason suggested in these interviews is that the importance of South Africa derives from its symbolic importance as a "citadel of racism" and a contributing element in this is that South Africa presents a disquieting mirror image of our own society.

South Africa's policy of apartheid or separate development is condemned by people representing all points in the political spectrum. As one politically active conservative put it, "I think we should be resolute in our opposition to apartheid and use the diplomatic and moral dimensions of our policy to encourage change."

South Africa is therefore seen as a challenge to America's moral character and to its commitment to the principle of racial equality by a broad cross section of Americans.

It is, however, a striking feature of these interviews that the implications of developments in South Africa for racial harmony in the United States are accorded signal importance. However, in practical terms few of those interviewed could really demonstrate how the issue of South Africa would become highly explosive among whites and blacks in this country.

The vast majority of those interviewed emphasized the limitations of U.S. influence and agonized over policy choices. Even so, the majority sentiment was that the United States cannot simply be peripheral to developments in South Africa. This represents a clear convergence of public opinion, as expressed by one labor official: "The United States as the largest and most important democracy in the world has a responsibility to try to use its 'moral suasion' to change those situations in the world that we think are wrong."

Thus, in assessing current policy toward South Africa, the basic criticism is not of its thrust but of its execution. The Carter administration's policy is criticized as being rhetorical, fuzzy, confused, and confusing. But when asked to identify specific sources of leverage which we have, the answers betray the same range of confusion that is the basis of the criticism of current policy. In short, there is no consensus on how the United States should relate ends to means in dealing with South Africa.

But in spite of considerable skepticism about the efficacy of economic sanctions against South Africa, there is substantial support for somehow or other using our economic relations as a level to bring about change. This support masks deep disagreement over using existing economic involvement to promote change on the one hand, and economic withdrawal as a lever on the other.

The debate over U.S. policy takes place almost exclusively in terms of how we can best influence white South African political establishments. This rests on some sophistication about developments in white South African politics, which derives from the accessibility of white South Africa to the American elite. There is a very high degree of ignorance about black South Africa, and strikingly little discussion on how we can best influence the direction of black politics and trends, even though there is a consensus on the historical inevitability of black rule.

In sum, there are no deep disagreements between the general public and the foreign policy community about South Africa, although the public is on balance more willing to use economic leverage. Both groups reject direct American military involvement, although there is a surprising willingness in the general public to give tangible support to black groups in South Africa which are pursuing peaceful change. In both cases there is strong support for an activist U.S. posture and a bedrock belief that, as a great power, somehow, in some way, the United States ought to be able to have an effect.

The foreign policy community fears that we may become the prisoner of events we cannot shape, let alone control, which can only contribute to the finding which we and others have made, that the public believes the power and influence of the United States is declining.

The public's attitudes toward South Africa are deeply rooted in American values, which indicates that they have considerable staying power. This is especially so because the issue of racial justice overrides the question of Soviet and Cuban involvement as well as economic interests in the public's perception of South Africa.

Finally, I would ask you to bear in mind that our poll was based on the presumption that public opinion is latent with respect to specific policy options which this country has in South Africa. Our findings support the conclusion that these latent opinions can be shaped by the way in which official policy is explained and presented. This gives support to the view of many in the foreign policy community that public education and visible leadership by the President and others could build a constituency for an activist policy toward South Africa as long as that government openly pursues policies of racial discrimination.

Thank you.

[Mr. O'Flaherty's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF J. DANIEL O'FLAHERTY, SENIOR ASSOCIATE,
CARNEIGE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

FULL REPORT

PUBLIC OPINION POLL ON AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA

I. INTRODUCTION

A. SUMMARY

1. While the public is not turned off by foreign affairs, it is deeply divided on fundamental questions involving the role of the United States in the world. The basic picture is one of equally balanced impulses toward involvement and non-involvement whether the issue be Soviet activities in other parts of the world or situations of racial or religious discrimination. In terms of policy activities, there is a predictable inverse relationship between the degree of involvement and the level of popular support -- few oppose statements of condemnation but even fewer support the sending of U.S. troops. At the same time, there is a clear plurality support for a wide range of activities in dealing with international problems, including the use of trade restrictions and non-military direct involvement (i.e., money and moral support). Africa ranks very low in terms of public interest, and the image of a backward primitive continent is still widely held.
2. Three features dominate public opinion toward South Africa -- a profound dislike of the present system in that country, a general feeling that the United States should do something about it, and a strong reluctance to get directly involved. While the general thrust of these attitudes is not surprising, the intensity with which they were expressed is. The basic conflict between

involvement and non-involvement is more clearly silhouetted -- a majority support for "doing something," plurality support for a range of activities, including supporting black organizations in South Africa seeking peaceful change, and a clear "no involvement" response to foreseeable contingencies such as increased internal violence or increased Soviet activity in the area. Knowingly or not, the public gave an overwhelming endorsement to the basic outline of current U.S. policy toward South Africa.

3. The survey indicates a clear distinction between black and white respondents and between respondents who identified themselves as Republicans or Democrats.

B. SURVEY PROCEDURE

1. The survey upon which this report is based was conducted by Response Analysis Corporation (Princeton, New Jersey) at the request of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. It is based on telephone interviews conducted February 15 to March 16, 1979, with 1,000 adult men and women around the United States.

The sample of telephone exchanges called was selected by a computer from a complete list of exchanges in the country. The exchanges were chosen in such a way as to insure that each region of the country was represented in proportion to the numbers in the population. For each exchange, the telephone numbers were formed by random digits.

The results have been weighted to take account of household

size and to adjust for variations in the sample relating to region, race, sex, age and education.

In theory, one can say with 95 percent certainty that the results based on the entire sample differ by no more than 3 percentage points in either direction from what would have been obtained by interviewing all adult Americans. The error for smaller subgroups is larger, depending on the number of sample cases in the sub-group.

2. The basic assumption in the construction of the poll itself was that the general public does not have a great deal of knowledge or information about South Africa. Thus, although some questions were asked to explore attitudes about South Africa already held, more attention was devoted to exploring general attitudes which could have a bearing on perceptions of South Africa and to exploring reactions to specific information inputs about South Africa. The result was more than just a static picture of current attitudes; it gave some indication of public reactions to future developments.

3. The attitudes of the black community are of particular importance to the purposes of this survey, and special attention was given to ensuring a representative sample population. The basic poll of 1,000 adults had 79 black respondents. In the subsequent calculations, these responses were weighted to reflect a 12 percent black component of the total population (Current Population Report, U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1974,

1975 & 1976) to produce a "National Black" profile. In addition, a supplemental poll surveyed the attitudes of an additional 69 black respondents. The results of the two black population groups were combined to produce an "All Black" profile. Given its larger base, this profile more accurately reflects black attitudes. However, because the "National Black" statistics were used in the calculations for the basic poll, this report will use those statistics unless otherwise indicated. .

II. BACKGROUND

A. GENERAL

1. While the question of public interest in foreign affairs was not explored in depth, it is interesting that the level of expressed interest in world news did not vary significantly from the level of expressed interest in either local or national news. Perhaps the only conclusion that can be drawn is that while world events do not dominate public attention, neither has the public been turned off by foreign affairs.

- (1) Which kind of news are you most interested in:
local, national or world news?

Local	29%
World	20
National	19
All the same	32

Jewish and black respondents identified world news as their major interest.

2. Television was clearly identified as the major source of information about world news.

- (3) Where would you say that you get most of your information about world news?

Television	65%
Newspapers	31
Magazines	13
Radio	12

3. Whatever the source, the public is generally skeptical of the reliability of the information they receive.

- (4) Would you say you usually do get the whole story or you usually don't get the whole story?

	<u>Do</u>	<u>Do Not</u>
Television	20%	39%
Newspapers	3	8
Magazines	4	7
Radio	3	8

4. Not surprisingly, Africa ranks far down on the scale of geographic areas of interest for the general public. It is, however, the major area of interest for black respondents.

- (5) Which of these areas do you have the most interest in: South America, Africa, Asia or Europe?

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Black</u>	<u>White</u>
Europe	34%	21%	37%
Asia	31	14	33
Africa	8	33	4
South America	6	10	6

5. In answer to an open-ended question with no response categories indicated ("What comes to your mind when you think about Africa and the people who live there?"), the general public indicated two general impressions of Africa: underdevelopment

and racial tensions. The negative expression of the former is a stereotype image of primitive natives and animals (25%) that is still prevalent. A less biased expression is evidenced in references to poverty (16%) and to emerging nations with potential power and influence (7%). Perceptions of racial tensions are expressed in terms of discrimination against blacks (21%), problems of whites (10%), and fighting/liberation movements (8%). Nine percent of the respondents identified Africa with southern Africa. Five percent of the respondents identified Africa with Idi Amin. Interestingly, there were few references to Africa's mineral resources (7%), Soviet/Cuban involvement (2%) or political repression (1%). These perceptions were generally held by all sub-groups of the public though black respondents were more sensitive to the needs and potential of Africa and give significantly less credence to the stereotype image of primitive natives. (See Table 1.)

B. GENERAL POLICY ORIENTATION

1. The public is almost evenly divided on the question of whether or not the United States is losing power and influence in the world but has a clearer sense that we have been falling behind the Soviet Union in recent years.

- (9) Do you feel that the power and influence of the United States is increasing, decreasing, or staying about the same?

Decreasing	49%
Increasing	23)
The same	23) -46%

TABLE 1

(18) What comes to your mind when you think about Africa and the people who live there?

	* Total	Coll. Grad.	Rep.	Dem.	Union	Jew	Blk	White
Primitive natives: animals	25	22	26	25	24	35	13	22
Discrimination against blacks	21	29	18	22	21	25	29	20
Poverty/hunger	16	15	14	16	12	15	24	15
Racial tensions: problems of whites	10	16	8	10	14	15	14	10
Southern Africa	9	18	10	9	9	30	6	8
Fighting: liberation movements	8	13	10	8	11	10	9	8
Blacks	8	3	9	7	7	-	1	12
Emerging nations: potential power	7	11	6	7	5	5	2	7
Minerals: natural resources	7	15	8	8	10	5	6	6
Idi Amin	5	8	4	6	7	10	4	6
Missionaries	2	1	2	2	2	-	-	2
Soviet/Cuban activities: Communism	2	1	2	2	1	-	1	2
Political repression	1	1	1	4	6	-	-	1
Miscellaneous	13	14	17	12	18	20	11	16
No answer	14	4	12	15	12	5	16	13

*(Since multiple answers permitted, totals more than 100%)

- (10) Do you think that the United States has been falling behind Russia in power and influence in recent years?

Yes	48%
No	38

2. There is no apparent correlation between these attitudes and the interest in world news. Those who believe that U.S. power and influence is decreasing overwhelmingly believe that the U.S. is falling behind Russia but the latter is a generally shared attitude. (See Table 2.)

3. What is impressive is how evenly the public is divided on questions related to U.S. involvement in foreign situations -- a slight preference for the proposition that the U.S. should mind its own business internationally, that the U.S. should do something if Soviet troops should intervene in a conflict in another country and that the U.S. should not try to get other countries to change practices of racial or religious discrimination. In no instance, however, were the differences significant given the margins of error for this study. If nothing else, the thrust of the above would seem to indicate that neither non-involvement nor anti-Soviet attitudes dominate public opinion.

- (12) It has been said that the United States should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along as best they can. Do you mostly approve or mostly disapprove of this idea?

Mostly approve	43%
Mostly disapprove	42
Qualified	9

TABLE 2

	U.S. Influence Decreasing		U.S. Falling Behind USSR	
	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>
College Graduates	65	33	44	45
Jewish	65	35	70	20
Republicans	56	40	58	31
White	51	43	49	37
High School Graduates	48	47	51	37
Union Members	47	50	52	37
Democrats	46	50	45	41
Black	37	61	39	47
("All Black")	40	58	45	39)

- (13) If Russia or its allies were to send troops to help one side in a conflict in another country, should the United States do anything about this or not?

Do something	36%
Not do something	33
Qualified	22

- (15) Think about a country in which the government practices discrimination against racial or religious groups. Do you think the United States should try to get that country to change these practices?

Yes	44%
No	45
Qualified	6

4. College graduate, Democrat, Jewish and black respondents held internally consistent attitudes, i.e., rejecting non-involvement in world affairs and calling for a U.S. response to both Soviet activities and to situations of discrimination. Predictably, Jewish and black respondents were significantly more sensitive to situations of discrimination. While endorsing a general attitude of non-involvement, union members nevertheless called for a U.S. response to Soviet activities and situations of discrimination while Republicans would respond only to Soviet activities. Whatever their general orientation, all sub-groups indicated a general willingness to do something about Soviet activities. (See Table 3.)

5. There is no evident pattern of logic in these attitudes. For example, of those who believe that U.S. power and influence is decreasing, roughly one-half think that the U.S. should mind its own business and one-half disagrees with that proposition.

TABLE 3

	<u>Non-Involvement</u>		<u>Respond To Soviets</u>		<u>Respond To Discrimination</u>	
	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
Union Members	51	40	45	26	49	40
Republicans	49	37	37	33	40	50
High School Graduates	46	40	36	35	45	45
White	43	41	34	33	42	47
Black	44	48	46	35	60	27
("All Black")	47	43	40	40	61	28)
Democrats	38	49	38	32	50	40
College Graduates	35	53	39	26	48	41
Jewish	25	55	40	30	55	30

The same is true when individual responses are aggregated into sub-groups. Internal inconsistency rather than consistency seems to be the rule, which suggests that individuals regard these as discrete rather than interrelated issues. (See Table 4.)

C. GENERAL POLICY TACTICS

1. The attempt was to construct a scale of increasing levels of involvement which would give some indication of the acceptable range of policy activities related to the United States "doing something" about Soviet activities and situations of discrimination. The questions were not asked of respondents who said that the United States should not do anything. The data is presented in terms of (1) percentage of the total survey population and (2) percentage of respondents asked.

2. There is a predictable inverse relationship between the degree of involvement and the level of popular support -- there is little opposition to official statements of disapproval but even less support for direct military involvement. What is perhaps significant is that in these general terms, there is clear plurality support for the use of trade restrictions and for non-military direct involvement. There was little or no significant variation in these attitudes between the various sub-groups of the public. (See Table 5.)

3. In responding to two questions not directly related to

TABLE 4

	U.S. Influence Decreasing	U.S. Should Mind Own Business	U.S. Falling Behind Soviets	U.S. Should Respond To Soviets	U.S. Should Respond To Discrimination
College Graduates	Yes	No	0	Yes	Yes
Jewish	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Republican	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
White	Yes	0	Yes	0	No
High School Graduate	0	Yes	Yes	0	0
Union Member	0	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Democrat	No	No	0	Yes	Yes
Black	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
("All Black"	No	Yes	Yes	0	Yes)

TABLE 5

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		
	Speeches		Trade Restrictions		Non-Military Involvement		Military Involvement		
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	
Soviet Activity:	Approve	41	61	38	57	26	39	14	21
	Disapprove	15	22	15	22	17	25	29	43
	Qualified	4	6	7	10	18	27	18	27
Discrimination:	Approve	38	69	28	53	28	51	6	11
	Disapprove	9	16	13	24	13	24	38	69
	Qualified	4	7	9	16	9	16	6	11

Would you be in favor of...

(1) speeches by high U.S. government officials condemning these { actions
practices

(2) restricting trade with { Russia or its allies
the country involved

(3) giving money and moral support to { the other side
those who are being discriminated against

(4) sending in US troops to { help the other side
force the country to change these practices

either Soviet activities or situations of discrimination, the public indicated its general support of limiting trade "with countries that go against our sense of right and wrong" and its agreement with the proposition that the United Nations plays a "useful role in world affairs." There is an apparent direct relationship between the view that the United States is falling behind the Soviets and a general willingness to employ trade restrictions and an inverse relationship between that view and the perceived usefulness of the United Nations. The only exception to the general assessment that the United Nations plays a useful role was the Jewish response which rejected the proposition by a margin of 55% to 35%.

- (11) Do you think that the United States should, as a general rule, limit trade with countries that go against our sense of right and wrong?

Yes	59%
No	26
Qualified	6

- (17) What do you think about the United Nations? Does the U.N. play a useful role in world affairs?

Yes	52%
No	28
Qualified	10

III. UNITED STATES-SOUTH AFRICA RELATIONS

A. GENERAL

1. Roughly two-thirds of the general public have an image of South Africa and have formed an opinion about the country. It is not possible on the basis of this survey to comment on the

validity of the images or the depth of the impressions.

2. The public image of South Africa corresponds generally to the public image of Africa as a whole though racial tensions replace underdevelopment as the most cited theme. The negative stereotype of primitive natives was far less prevalent. Soviet/Cuban activities are not mentioned. Some new themes are introduced -- need for majority rule (3%), "none of our business" (1%), similar to the United States (1%), and stable government/country (less than 1%). This basic image is rather consistently held by all elements in the society. The similarity of the public's image of Africa and of South Africa is interesting in view of the claims of the South African government and others that it is substantially different from the rest of the continent. (See Table 6.)

3. Most of the general public have an impression of South Africa, and the majority of those that do have an unfavorable impression. The unfavorable impression is strongest among college graduates and blacks. Less than high school graduates, Republicans and union members showed the highest percentage of favorable impressions, though except for the less than high school this was clearly a minority view. (See Table 7.)

B. VIEWS OF SOUTH AFRICA

1. Based on the assumption that the general public does not have a great deal of knowledge or information about South Africa, the effort was to provide a basic description of the situa-

TABLE 6

(20) What comes to mind when you think about the country of South Africa?

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Coll. Grad.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Union</u>	<u>Jew</u>	<u>Blk.</u>	<u>White</u>
Discrimination against Blacks	22	40	23	23	23	45	35	20
Racial tension: problem of whites	11	19	15	9	9	10	5	11
Primitive natives: animals	8	4	8	7	9	-	-	8
Minerals: natural resources	7	12	8	7	9	15	2	7
Civil unrest	6	9	5	6	8	5	8	6
Poverty/hunger	6	3	5	6	7	-	9	6
Need for majority rule	3	3	2	3	2	-	6	2
Advanced modern country	2	4	3	2	2	5	-	2
Blacks	2	1	2	2	2	5	4	2
Potential power/importance	1	2	2	1	2	5	-	1
None of our business	1	-	1	-	2	-	-	1
Similar to the U.S.	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
Stable government/country	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
Injustice to whites	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-
Miscellaneous	10	11	9	10	11	10	5	11
No Answer	34	13	30	36	29	25	29	35

TABLE 7

(19) Generally speaking, would you say that you have a favorable or unfavorable impression of the country of South Africa?

	<u>Favorable</u>	<u>Unfavorable</u>	<u>Qualified</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
Less than high school	25	23	2	50
Republicans	25	35	1	39
Union members	25	41	1	33
Black	25	48	-	27
("All Black"	22	43	1	34)
White	23	35	3	38
Democrats	22	38	3	37
College graduates	21	50	6	23
Jewish	15	40	-	45
Total	23	37	3	37

tion there and to indicate some of the current arguments involving possible future scenarios. The basic description focused on the existent political, social and judicial structure of the current regime resulting in white rule. The subsequent arguments covered some of the reasons that have been suggested for maintaining this pattern -- the potential for economic chaos, the fate of the whites, and possible Communist influence. Respondents were asked their reaction to the information provided and whether the arguments affected their basic attitudes toward South Africa.

2. On the basis of the description given, there was an overwhelming disapproval of the current regime in South Africa. This assessment was shared by all elements in the society.

- (22) There are about 5 million whites in South Africa and about 18 million blacks. Black South Africans cannot vote or participate in the national government. South African law strictly enforces racial discrimination. In addition, the government does not live up to many of our standards of justice. For example, it keeps people in jail without making criminal charges against them and it doesn't bring them to trial.

How do you feel about this situation? Do you feel that it is right or wrong that these conditions exist, or doesn't it matter to you one way or the other?

Right	2%
Wrong	86
Doesn't matter	5
Qualified	3

3. In general terms, the public does not believe that black political control in South Africa would result in economic

chaos, is pretty evenly divided on what would happen to whites if blacks took over, and accepts the argument that a black government would be heavily influenced by Communists. This aggregate perception hides some significant differences of view between sub-groups of the general public. Black respondents clearly reject all three arguments -- economic chaos, whites being killed or exiled, and Communist influence -- while white respondents accept them. Similarly, Democrat respondents reject the arguments while Republican respondents accept them. Union members clearly reject the thesis of economic chaos but split pretty evenly on the fate of whites and Communist influence. Approximately one third of the respondents said that they were not sure about the consequences of black majority rule (See Table 8).

4. In terms of general orientation (see Section II-B), those who believe that U.S. power and influence in the world is not decreasing and/or that the U.S. is not falling behind the Soviet Union tend to have a more roseate view of possible developments in South Africa, i.e., rejecting scenarios of economic chaos, whites being killed or exiled, and Communist influence. (See Table 9.)

5. Given current U.S.-South African economic relations, it is significant that the argument that black rule in South Africa would result in economic chaos is rejected by almost all groups

TABLE 8

"If blacks gain political control in South Africa..."

		Coll.		Dem.	Union	Jew	Black	White
		Total	Grad.					
(23) it would result in economic chaos	YES	28	33	37	22	29	30	30
	NO	43	41	33	49	42	50	28
	NOT SURE	29	23	28	26	28	20	29
(25) whites will either be killed or driven out	YES	37	39	41	33	42	25	40
	NO	36	33	31	40	39	40	31
	NOT SURE	26	26	27	25	17	30	28
(27) would be heavily influenced by Communists	YES	36	35	44	31	34	35	40
	NO	29	32	21	34	33	30	24
	NOT SURE	34	31	34	34	32	35	34

TABLE 9

"If blacks gain political control in South Africa...."

	Total	U.S. Power Decreasing		U.S. Falling Behind USSR	
		Yes	No	Yes	No
(23) it would result in economic chaos	28	32	23	34	23
	43	41	49	41	50
NOT SURE	29	25	27	24	25
(25) whites would be killed or driven out	37	42	31	43	31
	36	34	45	35	41
NOT SURE	26	22	22	21	27
(27) would be heavily influenced by Communists	36	39	32	44	29
	29	27	36	26	36
NOT SURE	34	32	31	30	32

in the society, the outstanding exception being Republicans.

6. It is striking that in aggregate terms, none of these arguments seem to affect basic attitudes toward South Africa. Asked whether the arguments discussed above "would make you more likely or less likely to favor the continuation of white rule" in South Africa, the majority response in each instance was "less likely" or "no effect." In terms of intensity, the argument that a black government in South Africa would be heavily influenced by the Communists marginally produced a greater reaction than arguments about economic chaos or the fate of the whites. (See Table 10.)

7. There is a clear relationship between the credibility which individuals attach to the arguments and their impact on basic attitudes. A significantly higher percentage of those who believed that the scenarios outlined would take place indicated that it would make them more likely to favor the continuation of white rule. However, in no instance was this a majority reaction and only in the case of Communist influence did it constitute a significant plurality of this group. (See Table 11.)

8. The general public does not believe that the whites in South Africa are justified in using force to preserve their position, does believe that blacks are justified in non-violent efforts to improve their situation, and rejects the "homeland" solution to the situation. These views were shared by all elements in

TABLE 10

"Would this argument make you more likely or less likely to favor the continuation of white rule there?"

		Total	Coll. Grad.					
				Rep.	Dem.	Union	Jew	Black
(24)	Economic chaos:							
	More likely	17	19	23	13	18	15	8
	Less likely	46	50	40	50	46	50	63
	No effect	13	16	13	13	14	10	9
(26)	No opinion	21	12	22	20	19	20	18
	Whites killed/exiled:							
	More likely	18	18	25	14	20	15	5
	Less likely	43	46	37	48	47	50	63
(28)	No effect	14	19	12	14	14	20	8
	No opinion	22	13	23	19	17	10	18
	Communist influence:							
	More likely	22	21	31	19	19	20	6
	Less likely	35	40	30	40	46	55	56
	No effect	16	22	14	16	14	15	14
	No opinion	24	14	22	22	19	10	20

TABLE 11

POSITION ON BASIC ARGUMENT

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Not Sure</u>
Economic chaos:			
More likely	41	6	9
Less likely	29	69	26
No effect	12	12	17
Not sure	16	11	44
Whites killed/exiled:			
More likely	34	8	8
Less likely	37	64	22
No effect	11	16	17
Not sure	15	10	48
Communist influence:			
More likely	49	6	8
Less likely	25	63	23
No effect	12	20	15
Not sure	13	9	49

the society.

- (29) Do you think that the whites in South Africa are justified or not justified in using force to preserve their position in the country?

Justified	23%
Not Justified	56
Qualified	7

- (30) Do you think that the blacks in South Africa are justified or not justified in doing things like conducting boycotts, sit-ins, and demonstrations in order to improve their situation?

Justified	79%
Not Justified	11
Qualified	1

- (31) As a way to resolve their domestic racial problems, the South African government has proposed that some of the land be used to create separate and independent countries for the blacks. It has set aside 13% of the land for this purpose for the blacks who make up 80% of South Africa's population.

Do you think this is a reasonable solution to South Africa's racial problem or not?

Reasonable	13%
Not Reasonable	68
Qualified	5

C. UNITED STATES-SOUTH AFRICA RELATIONS

1. A clear majority of the public thinks that the United States should do something to get the South African government to change its racial policies. This is a generally shared perception though predictably more intensely held by blacks. The strongest opposition to doing something is found among the Jewish and Republican respondents, though it is still a minority view. (See Table 12.)

TABLE 12

(35) Do you think that the United States should or should not do something to try to get the white South African government to change its racial policies?

	Total	Coll. Grad.	Rep.	Dem.	Union	Jew	Blk.	White
Yes	53	55	50	58	56	50	67	51
No	35	35	38	31	35	40	27	36
Qualified	5	6	4	4	6	-	-	5

2. Support for United States efforts with regard to South Africa (53%) is greater than support for the general proposition that the United States should respond to situations of religious or racial discrimination (44%). Of those who agreed with the proposition that the United States should "mind its own business internationally" (see Section II-B), 49% think that the United States should do something about South Africa while 41% disagree.

3. Of those who feel that the United States should not do anything about South Africa, only 5% feel that we should support the present government while 85% feel that the United States should simply leave the situation alone. (In terms of the total survey population, this amounts to 2% arguing for support of the South African government.)

4. Knowingly or unknowingly, the public gave a strong endorsement to the outline of current U.S. policy toward South Africa as expressed by Vice President Mondale in his 1977 meeting with then Prime Minister Vorster, i.e., the appeal for the elimination of racial discrimination, one-man, one-vote, and the initiation of internal negotiations.

(32) Would you or wouldn't you agree with a United States position that called on South Africa to eliminate racial discrimination?

Agree	70%
Not Agree	16
Qualified	4

- (33) Would you or wouldn't you agree with a United States position that called on South Africa to allow everybody in the country to vote in national elections?

Agree	78%
Not Agree	11
Qualified	2

- (34) Would you or wouldn't you agree with a United States position that called on South Africa to start talks between black and white leaders there on the future of their country?

Agree	83%
Not Agree	8
Qualified	1

5. In general, public support for possible United States policy actions with regard to South Africa follow the same pattern discussed in Section II-C relating to general policy tactics, *i.e.*, an inverse relationship between the degree of involvement and the level of support. (As above, these questions were not asked of those who said that the United States should not do anything, and the data is presented in terms of both (1) percentage of the total survey population and (2) percentage of those asked.) Among the respondents asked, there was majority support for official public statements of condemnation, plurality support for cutting down trade and restricting investment, majority support for money and moral support to black organizations in South Africa trying to bring about peaceful change, and an overwhelming rejection of support for black organizations in South Africa willing to use violence. (See Table 13.)

6. In assessing this data, it should be borne in mind that the positive responses indicated above represent roughly one-third

TABLE 13

(37) With regard to South Africa, would you be in favor of...*

		<u>Total</u>	<u>Coll. Grad.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Union</u>	<u>Jew</u>	<u>Blk.</u>	<u>White</u>
(a) official public statements condemn- ing SA's racial policies	YES	57	62	53	59	66	67	70	55
	NO	28	22	32	25	23	17	15	28
	QUALIFIED	6	11	5	6	6	8	3	3
(b) cutting down trade	YES	43	55	42	48	52	50	52	41
	NO	37	28	42	33	32	33	29	38
	QUALIFIED	8	11	5	10	6	-	7	8
(c) restricting business investments	YES	48	52	45	51	58	58	53	47
	NO	32	32	35	32	28	25	26	33
	QUALIFIED	8	9	10	9	6	-	11	8
(d) supporting black organizations seeking peaceful change	YES	55	52	50	61	69	58	77	53
	NO	23	26	29	22	18	8	5	27
	QUALIFIED	11	17	11	10	9	25	8	11
(e) supporting black organizations willing to use violence	YES	11	8	10	10	10	8	21	8
	NO	77	78	79	78	80	58	59	78
	QUALIFIED	3	6	3	3	3	17	3	3

* Percentage of respondents asked

of the total population surveyed. Assuming that those who say that the United States should not do anything about South Africa (35% of the survey population) would oppose all of the activities discussed, a majority of the general public would be opposed to undertaking any of the activities: 53% to 37% against official statements, 59% to 28% against trade restrictions, 56% to 31% against investment restrictions, 50% to 36% against supporting non-violent black organizations, and 85% to 7% against supporting black organizations willing to use violence. (See Table 14.)

7. While the questions are not exactly comparable, the response to possible activities with regard to South Africa are very similar to the general pattern of acceptable policy activities indicated earlier in terms of responding to Soviet activities and to situations of religious and racial discrimination. There is a clear tendency for the "activists" and the "non-activists" to be consistent, i.e., those supporting the widest range of activities in response to Soviet activities following the same pattern with respect to South Africa, and vice versa. (See Table 15.)

8. In response to possible contingencies which might take place in South Africa -- increasing internal violence, Soviet support of black insurgents, and direct Soviet involvement -- the public indicated a clear preference that the United States not get involved, a preference consistently held throughout the society.

TABLE 14

(37) With regard to South Africa, would you be in favor of...*

		Total	Coll. Grad.	Rep.	Dem.	Union	Jew	Blk.	White
(a) official public statements condemn- ing SA's racial policies	YES	37	40	33	41	43	40	51	35
	NO	18	14	20	17	15	10	11	18
(b) cutting down trade	QUALIFIED	4	7	3	4	4	5	2	5
	YES	28	36	26	33	31	30	38	26
(c) restricting business investments	NO	24	18	26	23	21	20	21	24
	QUALIFIED	5	7	3	7	4	-	5	5
(d) supporting black organizations seeking peaceful change	YES	31	34	28	35	38	35	39	30
	NO	21	21	22	22	18	15	19	21
(e) supporting black organizations willing to use violence	QUALIFIED	5	6	6	6	4	-	8	5
	YES	36	34	31	42	45	35	56	34
(f) supporting black organizations willing to use violence	NO	15	17	18	15	12	5	4	17
	QUALIFIED	7	11	7	7	6	15	6	7
(g) supporting black organizations willing to use violence	YES	7	6	6	7	7	5	15	5
	NO	50	51	49	54	52	50	43	50
(h) supporting black organizations willing to use violence	QUALIFIED	2	4	2	2	2	2	2	2

*Percentage of total survey population

TABLE 15

	Speeches		Trade Restrictions		Investment Restrictions		Nonmilitary Involvement		Military Involvement	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Soviet activity:										
Approve	41	61	38	57	-	-	26	41	14	21
Disapprove	15	22	15	22	-	-	17	25	29	43
Qualified	4	6	7	10	-	-	18	27	18	27
Discrimination:										
Approve	38	69	28	53	-	-	28	51	6	11
Disapprove	9	16	13	24	-	-	13	24	38	69
Qualified	4	7	9	16	-	-	9	16	6	11
South Africa:										
Approve	37	57	28	43	31	48	36	55	7	11
Disapprove	18	28	24	37	21	32	15	23	50	77
Qualified	4	6	5	8	5	9	7	11	2	3

(1) Percentage of total

(2) Percentage of respondents asked (excluding those who say nothing should be done)

At a much lower level of support, more respondents argued for supporting whites rather than blacks in these contingencies. Interestingly, approximately 10% of the respondents volunteered that the United States should seek to play a mediating role even though this was not one of the options presented. (See Table 16.)

9. A plurality of the general public supported the proposition that the United States should act in accordance with a United Nations embargo on trade with South Africa if enacted. (This probably corresponds with the earlier assessment, Section II-C, that the United Nations plays a useful role in world affairs.)

- (41) If the United Nations were to approve a resolution calling on all countries to cut off trade with South Africa, do you think the United States should or should not cut off trade?

Should	46%
Should not	33
Qualified	5

IV. CONCLUSIONS

A. GENERAL

1. The level of expressed interest in world news (20%) does not vary significantly from the level of expressed interest in local (29%) or national (18%) news which suggests that while world events do not dominate public attention, neither is the public turned off by foreign affairs.

2. Africa has very low saliency for the general public. Only

TABLE 16

"If ... should the U.S. support the whites, support the blacks, or not get involved?"

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Coll. Grad.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Union</u>	<u>Jew</u>	<u>Blk.</u>	<u>White</u>
(38) Increasing internal violence:								
Support whites	9	4	6	11	8	5	8	10
Support blacks	2	3	2	2	4	5	6	2
Not get involved	52	62	64	57	63	75	57	59
Qualified	6	13	7	12	7	5	13	10
Mediate	10	7	6	6	6	10	2	6
(39) Communist support:								
Support whites	15	12	18	16	16	20	8	16
Support blacks	3	5	2	4	5	5	6	2
Not get involved	49	48	50	48	45	35	56	48
Qualified	7	12	7	10	10	20	11	8
Mediate	9	9	9	6	7	-	2	7
(40) Communist troops:								
Support whites	17	15	19	17	16	15	5	19
Support blacks	3	5	1	4	4	5	10	2
Not get involved	46	46	49	47	41	40	52	45
Qualified	8	10	6	8	10	5	8	8
Mediate	9	13	9	8	12	20	8	9

8% identified it as the area in which they were most interested and most of that interest originates in the black community (33% of blacks as opposed to 4% of whites).

3. The public is almost evenly divided on the question of whether the United States is losing power and influence in the world (49% to 46% supporting the proposition) but has a clearer sense that we have been falling behind the Soviet Union (48% to 38%).

4. The public is evenly divided on questions relating to United States involvement in foreign situations - a slight preference for the proposition that the United States should mind its own business internationally (43% to 42%), that the United States should do something if Soviet troops intervene in a conflict in another country (36% to 33%), and that the United States should not try to get other countries to change practices of racial or religious discrimination (44% to 45%).

5. With regard to specific policy activities, there is a predictable inverse relationship between the degree of involvement and the level of public support. While military intervention is clearly rejected, the public seems willing to accept a wide range of official action including trade restrictions and non-military direct involvement.

B. UNITED STATES-SOUTH AFRICA RELATIONS

1. Approximately two-thirds of the general public have an image

of South Africa, essentially one involving racial tensions, and have formed an opinion about the country. The majority of those who do have an opinion have an unfavorable (37%) rather than favorable (23%) impression.

2. In response to a general description of the situation in South Africa, an overwhelming majority of the public (86%) condemned the present system. In terms of possible future developments, the public does not believe that black political control in South Africa will result in economic chaos (43% to 28%), is pretty evenly divided on whether whites would be killed or driven out of the country (37% to 36%), and accepts the argument that a black government will be heavily influenced by the Communists (36% to 29%). None of these possibilities, however, significantly affect aggregate basic attitudes toward South Africa in terms of the desirability or non-desirability of a continuation of white rule.

3. The public does not believe that whites in South Africa are justified in using force to preserve their position (56% to 23%), does believe that blacks are justified in non-violent efforts to improve their situation (79% to 11%), and does not consider the "homeland" solution to South Africa's racial problems to be reasonable (68% to 13%).

4. A clear majority of the public thinks that the United States should do something to get the South African government to change its racial policies (53% to 35%). Only 2% of the public argue

for supporting the present government. Knowingly or unknowingly, the public gave a strong endorsement to the outline of current United States policy calling on South Africa to eliminate racial discrimination (70% to 16%), to allow everyone in the country to vote (78% to 11%), and to initiate talks between white and black leaders on the future of their country (83% to 8%).

5. Of those calling for the United States to do something about South Africa, there was majority support for official public statements of condemnation (57% to 28%) and for providing money and moral support to black organizations in South Africa seeking peaceful change (55% to 23%), and plurality support for cutting down trade (43% to 37%) and restricting business investments (48% to 32%). The line was clearly drawn, however, at providing money and moral support to black organizations willing to use violence (11% to 77%).

6. At the same time, the public expressed a clear preference that the United States not get involved if internal black-white violence in South Africa increases (52% to 11%), if Communists supply black revolutionaries in South Africa with military support (49% to 18%), or if Soviet troops actually get involved on the side of the blacks (46% to 20%). Interestingly, approximately 10% of the respondents volunteered that the United States should play a mediating role under these circumstances. Finally, the public indicated a willingness to go along with

a United Nations trade embargo on South Africa if enacted (46% to 33%).

7. It is significant that approximately one-third of those surveyed did not respond to many of the questions dealing with South Africa and, in many cases, this "silent voice" could have been decisive in defining public opinion.

C. COMMENTS

1. It is possible that the major significance of this poll is negative, that is, in what it did not say. Contrary to some prevalent assumptions held by members of the foreign policy community, the poll suggests that the general public is not turned off by or apathetic to foreign policy. More significantly, the poll clearly suggests that popular attitudes are not dominated by either a resurgence of Cold War themes or a continuation of the post-Vietnam spirit of non-intervention. While the public was sensitive to issues involving actions by the Soviet Union or its allies, in no instance is this sensitivity translated into a majority impulse in terms of either the general orientation of the public or in terms of its reactions to the situation in South Africa. Most striking in this connection was public acceptance of the proposition that a black government in South Africa would be heavily influenced by the Communists but that this does not significantly affect attitudes toward South Africa. Similarly the forces of involvement and non-involvement seem to be

in roughly equal balance especially in terms of the public's general orientation toward foreign affairs. The almost even split between those who would have us respond to Soviet troop involvement and those who would oppose such a response is indicative of this equilibrium and of the non-dominance of anti-Soviet themes. In terms of South Africa, it is significant that a majority of the public favored the United States doing something to get the South African government to change its policies but equally clearly responded "do not get involved" when confronted with specific (and not unrealistic) possible future scenarios. The picture which emerges is not one of a general public with attitudes which run counter to efforts toward a more activist foreign policy; rather, it is a deeply divided public with a significant portion still sitting on the fence.

2. Under this general rubric, some interesting themes develop. Predictably the public is opposed to direct military involvement in foreign situations and shies away from supporting organizations willing to use violence. It is, however, willing to use economic measures -- trade and investment restrictions -- and, perhaps more significantly, it is willing to support patterns of non-military involvement such as money and moral support for black organizations seeking change through non-violent means. Finally, although public support for the United Nations has undoubtedly waned, a majority of the public

still believes that it plays a useful role in world affairs and would support U.S. compliance with a United Nations trade sanction against South Africa.

3. The poll also demonstrates a distinct black perspective on foreign policy. Compared to their white counterparts, blacks evidence a higher interest in world affairs, a particular interest in Africa (shorn of the negative stereotypes of primitive natives still prevalent in the white community), a vision of the United States more viable in world affairs, and a high degree of sensitivity to issues involving discrimination. Similar to the whites, roughly one-third of the blacks did not express views about South Africa. But the expressed view of the black community is clear and essentially consistent in its support for a more activist U.S. approach to South Africa. This breaks down, and significantly so, only in the "do not get involved" response to likely future contingencies. The potential black constituency for U.S. policy toward South Africa is not a figment of the imagination of black leaders; the basic concern and interest is there whether or not it has been realized.

4. A current description of the Jewish community has them essentially paralyzed on the issue of South Africa. This survey does indicate that some tensions do exist. In general, Jewish respondents match or better blacks in their internationalist approach and in their sensitivity on issues of dis-

crimination in general. While a majority supported doing something about South Africa (50%), there was also a very strong opposing voice (40%) in the community. At the same time, Africa is not a salient issue for the Jewish community, and they remain firm disbelievers in the United Nations.

5. The survey clearly highlights differences between Republicans and Democrats, differences that become even more pronounced when aggregated in terms of Ford versus Carter voters. Democrats emerge as clearly more internationalist, more confident of the role of the United States in the world, more responsive to international situations involving racial or religious discrimination (and correspondingly less concerned about Soviet activities), and in general more inclined to support an activist policy toward South Africa.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much for your testimony, Mr. O'Flaherty.

Our final witness will be Arthur Lewis, the Director of the Office of African Affairs of the U.S. International Communication Agency.

Mr. Lewis.

STATEMENT OF ARTHUR W. LEWIS, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY

Mr. LEWIS. I wish to thank you for your kind invitation to testify before this committee on a subject of serious concern to the Office of African Affairs of the International Communication Agency—American perception of Africa.

As you know, it is the responsibility of the International Communication Agency to help enhance American understanding of other societies, just as it is our responsibility to increase foreign understanding of U.S. society, its people, culture, and institutions. This responsibility derives directly from the President's message to the Congress transmitting Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1977, which created USICA. In his message, the President set as a goal for the new agency: "To tell ourselves about the world so as to enrich our own culture as well as to give us the understanding to deal effectively with problems among nations."

This committee does not need me to tell you why we need to know more about Africa. These hearings speak for themselves. I think that we are all here because we agree that if we as a people and as a government are to conduct our foreign affairs with sensitivity and responsibility, we need to inform ourselves of the hopes and aspirations of others through an understanding of their histories, their cultures, and their societies.

Let me now illustrate for this committee the range of my agency's involvement in activities that make a contribution to enhancing Americans' understanding of African societies.

Approximately 140 American and African scholars participate annually in the Fulbright academic exchange program.

Some 500 African leaders and professionals visit the United States to meet with American counterparts every year under our international visitor program. While here we try to make a maximum use of them in outreach programs designed to inform Americans about the countries and peoples of Africa. For example, a Cameroonian visitor to York, Pa., might be asked to address a Rotary Club or a high school social studies class, or to appear on a local TV program. In Detroit, a visiting information ministry official from Tanzania might address a meeting of the League of Women Voters. At Princeton, a Malian economist might be invited to participate in a seminar on development.

About 70 American speakers and specialists are sent to our 32 posts in Africa to discuss some aspect of American society and/or policy. On their return they share what they have learned in Africa with other Americans.

A number of American musicians and dancers tour Africa under our performing arts programs.

Three or four American coaches work in Africa under our athletic exchange programs to train young African athletes.

Additionally, there are about 30 American private voluntary organizations that receive grants for programs to work with Africans. These organizations include: The African-American Institute, the African-American Labor Center, the Institute for International Education, the American Association of University Women, the Phelps-Stokes Foundation, Sister Cities International, and the American Council of Young Political Leaders.

You will note a common characteristic of most of these activities is "mutuality"—the exchange—and here I emphasize exchange—not only of people and experiences, but also of ideas. The International Communication Agency operates on the principle that understanding, like communication, is a two-way street. In all that we do we try to listen as well as to inform; to learn as well as to teach. The aim of these activities is to establish productive relationships between influential Americans and Africans so that effective dialog based on mutual respect and understanding can take place. Such relationships, we believe, help to determine whether future United States-African cooperation and accommodation on issues of mutual interest will flourish or atrophy. Some of the issues that we stress in Africa include:

U.S. support for peaceful resolution of problems in southern Africa.

Encouragement of African solutions to African problems and the absence of great power rivalries and massive arms buildups. American interest in Africa's economic development.

America's deep concern for and commitment to human rights at home and abroad.

The responsiveness of America's free and open society in providing social, political, economic, and racial justice and equality for all of its people.

Let me now turn to a different dimension on the issue of American perceptions of Africa—the African dimension. What we have heard before, and what we hear repeatedly from African participants in our programs is that they know much more about America than Americans know about Africa, and that what Americans know about African countries is often distorted or sometimes just plain wrong. Here are some examples.

The Nigerian legislator who was asked by an American businessman if he knew his friend "who lives in Nairobi."

The high school principal from Botswana being asked by an American housewife if he used to sleeping on a bed or eating with knives and forks.

The South African who was surprised that more than once on his trip around the United States, Americans expressed surprise that a white-skinned person lived in Africa.

Or the Kenyan university professor who was asked, "In your country, do they speak African or English?"

But perhaps it is not surprising that Americans display a lack of knowledge about the African Continent. We have to recognize that to Americans, Africa is both geographically and psychologically very far away. We still use school textbooks referring to the "Dark Continent," and the meager materials devoted to Africa in United States school curricula is usually hopelessly outdated. But there have been movements, recently, to update and to modernize much of this material.

Nevertheless, we tend to get our visual images of Africa from uni-dimensional films or TV series, such as Tarzan, which has been already noted; the "African Queen," where Africa is presented as a continent of scarcely clad, spear-carrying natives living in grass huts. Few Americans visit, study, or work in Africa. While the number of these Americans has increased in recent years, the totals certainly are insignificant when compared to other areas of the world.

Another reason why Americans have difficulty in learning about Africa has to do with the kinds of coverage given that continent by the international news media. The TV news producers and newspaper editors making day-to-day decisions of what is most important to American audiences do not give Africa a very high priority. Moreover, there are few permanent American news media representatives in Africa. Coverage is often given by a London-based or New York-based journalist who does not spend sufficient time to do indepth stories on the wide range of activities on the continent.

Africans who visit the United States are surprised that so little news is published about Africa. They feel that good news gets lost in the shuffle and only the bad news about dictators, violent struggles between African peoples, famine, disasters, and pestilence get reported.

Mr. SOLARZ. So, what else is new? [Laughter.]

Mr. LEWIS. For example, do Americans have access to detailed reports on the recent Nigerian and Ghanaian elections which returned those countries to civilian rule and constitutional government? Do we learn about stable institutions in Gabon, or Botswana, or the Ivory Coast? What about attempts to form a customs union and a common market in West Africa, or resettlement projects involving nomadic Somali people?

I think you will agree, Mr. Chairman, that these subjects are not widely reported in America. Instead, we are fed a constant diet of the Idi Amins, the Macias, the Bokassas; the brutal struggles and their latest victims in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, or Eritrea, or the Western Sahara; a famine in the Sahel; rebellion in Zaire. The picture is indeed one-sided. Africans blame this news imbalance for what they consider to be misconceptions and misperceptions about Africa by Americans.

But if we agree that there is a problem with Americans not really knowing too much about Africa, perhaps it would be worthwhile to see what is being done about it.

In addition to what we in the International Communication Agency are doing, you and your congressional colleagues with an interest in African affairs are contributing substantially to a better understanding within the United States about African nations. Also, the Department of State over the past 2 years has made a major public affairs outreach effort using personnel from the African Bureau, American Ambassadors assigned to African countries, and other qualified speakers. Just to cite one example, last month an Ambassador scheduled one day in Portland, Oreg. which included newspaper and radio interviews in the morning, a major luncheon address followed by a question-and-answer session, and then an appearance on a TV "Current Affairs" program before heading back to the east coast.

Last October, the administration's leading experts on Africa discussed and debated African policy questions before more than 1,000 citizens at San Francisco's major conference on Africa. This December, a similar conference is scheduled for Detroit, where U.S. officials will discuss African affairs with a broad cross section of citizens from Midwestern States.

I might mention some parallel efforts by other U.S. organizations engaged in creating a more accurate image of African realities for Americans. Michigan State University's African Media Center screens, evaluates, catalogs, and distributes accurate films about Africa.

There are major African studies centers at several universities, offering business briefing programs, teacher-training workshops, traveling exhibits, film kits, and speakers.

UCLA, particularly, is to be commended for its widely circulated quarterly, *African Arts*, which has awakened thousands of Americans to African cultural achievements. Indiana has proposed a 14-part film series on Africa which could have tremendous impact. Similar endeavors have been undertaken by the African studies centers at Northwestern University, Boston University, Howard University, the University of Florida, the University of Wisconsin, and the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, Stanford University, as well as the University of California.

But frankly, Mr. Chairman, organizations involved in the effort to improve American perceptions of Africa have an enormous task to make up for the years when too little attention and too few resources were allocated to the job. A look at some of the representative statistics helps to put the problem into focus. Between 1949 and 1977, only 3 percent—in aggregate figures that is 3,138 out of 123,321—of the Fulbright scholarships went to Africa. Of the Office of Education's area studies programs, approximately 11 percent of the funding went to Africa-related programs. This year's Institute of International Education statistics show at the beginning of 1978-79 academic year that there were 1,883 Fulbright grantees in the United States, and only 181 from Africa.

While these statistics show that Africa gets a disproportionately small piece of the pie, in all fairness, we must admit that the situation today is far better than it was 20 years ago. One indication of growing interest in Africa is the fact that of the estimated 7,500 Ph. D.'s in area studies in the United States, 1,800—or approximately 24 percent—are in African area studies. That number, we hope, will grow as more Americans appreciate the importance of our country's relations with Third World nations.

As an agency we recognize that we are but one of the many actors on the scene in the international exchange and education field. As a matter of fact, what we do is a mere drop in the bucket. There are 159 international educational exchanges currently administered by 31 Federal agencies and authorized by 42 separate pieces of legislation. Of the \$659 million spent in these efforts, USIC funds constitute only 5 percent. We would hope that we might work more closely together with the members of your committee and your staff to develop ways in which we might better carry out our mandate to coordinate this wide array of exchange efforts affecting Africa.

It will take a sustained effort by all of us to improve communications between Africans and Americans, and to build understanding of Africa and its problems among Americans. As the world becomes more interdependent, our work becomes even more essential.

Before ending my testimony, Mr. Chairman, I would simply say that from the perspectives of those in the Foreign Service working in African affairs, we are pleased—pleased indeed, Mr. Chairman—that you and this committee are holding this series of hearings. We feel that the issues being discussed and brought to the attention of other Members of Congress and the American public are important and worthy of more interest than is usually given them.

We would like to thank you and the members of your committee for your efforts at expanding the knowledge about Africa and United States-African relations. In so many ways, your work is making our work easier.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Lewis' prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ARTHUR W. LEWIS, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
U.S. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY

I wish to thank you for your kind invitation to testify before this Committee on a subject of serious concern to the Office of African Affairs of the International Communication Agency -- American perceptions of Africa. As you know, it is the responsibility of the International Communication Agency to help enhance American understanding of other societies, just as it is our responsibility to increase foreign understanding of U.S. society, its people, culture and institutions. This responsibility derives directly from the President's message to the Congress transmitting Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1977, which created USICA. In his message, the President set as a goal of the new Agency: "to tell ourselves about the world, so as to enrich our own culture as well as to give us the understanding to deal effectively with problems among nations."

This Committee does not need me to tell you why we need to know more about Africa. These hearings speak for themselves. I think we are all here because we agree that if a people and a government are to conduct our foreign affairs with sensitivity and responsibility, we need to inform ourselves of the hopes and aspirations of others through an understanding of their histories, cultures and societies.

Let me now illustrate for this Committee the range of my Agency's involvement in activities that make a contribution to enhancing Americans' understanding of African societies:

- Approximately 140 American and African scholars participate annually in the Fulbright academic exchange program.
- Some 500 African leaders and professionals visit the U.S. to meet with American counterparts every year under the International Visitor Program. While here we try to make maximum use of them in outreach programs designed to inform Americans about the countries and people of Africa. For example, a Cameroonian visitor to York, Pennsylvania, might be asked to address a Rotary Club, or a high school social studies class, or appear on a local TV news program. In Detroit a visiting information ministry official from Tanzania might address a meeting of the League of Women Voters. At Princeton a Malian economist might be invited to participate in a seminar on development.
- About 70 American speakers and specialists are sent to our 32 posts in Africa to discuss some aspect of American society and/or policy. On their return they share what they have learned in Africa with other Americans.
- A number of American musicians and dancers tour Africa under our performing arts program.

- Three or four American coaches work in Africa under our athletic exchange program to train young African athletes.
- About 30 American private voluntary organizations receive grants for programs to work with Africans. These organizations include: The African-American Institute, the African-American Labor Center, the Institute for International Education, the American Association of University Women, the Phelps-Stokes Foundation, Sister Cities International, and the American Council of Young Political Leaders.

You will note a common characteristic of most of these activities is "mutuality"

-- the exchange (and I emphasize exchange) not only of peoples, experiences but also of ideas. The International Communication Agency operates on the principle that understanding, just as communication, is a two-way street. In all that we do we try to listen as well as to inform; to learn as well as to teach. The sum total of these activities is to establish productive relationships between influential Americans and Africans so that effective dialogue based on mutual respect and understanding can take place. Such relationships, we believe, help to determine whether future U.S. African cooperation and accommodation on issues of mutual interest will flourish or atrophy. Some of the issues we stress in Africa include:

- U.S. support for peaceful resolution of problems in southern Africa;
- Encouragement of African solutions to African problems and the absence of great power rivalries and massive arms build-ups;

- American interest in Africa's economic development;
- America's deep concern for and commitment to human rights at home and abroad;
- The responsiveness of America's free and open society in providing social, political, economic and racial justice and equality for all its people.

Let me now turn to a different dimension on the issue of American perceptions of Africa -- the African dimension. What we have heard repeatedly from the African participants in our programs is that they know much more about America than Americans know about Africa, and that what Americans know about African countries is often distorted or just plain wrong. Here are some examples:

- The Nigerian legislator who was asked by an American businessman if he knew his friend "who lives in Nairobi."
- the high school principal from Botswana being asked by an American housewife if he is used to sleeping on a bed or eating with knives and forks.
- the South African who was surprised that more than once on his trip around the U.S. Americans expressed surprise that a white skinned person lived in Africa.

-- Or the Kenyan university professor who was asked: "In your country do they speak African or English?"

But perhaps it is not surprising that Americans display a lack of knowledge about the African continent. We have to recognize that to Americans, Africa is both geographically and psychologically very far away. We still use school textbooks referring to "the Dark Continent", and the meager material devoted to Africa in U.S. school curricula is usually hopelessly outdated. We tend to get our visual images of Africa from uni-dimensional films or TV series such as Tarzan, King Solomon's Mines, Dakhtari and African Queen where Africa is presented as a continent of scarcely clad, spear-holding natives living in grass huts. Few Americans visit, study or work in Africa. While the number of these Americans have increased in recent years, the totals are still insignificant when compared to other areas of the world.

There is also another important reason why Americans can be excused for not knowing much about the African continent, and that has to do with the kinds of information being reported -- or not reported -- by the media out of that continent, and in turn the kinds of articles on Africa appearing in our newspapers and news features broadcast by our TV networks.

Do Americans have access to detailed reports on the recent Nigerian and Ghanaian elections which returned those countries to civilian rule and constitutional government? Do we learn about stable institutions in Gabon, or Botswana or Ivory Coast? What about attempts to form a customs union and common market in west Africa, or resettlement projects involving

nomadic peoples in Somalia? I think you will agree these subjects are not widely reported in America. Instead, we are fed a constant diet of the Idi Amin's, the Macias', the Bokassa's; the brutal struggles and their latest victims in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, or Eritrea, or the Western Sahara; a famine in the Sahel; rebellion in Zaire. The picture is very one-sided.

As you well know, permanent American news media representatives in Africa are few and far between. Too often the London-based or New York-based journalist parachutes in to do a quick story, stays on the ground a minimum of time, and then hops the first plane back home. As a result, the splashy or bloody is frequently emphasized to the detriment of a balanced, more long range view. Africans resent this practice and blame distorted media coverage for much of the misconceptions and misperceptions they find about Africa in our country. They are further frustrated by the inability of their media, which are insufficiently developed, to counter the Western press.

But if we agree there is a problem of Americans not really knowing about Africa, perhaps it would be worthwhile to see what is being done about it.

In addition to what we in the International Communication Agency are doing, you and your Congressional colleagues with an interest in African affairs are contributing substantially to a better understanding within the United States about African issues. Also, the State Department over the past two years has made a major public affairs outreach effort using personnel from the African bureau, American ambassadors assigned to African countries and other qualified speakers. Just to cite one example, last month an

ambassador scheduled one day in Portland, Oregon which included newspaper and radio interviews in the morning, a major luncheon address followed by question & answer session and then an appearance on a TV current affairs program before heading back to the east coast. Last October the Administration's leading experts on Africa discussed and debated African policy questions before more than 1,000 citizens at San Francisco's major conference on Africa. This December a similar conference is scheduled for Detroit where U.S. officials will discuss African affairs with a broad cross-section of citizens from mid-western states.

I might mention some parallel efforts by other U.S. organizations engaged in creating a more accurate image of African realities for Americans. Michigan State University's African Media Center screens, evaluates, catalogues and distributes accurate films about Africa. There are major African Studies centers at several universities offering business briefing programs, teacher training workshops, travelling exhibits, film kits and speakers. UCLA, particularly, is to be commended for its widely circulated quarterly, African Arts, which has awakened thousands of Americans to African cultural achievements. Indiana has proposed a 14 part film series on Africa which could have tremendous impact. Similar endeavors have been undertaken by the African Studies centers at Northwestern University, Boston University, Howard University, the University of Florida, the University of Wisconsin, the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, Stanford University and the University of California.

But frankly, Mr. Chairman, organizations involved in the effort to improve American perceptions of Africa have an enormous task to make up for the

years when too little attention and too few resources were allocated to the job. A look at some representative statistics helps put the problem into focus. Between 1949 and 1977 the Board of Foreign Scholarships which oversees the Fulbright exchange program approved 123,321 scholarships. Only 3,138 (3%) went to Africa. Of the Office of Education's Area studies programs, approximately 11% of the funding went to Africa-related programs. This year's Institute of International Education statistics show at the beginning of the 1978 - 79 academic year there were 1,883 Fulbright grantees in the United States, only 181 from Africa.

While these statistics show that Africa still gets a disproportionately small piece of the pie, in all fairness we must admit the situation today is far better than it was twenty years ago. One indication of growing interest in Africa is the fact that of the estimated 7,500 Ph.D.'s in Area studies in the United States, 1,800 (24%) are in African area studies. That number will grow as more Americans appreciate the importance of our country's relations with Third-world nations.

As an Agency we recognize that we are but one of many actors on the scene in the international exchange field. As a matter of fact, what we do is a mere drop in the bucket. There are 159 international educational exchanges currently administered by 31 Federal agencies and authorized by 42 separate pieces of legislation. Of the \$659 million spent in these efforts, USICA funds constitute only 5 percent. We would hope that we might work more closely together with the members of your committee and your staff to develop ways in which we might better carry out our mandate to coordinate this wide array of exchange efforts affecting Africa. It will take a sustained

effort by all of us to improve communications between Africans and Americans and build understanding of Africa and its problems among Americans. As the world becomes more interdependent, our work becomes even more essential.

Before ending my testimony, I would simply say that from the perspectives of those in the foreign service working in African affairs we are pleased, Mr. Chairman, that you and this committee are holding this series of hearings. We feel the issues being discussed and brought to the attention of other members of Congress and the American public are important and worthy of more interest than is usually given them. We would like to thank you and the members of your committee for your efforts at expanding knowledge about Africa and US/African relations. In so many ways, your work is making our work easier.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Lewis. I must say on behalf of my colleagues on the committee, as well as myself, that it is nice to know that there is someone out there who appreciates our efforts and endeavors. You can be sure that we really appreciate the work the ICA is doing.

As a reward for her extraordinary diligence and dedication, as exemplified by her faithful attendance at virtually all of the hearings which the subcommittee has been holding on this subject, except for the one the other day which she was unable to attend only because she was on a mission of mercy to Southeast Asia in order to deal with the current crisis in Cambodia, I am going to yield at this time to the gentlewoman from New Jersey, who is truly one of the outstanding members of this committee and the entire Congress. As a matter of fact, in the unlikely event that a Republican should get elected President next November, I intend to submit her name as Secretary of State, and as a second choice, Assistant Secretary for Africa. [Laughter.] Because if she is not going to be sitting on the committee, we want her sitting before us at the witness table.

Mrs. Fenwick.

Mrs. FENWICK. How do I thank my chairman for such kind words?

I am very much interested in putting together what has been the testimony of two of the three witnesses here today. On page 3, Professor Foltz, of your testimony you speak of, "Interestingly, the well-educated and wealthy, who tend to be the strongest in their expressions of principled outrage at the apartheid, seem less likely than less privileged Americans to be willing to take strong action to back up their principles." There is some indication, perhaps, that their education and their wealth prevented them from following what they believe to be right. I think that is worth, perhaps, another meeting, if not this one.

But it is interesting, in view of page 35 of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace where we find—if I read it correctly, it is very puzzling. If there is increasing internal violence in South Africa, should the United States support the whites, support the blacks, or not get involved?

Support the whites, six. Would that be 6 percent of the Republicans?

Mr. FOLTZ. Yes.

Mrs. FENWICK. Eleven percent of the Democrats; eight percent of the blacks would support the whites. Am I correct?

Mr. FOLTZ. That is what it says. [Laughter.]

Mrs. FENWICK. Well, that scarcely would follow with the professor's analysis of reaction. In other words, what I am wondering very much about on questions, for example, on investment, new investment or continuing investment and so on, disinvestment, we have evidence or testimony, and statements from Andy Young, Ambassador Young; from Mr. Percy Qoboza, a respected African; and Mrs. Suzman, another respected African, strongly advising against disinvestment or the denial of investment—strongly supporting the solvency of Africa. Suggesting that we continue pressure on the businesses and government of Africa, and also some recognition of the changes that have been made, specifically the 99-year leasehold now being allowed in Africa; the recognition of black labor unions and the inclusion of migrant blacks, as well as resident blacks in those unions.

Now, is that going to be construed by the professor as part of the wealthy and educated? I mean, do we listen to them or do we not?

I think if we are going to try to do something constructive, we are going to have to make up our minds if we are going to listen exclusively to the radicals who want violence and advocate violence, and are fed up with Mrs. Suzman and Mr. Percy Qoboza, and everybody who wants peace or not. I mean, where is the line?

There is no use denigrating it with the wealthy and the educated being unwilling to follow through on their principles because Mrs. Suzman, and Percy Qoboza, and Andy Young are certainly not to be categorized that way. I mean, we have to make up our minds. If we are going to have a rational policy, what is the wise outlook?

If you look at Carnegie, what are we supporting? You can see quite clearly there that the blacks in America will not support violence. So, we are going to have to consider that, too.

So, what we are going to hear is some more constructive analysis of the forces that exist. One, what should we do? Two, what would public opinion in America support? Those are two very important things addressed by the testimony that we have heard here today.

I would like some comment on that.

Mr. FOLTZ. If I may take a crack at parts of that, Congresswoman. You have laid out a great many issues, and very troubling and difficult issues.

Let me deal with perhaps the easiest part, the difference between principle and action. Americans—and I suspect that would be true of any population group in the world—sometimes are willing to take stronger positions in principle than they are in action. To give you just a simple example of that, for years, Americans have been asked, "Do you believe in free speech at all times?" and when asked that, Americans overwhelmingly will respond, "Yes, of course."

If they are asked, "Do you believe it is correct for a Communist to address your children in school?" they will answer, "No."

Mrs. FENWICK. Oliver Wendell Holmes said it, too.

Mr. FOLTZ. Exactly; there is a disjunction between principle and more specific action.

Mrs. FENWICK. There are limitations on all principles.

Mr. FOLTZ. Oh, I have no quarrel with that whatsoever. All I want to point out here—and not by way of denigration, by the way—is that there is a difference in the response between blue-collar workers, labor union members particularly, and the way more privileged and better educated Americans respond to some of these issues.

Some of that may be simply that the well-educated people articulate their principles much more clearly, and therefore the disjunction may turn out to appear greater in their cases.

Now, if we look at the table, I have trouble relating, I confess, the table that you mentioned on page 35 to a principle, or to the general issue. One particular point should be noted here: We are dealing with small numbers and one cannot make too much of the difference between 5 and 8 percent, and I think my colleague who produced this would agree with me on that.

I believe that what you get—and this is typical in a number of responses—is a certain amount of confusion on the part of the respondents, which may have accounted for some of the black responses to that issue.

What I find overwhelmingly important about that table is the very strong sense in most population groups that we should not get strongly involved. That is really the way I would read that table: We should not ourselves get in the middle of trying to choose between one side and the other in a violent situation.

Mrs. FENWICK. Well, then, does that mean that you believe by "involved" they should not get involved in the question of disinvestment or new investment? What conclusion are you drawing?

Mr. FOLTZ. Are you asking me about investment or disinvestment?

Mrs. FENWICK. I am asking you how you regard this. Would that in your opinion include investment and disinvestment? These are things we are going to have to have policy on.

What I am trying to find out from you is, do we just discard Mr. Qoboza and Helen Suzman?

Mr. FOLTZ. Absolutely not.

Mrs. FENWICK. They are going to be more and more in difficulties because of the young. She told me the other day the parents are getting afraid of their children. Now, do we just toss aside those opinions? I mean, where is justice; right? If we view the Carnegie tables, what policy could we effectuate?

Mr. FOLTZ. Let me take just one more small crack at this. I think you are asking me what I think we ought to do, rather than what the specific table shows about a slightly different set of questions.

Mrs. FENWICK. Well, the only reason I brought the table in is because it seems to contradict your conclusions. I wondered how you regarded that in light of the information now received.

Mr. FOLTZ. I do not find quite that same contradiction in that particular table. We can go through the numbers, but I think—and I am

not trying to dodge this—that the prime thrust of your question is, do we take very seriously what Mrs. Suzman says and Mr. Qoboza, both of whom I know and for whom I have enormous respect, and the answer to that is obviously, we must, because they do speak out of long experience, and pain, and personal suffering—in this case the white as well as the black in that system.

Are they the only people we listen to in South Africa, or who we can expect to have an audience in the United States? Obviously, again, no. It is a very, very difficult set of issues requiring for each person, for each American who is going to have a serious opinion on it, some very difficult judgment about the connection between, say disinvestment, or economic pressure, and what the outcomes are going to be. Those are very tough decisions and I think very serious people will disagree in their judgment of what the causal links are going to be.

But in a straightforward answer to you, I would think it would be absolutely wrong to disregard the opinions of the individuals whom you mentioned. I confess, I do not see the relationship of table 8 on page 35 with that question.

Mrs. FENWICK. Well, it is confusing.

Mr. O'FLAHERTY. Mrs. Fenwick, if I might say something about that.

I think it would be a mistake to look for policy guidance in the numbers of a public opinion poll which asks questions of someone at 7 o'clock in the evening.

Mrs. FENWICK. I know.

Mr. O'FLAHERTY. The lesson, it seems to me, does come through all of those figures, though, that there is a willingness to use economic instruments of policy to change something that is perceived to be wrong. What instruments, what the costs are, and how effective the instruments are, are things these respondents have not thought through, and it is unfair to expect these respondents to have thought them through.

I might say that in response to our general question as to whether they felt the United States should do something to change things in South Africa, there was a very consistent percentage among all educational and economic groups that said "yes."

Mrs. FENWICK. Except, "Do not get involved."

Mr. O'FLAHERTY. Well, the question to which you were referring was, "What should we do if internal violence increases in South Africa," and most people said, "We do not want to get mixed up in it." Now, that is different from saying that before it happens, we might want to put pressure on.

Mrs. FENWICK. Right.

Mr. O'FLAHERTY. I might also point out that in the poll which the Council on Foreign Relations conducted, and which was compared in their document with the Harris Poll of 1977, they found substantially higher percentages in the general public in support of economic measures than in the Council membership and the membership of its affiliated committees. For example, on the question of whether to prevent all new business investment in South Africa, 42 percent of the public said yes, while 16 percent of the Council on Foreign Relations members said yes. So, it might change if the costs were manifest to the public.

But you have a willingness to be led, it seems to me, on the part of people.

Mrs. FENWICK. I think that is the popular perception. I think it would be supported by the majority, as your figures show. But what troubles me is, would it be wise? Is it the right thing to do? That is what I am trying to feel toward. There are two aspects of what would be popular and therefore possible, and what is the wise and right thing to do.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOLARZ. I must say, nobody has ever sought an assignment to this committee in pursuit of popularity.

Mrs. FENWICK. No.

Mr. SOLARZ. But I can also say that this committee has consistently acted on the basis of what it truly believes is in the best interest of our country.

Mrs. FENWICK. We try.

Mr. SOLARZ. Without putting its finger up into the air for the prevailing wind.

Since next to "Secretary Fenwick," the most active participant in these hearings has been "Ambassador Gray" of Pennsylvania, I will call upon my good friend from Philadelphia for whatever questions he may choose to ask at this point.

Mr. GRAY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. May I also thank you for the opportunity, however brief it was, to sit in the chair today. [Laughter.]

I welcome the sense of power that comes with being a chairman in my freshman term.

Mr. SOLARZ. This will teach you, Mr. Gray, as a freshman Member, how effervescent power is. [Laughter.]

You are in today, and you are out tomorrow.

Mr. GRAY. I will keep that in mind.

Let me just say how appreciative I am of the witnesses who have come to testify before us. I just have a few questions that I would like to ask.

Mr. O'Flaherty, in the poll that you have taken, it seems to me that one of the questions that comes up, it seems that you mention that there is a feeling, a strong feeling, that we should use moral suasion as a tactic, to apply pressure, to bring about change in the South African Government. But once you go beyond that, are there any feelings on the part of the American public as to what other kinds of specific steps this country should take?

Mr. O'FLAHERTY. At the risk of repeating myself, I think it is a mistake to look for policy guidance in the opinions of people who answer public opinion polls. My general feeling is, that is putting the cart before the horse.

Mr. GRAY. I want to assure you that I am not going to make up my mind based upon what your figures say. But I would like to just know because you made a brief statement in your summary that the emphasis was on moral suasion, and that immediately beyond, the policy became kind of fuzzy.

I was wondering if you had any kind of reading—statistical figures—as to what most Americans feel. I want to assure you, and I am

sure I speak for the members of this committee that regardless of what those figures are, it is not going to decide what public policy is going to be of the U.S. Congress and the Subcommittee on Africa—maybe some other committees. [Laughter.]

Mr. GRAY. I assure you, Mr. Solarz will definitely not allow that to happen.

Did they have any kind of feeling toward disinvestment, toward sanctions, or anything else?

Mr. O'FLAHERTY. The answer is yes. We asked, as I mentioned: "If the United Nations voted sanctions, should we go along?" A substantial majority of the general public said yes. Of those who said yes, we should do something about South Africa, we went ahead and asked them what sorts of things they would then be willing to endorse. We asked about a scale of actions, from public statements of opposition by U.S. officials to military involvement. On that scale we found that a majority of those who were in that category were in favor of restricting trade, of restricting new investment, and taking general economic measures. As you fade off toward anything that smacks of military involvement, support diminishes.

As I mentioned, a majority of those who felt we should do something about South Africa were in favor of giving money and moral support to black organizations in South Africa which were pursuing peaceful change. When you asked about black organizations that were not pursuing peaceful methods, they resoundingly said no across the board.

The point of that, I think, is that there is a tolerance that shows up there for the use of economic measures. One might relate it to the considerable popularity of the President's action the other day, ending imports of oil from Iran. There is a consensus in this pool, a feeling on the part of the public that, in the absence of usable military force, there surely are economic weapons at our disposal that can achieve political ends.

So, while I would like to qualify the strength of the findings in this pool for specific policy measures, I think generally I would answer "yes" to your question.

Mr. GRAY. One of the things that I would like some comment on is, going back to that table 16 on page 35, if I may bring that up, the statistics that you have here, which are quite surprising to me, at least with regard to one segment of the American population, which is the black community.

Admittedly, I do not get a chance to talk with every black American to get their views on the subject, but I was quite surprised at some of the results, such as the increasing internal violence, 57 percent say, "Do not get involved."

I was wondering, how big was your sample, and can you give me any feelings for how strong the feelings were in that sample. Do you have any methodology that could determine the depth of feeling on this issue?

Mr. O'FLAHERTY. Yes. We made an extra effort to get a good sample of black Americans, whose views we were especially interested in. Aside from those blacks who would normally be questioned in a poll as part of the population, we conducted an additional survey of areas

identified by our pollster as black areas. Those are the figures that are represented here.

Now, it seems to me that the key to this question, Mr. Gray, is the 13 percent whose answers are "qualified." That is to say, with regard to "getting involved," it is not clear what "getting involved" means and, of course, for many blacks that would be a very sensitive aspect of it. Thirteen percent said, "Well, maybe," if the involvement were to their liking.

I think you also have to be careful of figures in the range of 5 to 7 percent where a margin of error is 4 to 5 percent. So, I would not attach a lot of significance to that. But it does unambiguously show a preference for not getting involved on the part of blacks as well as whites. Yes, that is true.

MR. GRAY. Do you have any explanation for that, that your poll ascertained, why people in the black community would feel that way?

MR. O'FLAHERTY. We did not ask why they held certain views. They answered questions, and that was it. So, it is a matter of speculation and interpretation which all of us can give to the data.

MR. GRAY. How does the American public view our policy with regard to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia?

MR. O'FLAHERTY. That was not a subject of our poll, which was solely concerned with South Africa.

MR. GRAY. Just purely South Africa. Have you done any research in that area?

MR. FOLTZ. If I can answer briefly. I have not myself done any polling. I have seen some others that have been done by, I believe, the Roper and Harris organizations. I do not have the figures in front of me, but I have the very strong recollection that it depends very much on precisely what question is asked when. The responses to a number of the Rhodesian polls suggest that there is a fair amount of, again, uncertainty on the part of the American public, but not a great deal of enthusiasm for sanctions as they understand them. This may be different from what the response of the same individuals would be if they were presented with a full explanation of the purposes of sanctions.

But I want to emphasize this is not my own work, and my recollection of what have been very, very few polls. We do not know an awful lot about the American attitude on Rhodesia.

MR. GRAY. Ambassador Young frequently made reference to the economic interests of America in the African Continent. Did you find any real strong evidence in the American public's view that there was such a strong economic interest that this country has in the African Continent, the whole continent and, let us say, South Africa? Someone stated that there were no vital interests. Was there a perception on the part of the American public that we do have strong economic interests in the continent?

MR. FOLTZ. That is something I have looked for in various polls, it is rarely asked directly. Again, I have to infer an answer rather than having a specific question in a specific poll I can point to.

The simple answer is that most people in the country do not think very much about it. Of those who do—and that is an important qualifier—they are aware of two sorts of interests. One is in the minerals of southern Africa, South Africa particularly; and the other in Nige-

rian oil. There is, I think, much less awareness of the amounts of natural gas and oil that we import from Algeria; that we continue to take from Libya. Those somehow seem not to have hit most people's public perceptions.

But the polarization between South Africa and Nigeria is something that many people notice, and of course arguments would go in two different ways, depending on which you gave the greater priority.

MR. O'FLAHERTY. Just a brief addition to that. In our survey of the foreign policy community on this question we found surprisingly little emphasis on economic interests as being controlling with respect to South Africa. There was a feeling that the volume of our trade and investment with South Africa was not sufficient to categorize it as a "vital" interest to the United States. That may be a significant finding of that group's opinion.

MR. GRAY. Mr. Lewis, what aspect of U.S. foreign policy has the ICA had most difficulty explaining to the African public, and also, perhaps, why?

MR. LEWIS. That is an interesting question, Mr. Gray. Very generally, one of our mandates, of course, is to explain American foreign policy to overseas audiences, particularly those with whom we have a need to communicate.

The focus of American foreign policies which are communicated to those audiences varies according to the interests of the different audiences. In Nigeria, for example, we were able to communicate our concerns for a peaceful resolution of African problems by Africans. In Zaire we concentrated on our policy not to create extra-African military forces in Africa. These were relatively simple policies to explain.

I guess what I am really getting at is that essentially we are able to communicate the policies of the United States. However, because of our inability to communicate with the total community, we focus our activities and communicate with a selected group of individuals. Since we are in the business of ideas and exchanging ideas, it is relatively easy to use that as a stage setting for subsequent discussions of American policy at greater depth and length.

Whether our communication efforts result in acceptance of our policies, that is another question. However, in terms of explaining our policies, I do not believe that we have had that much difficulty in most African states.

MR. GRAY. Do you find that black South Africans are pleased, displeased, or indifferent, or split on U.S. policy toward South Africa?

MR. LEWIS. I have just returned from a short trip to South Africa during which I had an opportunity to speak with a small number of black, colored, Afrikaner and English-speaking South Africans. U.S. policy, as far as the blacks and colored populations are concerned, I think, is well received.

I was intrigued with the discussion on disinvestment because that was a particular subject of interest to me during my visit, and in speaking with people, for example, in Soweto where we now operate a small reading room, this was one of the major questions that I attempted to discuss with people who were at a small luncheon. What I am convinced of is that there is no consensus on this in the black community. Some favor disinvestment. I think the ones who favor dis-

investment are those whom American investment does not affect in any way; while those who are affected by American investment tend generally to favor development principles and continuing U.S. investment in the South African economy.

Mr. SOLARZ. Will the gentleman yield on that point?

Mr. GRAY. Yes; go right ahead.

Mr. SOLARZ. You are aware, I am sure, Mr. Lewis, that the overwhelming percentage of black labor in South Africa is not directly affected by American investment. Would it be fair to conclude the implication of your point is that those black South Africans who are not directly affected by American investment favor some kind of policy of disinvestment, whereas those who are directly affected do not favor some form of disinvestment? That, in turn, would seem to lead to the conclusion that the great majority of black South Africans would favor such a policy inasmuch as they are not employed in businesses which benefit from American investment.

Mr. LEWIS. I do not think I would draw such a definitive conclusion because the number of people that I spoke to about this was relatively small. In Soweto, we had perhaps only half a dozen people who were willing to talk about that subject.

Mr. GRAY. But if your hypothesis is true, I think the figure is only about 60,000 black South Africans are working in American corporate plants there. So, if the hypothesis is true, and I am sure we understand it, you did not talk to a complete sample, it seems to me the conclusion has to be drawn from that hypothesis is that a consensus would be that an overwhelming majority of black South Africans would be for disinvestment.

Mr. LEWIS. First of all, I was not making a hypothesis, and I do not feel that a definitive conclusion can be drawn from my experience. As one of the people who attended the lunch said to me, "You know, it depends on who talks last to the man in the street about this question of disinvestment." If someone who favored disinvestment talked to him and then you ask the question, you would probably get the answer, "I favor this." But if no one has spoken to him about disinvestment, you would probably get the response, "I do not know."

Mr. GRAY. Even of those who are not affected by American interests there?

Mr. LEWIS. Well, frankly, the question of investment or disinvestment is one, I think, which we Americans have taken very seriously. That is not to say that the South African nonwhite population has not taken it as a very important question, but I think that in terms of the aggregate mass of nonwhites it is a question which is salient only to a very small percentage of the people. For example, as you get around Soweto, my feeling was that the question of investment or disinvestment was really the most relevant issue.

Mr. GRAY. The experience we have had—I guess it was about 1 month ago—we had 23 Members of the South African Parliament here on Capitol Hill and we had a very warm discussion around some of the issues with Members of Congress. I happened to be one of those who met with them. In fact, that was the question that each of them kept bringing up with regard to our policy, and basically warning us that was an incorrect approach while they solved their internal problems.

I just mention that; it is certainly a very heavy concern in the minds of the South African Parliament Members who are white.

One thing I would like to say in conclusion, and then turn it over to my chairman, going back to table 16 again and the figures that you have there for the black community in America. I am not questioning the accuracy, I would just say I represent a 70-percent black constituency, and their feelings on the whole question would not be reflected by the percentages asked here in terms of whom they support, what kind of action, and where it stands on the priority.

So, I would just like to say this, Mr. Chairman, for the record, that those in my district feel very, very strong by that it is not only a matter of principle, that South Africa represents one of the most repressive and racist forms of government that human civilization has seen, but that our policy should be very strong in terms of actually living out the American principle with regard to that country.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Gray.

Mr. O'Flaherty and Mr. Foltz, what would you say are the most significant differences between the mass and elite as regards American foreign policy toward Africa?

Mr. O'FLAHERTY. I suppose the most significant is over willingness to use economic leverage.

Mr. SOLARZ. On the part of?

Mr. O'FLAHERTY. By the U.S. Government to try to effect change. The willingness in the mass public exceeds by a considerable magnitude that which was found in the elite surveys. Beyond that, though we found no major cleavages in values, in policy preferences generally, and the direction of policy.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you more or less agree with that?

Mr. FOLTZ. I would certainly agree with it. There are other cleavages within the population. You can divide the population in different ways, but I do not think that education, socioeconomic status is the primary determinant, except with respect to what Mr. O'Flaherty has already said. Understandably, those who have had greater access to education frame their ideas more coherently, and there is perhaps a tighter relationship from one idea to the other which may tend to give the impression of a greater difference than there really is there.

Mr. SOLARZ. What accounts for this discrepancy between the willingness of the mass public opinion to countenance economic leverage against South Africa, as compared to a reluctance on the part of elite public opinion to use economic leverage against South Africa?

Mr. O'FLAHERTY. My view of that would be that the elite is highly sensitive to the difficulties of imposing successful sanctions, to the difficulty of tracing the consequences of various forms of economic leverage. So, their view is more tentative.

On the part of the general public, one suspects that there is a "gut" feeling that the United States, as the richest, most powerful Nation in the world, must somehow or other be able to affect this situation. Since they have pretty well concluded that military involvement does not work, the second best chance would be economic sanctions. That would be my guess.

Mr. SOLARZ. You both pointed out that all of the surveys seem to demonstrate a widespread opposition on the part of elite opinion to-

ward the use of force as a way of effecting change in South Africa, and a comparable reluctance on the part of public opinion to support the use of violence as a way of bringing about changes that would otherwise be considered desirable, in South Africa.

Given the fact that our own country was born, one might say, in a crucible of a violent revolution, rather than through a process of peaceful change or nonviolence, how do you account for this widespread opposition on the part of the American people toward the use of violent means to effectuate change in South Africa?

Mr. FOLTZ. It is a very complicated issue. Part of the answer is that we have become something of a status quo power; we are not, at least not in the same way, the revolutionary group that we were in 1776. The American public tends to distrust rapid upheavals, as indeed, I suspect, for very good reasons our Government tends to distrust rapid upheavals when they occur. They upset calculations. They upset linkages which, if not perfect, have at least been tolerable for us for a long period of time.

In the South African situation—there are cases where the American people can take a very sophisticated and discriminating view of violence. For example, in 1976, when the Soweto riots took place, the American public as a whole did not interpret those as a situation in which there were a group of radicals who got out of line and were doing horrible things to the established order. What they saw was that the police force was attacking innocent and unarmed civilians. They made, in effect, the so-called established order in South Africa responsible for the violence. In other words, they were able to make what was a sophisticated distinction that frankly sometimes eludes us in looking at our own society.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, there are an awful lot of Americans right now who would undoubtedly support a decision on the part of the President to use force to release the hostages in Iran, and to take punitive action against Iran if the hostages were harmed in any way. But the thrust of both of your presentations seems to be that even if the American people were convinced that the only way to bring about change was through violent methods, they would still be opposed to supporting those efforts.

I am interested in getting a better sense from you of what accounts for this attitude.

Mr. FOLTZ. May I make just a small observation on that? You used the phrase "even if the American people were convinced that it was the only way to bring about change." So far, we cannot ask that question because the American people by and large, who think about it, are not convinced that is the case. There is certainly hope—perhaps accurate, perhaps misplaced—that a number of other forces of change will produce satisfactory resolution. It is for that reason a very difficult question to get a fix on.

Mr. SOLARZ. You did not ask that question specifically.

Mr. FOLTZ. No, I did not.

Mr. SOLARZ. What do you think the answer would have been?

Mr. FOLTZ. I would guess—and I emphasize it is a pure guess—that there would be some, perhaps a significant minority, who would then say, "Yes, we would countenance violence." Perhaps even a majority

would say, "Yes, we certainly countenance South African blacks using violence on their own behalf." Perhaps a significant minority would then be willing to countenance American involvement in that violence. But that is a pure guess.

Mr. SOLARZ. So, your hypothesis would be that one very significant factor in the American reluctance to countenance violence is the feeling that it may in fact be possible to bring about meaningful change without violence, and it would be infinitely preferable to do it that way.

Mr. FOLTZ. Yes, I certainly think so.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. O'Flaherty?

Mr. O'FLAHERTY. I think one clue to this may lie in the fact that South Africa is perceived as an instance of racial injustice. In our own society we have had some success with nonviolent solutions to racial problems. The American civil rights movement with its nonviolent emphasis may well have convinced people that a similar road in South Africa is justified, and for that reason they are disinclined toward support of violence.

We asked whether the respondent thought the blacks in South Africa are justified or not in doing things like boycotts, sit-ins, demonstrations, in order to prove their situation; 79 percent to 11 percent said yes. So, in addition to the fact that was mentioned by Professor Foltz, it seems to me that the civil rights movement's nonviolent emphasis plays a role.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Lewis, are you aware of any public opinion polls in South Africa that are roughly comparable to these kinds of surveys, which would cast some light on the attitudes of South Africans, whites as well as blacks, coloreds and Indians, about the prospect for change in their country, and various methods of bringing it about?

Mr. LEWIS. I believe that some work has been done by Professor Schlemmer at the University of Natal. But his works have not really, I think, been published.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, could you see if you could possibly obtain this work, so that we could put it in the record, to the extent that it would reflect, or cast light on South African attitudes toward these questions? ¹

Does either of you gentlemen know of any polls that have been taken recently on American attitudes toward the issue of the Western Sahara, and the extent to which we should provide arms to Morocco?

Mr. FOLTZ. I do not know of any. I suspect, Mr. Chairman, that the answer would be overwhelmingly, "The Western who?" [Laughter.]

Mr. SOLARZ. Most Americans probably do not know where the Western Sahara is.

Mr. O'FLAHERTY. Congressman Solarz, there was an extensive poll done by Professor Hanf for the University of Freiburg, which has been published in German. It is a very long book which, the last I heard, was being translated into English. But it addresses the very questions you are raising, and it is an extensive and respectable poll.

Mr. SOLARZ. On South Africa?

Mr. O'FLAHERTY. In South Africa, Soweto, and in the cities.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you know when that translation will be available?

¹ The material referred to was furnished and is retained in committee files.

Mr. O'FLAHERTY. It may be available now; I do not know.

Mr. SOLARZ. Could the staff see if we could obtain a copy of that? I think that would be interesting.

Now, I was particularly interested in some of the observations you made, Mr. O'Flaherty, about Jewish attitudes toward change in South Africa and the way to bring it about. How many Jews were there in the sample that you included?

Mr. O'FLAHERTY. It was proportionate to their percentage of population, I do not know the exact number.

Mr. SOLARZ. You did a sample of about 1,100, as I recall?

Mr. O'FLAHERTY. Yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. The Jewish people constitute about 3 percent of the American population, which means you had about 33 Jews in your sample. From a statistical point of view, are you aware of what the margin of error is in a statistical result with a sample of 33?

Mr. O'FLAHERTY. Yes, I am.

Mr. SOLARZ. Then you realize that from a statistical point of view any conclusions you have reached about the relevant attitudes of American Jews versus the other sectors of the population contained in your survey are totally and absolutely worthless? Are you aware of that?

Mr. O'FLAHERTY. I am aware that there was a small number of individual Jews who would have been polled, although the sample was weighted in such a way—

Mr. SOLARZ. That is, in terms of the statistical accuracy of the findings, the margin of error on a sample of 33 is so enormous that it could just as easily have been 20 points under or 20 points over. When you are making relative judgments about the attitudes of one group compared to another group with such an enormous potential margin of error, it is simply not possible to come to a relevant and responsible conclusion.

But above and beyond that, I frankly find some of the figures within your own tables do not support the judgments and conclusions which you reached. One of the points you made, I think, was that Jews were one of the group least likely to support efforts to do something tangible to bring about change in South Africa.

Yet, I look at table 13 and I see that 50 percent of the Jews are in favor of cutting down on trade, compared to 43 percent of the total; compared to 48 percent of the Democrats; compared to 42 percent of the Republicans; compared to 52 percent of the blacks; compared to 51 percent of the whites.

In terms of restricting business investment, 58 percent of the Jews favor it compared to 48 percent of the total. As a matter of fact, a higher percentage of Jews favors restricting business investments, according to your figures than the blacks; and 11 percent more favor restricting business investment than the whites.

Now, since the margin of error here must be so enormous, then it is conceivable that 78 percent of Jews favor restricting investment. I really think that in terms of reaching any conclusions here, (a) you are not justified reaching any conclusions about Jewish attitudes; and (b) to the extent you are, your own figures disprove the conclusions which you announced.

Mr. O'FLAHERTY. We are aware, of course, of those statistical facts, but it is still the fact that we did demographic breakdowns of the people who were polled. That applies to other categories here as well.

Mr. SOLARZ. Maybe they are all worthless.

Mr. O'FLAHERTY. Let me say one thing about that. The table 13 are questions that were asked of those who said that they were in favor of doing something about South Africa.

Congressman Solarz, I do not want to draw any significant conclusions about Jewish attitudes based on the poll. There were one or two things that showed up that seemed to me to be interesting. For example, Jewish respondents had the highest propensity of any other group to say that apartheid was wrong, 95 percent of the Jewish respondents said that it was wrong.

We then find in this small sample that they have a higher propensity than other groups to say that we should not do anything about it, even though a majority of—

Mr. SOLARZ. Now, wait a second here. Look, on table 14, in which you ask this question about what we should do—this is on page 432—who are the people who answered the question on table 14?

Mr. O'FLAHERTY. These questions were asked of those who said, yes, we should do something about South Africa.

Mr. SOLARZ. That was table 13.

Mr. O'FLAHERTY. The percentages are expressed in different terms. These are percentages of the total survey population, which means that they add up to—

Mr. SOLARZ. In other words, table 14 is both those who think we should and should not do something about South Africa? What is the difference between table 13 and table 14?

Mr. O'FLAHERTY. Table 13 is expressed in percentages that add up to 100. That is to say, these are those who said yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. Said yes to what?

Mr. O'FLAHERTY. To the question of whether we should do something about South Africa.

Mr. SOLARZ. Right. What about table 14?

Mr. O'FLAHERTY. The same group, except that table 14 is expressed as percentages of the total population, as opposed to percentages of those who said yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. I got it. But you do understand that with a sample of 30 these results are really meaningless. I mean, you simply cannot responsibly draw any conclusion, let alone any comparative conclusions which have any validity whatsoever as a firm statistical measurement of the attitudes of that particular group. I think it is all well and good that you have done this survey, and I think you can statistically draw conclusions if the size of the sample is large enough. You certainly can draw conclusions about the American people as a whole from this. You can certainly draw conclusions, I imagine, from some of the subgroups if the samples are large enough. But when you get down that low, I really do not think you can. I think you do a disservice to the cause of rational analysis when you make such judgments, particularly when you do not qualify them in the way they should be qualified.

Let me ask one or two other questions, Mr. O'Flaherty and Mr. Foltz. Were there any significant differences between the Carnegie and Council on Foreign Relations surveys? I am sure you each have studied the work of the other. Did anything strike you in the results of the other that seemed inconsistent with the results of your own?

Mr. FOLTZ. Certainly not anything major, if we compare the survey that I did with the statistical survey that the Carnegie Endowment did. It is important to realize that we are addressing two somewhat different population groups. But I certainly did not find anything in there that seemed tremendously out of line. Perhaps in the elite, foreign affairs oriented group I surveyed, there is a greater explicit concern about the projection of Soviet and Cuban power in Africa. But I would not make too much of this difference; it is present in both cases, but in somewhat different forms.

Basically, the populations are on the same wavelength.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Lewis, have you in any way measured or analyzed the increase in coverage that the media provides for Africa in our country today, compared to the amount of coverage Africa got several years ago? In other words, could you in any way statistically demonstrate that there has been an increase? One intuitively suspects that there has, but it would be interesting to know how much more coverage Africa is getting today in print and the television media than it was getting previously.

Mr. LEWIS. I do not think the Agency has any figures on that as of today. We could probably go back and on the basis of reference material try to come up with some figures which would definitely indicate that there has been an increase.

Mr. SOLARZ. Would it be your feeling that there has been a substantial increase?

Mr. LEWIS. Oh, yes. The stationing of American media correspondents in Africa only began about 10 years ago.

There were West African resident correspondents for the New York Times and the Los Angeles papers; also there were resident East Africa correspondents for Time, Newsweek, the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, and the Christian Science Monitor. So, there were in the "salad days" of reporting on Africa about 10 representatives from the U.S. media, including television. I think we are down now to three or six.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, you suggest there has been a decline, then, in correspondents.

Mr. LEWIS. Yes; there has been a decline in resident correspondents, but they are beginning to increase in number again.

Mr. SOLARZ. This may be one area of the American economy where productivity has increased; we are getting more reporting out of fewer people.

I think if it would not impose too great a burden on your Agency, it would be useful for the record if you could give us measurable indications of the increase or decrease in coverage which Africa has been getting over some relative period of time; and that could include the number of correspondents, the amount of space in major newspapers like the New York Times, or the weekly magazines like Time and News-

week, or television coverage as well. And, if possible, you could break it down by different kinds of media, that would be useful, also.

Conceivably, the networks might have their own internal breakdowns in terms of the amount of time and people being devoted, for example, to Africa, on the network news each year over the last decade—that sort of thing.

Mr. Lewis, let me ask you, what do you think we could do that we are not doing now to improve Africa's understanding of America, and America's understanding of Africa? Is there anything that you think we could do?

Mr. LEWIS. Well, first of all, I think we could have an increase in the size of our exchange program, the benefit of which would be that more Americans would have an opportunity to go to Africa, and more Africans would have an opportunity to come to the United States. That mutuality, of course, would not only give Americans an experience in Africa when they go there, but also allow them to bring the experience back home and transfer it to a large number of other Americans.

So, I think that perhaps one of the roots toward better understanding would be an increase in our exchange programs.

I think possibly something else that could be done would be to create a North-South Institute along the lines of the East-West Center. This new institution would deal not just with United States-African relations but focus also on the problems of the Southern Hemisphere, all of which have a cross-cutting effect on one another and on their relationships with the United States. At such an institute or a center people could be brought together and studies could be made which, I think, could have a great impact on the mutual knowledge and understanding between the developed and developing worlds.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you.

Let me take this opportunity to thank all of you gentlemen for testifying. This marks the conclusion of a rather lengthy series of hearings on American interests in Africa. I think they have been enormously useful in giving the subcommittee an opportunity to look at the continent comprehensively, rather than selectively. Usually we confront African problems in the context of the particular crisis of the moment, but we very rarely have an opportunity to take an overview. I think this has been a very constructive conclusion to a productive series of hearings.

So, let me thank all of you for your work and for taking the time to testify this afternoon.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX 1

UNITED STATES INTERESTS IN AFRICA: AFRICA IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA

A STATEMENT* PREPARED BY DR. CLIFFORD ASHU ARREY

Mr. Chairman, the subject matter on United States interests in Africa is so vast, it could form a whole course of study and produce volumes of printed treatises. Thus, I have decided to centralize my statement on the issue of Africa in the international arena. My experience and my knowledge of history are too limited to allow me to make a dangerous expedition into an attempt to forecast based on pure conjecture. This is not to say, however, that speculations are undesirable in principle.

The African states became independent and members of the international community at a time when the frightening tremors of two world wars had subsided. Both the victorious and the vanquished had experienced the wasteful devastation and untold sorrows to which the present United Nations Charter alludes. Milton's words, in his "Nativity Hymn" may have expressed the sigh of relief and spelled the mood of the times:

"Nor war nor battles sound
Was heard the world around
The idle appear and shield hung up"

Yet, it was also a time when the horrors of that nightmare bullied man into proclaiming far-reaching universal ideals which in "normal" peacetime may have been impossible.

The African nations entered into the international arena with an approach to uphold the United Nations Charter. They believe very strongly in the enshrined principles of universality. In this arena, they must content, among other things, with the reluctance on the part of the western powers to accept the full implications of the concept of sovereign equality. An occasional gesture of good will on the part of the African states is viewed as characteristic hypocrisy. This can sometimes be overextended, clouding genuine motives. Sensitivity to the concepts of sovereignty and equality of states calls for patience and understanding from the most seasoned of diplomats from all sides.

Nationalist oriented, the African nations demonstrated an incredible voracity for internationalism at the level of conference diplomacy. The knowledge gained from the pre-independence period as opposed to the post-independence period tended to encourage unity of effort. It also brought home to the African states the taste of the fruits of international action for the achievement of common ends. Their very freedom was the child of such an action. Early problems of colonialism appear to have been the reason these new states tended to apply a nationalist approach to international relations. They perceived the international community in terms of their own positions in it, a position that was defined in terms of how they would meet the new challenge of equality with former colonial powers. Although natural, it was somewhat unfortunate from the point of view of the larger common goal.

In moments of utter frustration, Africa is known to take consolation in the thought that, with all its imperfections, there is still no existing satisfactory alternative to multilateral forums.

This idea must survive because these international forums make the well-being of all mankind their primal objective. With them, it is even possible to arrest the tragic process of history with regard to the rise and fall of nations. Africa is convinced of the need to induce the rise of nations without necessarily provoking their fall.

Mr. Chairman, after two decades of independence, an assessment of African diplomacy is a necessity, particularly as to the degree and the clarity with

*Check against general distribution until recorded.

which the aims, objectives, and demands of Africans are expressed in international organizations. One of the most important aspects of international organization membership is its far-reaching educational implications. Heightened African awareness of crucial world issues has been, for the Africans, a form of education in international affairs.

For example, United Nations' aims and purposes have increased African awareness on issues which were previously considered unimportant, or not even on the threshold of their awareness, in domestic politics. Questions of a new international economic order, the law of the sea, food, population, disarmament, and the general concept of global interdependence, for example, were not on the political agendas of many African countries, for they had no relevance to domestic politics whatsoever.

And yet, on joining the United Nations—and on having to participate in discussions and voting on the issues of international tensions (such as the Middle East, Southern Africa, and detente)—Africans have been drawn into and therefore instructed in the intricacies of these problems by the statements of purpose of conference diplomacy.

Similarly, with the OAU (Organization of African Unity), many African countries have had their ideological stances radically changed. Their positions, for example, on the Southern African issue have been definitely redefined for them by the rhetoric of the organization, and articulation of stated OAU objectives has had the effect of shaping and educating not only the policy makers, but also the educated general masses.

Another important level at which the relationship of African diplomacy may be analyzed is a series of cooperative efforts which may be either informal or formal. With this concept in mind, the level of operation is an educative process, for it teaches the African skills which many of them have not had the opportunity to practically acquire. It is important to view the diplomatic enterprise in which Africans are now engaged as "foreign cultural systems of communication"—within which they must fit because the world in which they operate is essentially non-African. This "world" makes philosophical and ideological assumptions which are sometimes at variance with traditional African forms of thought and behavior.

International organizations, therefore, serve the useful purpose of initiating the African into the intricacies of negotiation. They teach the African appropriate language and protocol and give him some understanding of international power stratification (a lesson as yet perhaps too improperly grasped by many Africans who tend to mistake the "equality of everyone" which is the celebrated tenet of the United Nations as representing international power realities). The lessons of international power stratification are learned when the African realizes that powerful states take leadership roles and weak states are the non-leaders.

The general practice of "one state, one vote" at the United Nations or at the OAU tends to hide the real importance and meaning of the lesson that power is matched by responsibility, and the corollary that diminished responsibility merits diminished power. This, of course, is a seriously debated question, but it is one the Africans within the international power system are facing and will continue to face.

Mr. Chairman, there is an important lesson to be learned from this process, once Africans have grasped the facts of power stratification in international politics. What it immediately suggests to smaller powers is that they should aggregate for the purposes of protecting their collective interests and aims. This realization, for example, seems to be moving Africans to think seriously of banding together in some kind of economic union to face the industrialized countries. Hitherto, the record of African countries in this respect has been disappointing: they do not seem to be sufficiently committed to their common interests to forego private, national interests when these are in conflict with collective aims. Thus, the francophone countries often broke away from others on some questions which affected France, mainly because they received substantial aid from the latter. In actual fact, one finds that there is little harmonization of aims and purposes in order to eliminate or at least to reduce inter-unit inconsistencies.

Usually there is agreement about general principles, but the specific aims and purposes are never clearly spelled out. As a result, articulation of the aims and purposes of aggregation often presents points of view which do not

reflect group consensus. More often than not, statements made by the delegate are couched in radical rhetoric which either embarrasses some governments within the group or so overstates the facts for some governments that they must repudiate the position stated by the delegate.

Perhaps this lack of coordination and harmonization of aims and purposes stems from a lack of clear policy objectives in the African states which have agreed to get together. This is not surprising, for, except in a few African states, the foreign policy position as to their options and alternatives has not been clearly developed and articulated domestically; issues tend to be defined in haste at international meetings by representatives who often misinform their respective governments.

In addition, many African representatives are from the "old school" who learn their art of diplomacy "on the job" as it were.

Mr. Chairman, it would be unfair not to mention what the attitude of the "new school" is. The "new school" consists of the young African intellectuals presently engaged in public diplomacy. These emerging Africans tend to grasp the issues on conference diplomacy better than those of the "old school." Africans of the new school are seriously questioning the actions of the time-honored leadership both in domestic and in foreign policies and in what the real meaning of independence is, since decisions affecting the daily lives of their different African states are being made in Paris, Moscow, London, and Washington. What one finds is a deep conflict between the so-called "wise elders of the old school" in African societies and the "young Turks"—the former are for the preserving of the status quo of leadership, while the latter are in favor of the intellectual force of freedom, equity and change. The result is a race between certain established principles and process in the interests of the ruling elite of the "old school" and the full development of human character in pursuit of the completeness of man by the "new school." In other words, between human nature and human folly as to ends resulting in strife and frustration.

Another contributing factor to this lack of coordination is the fact that very few African countries have clearly worked out their ideological positions and, at international conferences, this gives the leadership roles to the few which have thought out their ideological perspectives. In this sense, the international meetings act as instant instruction schools in ideology.

Mr. Chairman, it may be objected that the problems discussed here are not peculiar to Africa and that other regions show the same weaknesses. It would be inappropriate to take issue with that, except to point out that states of other regions do not have the structural weaknesses which the African states have, and few have the vulnerability of the majority of the African states. Besides, other countries of the developing world have longer experiences and many have better trained diplomatic personnel than many African states.

This brings us to the problem of socialization. It is an interesting area of analysis. In view of their diverse socio-political background, Africans naturally bring their cultural traditions as part of their social and political "equipment"—for African countries, as a custom, come basically from tradition oriented societies. Most come from strong ethnic groups, where tribal allegiance is an important factor, as against the national interests which have not, until the past few decades, participated in any international meetings. Their basic values and norms of behavior are, therefore, vastly different from those of their colleagues with whom they have to interact. One can illustrate this by discussing the differences between the individual and his relation to society.

The liberal democratic tradition considers the individual as a value in himself, and the preservation and enhancement of the individual's aims and desires are considered to be the goal of the society and, indeed, the standard of political legitimacy. The individual is served by and placed above the group, and his private judgment, private will, and private conscience are considered inviolable and basic units upon which political life is built.

The African tradition, on the other hand, has a different approach. Man is given a central place, but he is not seen primarily as an individual. He is seen as a member of a group at various levels of comprehensiveness: family, kin, ethnic groups, and the nation; and he is always bound to it by social, economic, and political networks. His socialization, therefore, has a society orientation and he is never conceived—nor does he conceive of himself—as a kind of atomistic

individual removed from his group mooring. The interests of the nation as a whole are important, but not those of the individual in his separate and private capacity.

At independence, most African states continued to maintain ties with their former colonializers who are western and mostly capitalist oriented. These are the same people with whom they interact in international organizations. Consequently, though, coming from pluralist societies, believing in communal and socialist values, most Africans find themselves being socialized in the behavioral patterns and norms of the west, which are individualist and capitalist oriented. The African faces a very serious dilemma here for he tends to find himself pitted against states of the developed world with which his country wishes to be friendly because they are potential aid-givers. More often than not, the African is at a disadvantage technically because there is the lack of experience, and the division of human resources in know-how is a drawback, unlike colleagues from regions such as Latin America and Asia who have had longer acquaintance with the functioning of international organizations. It is at this point that "bloc" organizations become important arenas of socialization because the values and the operational norms are pressed constantly. These organizations are potentially radicalizing agents for the Africans who are sent to them, and often end up espousing views which are far ahead and sometimes at variance with those of their governments.

As institutions, they set limits within which power is or can be exercised. This follows from the fact that within the organizations certain normative assumptions are taken for granted. First, there is the commitment to the democratic process of decision making through discussion and consensus. Then there is a preference for political pluralism. Both assumptions are important, and their general acceptance by the African states does, in a sense, mean that there is a process of socialization taking place. The general development of African states has tended to create, in the minds of observers, some doubts as to African commitments to these assumptions. The assumption of the discussion and consensus strikes at the very root of African views as to the basis of legitimacy of government and authority. Legitimacy of power is seen as vesting in those authorities who have the mystical credentials of authority which derive from time honored tradition.

Mr. Chairman, the question which arises sharply, therefore, is whether in the long run different and incompatible social structures and ideological orientations can achieve any consensus at all in matters of importance. Or, must the African so modify his own perspectives that he can fit into the west oriented world? What is involved here is the conception of "reasonableness." Can western diplomats behave in a rationality different in structure from that of the African in order to understand the African concept of reasonableness—especially where the African probably disputes the assumptions made about an individual in society? Do discussion and consensus presuppose a democratic structure where the ruled have a right to decide who should rule? In societies where the military have taken power, it is difficult to argue that discussion and consensus become the basis for decisions. However, within an international organization, the principle of consensus based on discussion becomes the invariable rule. The second assumption—that is, a preference for political pluralism, is based on the prior assumption of a democratic order which presumes that in a society people will not always agree as to the methods or indeed final aims.

But the problem, in African societies, has been that political pluralism has often been sacrificed at the altar of alleged threats to continuity and unity which have been used as covers for dislikes of opposition which did not threaten national unity at all. The thesis, then, is that the necessity for accepting commitment to these two principles at the international level might well be educative for the Africans who, more often than not, get recruited into the mainstream of leadership in their respective governments. It is true, of course, that leadership selection is seldom performed within specialized structures of international organizations. But the African case is different because of the dearth of trained personnel, so that those who are representatives in international organizations are often the ones who are likely to assume important roles in their countries.

Mr. Chairman, perhaps the most important aspect of international organizations is that they represent the process of international cooperation through the consent of the states concerned. They are not ends in themselves, but channels through which states can achieve some of their goals in international arenas. It is instructive to look at those organizations in which Africans are represented,

and to inquire as to how they use them as processes and what successes they have had. There is no doubt that in terms of meeting their developmental aims, African states have been considerably successful with the United Nations and its specialized agencies, particularly the UNDP, UNESCO, UNICEF, WHO and the World Bank. It is here that they have been able to use these agencies, for financing their developmental programs. The measure of their success, however, is an index of their willingness to subordinate political and ideological issues to practical and technical ones.

They have been most unsuccessful in areas where they challenged western powers on political and ideological grounds. The Rhodesian and South African apartheid policies are examples of situations where Africans tended to press these issues on ideological lines which have always failed to achieve results. It is noteworthy that when the Africans use the OAU to deal with practical problems of mediating disputes between warring African states, they have been with considerable success. They have been divided and least successful when they dealt with liberation movements.

It is vital, therefore, to look at the role of morality in international relations and in the operation of international organizations. Many scholars tend to treat the whole question with justifiable cynicism; for what seems to be documented by the historical record is that while men have attempted to humanize decisions, most statesmen have asked, first, what was needed to be done to preserve the interests of the country—and only second (if at all), what was the moral thing to do; and, when there were incompatibilities in the answers, the interests of the country almost always carried the day.

The reason I say it is important to address this question is this: African states generally tend to put the major emphasis on morality, and there is little doubt that much of Africa's disenchantment with the western world is its alleged lack of morality. This is important to keep in mind, in the game of power politics as well as in African efforts to influence other states. Often the moral stance of African states has been dismissed as naïveté" by western observers who do not appreciate the important fact that Africans have been socialized in environments which put social morality above gain. What seems to be suggested, then, is that Africans should learn, and learn pretty quickly, that national interests take precedence over morality in international affairs, and they should shape their policies accordingly.

Skepticism about the role of morality ought to be viewed against history. There is no doubt that, in our age, morality does play a role. Thus, nation states refuse to consider certain ends and the use of certain means to promote their aims and desires. In reality, economic aid to African countries is often justified on moral grounds—and the African countries themselves use moral arguments to pressure the aid-giving countries.

Moral rules do not permit certain policies to be considered at all, from the point of view of expediency. Certain things are not done on moral grounds, even though it would be expedient to do so. Such ethical inhibitions come into play in our time on different levels, with different effectiveness; their restraining function is most obvious and most effective in affirming the sacredness of human life in times of peace.

Mr. Chairman, the problem for the Africans in this area is that, while they have preached morality at the international level, the domestic scene has not supported their preachments. Very often, while Africans have urged a return to morality in international behavior, their own national politics have left much to be desired in that area. Thus, Africans have pressed for more economic aid, while the political elites at home were being accused of failure to live up to expected standards as to the use of that aid. While Africans have rightly protested disregard of the sanctity of human life among western powers, they have not been careful about the sanctity of the rights—even the very lives—of their citizens. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that national moralities are often put forward by different national spokesmen as "international ideals."

In other words, there is too much room for ethnocentrism in this area, with the result that we end up with a multitude of international moralities representing the ethical code of the politically powerful nations, with their national codes as international standards of ethics.

Subject to these facts, international morality implies a "world public opinion" which is the final court before the actions of public men and nations are judged. It is this court to which international organizations must turn as the most potent force for peace and for the achievement of whatever collective aims

international organizations process. To be effective, public opinion must obviously transcend national boundaries, and it is dependent, therefore, on effective international media of information dissemination. Public opinion must make itself felt by a public, international consensus on issues which affect the world community.

The critical issue for the African diplomats is that they do not have constituencies who are fully aware of what is happening in the world; as a general rule, the African peoples do not even know what is happening in their own countries, except what their governments wish them to know. For these reasons, Africans cannot rise and join the rest of humanity about issues which directly affect them, simply because they are not informed about them. A corollary of this is that African diplomats lack the means of using political or moral pressure because they do not control or have access to the communications media which would give them such leverage. This suggests, of course, that African participation in world affairs suffers from many handicaps and therefore lacks not only craft in diplomacy but maximum effectiveness.

Since World War II, there has developed a structure for the balance of power—from the “cold” war to what is often referred to as the bi-polarity of power. The power of the United States, and of the Soviet Union, in comparison with the power of their actual or potential allies, has become so overwhelming that through their own preponderant weight they determine the balance of power between them. Most of the other nations became satellites of the two super-powers and are firmly set in their respective orbits. The sole element of flexibility, therefore, is provided by the uncommitted nations whose moves and alignments cannot be predicted. African countries are within this uncommitted category, but this position gives them the illusion of power, rather than power itself. It is easy for them to fancy themselves as “balancers” of power. As suggested, this is an illusion because the structure of the balance of power has been transformed from a multi-polar one into a bi-polar one; and the balance cannot at present be decisively affected by changes in the alignments of one or other of the allies.

Mr. Chairman, the importance of the uncommitted nations is that the international forum has moved them toward formation of a “Third Force” in the world—a concept which was popularized by General deGaulle. DeGaulle's idea was that the Third Force would be the “balancer”—the African countries, most of them attracted to this idea, intend to stay out of East-West confrontations, to be neutral in all affairs except those that affect Africa. As they have often stated, Africans have decided to be for neither the West nor the East, but for Africa, a very questionable statement. However, in view of the disparity of power between the uncommitted nations and the super-powers, the formation of the Third Force would be a stillborn.

The critical factors in power politics today are finance and technology, and, since these factors lean overwhelmingly in favour of the super-powers, the Third Force can be but a token expression of dissent from the super-powers. But, in terms of African effectiveness in international organizations, their so-called non-alignment tends to deprive Africans of leverage against the industrialized nations—for whatever they deem to be in their own self-interest.

African posture of disengagement from the super-powers, and of nonalignment, is particularly important when we remember that with the colonial revolution, African states and the rest of the once-colonial world have become the main centers of attention by the super-powers. African states are the main “theaters” where the struggle between the super-powers is being fought, in terms of controlling raw materials and men's minds. Two factors are responsible for this situation: (a) the revolution of neocolonialism and semicolonialism against former colonizers; (b) the tendency inherent in a bi-polar system to transform itself into a two-bloc system.

RECOMMENDATIONS

For centuries Africa has been at the receiving end of domination, oppression, exploitation, and the use of force by those whose interests are challenged. The present underdevelopment of Africa does not equip her for policing global belligerency in military and economy terms. Consequently, the United States can at least influence events in Africa if the following recommendations are seriously considered and implemented:

1. The United States should take positive initiative in assisting Africa to build sound foundations in the political, economic and social fields. The United States has the capabilities to launch a genuine peace effort. The SALT treaties with regard to armaments are very encouraging, but the active “agents of war”

are not only those nations which possess weapons and munitions. Let us never forget those other major causes of war and strife—the basic needs of man—hunger, unemployment, lack of medical attention, education, etc.

2. The United States should also consider the possibility of strengthening the existing institutions of the United Nations which have contributed to the realization of the aims and purposes of collective action. Abhorrence of bilateral aid systems for Africa is a real problem, because of the inequitable contracts they tend to produce. Africa believes in multilateral aid systems through the United Nations, as a true centre for direct coordination of aid.

3. In order that the United States may fully understand the problems concerning the various African states, it would serve the purpose if this Subcommittee were to advise the Executive branch of the United States Government to appoint a Special Envoy to Africa. The Rev. Ambassador Andrew Young, in effect was carrying out this secondary assignment during his tenure as the United States Ambassador to the United Nations. While it lasted, that secondary assignment proved to be an effective diplomatic tool, as it allowed Mr. Young—because he was assigned by the President of the United States, outside the jurisdiction of the State Department—to have direct contact with African heads of state. He gained their confidence and there were distinct advantages to this kind of relationships.

4. The United States should not attach itself too closely to a ruling clique nor support or maintain such a regime in power, despite the fact that the ruling clique have lost support of their people. Rather, the United States should be more sensitive to the basic needs of the general public in the countries concerned. Situations are certainly changing in Africa day by day, and the United States cannot predict that comforting patterns will hold in a rapidly changing continent like Africa.

5. Instead of merely proclaiming its virtues, the United States might now ratify the United Nations human rights covenants still pending, on Civil and Political Rights; Social Economic and Cultural Rights; and the Elimination of Racial Discriminations—not to mention the Genocide Convention—which President Truman submitted a generation ago.

6. Congress might be advised to take action and withdraw assistance should a strong *prima facie* case be made against countries in Africa that trample on the political and civil rights of their peoples.

CONCLUSION

The turbulence and outbursts of violence in Africa are symptoms of a dramatic transition in African life, that still has a long way to go. De facto independence, however, is one thing, de jure is another, and the realities of power and progress are still another. Independence in the full sense of the term remains a distant goal for many an African state whose economy and political development are heavily dependent and controlled by foreign powers.

Post-independence African leaderships and successive military juntas of the African states have not given credence to their earlier affirmations as to human dignity and rights, dedication to the social force of democracy—instead, they proceeded to put into effect a long list of rival interests. The African states have witnessed, in the last two decades, one-man/one-party governments—it has been a wide-spread pattern, an excuse to repress dissident opinions and weaker factions.

With greater support and enforcement, on the part of the United States, for the greater independence of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, the peoples of Africa will increasingly benefit in international arenas. International forms—such as the United Nations and its specialized agencies—are centers for the practical application of principles, in shaping the norms to which states would have to adhere and conform by practicing more positive cooperation strategies. This would undoubtedly reduce tension with respect to a symmetrical political-economic dependency. It would aim at codifying African interdependence by establishing rules of conduct and codes of behavior as the optimum rational solution.

Whether one likes it or not, Africa is now rowing a larger, more fragile and unstable "boat." Those who are relatively more comfortably placed than others are obviously not interested in rocking this boat. But such short-sighted preference for stability over equity may result in neither equity nor stability. The fatal flaw in unshared affluence is its tendency to sow the seeds of its own decay.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

APPENDIX 2

TABLES SUBMITTED BY THE BUREAU OF MINES SHOWING DEPENDENCY ON
AFRICAN MINERALS BY THE UNITED STATES, EUROPE, AND JAPAN

Algeria and its relationship to the United States, European Economic Community and Japan
(All data in metric tons unless otherwise noted and for the year 1976)

GDP (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Contribution To GDP (%)	Export Total (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Exports (\$10 ⁶)	Major Mineral Item	Production Amount	Imports by U.S.	% of U.S. Consump- tion	Imports by EEC (a)	% of EEC Consump- tion (b)	Imports by Japan	% of Japan Consump- tion (c)
14,840 1/	33 2/	5,094 1/	4,680 2/	<u>METALS</u>							
				Copper, mine output**	370	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Iron ore, marketable							
				1,000 tons	3,188	(-)	(-)	1,599	1	(-)	(-)
				Lead, mine output**	2,100	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Mercury, 76 pound flasks	31,000	10,248	15	376	12	1,101	108
				Zinc, mine output**	7,900	906	(1)	419	(1)	(-)	(-)
				<u>NONMETALS</u>							
				Barite	64,000	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Phosphate rock, mine output	820,000	(-)	(-)	202,700	1.5	(-)	(-)

** Metal content

(1) Less than 1/2 unit

(-) No imports indicated

1/ Source, International Monetary Fund, Financial Statistics, October, 1979.
2/ Includes values for cement, natural gas, petroleum and petroleum products.

(a) EEC in 1976 was composed of Belgium, France, Denmark, West Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and United Kingdom.

(b) Derived EEC apparent consumption = imports + domestic production less exports.

(c) Derived Japan apparent consumption = imports + domestic production + secondary recovery less exports.

Angola and its relationship to the United States, European Economic Community and Japan
(All data in metric tons unless otherwise noted and for the year 1976)

GDP (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Contribution To GDP (%)	Export Total (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Exports (\$10 ⁶)	Major Mineral Item	Production Amount	Imports by U.S.	% of U.S. Consump- tion	Imports by EEC (a)	% of EEC Consump- tion (b)	Imports by Japan	% of Japan Consump- tion (c)
900 1/	52 2/	535 3/	442 4/	METALS							
				Beryllium, mine output	30	NA	NA	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Gold, mine output**	1	NA	NA	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				1,000 troy oz.		(-)	(-)	57,939	(1)	(-)	(-)
				Iron ore, marketable	0						
				NONMETALS							
				Diamond, 1,000 carats		(-)	(-)	NA	NA	(-)	(-)
				Gem	255	(-)	(-)	NA	NA	(-)	(-)
				Industrial	85						

NA not available
** metal content

(1) Less than 1/2 unit
(-) No imports indicated

1/ Barclay Bank Country Reports (London), Angola, Oct. 28, 1976, p. 1.

2/ Includes values for petroleum, petroleum products and cement.

3/ New Africa Yearbook, 1979, Facts and Figures, Unctad Handbook of Statistics.

4/ Includes export values for petroleum and petroleum products.

(a) EEC in 1976 was composed of Belgium, France, Denmark, West Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and United Kingdom.

(b) Derived EEC apparent consumption = imports + domestic production less exports.

(c) Derived Japan apparent consumption = imports + domestic production + secondary recovery less exports.

Botswana and its relationship to the United States, European Economic Community and Japan
(All data in metric tons unless otherwise noted and for the year 1976)

GDP (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Contribution To GDP (%)	Export Total (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Exports (\$10 ⁶)	Major Mineral Item	Production Amount	Imports by U.S.	% of U.S. Consump- tion	Imports by EEC (a)	% of EEC Consump- tion (b)	Imports by Japan	% of Japan Consump- tion (c)
318 1/	33 2/	176 1/	105 2/	<u>METALS</u>							
				Cobalt, mine output**	150	476 3/	5	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Copper, mine output**	12,482	12,904 3/	1	NA 4/	NA	(-)	(-)
				Nickel, mine output**	12,579	(-) 4/	(-)	NA 4/	NA	(-)	(-)
<u>NONMETALS</u>											
				Diamond, 1,000 carats	358	NA 5/	NA	NA 5/	NA	NA 5/	NA
				Gem		NA 5/	NA	NA 5/	NA	NA 5/	NA
				Industrial	2,026						

NA not available

(-) no imports indicated

** metal content

1/ Source, International Monetary Fund, Financial Statistics, October, 1979.

2/ Includes values for coal, semiprecious gems and talc.

3/ Metal content of nickel-copper matte.

4/ Botswana re-exports via Port Louisiana to EEC.

5/ All diamonds are re-exported via South Africa, Belgium, Israel and the United Kingdom to the United States, Western Europe and Japan.

Contribution to imports is unknown.

(a) EEC in 1976 was composed of Belgium, France, Denmark, West Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and United Kingdom.

(b) Derived EEC apparent consumption = imports + domestic production less exports.

(c) Derived Japan apparent consumption = imports + domestic production + secondary recovery less exports.

U.S. Bureau of Mines
December 15, 1979

Congo and its relationship to the United States, European Economic Community and Japan
(All data in metric tons unless otherwise noted and for the year 1976)

GDP (\$106)	Mineral Contribution To GDP (%)	Export Total (\$106)	Mineral Exports (\$106)	Major Mineral Item	Production Amount	Imports by U.S.	% of U.S. Consump- tion	Imports by EEC (a)	% of EEC Consump- tion (b)	Imports by Japan	% of Japan Consump- tion (c)
700 <u>1/</u>	28 <u>2/</u>	208 <u>3/</u>	178 <u>2/</u>	METALS							
				Copper, mine output**	408	(-)	(-)	729	(1)	(-)	(-)
				Gold, mine output**	482	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Lead, mine output**	2,100	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Zinc, mine output**	5,200	(-)	(-)	6,405	(1)	(-)	(-)
				NONMETALS							
				Potash, mine output	254,000	15,746	(1)	54,315	1	18,103	3

** Metal content

(-) No imports indicated

(1) Less than 1/2 unit

1/ Source, World Bank Statistics

2/ Includes value for petroleum.

3/ Source, International Monetary Fund, Financial Statistics, October 1979.

(a) EEC in 1976 was composed of Belgium, France, Denmark, West Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and United Kingdom.

(b) Derived EEC apparent consumption = imports + domestic production less exports.

(c) Derived Japan apparent consumption = imports + secondary recovery less exports.

U.S. Bureau of Mines
December 15, 1979

Egypt and its relationship to the United States, European Economic Community and Japan
(All data in metric tons unless otherwise noted and for the year 1976)

GNP (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Contribution To GNP (%)	Export Total (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Exports (\$10 ⁶)	Major Mineral Item	Production Amount	Imports by U.S.	% of U.S. Consump- tion	Imports by EEC (a)	% of EEC Consump- tion (b)	Imports by Japan	% of Japan Consump- tion (c)
15,635 1/	15 2/	1,522 1/	670 2/	<u>METALS</u>							
				Aluminum,							
				Ingot	55,000	(-)	(-)	7,434	(1)	(-)	(-)
				Iron ore,							
				marketable							
				1,000 M.T.	1,243	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Manganese ore,							
				marketable	4,256	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				<u>NONMETALS</u>							
				Asbestos,							
				all types	1,096	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Barite	288	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Feldspar,							
				marketable	2,128	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Fluorspar, mine							
				output	2,400	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Phosphate rock,							
				mine output	394,000	(-)	(-)	5,429	(1)	(-)	(-)

(-) No imports indicated
(1) less than 1/2 unit

1/ Source, International Monetary Fund, Financial Statistics, October 1979.
2/ Includes values for petroleum, petroleum products, and cement.

(a) EEC in 1976 was composed of Belgium, France, Denmark, West Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and United Kingdom.
(b) Derived EEC apparent consumption = imports + domestic production less exports.
(c) Derived Japan apparent consumption = imports + domestic production + secondary recovery less exports.

Ethiopia and its relationship to the United States, European Economic Community and Japan
(All data in metric tons unless otherwise noted and for the year 1976)

GDP (\$106)	Mineral Contribution To GDP (%)	Export Total (\$106)	Mineral Exports (\$106)	Major Mineral Item	Production Amount	Imports by U.S.	% of U.S. Consump- tion	Imports by EEC (a)	% of EEC Consump- tion (b)	Imports by Japan	% of Japan Consump- tion (c)
2,900 1/	1	280 1/	20 2/								
				METALS							
				Copper, mine output**	400	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Gold, mine output**							
				Platinum group metals, mine output**	11,253	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				troy oz.							
				troy oz.	145	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)

** Metal content

(-) No imports indicated

1/ Source, International Monetary Fund, Financial Statistics, October, 1979

2/ Includes export values for petroleum products.

(a) EEC in 1976 was composed of Belgium, France, Denmark, West Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and United Kingdom.

(b) Derived EEC apparent consumption = imports + domestic production less exports.

(c) Derived Japan apparent consumption = imports + domestic production + secondary recovery less exports.

U.S. Bureau of Mines
December 15, 1979

Gabon and its relationship to the United States, European Economic Community and Japan
(All data in metric tons unless otherwise noted and for the year 1976)

GDP (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Contribution To GDP (%)	Export Total (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Exports (\$10 ⁶)	Major Mineral Item	Production Amount	Imports by U.S.	% of U.S. Consump- tion	Imports by EEC (a)	% of EEC Consump- tion (b)	Imports by Japan	% of Japan Consump- tion (c)
2,894 1/	64 2/	1,092 1/	1,016 2/	METALS							
				Gold, mine output**							
				1,000 troy oz.	3	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Manganese ore, marketable							
				1,000 M.T.	2,217	490	34	611	21	207	6

(-) No imports indicated

** Metal content

1/ Source, International Monetary Fund, Financial Statistics, October 1979.

2/ Includes values for petroleum, petroleum products, and uranium.

(a) EEC in 1976 was composed of Belgium, France, Denmark, West Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and United Kingdom.

(b) Derived EEC apparent consumption = Imports + domestic production less exports.

(c) Derived Japan apparent consumption = imports + domestic production + secondary recovery less exports.

U.S. Bureau of Mines
December 15, 1979

Ghana and its relationship to the United States, European Economic Community and Japan
(All data in metric tons unless otherwise noted and for the year 1976)

GNP (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Contribution To GNP (%)	Export Total (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Exports (\$10 ⁶)	Major Mineral Item	Production Amount	Imports by U.S.	% of U.S. Consump- tion	Imports by EEC (a)	% of EEC Consump- tion (b)	Imports by Japan	% of Japan Consump- tion (c)
5,920 1/	7%	825 2/	311 3/	Aluminum, ingot	146,647	81,454	2	31,636	1	6,959	(1)
				Bauxite, ore 1,000 M.T.	267	(-)	(-)	294	3	(-)	(-)
				Gold, mine output** troy oz	532 4/	(-) 5/	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Manganese ore, market- 1,000 able M.T.	312	(-)	(-)	139	5	19	(1)
				<u>NONMETALS</u>							
				Diamond Gem	1,000 carats	(1)	(1)	NA	NA	NA	NA
				Indus- trial carats	1,000 2,055	30	(1)	NA	NA	NA	NA

NA not available

(1) less than 1/2 unit

(-) No imports indicated

** Metal content

1/ Source, World Bank Statistics

2/ Source, International Monetary Fund Financial Statistics, October, 1979

3/ Includes export values for petroleum, petroleum products, coal and cement.

4/ All gold is re-exported via Switzerland.

5/ Gold is imported via London, Paris and Switzerland, exact contribution to U.S. is unknown.

(a) EEC in 1976 was composed of Belgium, France, Denmark, West Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and United Kingdom.

(b) Derived EEC apparent consumption = imports + domestic production less exports

(c) Derived Japan apparent consumption = imports + domestic production + secondary recovery less exports.

U.S. Bureau of Mines
December 15, 1979

Guinea and its relationship to the United States, European Economic Community and Japan
(All data in metric tons unless otherwise noted and for the year 1976)

GDP (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Contribution To GDP	Export Total (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Exports (\$10 ⁶)	Major Mineral Item	Production Amount	Imports by U.S.	% of U.S. Consump- tion	Imports by EEC (a)	% of EEC Consump- tion (b)	Imports by Japan	% of Japan Consump- tion (c)
860 1/	23	272	264	<u>METALS</u>							
				Bauxite							
				ore, salable							
				1,000 M.T.	9,685	2,736	24	3,211	37	(-)	(-)
				Alumina	560,000	(-)	(-)	51,947	2	(-)	(-)
				<u>NONMETALS</u>							
				Diamond, 1,000 carats							
				Gem	25	NA	2/	NA	2/	NA	2/
				Industrial	55	NA	2/	NA	2/	NA	2/

NA not available

(-) No Imports indicated.

1/ Source, State Department Statistics.

2/ All diamonds are re-exported via Belgium, Israel, and the United Kingdom to the United States, Western Europe, and Japan.
Contribution to Imports is unknown.

(a) EEC in 1976 was composed of Belgium, France, Denmark, West Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and United Kingdom.

(b) Derived EEC apparent consumption = imports + domestic production less exports.

(c) Derived Japan apparent consumption = imports + domestic production + secondary recovery less exports.

U.S. Bureau of Mines
December 15, 1979

Kenya and its relationship to the United States, European Economic Community and Japan
(All data in metric tons unless otherwise noted and for the year 1976)

GDP (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Contribution To GDP (%)	Export Total (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Exports (\$10 ⁶)	Major Mineral Item	Production Amount	Imports by U.S.	% of U.S. Consump- tion	Imports by EEC (a)	% of EEC Consump- tion (b)	Imports by Japan	% of Japan Consump- tion (c)
3,416 1/	7 2/	825 1/	196 3/	<u>METALS</u>							
				Copper, mine output**	70	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Gold, mine output**							
				Iron ore, marketable	37	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Lead, mine output**	20,784	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Silver, mine output**	480	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				troy ounces	118	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				<u>NONMETALS</u>							
				Barite	359	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Corundum	15	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Feldspar							
				marketable	1,115	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Fluorspar	75,027	19,434	2	11,340	1	38,457	10
				Vermiculite	3,587	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)

** Metal Content

(-) No imports indicated

1/ Source, International Monetary Fund, Financial Statistics, October, 1979.

2/ Also includes refined petroleum, cement, soda ash and minor minerals not listed above.

3/ Includes refined petroleum, cement, soda ash and fluorspar.

(a) EEC in 1976 was composed of Belgium, France, Denmark, West Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and United Kingdom.

(b) Derived EEC apparent consumption = imports + domestic production less exports.

(c) Derived Japan apparent consumption = imports + domestic production + secondary recovery less exports.

U.S. Bureau of Mines
December 15, 1979

Liberia and its relationship to the United States, European Economic Community and Japan
(All data in metric tons unless otherwise noted and for the year 1976)

GNP (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Contribution To GNP (%)	Export Total (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Exports (\$10 ⁶)	Major Mineral Item	Production Amount	Imports by U.S.	% of U.S. Consump- tion	Imports by EEC (a)	% of EEC Consump- tion (b)	Imports by Japan	% of Japan Consump- tion (c)
552 1/	27	457	348								
				<u>METALS</u>							
				Iron ore, marketable, 1,000 MT	18,517	1,952	1	12,381	8	746	(1)
				<u>NONMETALS</u>							
				Diamonds, 1,000 carats							
				Gem	221	NA 2/	NA	265 3/	NA	NA 2/	NA
				Industrial	185	NA 2/	NA	NA 2/	NA	NA 2/	NA

NA not available

(1) Less than 1/2 unit

1/ Source, International Monetary Fund, Financial Statistics, October 1979.

2/ All diamonds are re-exported via Belgium, Israel, and the United Kingdom to the United States, Western Europe, and Japan.

3/ Contribution to imports is unknown.

3/ Includes gem and industrial diamonds.

(a) EEC in 1976 was composed of Belgium, France, Denmark, West Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and United Kingdom.

(b) Derived EEC apparent consumption = imports + domestic production less exports.

(c) Derived Japan apparent consumption = imports + domestic production + secondary recovery less exports.

U.S. Bureau of Mines
December 15, 1979

Madagascar and its relationship to the United States, European Economic Community and Japan
(All data in metric tons unless otherwise noted and for the year 1976)

GDP (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Contribution To GDP (%)	Export Total (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Exports (\$10 ⁶)	Major Mineral Item	Production Amount	Imports by U.S.	% of U.S. Consump- tion	Imports by EEC (a)	% of EEC Consump- tion (b)	Imports by Japan	% of Japan Consump- tion (c)
1,690 1/	4 2/	260 1/	38 2/	<u>METALS</u>							
				Beryl, mine output	17	(-)	(-)	NA	NA	NA	NA
				Chromite, marketable mine output	221,172	(-)	(-)	105,832	8	134,359	11
				<u>NONMETALS</u>							
				Graphite, mine output	17,412	3,703	7 (1)	10,677	18 (1)	830	3
				Mica, all types	81	89		55		264	3

NA not available

(1) Less than 1/2 unit

(-) No imports indicated

1/ Source, International Monetary Fund, Financial Statistics, October, 1979.

2/ Includes values for cement and petroleum products.

(a) EEC in 1976 was composed of Belgium, France, Denmark, West Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and United Kingdom.

(b) Derived EEC apparent consumption = imports + domestic production less exports.

(c) Derived Japan apparent consumption = imports + domestic production + secondary recovery less exports.

U.S. Bureau of Mines
December 15, 1979

Mauritania and its relationship to the United States, European Economic Community and Japan
(All data in metric tons unless otherwise noted and for the year 1976)

GNP (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Contribution To GNP (%)	Export Total (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Exports (\$10 ⁶)	Major Mineral Item	Production Amount	Imports by U.S.	% of U.S. Consump- tion	Imports by EEC (a)	% of EEC Consump- tion (b)	Imports by Japan	% of Japan Consump- tion (c)
460 1/	45	184 2/	167								
				METALS							
				Copper, mine output**	9,431	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Iron ore, marketable	9,664	(-)	(-)	6,865	4	1,342	1
				1,000 M.T.							

** Metal content

(-) No imports indicated

1/ Source, World Bank Statistics.

2/ Source, International Monetary Fund, Financial Statistics, October 1979.

(a) EEC in 1976 was composed of Belgium, France, Denmark, West Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and United Kingdom.

(b) Derived EEC apparent consumption = imports + domestic production less exports.

(c) Derived Japan apparent consumption = imports + domestic production + secondary recovery less exports.

U.S. Bureau of Mines
December 15, 1979

Morocco and its relationship to the United States, European Economic Community and Japan
(All data in metric tons unless otherwise noted and for the year 1976)

GDP (\$106)	Mineral Contribution To GDP (%)	Export Total (\$106)	Mineral Exports (\$10 ⁶)	Major Mineral Item	Production Amount	Imports by U.S.	% of U.S. Consump- tion	Imports by EEC (a)	% of EEC Consump- tion	Imports by Japan	% of Japan Consump- tion
9,350 1/	7.5 2/	1,262	592	METALS							
				Antimony, mine output**	1,560	(-)	(-)	459	4	(-)	(-)
				Cobalt, mine output**	862	(-)	(-)	1,039	12	(-)	(-)
				Copper, mine output**	4,914	(-)	(-)	2,396	(1)	(-)	(-)
				Iron ore, marketable	342,763	9,979	(1)	117,206	(1)	(-)	(-)
				Lead, mine output**	60,198	(-)	(-)	16,969	2	(-)	(-)
				Manganese ore, marketable	117,304	23,389	2	63,657	2	(-)	(-)
				Nickel mine output**	220 3/	(-)	(-)	61	(1)	(-)	(-)
				Silver, mine output**		(-)	(-)	64.3	(1)	(-)	(-)
				1,000 troy oz.	2,054	(-)	(-)	21,111	2	(-)	(-)
				Zinc, mine output**	17,740	(-)	(-)	9,829	(1)	(-)	(-)
				NONMETALS				17,518	2	(-)	(-)
				Barite	137,463	92	(1)				
				Fluorspar, marketable	51,450	(-)	(-)				
				Phosphate rock, mine output		(-)	(-)				
				1,000 M.T.	15,656	(-)	(-)	4,927	36	443	18

** Metal content

(1) Less than 1/2 unit.

(-) No imports indicated

1/ Source, International Monetary Fund, Financial Statistics, October, 1979.

2/ Includes values for petroleum, natural gas, cement, coal, pyrite, clays and salt.

3/ Nickel content of cobalt ore, estimated.

(a) EEC in 1976 was composed of Belgium, France, Denmark, West Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and United Kingdom.

(b) Derived EEC apparent consumption = imports + domestic production less exports.

(c) Derived Japan apparent consumption = imports + domestic production + secondary recovery less exports.

U.S. Bureau of Mines
December 15, 1979

Mozambique and its relationship to the United States, European Economic Community and Japan
(All data in metric tons unless otherwise noted and for the year 1976)

GNP (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Contribution To GNP (%)	Export Total (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Exports (\$10 ⁶)	Major Mineral Item	Production Amount	Imports by U.S.	% of U.S. Consump- tion	Imports by EEC (a)	% of EEC Consump- tion (b)	Imports by Japan	% of Japan Consump- tion (c)
1,640 <u>1/</u>	2 <u>2/</u>	147	5.2 <u>2/</u>	<u>METALS</u>							
				Bauxite, salable ore	2,000	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Beryl, mine output	10	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	NA	NA
				Copper, mine output**	700	(-)	(-)	2,949 <u>3/</u>	(1)	24	(1)
				Columbite- Tantalite, mine output	86	24	(1)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Columbium content			(1)				
				Tantalum " "			4				
				Gold, mine output**	20	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				troy ounces							
				Tungsten, mine output**	2	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				<u>NONMETALS</u>							
				Asbestos, all types	NA	(-)	(-)	4,614 <u>4/</u>	(1)	(-)	(-)
				Lithium minerals, mine output	755	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	NA	NA
				Mica, all types	900	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)

NA not available

** metal content

(1) Less than 1/2 unit

(-) No imports indicated

1/ World Bank Estimate.

2/ Includes values for cement, coal and petroleum products.

3/ Refined copper, not of Mozambique origin.

4/ Probably originated in Swaziland.

(a) EEC in 1976 was composed of Belgium, France, Denmark, West Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and United Kingdom

(b) Derived EEC apparent consumption = imports + domestic production less exports.

(c) Derived Japan apparent consumption = imports + domestic production + secondary recovery less exports.

Nigeria and its relationship to the United States, European Economic Community and Japan
(All data in metric tons unless otherwise noted and for the year 1976)

GDP (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Contribution To GDP (%)	Export Total (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Exports (\$10 ⁶)	Major Mineral Item	Production Amount	Imports by U.S.	% of U.S. Consump- tion	Imports by EEC (a)	% of EEC Consump- tion (b)	Imports by Japan	% of Japan Consump- tion (c)
28,691 1/	33 2/	10,087 1/	9,425 3/	METALS							
				Columbite - tantalum mine output	651	216	3	(-)	(-)	484	26
				Lead, mine output**	276	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Rare-earths, monazite concentrate	20 e/	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Tin, mine output**	3,710	(-)	(-)	3,026	6	(-)	(-)
				Zinc, mine output**	800 e/	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				NONMETALS							
				Feldspar, marketable	5,000 e/	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)

** Metal content

(-) No imports indicated

e/ Estimate based on partial reports.

1/ Source, International Monetary Fund, Financial Statistics, October 1979.

2/ Includes values for petroleum, cement and coal.

3/ Includes values for petroleum and coal.

(a) EEC in 1976 was composed of Belgium, France, Denmark, West Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and United Kingdom.

(b) Derived EEC apparent consumption = imports + domestic production less exports.

(c) Derived Japan apparent consumption = imports + domestic production + secondary recovery less exports.

U.S. Bureau of Mines
December 15, 1979

Other African Countries and their relationships to the United States, European Economic Community and Japan
(All data in metric tons unless otherwise noted and for the year 1976)

Country	GDP (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Contribution To GDP (%)	Export Total (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Exports (\$10 ⁶)	Major Mineral Item	Production Amount	Imports by U.S.	% of U.S. Consump- tion	Imports by EEC (a)	% of EEC Consump- tion (b)	Imports by Japan	% of Japan Consump- tion (c)
Cameroon	2,769	1	511	17	Aluminum, ingot	57,724	(-)	(-)	12,631	1	8,201	1
Ivory Coast	4,688	1	1,642	63 <u>1/</u>	Diamond 1,000 carats	60 <u>4/</u>	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Niger	518	17	134	86 <u>2/</u>	Tin, mine output**	126	(-)	(-)	76	(1)	(-)	(-)
Senegal	1,922	3	485	65 <u>3/</u>	Phosphate rock, mine output, 1,000 M.T.	1,809	(-)	(-)	617	(1)	(-)	(-)
Tanzania	2,761	1	460	19 <u>3/</u>	Diamond 1,000 carats	438 <u>4/</u>	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Togo	560	10	104	55	Phosphate rock, mine output, 1,000 M.T.	2,886	(-)	(-)	1,510	11	(-)	(-)

NA not available

** Metal content

(1) Less than 1/2 unit

(-) No imports indicated

1/ Includes export value for refined petroleum products.

2/ Includes export value for uranium.

3/ Does not include refined petroleum exports.

4/ Includes both gem and industrial diamonds.

(a) EEC in 1976 was composed of Belgium, France, Denmark, West Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and United Kingdom.

(b) Derived EEC apparent consumption = imports + domestic production less exports.

(c) Derived Japan apparent consumption = imports + domestic production + secondary recovery less exports.

U.S. Bureau of Mines
December 15, 1979

Other African Countries and their relationships to the United States, European Economic Community and Japan
(All data in metric tons unless otherwise noted and for the year 1976)

Country	GNP (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Contribution To GNP (%)	Export Total (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Exports (\$10 ⁶)	Major Mineral Item	Production Amount	Imports by U.S.	% of U.S. Consump- tion	Imports by EEC (a)	% of EEC Consump- tion (b)	Imports by Japan	% of Japan Consump- tion (c)
Burundi	370	1	63	4	Tin, mine output** Tungsten, mine output**	26 2	(-) 1	(-) (1)	36 (-)	(1) (-)	(-) (-)	(-) (-)
Central African Empire	420	2	59	10	Diamond 1,000 carats	286 1/	36	1	NA 2/	NA	NA	NA
Lesotho	210	(1)	12	(1)	Diamond 1,000 carats	5 1/	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

NA not available

** Metal content

(1) Less than 1/2 unit

(-) No imports indicated.

1/ Includes both gem and industrial diamonds.

2/ France is an importer of CAE diamond.

(a) EEC in 1976 was composed of Belgium, France, Denmark, West Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and United Kingdom.

(b) Derived EEC apparent consumption = imports + domestic production less exports.

(c) Derived Japan apparent consumption = imports + domestic production + secondary recovery less exports.

U.S. Bureau of Mines
December 15, 1979

Republic of South Africa and its relationship to the United States, European Economic Community and Japan
(All data in metric tons unless otherwise noted and for the year 1976)

GDP (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Contribution To GDP (%)	Export Total (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Exports (\$10 ⁶)	Major Mineral Item	Production Amount	Imports by U.S.	% of U.S. Consump- tion	Imports by EEC (a)	% of EEC Consump- tion (b)	Imports by Japan	% of Japan Consump- tion (c)
33,370 1/	16	8,302 2/	4,390 2/	METALS							
				Aluminum, ingot	78,400	3,065	(1)	2,269	(1)	2,884	(1)
				Antimony, mine	10,698	8,555	24	1,775	15	328	5
				output**							
				Chromite, market- able mine	2,409	397	44	407	32	416	34
				output, 1,000 tons							
				Copper, mine	196,880	4,482	(1)	154,116	8	5,837	(1)
				output**							
				Ferrochromium, all types	350,000	78,679	21	130,950	43	90,044	18
				Ferromanganese, all types	350,000	158,018	19	111,694	10	--	--
				Gold, mine	22,936	11 3/	(1)	17,908	55	--	--
				output**							
				1,000 troy oz.							
				Iron ore, marketable	15,663	162	(1)	813	(1)	2,414	2
				1,000 tons							
				Manganese ore, marketable	5,503	125	9	1,396	49	1,277	36
				1,000 tons							
				Nickel, mine	22,371	2,693	1	10,317	7	3,038	3
				output**							
				Platinum group metals, mine	2,700	1,242	58	32	(1)	620	33
				output, 1,000 troy oz.							
				Silver, mine	2,821	(-)	(-)	663	1	(-)	(-)
				output**, 1,000 troy oz.							
				Tin, mine	2,798	(-)	(-)	3,074	6	(-)	(-)
				output**							

Republic of South Africa and its relationship to the United States, European Economic Community and Japan
(All data in metric tons unless otherwise noted and for the year 1976)

GDP (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Contribution To GDP (%)	Export Total (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Exports (\$10 ⁶)	Major Mineral Item	Production Amount	Imports by U.S.	% of U.S. Consump- tion	Imports by EEC (a)	% of EEC Consump- tion (b)	Imports by Japan	% of Japan Consump- tion (c)
				Vanadium, mine output**	9,875	606	7	768	30	1	69
				Zinc, mine output**	78,559	3,311	(1)	49,417	4	(-)	(-)
				Zirconium, mine output	11,252	122	(1)	1,297	1	487	(1)
<u>NONMETALS</u>											
				Andalusite	77,464	45	NA	23,532	23	12,385	103
				Asbestos, all types	369,840	18,229	3	96,413	11	96,645	29
				Diamond, 1,000 carats							
				Gem	3,340	1,216	22	NA	NA	NA	NA
				Industrial	3,683	5,432	20	NA	NA	NA	NA
				Corundum, mine output	142	NA	NA	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Feldspar, marketable	46,138	(-)	(-)	1,588	(1)	2	(-)
				Fluorspar, mine output	290,718	110,951	9	6,003	1	99,434	26
				Graphite, mine output	530	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Mica, all types	2,380	4	(1)	3,409	13	262	3
				Phosphate rock, mine output	1,731	(-)	(-)	33	(1)	5	(1)
NA not available				1,000 tons							
** Metal content				Vermiculite, mine output	222,079	36,290	13	104,227	29	322	1
*1) Less than 1/2 unit											
(-) No imports indicated											

1/ Source, International Monetary Fund, Financial Statistics, October, 1979.

2/ Includes export values for petroleum products, coal and cement.

3/ Gold is imported via London, Paris and Switzerland, exact contribution to U.S. is unknown.

(a) EEC in 1976 was composed of Belgium, France, Denmark, West Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and United Kingdom.

(b) Derived EEC apparent consumption = imports + domestic production less exports.

(c) Derived Japan apparent consumption = imports + domestic production + secondary recovery less exports.

Rhodesia and its relationship to the United States, European Economic Community and Japan
(All data in metric tons unless otherwise noted and for the year 1976)

GDP (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Contribution To GDP (%)	Export Total (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Exports (\$10 ⁶)	Major Mineral Item	Production Amount	Imports by U.S.	% of U.S. Consump- tion	Imports by EEC (a)	% of EEC Consump- tion (b)	Imports by Japan	% of Japan Consump- tion (c)
3,123 <u>1/</u>	12 <u>1/</u>	450 <u>2/</u>	300 <u>3/</u>	METALS							
				Antimony, output**	300	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Beryllium, mine	60	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	NA	NA
				Chromite, marketable mine output,	610	32	4	46 <u>4/</u>	4	15 <u>4/</u>	1
				1,000 tons							
				Columbium - Tantalum mine output	40	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Copper, mine							
				output**	31,723	1,077	(1)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Ferrochromium all types, 1,000 tons	200	47	13	2 <u>4/</u>	(1)	(-)	(-)
				Gold, mine output							
				1,000 troy oz.	800	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Iron ore, marketable							
				1,000 tons	600	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Nickel, mine							
				output**	15,000	2,815	1	107 <u>4/</u>	(1)	(-)	(-)
				Silver, mine							
				output**							
				1,000 troy oz.	117	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Tin, mine							
				output**	600	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Tungsten, mine							
				output**	25	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)

Rhodesia and its relationship to the United States, European Economic Community and Japan
(All data in metric tons unless otherwise noted and for the year 1976)

GDP (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Contribution To GDP (%)	Export Total (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Exports (\$10 ⁶)	Major Mineral Item	Production Amount	Imports by U.S.	% of U.S. Consump- tion	Imports by EEC (a)	% of EEC Consump- tion (b)	Imports by Japan	% of Japan Consump- tion (c)
NONMETALS											
				Asbestos, all types	165,000	2,380	(1)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Fluorspar, mine output	200	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Lithium minerals, mine output	9,000	(-)	(-)	538 ⁴ / ₁	6	(-)	(-)
				Phosphate rock, mine output	130,000	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)

NA not available

** metal content

(1) less than 1/2 unit

(-) no imports indicated

1/ Southern Rhodesia Government Statistics.

2/ New Africa Yearbook, 1979, Facts and Figures.

(UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics)

3/ Estimate, includes coal and other minerals not listed in table.

4/ Listed as imports from Mozambique; Rhodesian origin probable.

(a) EEC in 1976 was composed of Belgium, France, Denmark, West Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and United Kingdom.

(b) Derived EEC apparent consumption = imports + domestic production less exports.

(c) Derived Japan apparent consumption = imports + domestic production + secondary recovery less exports.

U.S. Bureau of Mines
December 15, 1979

Rwanda and its relationship to the United States, European Economic Community and Japan
(All data in metric tons unless otherwise noted and for the year 1976)

GDP (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Contribution To GDP (%)	Export Total (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Exports (\$10 ⁶)	Major Mineral Item	Production Amount	Imports by U.S.	% of U.S. Consump- tion	Imports by EEC (a)	% of EEC Consump- tion (b)	Imports by Japan	% of Japan Consump- tion (c)
667 1/	1	41.7 1/	6.3	METALS							
				Beryl, mine output	46	60	5	(-)	(-)	NA	NA
				Columbite-tantalite, mine output	43.4	45	(1)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Columbium content Tantalum " "			4				
				Tin, mine output**	1,605	(-)	(-)	855	2	(-)	(-)
				Tungsten, mine output**	432	17	(1)	106	2	(-)	(-)

NA not available

** Metal content

(1) Less than 1/2 unit

(-) No imports indicated

1/ Source, International Monetary Fund, Financial Statistics, October, 1979.

(a) EEC in 1976 was composed of Belgium, France, Denmark, West Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and United Kingdom.

(b) Derived EEC apparent consumption = imports + domestic production less exports.

(c) Derived Japan apparent consumption = imports + domestic production + secondary recovery less exports.

U.S. Bureau of Mines
December 15, 1979

Sierra Leone and its relationship to the United States, European Economic Community and Japan
(All data in metric tons unless otherwise noted and for the year 1976)

GDP (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Contribution To GDP (%)	Export Total (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Exports (\$10 ⁶)	Major Mineral Item	Production Amount	Imports by U.S.	% of U.S. Consump- tion	Imports by EEC (a)	% of EEC Consump- tion (b)	Imports by Japan	% of Japan Consump- tion (c)
650 1/	9	93	61 2/	<u>METALS</u>							
				Bauxite	660,000	48,080	1	403,992	5	(-)	(-)
				ore, salable							
				Iron ore,		(-)	(-)	73,059	(1)	(-)	(-)
				marketable	0						
<u>NONMETALS</u>											
				Diamond,	1,000 carats						
				Gem	560	NA 3/	NA	NA 3/	NA	NA 3/	NA
				Industrial	840	NA 3/	NA	NA 3/	NA	NA 3/	NA

NA not available

(1) less than 1/2 unit

(-) No imports indicated

1/ Source, State Department Statistics.

2/ Includes export value for petroleum products.

3/ All diamonds are re-exported via Belgium, Israel, and the United Kingdom to the United States, Western Europe, and Japan.
Contribution to imports is unknown.

(a) EEC in 1976 was composed of Belgium, France, Denmark, West Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and United Kingdom.

(b) Derived EEC apparent consumption = imports + domestic production less exports

(c) Derived Japan apparent consumption = imports + domestic production + secondary recovery less exports.

U.S. Bureau of Mines
December 15, 1979

Sudan and its relationship to the United States, European Economic Community and Japan
(All data in metric tons unless otherwise noted and for the year 1976)

GDP (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Contribution To GDP (%)	Export Total (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Exports (\$10 ⁶)	Major Mineral Item	Production Amount	Imports by U.S.	% of U.S. Consump- tion	Imports by EEC (a)	% of EEC Consump- tion (b)	Imports by Japan	% of Japan Consump- tion (c)
5,102 1/	(1)	555 2/	33 3/	<u>METALS</u>							
				Chromite,							
				marketable, mine							
				output, 1,000							
				tons	25,000	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	NA 4/	(-)
				Gold, troy oz.	300	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)

NA not available

(-) No imports indicated

(1) Less than 1/2 unit

1/ Source, World Bank Statistics.

2/ Source, International Monetary Fund, Financial Statistics, October, 1979.

3/ Includes export values for petroleum products, cement, chrome and salt.

4/ Probably exported to People's Republic of China and Japan.

(a) EEC in 1976 was composed of Belgium, France, Denmark, West Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and United Kingdom.

(b) Derived EEC apparent consumption = imports + domestic production less exports.

(c) Derived Japan apparent consumption = imports + domestic production + secondary recovery less exports.

U.S. Bureau of Mines
December 15, 1979

Swaziland and its relationship to the United States, European Economic Community and Japan
(All data in metric tons unless otherwise noted and for the year 1976)

GDP (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Contribution To GDP (%)	Export Total (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Exports (\$10 ⁶)	Major Mineral Production Item	Amount	Imports by U.S.	% of U.S. Consumption	Imports by EEC (a)	% of EEC Consumption (b)	Imports by Japan	% of Japan Consumption (c)
240 1/	12 2/	207 3/	29 2/	<u>METALS</u>							
				Iron ore, marketable							
				1,000 tons	1,936	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	1,518	1
				Tin, mine output**	2	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				<u>NONMETALS</u>							
				Asbestos, all types	41,847 4/	(-)	(-)	20,096	2	(-)	(-)
				Barite	200	18	(1)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)

** Metal content

(1) Less than 1/2 unit

(-) No Imports Indicated

1/ World Bank Statistics.

2/ Includes value for coal.

3/ Source, National Basic Intelligence FACTBOOK, July 1979.

4/ Exports.

(a) EEC in 1976 was composed of Belgium, France, Denmark, West Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and United Kingdom.

(b) Derived EEC apparent consumption = imports + domestic production less exports.

(c) Derived Japan apparent consumption = imports + domestic production + secondary recovery less exports.

U.S. Bureau of Mines
December 15, 1979

South-West Africa and its relationship to the United States, European Economic Community and Japan
(All data in metric tons unless otherwise noted and for the year 1976)

GDP (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Contribution To GDP (%)	Export Total (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Exports (\$10 ⁶)	Major Mineral Item	Production Amount	Imports by U.S.	% of U.S. Consump- tion	Imports by EEC (a)	% of EEC Consump- tion (b)	Imports by Japan	% of Japan Consump- tion (c)
887 e/	44 1/	650 2/	390 1/	METALS							
				Arsenic, As ₂ O ₃ white	6,984	(-)	(-)	3,339	41	(-)	(-)
				Cadmium, smelter output	83	(-)	(-)	71	1	(-)	(-)
				Copper, mine output**	36,000	2,287	(1)	28,100 e/	1	4,693	(1)
				Lead, mine output**	42,200	(-)	(-)	8,140	1	198	1
				Silver, mine 1,000 troy output** oz.	1,400	134	(1)	1,266 e/	2	(-)	(-)
				Tin, mine output**	800	(-)	(-)	800 e/	1	(-)	(-)
				Tungsten, mine output**	140	(-)	(-)	140 e/	3	(-)	(-)
				Vanadium, mine output**	700	(-)	(-)	NA	NA	NA	NA
				Zinc, mine output**	41,308	(-)	(-)	41,308 e/	3	(-)	(-)
				NONMETALS							
				Diamond, 1,000 carats Gem	1,609	NA 2/	NA	NA 2/	NA	NA 2/	NA
				Industrial Lithium minerals, mine output	85	7	(1)	NA 2/	NA	NA 2/	NA
e/	Estimate based on partial reports.					(-)	(-)	5,915	70	(-)	(-)
NA	Not available										
(-)	No imports indicated										
**	Metal content										
(1)	Less than 1/2 unit										

1/ Includes value for uranium.

2/ All diamonds are re-exported via South Africa, Belgium, Israel, and the United Kingdom to the United States, Western Europe, and Japan.
Contribution to imports is unknown.

(a) EEC in 1976 was composed of Belgium, France, Denmark, West Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and United Kingdom.

(b) Derived EEC apparent consumption = imports + domestic production less exports.

(c) Derived Japan apparent consumption = imports + secondary recovery less exports.

Tunisia and its relationship to the United States, European Economic Community and Japan
(All data in metric tons unless otherwise noted and for the year 1976)

GDP (\$106)	Mineral Contribution To GDP (%)	Export Total (\$106)	Mineral Exports (\$106)	Major Mineral Production Item	Imports by U.S.	% of U.S. Consumption	Imports by EEC (a)	% of EEC Consumption (b)	Imports by Japan	% of Japan Consumption (c)
4,440 <u>1/</u>	7%	788 <u>2/</u>	417 <u>3/</u>	NONMETALS Fluorspar, mine output	(-)	(-)	8,200	1	(-)	(-)
				Phosphate rock, mine output	(-)	(-)	559	4	(-)	(-)
				1,000 tons	(-)	(-)				

(-) No imports indicated

1/ Source, World Bank Statistics.

2/ Source, International Monetary Fund, Financial Statistics, October, 1979.

3/ Includes export values for petroleum and phosphate rock.

(a) EEC in 1976 was composed of Belgium, France, Denmark, West Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and United Kingdom.

(b) Derived EEC apparent consumption = imports + domestic production less exports.

(c) Derived Japan apparent consumption = imports + domestic production + secondary recovery less exports.

U.S. Bureau of Mines
December 15, 1979

Zaire and its relationship to the United States, European Economic Community and Japan
(All data in metric tons unless otherwise noted and for the year 1976)

GDP (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Contribution To GDP (%)	Export Total (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Exports (\$10 ⁶)	Major Mineral Item	Production Amount	Imports by U.S.	% of U.S. Consump- tion	Imports by EEC (a)	% of EEC Consump- tion (b)	Imports by Japan	% of Japan Consump- tion (c)
3,580 $\frac{1}{2}$	23 $\frac{e}{2}$	926 $\frac{1}{2}$	900 $\frac{e}{2}$	METALS							
				Cadmium, smelter output	260	60	1	75	3	(-)	(-)
				Cobalt, mine output**	11,000	3,076 $\frac{3}{4}$	34	1,257	52	2,658	69
				Columbite-tantalum, mine output	79	77	4	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Copper, mine output**	444,610	2,342	(1)	405,306	21	37,107	4
				Germanium, refinery output	23	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				Gold, mine output 1,000 troy oz.	103	NA $\frac{4}{1}$	(-)	257	1	(-)	(-)
				Manganese ore, marketable 1,000 tons	157	5.6 $\frac{5}{1}$	(1)	139	5	0.8	(1)
				Rare earths, monazite concentrate	240	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	NA	NA
				Silver, mine output**	2,472	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
				1,000 troy oz.		(-)	(-)				
				Tin, mine output**	3,776	(-)	(-)	3,481	6	(-)	(-)
				Tungsten, mine output**	240	3	1	120	2	15	(1)
				Zinc, mine output**	70,300	29,300	2	4,800	(1)	(-)	(-)

Zaire and its relationship to the United States, European Economic Community and Japan
(All data in metric tons unless otherwise noted and for the year 1976)

GDP (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Contribution To GDP (%)	Export Total (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Exports (\$10 ⁶)	Major Mineral Production Item	Imports by U.S.	% of U.S. Consumption	Imports by EEC (m)	% of EEC Consumption (b)	Imports by Japan	% of Japan Consumption (c)
NONMETALS										
				Diamond, 1,000 carats						
				Gem	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
				Industrial	702	2	NA	NA	NA	NA

NA not available

** Metal content

e/ Estimate based on average market values and partial reports

(1) Less than 1/2 unit

(-) No imports indicated

1/ Source, International Monetary Fund, Financial Statistics, October, 1979.

2/ Includes export values for petroleum, petroleum products, coal and cement.

3/ Direct imports only, does not include re-exports via Belgium.

4/ Gold is imported via London, Paris and Switzerland, exact contribution to U.S. is unknown.

5/ Benguela railroad closed, manganese shipments enroute delivered only.

(a) EEC in 1976 was composed of Belgium, France, Denmark, West Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and United Kingdom.

(b) Derived EEC apparent consumption = imports + domestic production less imports.

(c) Derived Japan apparent consumption = imports + domestic production + secondary recovery less exports.

U.S. Bureau of Mines
December 15, 1979

Zambia and its relationship to the United States, European Economic Community and Japan
(All data in metric tons unless otherwise noted and for the year 1976)

Mineral Contribution To GDP (%)	Export Total (\$10 ⁶)	Mineral Exports (\$10 ⁶)	Major Mineral Item	Production Amount	Imports by U.S.	% of U.S. Consump- tion	Imports by EEC (a)	% of EEC Consump- tion (b)	Imports by Japan	% of Japan Consump- tion (c)
GDP (\$10 ⁶)										
2,200 1/	35 e/	1,040	947 2/							
			METALS							
			Cadmium, smelter output	7	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
			Cobalt, mine output**	2,177	784 3/	9	625	26	482	13
			Copper, mine output**	708,507	116,119	6	297,483	15	112,955	11
			Gold, mine output	1,000 troy oz	(-)	(-)	(-) 4/	(-)	(-) 4/	(-)
			Lead, mine output**	13,500	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
			Silver, mine output**	1,000 troy oz	(-)	(-)	(-) 4/	(-)	(-) 4/	(-)
			Tin, mine output**	10	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
			Zinc, mine output**	37,194	3,307	(1)	25,773	2	(-)	(-)
			NONMETALS							
			Feldspar, marketable	469	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
			Fluorspar, mine output	3	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)

NA not available

** metal content

e/ Estimate based on partial reports

(1) less than 1/2 unit

(-) No imports indicated

1/ Source, International Monetary Fund Financial Statistics, October, 1979

2/ Includes export values for petroleum, petroleum products, coal and cement.

3/ Direct imports only, does not include re-exports via Belgium

4/ Recovered at refineries in Belgium, Sweden and Japan from copper-bearing residues.

(a) EEC in 1976 was composed of Belgium, France, Denmark, West Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and United Kingdom.

(b) Derived EEC apparent consumption = imports + domestic production less exports

(c) Derived Japan apparent consumption = imports + domestic production + secondary recovery less exports.

U.S. Bureau of Mines
December 15, 1979

[In thousand metric tons (gross weight) except percent]

Commodity and uses	1978 U.S. consumption	1978 U.S. production	1978 U.S. imports	Import dependence ¹ (percent)	Imports from Africa	Imports from Africa (percent of total)	Other major sources		U.S. stocks		Industry stocks, Dec. 31, 1978
							Goal	Inventory	Goal	Inventory	
Aluminum:											
Alumina: Aluminum, chemicals, refrac-	2 8,312	5,960	3,967	35	0	0	Australia, Jamaica, Surinam	10,462	0		3 1,424
tories, abrasives,											
Bauxite-metal grade:											
Jamaica type: Alumina			7,664	90	0	0	Jamaica, Dominican Republic,	531	9,001		8,000
Surinam type: Alumina	13,593	4 1,446	5 6,183		5 3,470	56	Haiti, Surinam, ⁵ Guyana	0	5,385		

¹ Net import reliance (imports less exports plus adjustments for stock changes) expressed as a percent of apparent consumption. Import dependence for bauxite (all grades) and alumina combined was 93 percent.

² For aluminum production only. Other uses of alumina are believed to be about 10 percent of total alumina consumption.

³ At alumina and primary aluminum plants only.

⁴ Bauxite production in Arkansas, including small quantity for nonmetal uses.

⁵ Imports of crude and dried bauxite; includes some bauxite for nonmetal uses. Imports from all sources except Jamaica, Dominican Republic, and Haiti were considered as Surinam-type bauxite.

IMPACT OF TOTAL FOREIGN CUTOFF

1. Industry stocks of alumina at the end of 1978 were equivalent to about 2 mo of consumption by the primary aluminum industry in 1978. Imports of alumina provided 40 percent of the new supply (domestic production plus imports) of alumina. (Exports took 9 percent or 878,000 M.T. of the new supply).
2. Industry stocks of bauxite were equivalent to 7 mo of consumption by domestic alumina plants, which provided 60 percent of the new supply of alumina. Stocks consist of different types of bauxite, some of which can only be used in specific alumina plants.
3. Government stocks of bauxite were equivalent to slightly over 1-yr of consumption by domestic alumina plants. Some alumina plants can only use one "type" of bauxite efficiently without major plant modification.
4. Domestic bauxite production and alumina recovery from domestic bauxite could be increased only marginally in the short term.
5. Cutoff of foreign alumina would impact shortly on aluminum smelter production because United States alumina capacity is inadequate to meet total demand of the aluminum industry. Cutoff of bauxite would have potentially greater impact but would not be felt as soon because of bauxite stocks. United States is also a net importer of aluminum metal, and cutoff of these imports would add to an aluminum shortage.
6. Africa, largely Guinea, supplies about $\frac{1}{4}$ of United States bauxite imports.

[In short tons (gross weight) except percent]

Commodity and uses	1978 U.S. consumption	1978 U.S. production	1978 U.S. imports	Import depend- ence: (percent)	Imports from Africa	Imports from Africa (percent of total)	Other major sources	U.S. stocks		Industry stocks, Dec. 31, 1978
								Goal	Inventory	
Antimony: Batteries, solder, bearings, ammunition.	3,736	1,108	4,127	79			Mainland China, Mexico, Bolivia.	20,130	40,729	1,119

1 Based on ratio of imports to production plus imports.

IMPACT OF TOTAL FOREIGN CUTOFF

1. Industry antimony stocks at 1978 consumption rates would last 3.5 mo., while the Government stockpile at the same rate of consumption would last about 11 yr. About 28 percent of the total imports of antimony oxide arrive from the Republic of South Africa. A termination of supply of oxide from the Republic of South Africa would result in a significant loss.

[In metric tons, except percent]

Commodity (subspecies) and uses	1978 U.S. consumption	1978 U.S. production	1978 U.S. imports	Import reliance (percent)	Imports from Africa		Other major sources	U.S. stocks		Industry stocks, Dec. 31, 1978
					Quantity	Percent of total		Goal	Inventory	
Asbestos (amosite): High temperature insulation (up to 480° C). Engine coverings, hot pipe insulation, marine partition board, and asbestos-cement products.	3,300	0	1,270	100	1,270	100		23,851	38,587	24

IMPACT OF TOTAL FOREIGN CUTOFF

1. Industry amosite stocks at 1978 consumption rates would last less than 1 week in all industry.
2. Government amosite stockpile inventory at 1978 consumption rates would last 10.8 yr in all industry.
3. The major industrial impact in event of amosite supply interruption from southern Africa would be on the asbestos-cement industry where roughly half of it is used. Reformulation of casting slurries could probably solve this problem.
4. Substitutes, alternate designs, and reformulation could reduce amosite demand by about $\frac{3}{4}$.

[In thousand long tons (calcined weight) except percent]

Commodity and uses	1978 U.S. consumption	1978 U.S. production	1978 U.S. imports	Import depend- ence ¹ (percent)	Imports from Africa	Imports from Africa (percent of total)	Other major sources		U.S. stocks		Industry stocks, Dec. 31, 1978
							Goal	Inventory	Goal	Inventory	
Refractory-grade bauxite: High-alumina refrac- tories.	345	290	2252	73	0	0	Guyana, Surinam, China (Main- land).	175	2,083	175	118

¹ U.S. imports as a percent of consumption.² Calcined bauxite, assumed to be all refractory grade.

IMPACT OF TOTAL FOREIGN CUTOFF

1. Government refractory-grade bauxite stockpile was equivalent to 6 mo of consumption at the rate used in 1978.
2. Industry stocks at the end of 1978 were equivalent to 4 mo of supply at the 1978 rate of consumption. However, by the end of August 1979, industry stocks were believed to have been reduced about 1/3 of the 1978 year-end level because of interruptions in shipments from Guyana.
3. Total foreign cutoff of bauxite for high-alumina refractories would impact on production in other industries, such as steel, aluminum, and glass, because of the need for these refractories in furnace linings, ladles, etc.

4. Strikes and other bauxite production difficulties in Guyana in 1979 resulted in a severe world-wide shortage of refractory-grade bauxite. U.S. refractory manufacturers inquired about the release of bauxite from Government stockpiles to alleviate the shortage.
5. Guyana provided 87 percent of the U.S. imports in 1978. Adequate supplies of comparable bauxite have not been available from alternate foreign sources. U.S. bauxite is usually lower in alumina than Guyana bauxite, and reserves are limited.

[In short tons (gross weight) except percent]

Commodity and uses	1978 U.S. consumption	1978 U.S. production	1978 U.S. imports	Import dependence (percent)	Imports from Africa	Imports from Africa (percent of total)	Other major sources	U.S. stocks		Industry stocks, Dec. 31, 1978
								Goal	Inventory	
Beryllium: Beryl: One of the commercial ores of beryllium that is converted to beryllium hydroxide and then into beryllium oxide, beryllium metal, beryllium-copper master alloys, and other beryllium master alloys. Beryllium-copper master alloys: Alloys, electrical and electronic connectors, switches, and springs. Beryllium metal: Aerospace applications and mobile nuclear reactors.	5,685	(1)	1,035	(1)	28	3	Brazil	0	17,987	3,414
	(1)	(1)						16,710	7,387	(1)
	(1)	(1)	1				Mexico	895	229	(1)

¹ Withheld to avoid disclosing company proprietary data.

IMPACT OF TOTAL FOREIGN CUTOFF

- Any cutoff of beryl supplies from Africa or other parts of the world would have only short-term effects on the domestic beryllium industry.
- As of the middle of 1969 the United States began reducing dependence on foreign ore by commencing to process domestically mined low grade bertrandite ore in Utah. In the event of a national emergency, this plant's capacity could be increased sufficiently in 18 to 24 mo to completely eliminate the Nation's requirement for imported beryl from any part of the world. African beryl imports in 1978 were very small and can be expected to remain small or to phase out in the near future. Complete cutoff of world beryl supplies to the United States would only cause the domestic industry to rapidly expand its bertrandite mining and processing facilities to replace imported beryl.

- Current U.S. Government stocks of beryllium master alloy and beryllium metal do not meet present master alloy and metal goals. Available stockpiled beryl can be used to offset some of the shortfall of master alloy and metal. During an emergency period consumer stocks of raw beryllium mineral concentrates, master alloy and metal will be an additional source. There is only one known vertically integrated company in the free world (located in the United States) that processes commercial beryllium concentrates (beryl and bertrandite) to beryllium hydroxide, oxide, metal, master and other alloys. On Oct. 15, 1977, this company announced plans to add 25 percent to its plant capacity to extract beryllium from bertrandite ore. One other domestic company converts beryllium hydroxide to master alloy. As of Oct. 1, 1979, this company ceased production of beryllium metal.
- The U.S. Government is currently considering a new set of health standards for the beryllium industry. The effect of these standards on the industry if implemented is not known.

[In thousand pounds (gross weight) except percent]

Commodity and uses	1978 U.S. consumption	1978 U.S. production	1978 U.S. imports	1978 import dependence ¹ (percent)	1978 imports from Africa	1978 imports from Africa (percent of total)	U.S. stocks		Industry stocks, Dec. 31, 1978
							Goal	Inventory	
						Other major sources			
Bismuth: Pharmaceutical, metallurgical additives, fusible alloys.	2,512	(2)	2,658	106		Mexico, Peru, Japan.	771	2,081	782

¹ Ratio of imports to consumption.² Withheld to avoid disclosing company proprietary data.

IMPACT OF TOTAL FOREIGN CUTOFF

1. The United States depends almost entirely on foreign bismuth. The total industry and Government stocks of bismuth would last 1.1 yr at 1978 consumption rates. A portion of bismuth usage is defense related. A good portion of pharmaceutical uses could be substituted for in the event of a total cutoff.

[In thousand pounds (gross weight) except percent]

Commodity and uses	1978 U.S. consumption	1978 U.S. production	1978 U.S. imports	Import dependence ¹ (percent)	Imports from Africa	Imports from Africa (percent of total)	U.S. stocks		Industry stocks, Dec. 31, 1978
							Goal	Inventory	
						Other major sources			
Cadmium: Electroplating, pigments, plastics, batteries, alloys.	9,852	3,644	6,352	64	99	1.6 Canada, Mexico	24,701	6,329	5,093

¹ Based on ratio of imports to consumption.

IMPACT OF TOTAL FOREIGN CUTOFF

1. At the 1978 rate of U.S. consumption, domestically produced cadmium, plus industrial stocks and Government stockpile inventories, would last about 2.2 yr. Substitution by zinc, aluminum, tin, iron, and certain organic coatings for some established applications for cadmium may serve to extend the period of self-sufficiency.

[In thousand short tons (gross weight); except percent]

Commodity: Subspecies	Uses	1978 U.S. consumption	1978 U.S. production	1978 U.S. imports	Import dependence (percent)	Imports from Africa	Imports from Africa (percent of total)	U.S. stocks		Industry stocks, Dec. 31, 1978
								Goal	Inventory	
Other major sources										
Chromium:										
Chromite:										
Metallurgical	Ferrochromium manufacture: Specialty steels.	1 534	0	443	100	118	27	2 550	2 488	755.0
Chemical	Chromium chemicals: Plating, pigments, paints.	239	9	336	100	336	100	734	242	361.0
Refractory	Chromite refractory: Metallurgical furnace linings.	237	0	234	100	36	15	642	391	184.0
Ferrochromium:										
High-carbon	Specialty steels (stainless, high-temperature, high-strength, and corrosion resistant): Aircraft, powerplants, chemical equipment.	385	2 161	308	3 66	257	84	236	403	96.0
Low-carbon		60	2 17	16	3 49	0.1	1	124	319	12.0
Silicon		41	2 24	0.6	3 2	0.6	100	69	58	17.0
European Community.										
Chromium metal	Superalloys, high performance alloys: Aircraft engines, nuclear reactors.	5	W	4	4 71			10	4	.8
United Kingdom, Japan.										

1 Chromite used to make those items in (²).

2 Based on ratio of imports to production plus imports.

4 Based on ratio of imports to consumption.

IMPACT OF TOTAL FOREIGN CUTOFF

1. Industry chromite stocks at 1978 consumption rates would last 1.4 yr in the metallurgical industry; 1.5 yr in the chemical industry, and 0.8 yr in the refractory industry. However, stocks are not equally divided among consumers.
2. Government chromite stockpile inventory at 1978 consumption rates would last 4.7 yr in the metallurgical industry; 1 yr in the chemical industry, and 1.7 yr in the refractory industry.
3. Industry chromium alloys at 1978 consumption rates would last as follows: High-carbon ferrochromium, 3 mo; low-carbon ferrochromium, 2 mo; ferrochromium-silicon, 5 mo; and chromium metal, 2 mo.
4. Government chromium alloys stockpile inventories at 1978 consumption rates would last as follows: High-carbon ferrochromium, 1 yr; low-carbon ferrochromium, 5.4 yr; ferrochromium-silicon, 1.4 yr; and chromium metal, 0.7 yr.

5. The major impact on chromium in event of supply interruption from southern Africa would be on imports of ferrochromium for metallurgical use and chromite for production of chromium chemicals. The chemical industry exclusively uses South African chromite. To use other chromite from other countries would require extensive research, loss of capacity, and add to costs. Replacement of ferrochromium imports from South Africa would be difficult. The 308,000 tons of high-carbon ferrochromium imports from South Africa represents 770,000 tons of chromite. Although other world chromite producing countries could partially offset this loss, there would be a lack of world smelter capacity to process the material.

6. Smelter capacity in the United States is insufficient to process chromite in Government stockpiles. Although some ferroalloy furnaces could be diverted from manganese and silicon supply, problems would then be diverted to manganese and silicon supply.

7. Substitutes and alternate designs could reduce chromium demand by about 1/3.

[In thousand pounds (contained weight), except percent]

Commodity: Subspecies Uses	1978 U.S. consumption	1978 U.S. production	1978 U.S. imports	1978 import dependence (percent)	1978 imports from Africa	1978 other major sources	U.S. stocks, Dec. 31, 1987		Industry stocks, Dec. 31, 1978
							Goal	Inventory	
Cobalt: None	20, 364	None	19, 029	95	15, 058	79 Canada, Finland	85, 415	40, 802	6, 019
As a binder in cemented carbide cutting tools for metal cutting and mining. In superalloys used in the hottest sections of industrial and aircraft gas turbine engines. Tool steels and hardfacing of metal parts subject to abrasion such as valve seats. Permanent magnets in electric motors, telephones, loudspeakers, meters and a variety of electrical applications. Nonmetallic applications such as catalysts to remove sulfur from petroleum distillates, and driers in paints.									

IMPACT OF TOTAL FOREIGN CUTOFF

1. Industry cobalt stocks at 1978 consumption rates would last about 4 mo.
2. Government stock inventory at 1978 consumption rates would last about 2 yr.
3. In the event of supply interruption from southern Africa, lasting 3 mo or more, key metal cutting and high temperature alloy industries would be severely affected. Prices would escalate, and it is likely that the Government would have to impose a general allocation and export controls prior to releasing cobalt from the national stockpile to alleviate the situation. Under peacetime conditions in this situation, assuming cobalt were allocated only to defense and essential civilian applications, the Government stocks would last at least 5 yr; if cobalt were still available from sources outside of southern Africa. If there were a total cutoff from all foreign sources, the Government stocks would last at least 3 yr. Substitution and recycling would stretch these time periods further.
4. Recycling could account for no more than about 15 percent of demand because of dissipation in most end uses.
5. Substitution could reduce demand by as much as 25 percent under very high price conditions.

1978—U.S. DATA
[1,000 lb contained columbium unless otherwise specified]

Commodity (Item): Uses	Consump- tion	Produc- tion	Imports	Import dependence (percent)	Imports from Africa		Other major sources		Government stocks Dec. 31		Industry stocks, Dec. 31
					Quantity	Percent of total			Goal	Inventory	
Columbium (Concentrates): Manufacture of columbium ferroalloys, master alloys, and metal; Carbon and alloy steels (automobiles, oil and gas pipelines, construction), superalloys (jet engines), superconductors (power generation and transmission).	12,673	0	12,418	100	2,688	28	Brazil, Canada, Thailand	1	3,131	2,954	13,440

¹ Includes tin slag, synthetic concentrates, and other low-grade materials.

² About 90 percent from Nigeria.

³ Includes nonstockpile-grade material and offsets due to surplus columbium carbide powder, ferrocolumbium, and columbium metal credited to concentrates.

IMPACT OF TOTAL FOREIGN CUTOFF

1. Industry stocks of columbium concentrates and related raw materials would last 1.3 yr at the 1978 consumption rate.
2. Government stockpile inventories of columbium concentrates and other columbium materials are equivalent under the offset concept to 1.1 yr of consumption of concentrates at the 1978 rate.
3. A total foreign cutoff would cause complete loss of all columbium raw materials. Negligible quantities of columbium are available for recycling. While the loss of concentrates would have a significant effect on columbium supply, a more serious loss would be imports of ferrocolumbium from Brazil, which in 1978 contained 4,160,000 lb of columbium. Total apparent consumption of columbium in 1978 was 6,600,000 lb. In relation to total columbium demand at the 1978 level, industry stocks of all columbium materials would last 0.8 yr whereas Government stocks would last less than 0.5 yr.
4. Domestic processors have adequate capacity for upgrading columbium concentrates held in Government stockpiles to columbium oxide. However, capacity is insufficient to produce enough ferrocolumbium, either from oxide or directly from concentrates, to meet demand. On the other hand, ferrocolumbium production capacity can be relatively rapidly increased without requiring large amounts of either capital investment or energy consumption.
5. Substitutes, particularly vanadium, and alternate steelmaking practices could reduce columbium demand considerably.

[In thousand short tons, except percent]

Commodity and uses	1978 U.S. con- sumption	1978 U.S. pro- duction	1978 U.S. imports	1978 import dependence (percent)	1978 im- ports from Africa	1978 im- ports from Africa (percent of total)	U.S. stocks		Industry stocks, Dec. 31, 1978
							Goal	Inventory	

Copper: Refined: Power transmission, house wiring, motors, electrical contacts, bearings, bushings, naval fittings, pump housings, pipes and tubes, heat exchangers, household furnishings, jewelry.

21 Canada, Chile, Peru

1, 300 22 458

¹ Net import reliance (primary plus old scrap) equals imports minus exports plus adjustments for Government and industry stock changes, as a percent of apparent consumption.

IMPACT OF TOTAL FOREIGN CUTOFF

1. Identified stocks are equivalent to 16 mo of the 1978 shortfall of production compared to copper raw materials, and use of substitutes that would improve self-sufficiency in copper.

Commodity: Subspecies: Uses	1978 U.S. consump- tion ¹	1978 U.S. production	1978 U.S. imports	Import reliance (percent)	Imports from Africa	Imports from Africa (percent of total)	U.S. stocks		Industry stocks, Dec 31, 1978
							Goal	Inventory	

Diamond, industrial (in thousand carats):

Industrial diamond, stones: Machining hard alloys and refractories, wire drawing, precision cutting and finishing, drilling for mineral exploration and construction. Transportation industry, electrical industry, contract construction, mining.

Industrial diamond, crushing bort: Grinding and finishing: metals, metal alloys, refractories, optical material.

4, 247 0 7, 202 100 5, 603 88 5, 559 20, 008 (2)

28, 600 28, 676 14, 988 0 3, 505 23 Ireland 14, 974 25, 959 (2)

¹ Estimate.

² Not available.

IMPACT OF TOTAL FOREIGN CUTOFF

Stones: (1) Government stockpile inventory would last 4.7 yr at 1978 consumption rates. (2) Substitutes could reduce demand by $\frac{1}{3}$.
Crushing bort, powder and dust: (1) One U.S. company could produce quantities necessary for domestic use. (2) Government stockpile inventory would last 11 mo at 1978 consumption rates. (3) Government stockpile would have to be processed (crushed and sorted) before use.

Commodity: Subspecies: Uses	1978 U.S. consumption	1978 U.S. States and Canadian production	1978 U.S. imports	Import reliance (percent)	Imports from Africa (percent of total)	Other major sources	U.S. stocks		Industry stocks, Dec. 31, 1978
							Goal	Inventory	
Jewel bearings (data in million pieces): Jewel bearings: As bearings in mechanical and electrical instruments, watches.	33	2.5	30.7	*05	0	Switzerland	224.6	52.1	(1)

¹ Not available.

IMPACT OF TOTAL FOREIGN CUTOFF

1. Government stockpile inventories at 1978 consumption rates would last 1.6 yr.
2. *Production capacity at the Government-owned Langer plant is sufficient to supply approximately half of industries' requirements at 1978 consumption rates.

Commodity: Subspecies: Uses	1978 U.S. consumption ¹	1978 U.S. production	1978 U.S. imports	Import reliance (percent) ²	Imports from Africa (percent of total)	Other major sources	U.S. stocks		Industry stocks Dec. 31, 1979	
							Goal	Inventory	Mine	Consumer
Fluorine: (in thousand short tons): Fluorspar:										
Metallurgical grade (less than 97 percent CaF_2): Welding fluxes, ferroalloy industry, iron and steel foundries.	1,300		54		49	15 Mexico, Spain	1,914	412	3	142
Acid grade (more than 97 percent CaF_2): Manufacture of hydrofluoric acid, fluorocarbons, and refrigerants			75	82	183	31 Mexico, Italy, Spain	1,594	896	1	59
From hydrofluoric acid: Fluorocarbons and other chemicals.	616	(3)	4124		0	0 Canada, Mexico, United Kingdom				
From cryolite: Manufacture of aluminum.	(3)	(3)	424		0	0 Denmark, Japan				

¹ Apparent consumption (production plus imports minus exports plus or minus stock changes).

² Based on apparent consumption

³ Not available.

⁴ Fluorspar equivalent.

IMPACT OF TOTAL FOREIGN CUTOFF

1. The U.S. production of fluorspar in 1978 represented 18 percent of total domestic consumption of fluorspar equivalents in all forms. The reliance of foreign imports amounted to 82 percent, 31 percent of which came from Africa.
2. Industry stocks, both at mine and consumers, of metallurgical grade fluorspar would last 3 mo at the 1978 reported consumption level of 565,000 tons. Government stocks would last about 9 mo.
3. Total mine and consumer stocks of acid grade fluorspar would be depleted in 1 mo. Government stocks would last about 17 mo at the 1978 reported consumption level of acid grade material of 639,000 tons.
4. Africa produces about 12 percent of the world's fluorine from fluorspar. It is the 2d largest source of U.S. imports of fluorspar.

Commodity: Subspecies: Uses	1978 U.S. con- sumption ¹	1978 U.S. pro- duction ¹	1978 U.S. imports ¹	Import reliance (percent)	Imports from Africa		U.S. stocks ¹		Industry stocks, ¹ Dec. 31 1978
					Quantity ¹	Percent of total	Goal	Inventory	
Graphite: Malagasy crystalline flake: Crucibles, retorts, rocket nozzles, stoppers.	4	0	4	100	4	100	20	18	(²)

¹ Thousand short tons.² Not available.

IMPACT OF TOTAL FOREIGN CUTOFF

1. Industry stocks of crystalline flake graphite remain very low because of continuing short supply. It can be assumed that the stocks would last less than 3 mo after cutoff.

2. Government stockpile inventory of Malagasy crystalline flake graphite would last 4.5 yr in industry.

3. The major impact on industry in event of supply interruption from southern Africa would be on

metallurgical uses in the nonferrous metals industry for crucibles and retorts and in the ferrous metals industry for stoppers.

4. Substitutes and alternate designs have reduced demand to about the minimum now. Synthetic graphite is presently used to the maximum extent.

Commodity: Subspecies; uses	1978 U.S. con- sumption	1978 U.S. pro- duction	1978 U.S. imports	Import reliance (percent)	Imports from Africa	Imports from Africa (percent of total)	Other major sources	U.S. stocks		Industry stocks, Dec. 31, 1978
								Goal	Inventory	
Iodine (in thousand pounds): Crude iodine:										
Catalysts.....	1,700		6,837	384	None	0	Japan, Chile.....	3,333	8,010	(2)
Animal feed additives.....	1,700									
Inks and colorants.....	1,300									
Stabilizers.....	1,100									
Pharmaceuticals.....	1,000									
Sanitary and industrial disinfectants.....	600									
Photographic film.....	300									
Other.....	400									
Total.....	48,100									

¹ Estimate.

² Withheld to avoid disclosing individual company proprietary data.

³ Based on ratio of imports to apparent consumption.

⁴ Apparent consumption based on U.S. production, imports, exports, and changes in industry stocks.

IMPACT OF TOTAL FOREIGN CUTOFF

1. Industry iodine stocks would last less than 6 mo., if consumed at the 1978 rate.
2. Government iodine stockpile inventory would last about 1 yr. if consumed at the 1978 rate.
3. Since there is no supply of iodine from southern Africa there would be no effect on the U.S. iodine industry; however, interruption of supplies from Japan and Chile would be very serious.
4. U.S. Chemical processing capacity is sufficient to convert iodine in the Government stockpile into usable chemical products.
5. Bromine, chlorine, mercurochrome, antibiotics, and other disinfectants and germicidal medications could substitute for iodine in some sanitation and pharmaceutical uses, thereby reducing demand about 10 percent.

[In troy ounces, except percent]

Commodity and uses	1978 U.S. con- sumption ¹	1978 U.S. pro- duction ²	1978 U.S. imports ³	1978 import dependence ³ (percent) ⁴	1978 im- ports from Africa	1978 im- ports from Africa (percent of total)	Other major sources	U.S. stocks		Industry stocks, Dec. 31, 1978 ⁵
								Goal	Inventory	
Iridium: Crucibles for growth of single crystals of high-melting compounds (lasers, gem stones, bubble memory devices); alloying metal for chemical and petroleum catalysts, electrical contacts, and jewelry; catalyst for emergency power unit in aircraft.	16, 839	1, 565	35, 936	692	26, 903	75	United Kingdom ⁷	97, 761	16, 990	16, 264

¹ Sales to industry.² All secondary production; does not include 6,599 oz toll refined.³ Does not include an estimated 10,350 troy oz contained in osmium, unspecific metals, ores concentrates, and scrap.⁴ Import dependence equals imports minus exports plus adjustments for Government and industry

IMPACT OF TOTAL FOREIGN CUTOFF

1. Industry stocks at 1978 consumption rates would last about 1 yr; with Government stocks included, would be sufficient for about 2 yr.
2. A cutoff of imports from southern Africa would not be serious in the near term.
3. Substitution might reduce iridium demand by up to 50 percent; however, the substituting material

stock changes and domestic production, as percent of apparent consumption.

⁵ Stocks held by refiners, importers and dealers; user stocks not available.⁶ Iridium exports are unspecified in trade data; iridium exports, used in dependence calculation, were estimated to be 10,700 oz.⁷ Does not mine iridium but is a significant processor of platinum-group metal concentrates from South Africa and Canada.

would, in most cases, be one of the other platinum-group metals.

4. U.S. mine production is insignificant; a crash program to develop U.S. iridium resources might provide up to 10 percent of the 1978 consumption rate in 2-3 yr.

[In thousand short tons (gross weight) except percent]

Commodity and uses	1978 U.S. consumption	1978 U.S. production	1978 U.S. imports ¹	Import depend- ence ² (percent)	Imports from Africa	Imports from Africa (percent of total)	U.S. stocks		Industry stocks, Dec. 31, 1978
							Goal	Inventory	
Lead: ³ Electric storage batteries, gasoline antiknock fluids.	1, 313	856	248	19	7	3 Mexico, Canada.....	865	601	247

¹ Metal imports, for consumption.² Based on ratio of imports to consumption.³ Refined metal.

IMPACT OF TOTAL FOREIGN CUTOFF

1. The expected impact of total foreign supply cutoff would probably stimulate increased domestic production and foster substitution where known alternates have been or are in the process of being developed.

1978—U.S. DATA

[1,000 short tons, gross weight, unless otherwise specified]

Commodity: Subspecies: Uses	Consumption	Production	Imports	Import dependence (percent)	Imports from Africa		Other major sources	Government stocks, Dec. 31		Industry stocks, Dec. 31
					Quantity	percent of total		Goal	Inventory	
Manganese:										
Ore:										
Metallurgical: Manganese ferroalloy and metal manufacture: Iron and steel; aluminum.	1 832						(Brazil, Australia, Mexico)	2, 052	2, 390	903
Chemical: Manganese chemicals and as oxidizing agent: Various.	2 31	0	457	100	317	57	do.	247	217	2 45
Natural battery: Dry-cell batteries: Flashlights, power packs, etc.	35						(Mexico)	13	208	138
Synthetic manganese dioxide: Dry-cell batteries: Flashlights, power packs, etc.	4 28	22	6	4 21	0	0	Japan, Belgium, Greece, Ireland.	19	3	(*)
Ferro-manganese: Iron and steel: Various: High-carbon.	832	7 184	644	5 77	294	46	France, Mexico, Norway, Portugal.	439	609	196
Medium- and low-carbon.	154	7 107	36	5 23	9	25	France, Spain, Norway.	99	29	41
Silicomanganese: Iron and steel: Various.	164	8 142	93	5 57	3	3	Norway, Yugoslavia, Brazil.	81	24	41
Manganese metal: Steel, aluminum, manganese-copper alloys, chemicals: Various.	28	7 23	9	5 32	8	89	Japan.	15	14	7

¹ Manganese ore used to make ferromanganese, silicomanganese, and metal.² Estimates of ore not of national stockpile chemical-grade specifications, but used for same purposes.³ Gabon is the major source. Quantities are not available.⁴ Estimate.⁵ Ratio of imports to consumption.⁶ Not available.⁷ Gross production.⁸ Net production.

IMPACT OF TOTAL FOREIGN CUTOFF

1. Industry manganese ore stocks at 1978 consumption rates would last 1.1 yr for metallurgical-grade ore; 1.5 yr for chemical-grade ore; and almost 4 yr for natural battery ore. Industry stock data for synthetic dioxide are not available.
2. Government manganese ore stockpiles inventory at 1978 consumption rates would last 2.9 yr for metallurgical-grade ore; 7 yr for chemical-grade ore; and 6 yr for natural battery ore. Government synthetic dioxide inventory would last about 1 mo.
3. Industry stocks of manganese alloys at 1978 consumption rates would last as follows: High-carbon ferromanganese, less than 3 mo; medium- and low-carbon ferromanganese, about 3 mo; silicomanganese, 3 mo; and manganese metal, 3 mo.
4. Government manganese alloys stockpile inventories at 1978 consumption rates would last as follows: High-carbon ferromanganese, about 9 mo; medium- and low-carbon ferromanganese,

about 2 mo; silicomanganese, less than 2 mo; and metal, 6 mo.

5. Imports of high-carbon ferromanganese in 1978 were 77 percent of consumption and almost half (46 percent) were from the Republic of South Africa. France supplied 12 percent of the high-carbon imports. In 1974, the last year for which data are at hand, half of France's imported ore came from Gabon and 40 percent from the Republic of South Africa, both traditional suppliers to that country.

6. The ferromanganese imports into the United States have made it difficult for domestic producers to compete, with the result that production has fallen drastically and capacity to convert ore to ferroalloy appears to be in the process of drastic reduction.

7. There is no satisfactory substitute for manganese in its major uses.

Commodity and uses	1978 U.S. consumption (flasks) ¹	1978 U.S. production (flasks)	1978 U.S. imports (flasks)	1978 import dependence ² (percent)	1978 imports from Africa (flasks)	1978 imports from Africa (percent of total)	1978 U.S. stocks		Industry stocks, Dec. 31, 1978 (flasks)
							Goal (flasks)	Inventory (flasks)	
Mercury: Chlorine-caustic soda preparation, batteries, mildew-proofing paint, measuring and control devices, wiring devices and switches etc.	48,766	27,725	43,148	64	8,752	20	54,004	191,391	38,749
						Other major sources			
						Spain, Italy, Mainland China, Japan, Turkey, Mexico.			

¹ A flask contains 76 lb of mercury.

² Net import reliance as a percent of apparent consumption.

IMPACT OF TOTAL FOREIGN CUTOFF

1. U.S. industry stocks of mercury would last 10 mo at current rate of consumption.
2. Mercury in U.S. strategic stockpile would last about 4 yr at current rate of consumption.
3. U.S. primary production would be increased to fulfill current U.S. demand.
4. Secondary production would increase moderately.
5. Large low-grade resources would have to be exploited eventually.

(In thousand short tons (contained), except percent)

Commodity: Subspecies: Uses	1978 U.S. consumption	1978 U.S. production	1978 import dependence (percent)	1978 imports from Africa	1978 imports from Africa (percent of total)	1978 other major sources	U.S. stocks, Dec. 31, 1978		Industry stocks, Dec. 31, 1978 ²
							Goals ¹	Inventory	
Nickel: Nickel, pure form (cathode, briquets, pellets, powder): All applications (super-alloys, copper-base alloys, plating, steels): Gas turbines, powerplants, heat exchangers, industrial furnaces. Ferro-nickel (iron, 25-48 percent nickel): Iron-base alloys (stainless steels, alloy steels, cast irons): Nuclear and fossil powerplants, chemical plants, oil refineries, automotive, consumer products.	121	3 26	167	100	27	16 Canada, Norway, Australia, Philippines.	204.3	None	104
	58	11	26	81	0	0 New Caledonia, Dominican Republic, Japan.	None	None	26

¹ Product forms and relative quantities not decided to date.² Industry stocks abnormally high: 20,000 tons lower end of 1979.³ Refined in United States from imported matte (intermediate) materials.⁴ Includes nickel oxide, alternate form for steelmaking.

IMPACT OF TOTAL FOREIGN CUTOFF

1. Industry stocks would last about 8 mo.

2. No current Government stockpile; immediate Government allocation system necessary.

3. Nickel restricted essentially to defense material; U.S. nickel production restricted to steel applications.

4. Elimination of nickel for consumer products; construction (30-percent reduction).

5. Serious restraints on powerplants: civilian aviation, heavy earthmoving and mining equipment,

transportation equipment; chemical and oil refining and oil and gas drilling.

6. Major costly substitution testing and research and development programs required.

7. 3 to 4 yr required to construct U.S. plants to produce perhaps 50,000 tons per year of high-cost nickel from low-grade resources.

8. Cutoff of imports from Africa—minimal effect; alternate matte sources in Australia, Indonesia, Guatemala, New Caledonia, Indonesia.

[In thousand troy ounces, except percent]

Commodity and uses	1978 U.S. consumption ¹	1978 U.S. production ²	1978 U.S. imports ³	1978 import dependence ⁴ (percent)	1978 imports from Africa	1978 imports from Africa (percent of total)	Other major sources		U.S. stocks		Industry stocks, ⁵ Dec. 31, 1978
							Goal	Inventory	Goal	Inventory	
Palladium: Automobile emission catalysts, petroleum processing, chemical catalysts, electrical/electronic contacts and circuits, dental and medical uses, jewelry.	918	174	1,224	85	499	41	U.S.S.R.	2,450	1,255		370

¹ Sales to industry.² Includes 7,222 oz primary production and 166,371 oz secondary; does not include 344,022 oz toll refined.³ Does not include an estimated 134,000 oz contained in unspecified metal, ores, concentrates, and scrap.⁴ Import reliance equals imports minus exports divided by adjustments for Government and industry stock changes and production, as percentage of consumption (sales).⁵ Importers, dealers, and refiners; does not include user stocks which are not available.⁶ Includes 2,215 troy oz nonstockpile grade palladium.

IMPACT OF TOTAL IMPORT CUTOFF

1. Industry stocks at 1978 consumption rates would last about 4 mo and, if Government stocks are included, they would be sufficient for about 1.8 yr.

2. Improved availability and extension of stocks could be attained by recovering palladium from spent automobile emission catalysts, by more frequent toll refining in the petroleum and chemical industries and by substitution in the dental and electrical industries.

3. A cutoff of palladium imports from southern Africa would not be too serious if the U.S.S.R., producer of about $\frac{2}{3}$ of the world's palladium output, could be counted on to provide U.S. requirements.

4. U.S. mine production cannot be significantly increased in the short term; a crash program to develop domestic resources might provide up to 75 percent of the 1978 consumption rate in 2-3 yr.

[In thousand troy ounces, except percent]

Commodity and uses	1978 U.S. consumption ¹	1978 U.S. production ²	1978 U.S. imports ³	1978 import dependence ⁴ (percent)	1978 imports from Africa	1978 imports from Africa (percent of total)	Other major sources		U.S. stocks		Industry stocks, ⁵ Dec. 31, 1978
									Goal ⁶	Inventory	
Platinum: Automotive emissions catalysts, petroleum and chemical catalysts, fibre glasser manufacture, electrical wire and contacts, thermocouple devices, laboratory ware, jewelry, dental and medical uses, cancer drugs, fuel cell electrodes.	1,196	77	1,174	95	946	81	United Kingdom, ⁷ U.S.S.R.-----		1,314	7,453	369

¹ Sales to industry.² Comprised of 1,081 troy oz from mine production and 75,585 troy oz from secondary sources; does not include 631,000 troy oz toll refined in 1978.³ Does not include an estimated 149,000 troy oz imported in scrap, ores and unspecified combinations.⁴ Net import dependence equals imports minus exports plus adjustments for Government and industry stock changes and U.S. production; as percent of consumption (sales).⁵ Stocks held by refiners, importers, and dealers; user stocks not available.⁶ Does not mine platinum but is a large processor of platinum-group metal concentrates from South Africa and Canada.⁷ Includes 13,043 troy oz nonstockpile grade platinum.

IMPACT OF TOTAL FOREIGN CUTOFF

1. Industry stocks at 1978 consumption rates would last about 4 mo and, if Government stocks are included, they would be sufficient for about 8 mo.

2. Improved availability and extension of stocks could be attained by recovering platinum from spent automobile emission catalysts by more frequent toll-refining in the glass, chemical, and petroleum industries and by conservation and substitution in jewelry, dental and some electrical applications. If platinum became scarce, priorities could also be rearranged to insure additional supplies to essential industries; for example, automobile emission standards could be relaxed. Platinum sales for this use in 1978 accounted for 50 percent of total U.S. sales.

3. A cutoff of platinum imports from southern Africa could be serious because South Africa produces $\frac{2}{3}$ of the world's platinum and is the only country that can significantly increase production in near and medium term. The U.S.S.R., which produces the bulk of the remaining world platinum output, has not been a reliable supplier and could at best supply only 30 percent of U.S. requirements assuming exports to its traditional markets were terminated.

4. U.S. mine production cannot be increased significantly in the short term; a crash program to develop U.S. platinum resources might provide up to 20 percent of the 1978 consumption rate in 2-3 yr.

[In thousand pounds, except percent]

Commodity: Subspecies: Uses	1978 U.S. consumption	1978 U.S. production	1978 U.S. imports	Import reliance (percent)	Imports from Africa	Imports from Africa (percent of total)	Other major sources		U.S. stocks		Industry stocks, Industry Dec. 31, 1978
									Goal	Inventory	
Quartz crystal: Natural electronic and optical grade: Electronic components and optical instruments: Crystal oscillators, filters, and resonators for elec- tronic equipment: optical prisms and windows for lasers and video equipment.	32	0	152	100	0	0	Brazil	-----	2 596	2, 689	111

¹ Figure estimated. Total shown based on an average customs value per pound from total amount of quartz crystal imported.

² Based on a 1979 goal.

IMPACT OF TOTAL FOREIGN CUTOFF

1. Industry natural electronic and optical quartz crystal stocks at the 1978 consumption level would last 3.5 yr.
2. Government natural quartz crystal stocks, based on 1978 consumption, would last 84 yr.
3. There would be no impact from a supply interruption of quartz crystal from Africa. Impact from a total foreign cutoff of stockpile grade natural quartz crystal would be minimal.
4. Substitutes such as cultured quartz crystal could reduce the demand for natural electronic and optical grade quartz crystal by 90 percent. The United States produces cultured quartz crystal; however, the United States is dependent on Brazil for shipments of feedstock (lasca) used to grow cultured quartz crystal. A prolonged supply interruption of lasca could have some serious effect on the U.S. cultured quartz industry.

[In thousand pounds, except percent]

Commodity: Subspecies: Uses	1978 U.S. consumption	1978 U.S. production	1978 U.S. imports	Import reliance (percent)	Imports from Africa	Imports from Africa (percent of total)	Other major sources	U.S. stocks		Industry stocks, Dec. 31, 1978
								Goal	Inventory	
Sheet mica:										
Muscovite:										
Block: Electrical and electronic components; gage glass; Commutator segments and V- rings for electrical motors and generators; insulators and spacers for vacuum tubes; steam boiler gages	1 218 (162)	9	273	100	2	<1	India, Brazil	2 6,188	2 5,184	1 303 (185)
Splittings: Electrical and thermal insulation for electrical appliances and apparatus; Segment plate, heater plate, molding plate, flexible plate.	5,771	0	3,812	100	0	0	do	12,631	21,655	2,774
Film: Electronic components: Capacitors	3 8 (6)	0	0	100	0	0	do	490	41,273	88.6
Phlogopite:										
Block: High-temperature insulation: Electric soldering irons, transformer insulation, various insulating washers and disks.	21	0	47	100	47	100	do	206	131	16
Splittings: Electrical and thermal insulation for electrical appliances and apparatus; Segment plate, heater plate, molding plate, flexible plate.	166	0	24	100	24	100	do	932	2,818	77

¹ Number in () indicates amount of stained or better quality contained in total.² Stained or better qualities.³ Number in () indicates amount of 1st and 2d qualities contained in total.⁴ 1st and 2d qualities.⁵ Less than 1 unit.

IMPACT OF TOTAL FOREIGN CUTOFF

- Based on 1978 consumption of stockpile quality mica, industry stocks of muscovite mica would last as follows: block, 1.1 yr; splittings, less than 1 yr; film, less than 1 yr. Industry stocks of phlogopite block and splittings would not last 1 yr at 1978 consumption rates.
- Government muscovite mica stockpile, based on 1978 consumption levels, would last as follows: block, 32 yr; splittings, 3.8 yr; film, 212 yr. Government phlogopite block stockpile inventory would last 6.2 yr, and phlogopite splittings would last 17 yr, based on 1978 consumption.

3. The major impact on the U.S. sheet mica industry in the event of a supply interruption from Africa would be on phlogopite mica. However, supply interruptions from Madagascar, the primary source of phlogopite, have occurred in the recent past with no critical problems for the U.S. sheet mica fabricating industry. Muscovite mica could substitute for phlogopite mica in some applications. A prolonged supply interruption of muscovite sheet mica, especially from India, could have serious effects on the U.S. sheet mica fabricating industry.

4. Substitutes and technology advancements could probably reduce sheet mica demand by $\frac{1}{2}$.

[Data in thousand short tons, except percent]

Commodity: Subspecies: Uses	1978 U.S. consump- tion	1978 United States and Canadian production	1978 U.S. imports	Import reliance (percent)	Imports from Africa	Imports from Africa (percent of total)	Other major sources	U.S. stocks		Industry stocks, Dec. 31, 1978
								Goal	Inventory	
Silicon carbide: Refractory: Kiln furniture, heat exchangers, preheaters, crucibles, melting tanks, abrasives: bonded wheels and shapes, coated abrasives, loose abrasives; refining agent in casting iron and steel; in steel melting; electrical: heating elements, resistors, diodes, transistors.	182	182	107	(¹)	0	0	-----	306.6	80.5	7

¹ The United States and Canadian silicon carbide industries are highly integrated with most of the production centered around Niagara Falls (New York and Ontario). Since several companies have production plants on both sides of the river, the effect of foreign cutoff would be insignificant.

Impacts of total foreign cutoff: Government stockpile inventories of silicon carbide would last approximately 5 mo at 1978 consumption rates.

1978—U.S. DATA

[In thousand pounds contained tantalum, unless otherwise specified]

Commodity: Item: Uses	Consumption	Production	Imports (percent) dependence	Imports from Africa (quantity)	Imports from (percent of total)	Other major sources		Government stocks, Dec. 31		Industry stocks, Dec. 31
						Goal	Inventory			
Tantalum:	1 1,571	0	1 1,272	138	11	Thailand, Canada, Malaysia	2 2,552	1 3,062		
Mineral: Manufacture of tantalum intermediates (fluoride, oxide): Tantalum metal and carbide.										
Carbide powder: Cemented carbides: Steel-cutting tools, wear resistant parts.	3 300	(4)	(6)	0	0	Federal Republic of Germany	889	29	(4)	
Metal: Capacitors, protective cladding, high-temperature alloys: Electronics, computers: chemical process equipment; aerospace hardware, and engines.	978	973	6 137	0	0	do	1,650	201	8 619	

1 Includes tin slag, synthetic concentrates, and other low-grade materials.

2 Includes 1,152,000 lb of nonstockpile-grade material.

3 Estimate.

4 Withheld to avoid disclosing company proprietary data.

5 Not available.

6 Includes waste and scrap.

7 Based on ratio of imports to production less net exports.

8 All forms, including scrap.

IMPACT OF TOTAL FOREIGN CUTOFF

1. Industry stocks of tantalum minerals and related raw materials would last 1.9 yr at the 1978 consumption rate.
2. Government stockpile inventories of tantalum minerals would last 1.6 yr at the 1978 consumption rate.
3. Industry stocks of tantalum carbide powder cannot be disclosed.
4. Government stockpile inventories of tantalum carbide powder would last about 1 mo at the 1978 estimated consumption rate.
5. Industry stocks of tantalum metal would last 0.6 yr at the 1978 consumption rate.
6. Government stockpile inventories of tantalum metal would last 0.2 yr at the 1978 consumption rate.
7. The major impacts of a total foreign cutoff would be complete loss of all tantalum raw materials and loss of a significant amount of tantalum carbide supply. A minor part of tantalum metal supply would be lost. Recycling has only a minor effect on available supply. However, embargo

going the quantity of tantalum exported in 1978 would have added nearly a half-year supply. No one country is dominant as a supplier of tantalum raw materials. The most important sources are Thailand, Canada, Malaysia, and, for synthetic concentrates, the Federal Republic of Germany. The Federal Republic of Germany is the only important source of upgraded forms of tantalum.

8. The United States is a processor of tantalum raw materials for its own needs as well as for export of products. Processing capacity for raw materials in Government stockpiles is adequate. Domestic companies also have the capability of supplying U.S. needs for tantalum carbide and tantalum metal, assuming raw material availability.

9. Tantalum is mainly used in capacitors, cutting tools, and chemical equipment; by substitution and redesign, its use could be reduced gradually by about 1/3.

Commodity and uses	1978 U.S. consumption (pounds ThO ₂)	1978 U.S. production (pounds)	1978 U.S. imports (pounds ThO ₂) ¹	Import dependence (percent)	Imports from Africa (pounds)	Imports from Africa (percent of total)	U.S. stocks		Industry stocks, Dec. 31, 1978 (pounds ThO ₂)
							Goal (pounds ThO ₂)	Inventory (pounds ThO ₂)	
Thorium-nitrate: Mantles for incandescent lamps; magnesium-thorium alloys; and refractories.	60,000	0	62,000	100	0	0	836,000	3,318,000	(²)

¹ Most thorium imports are in the form of ThO₂. Other forms include ThO₂ and mantles.

² Not available.

IMPACT OF TOTAL FOREIGN CUTOFF

1. A foreign cutoff of thorium nitrate would have only short-term effects because the United States has large reserves of thorium and a large quantity of thorium-bearing residues held by industry could be processed in the United States.

[In thousand long tons (gross weight) except percent]

Commodity and uses	1978 U.S. consumption	1978 U.S. production	1978 U.S. imports	1978 import dependence (percent)	1978 imports from Africa	1978 im- ports from Africa (percent of total)	U.S. stocks		Industry stocks Dec. 31, 1978
							Goal	Inventory	
Tin: Solder, tinplate, brone and brass.	61	(²)	46	75			33	200	14

¹ Ratio of imports to consumption.

² Withheld to avoid disclosing individual company proprietary.

IMPACT OF TOTAL FOREIGN CUTOFF

1. The United States depends entirely on imported primary tin, but secondary tin is a significant portion of total tin supply. The total industry and Government stocks of tin would last 3.5 yrs at 1978 consumption rates. A portion of tin usage is defense related, especially in solder.

[In short tons (gross weight) except percent]

Commodity and uses	1978 U.S. consump- tion	1978 U.S. produc- tion	1978 U.S. imports	Import depend- ence 1 (percent)	imports from Africa	im- ports from Africa (percent of total)	Other major sources	U.S. stocks		Industry stocks Dec. 31, 1978
								Goal	Inventory	
Titanium sponge: Aerospace, industrial equip- ment, steel and other alloys. Rutile: TiO ₂ pigments, ³ welding rod coatings, titanium sponge metal.	19,854 263,184	(?) (?)	1,476 289,617	11 100	5,453	-----	Japan, U.S.S.R. 2 Australia-----	131,503 173,928	32,331 39,185	2,642 165,952

¹ Import dependence (net import reliance) equals imports minus exports plus adjustments for Government and industry stock changes, as percent of consumption.

² Withheld to avoid disclosing company proprietary data.

³ Ilmenite is the major source material for this use: 910,000 tons in 1978, including high titanium slag made from ilmenite.

IMPACT OF TOTAL FOREIGN CUTOFF

1. At 1978 consumption rates, industry stocks of rutile would last 7 mo; Government stocks would last 2 mo. However, if applied only to metal production, these stocks would last 3.7 yr and 0.9 yr., respectively.
2. At 1978 consumption rates, industry stocks of titanium metal sponge would last 1.6 mo; Government stocks would last 1.6 yr.
3. A cutoff of rutile imports could be offset by increasing the use of ilmenite for TiCl₄ manufacture and/or diverting TiCl₄ from pigment to metal production.

4. To produce enough ilmenite to make up for total imports of titanium concentrates (ilmenite slag, and rutile) would require expansion of domestic ilmenite capacity by about 80 percent.
5. To use ilmenite to make TiCl₄ for those pigment and metal plants which now use rutile would require additional synthetic rutile capacity, or extensive modifications in existing chlorination plants.

[In thousand pounds contained tungsten, except percent]

Commodity: Subspecies: Uses	1978 consump- tion	1978 production	1978 imports	1978 import de- pendence ¹ (percent)	1978 imports from Africa	1978 imports from Africa (percent of total)	1978 major import sources	U.S. Government stocks, Dec. 31, 1978		U.S. industry stocks, Dec. 31, 1978
								Goal	Inventory	
Tungsten:										
Tungsten concentrate:	18,806	6,896	9,138	49	322	4	Canada, Bolivia, Thailand, China...	8,823	97,583	1,511
Ammonium paratungstate, ferrotungsten, tungsten carbide, and tungsten chemicals manufacture: Intermediate products for use in machine tools, mining and petroleum industry drill bits, construction machinery, transportation and electrical industry, armor-piercing shells.										
Direct addition to steel melts: Tool, alloy, stainless, and heat-resisting steel.										
Ammonium paratungstate: Tungsten metal powder, ferrotungsten, and tungstate chemicals.	17,572	16,062	513	3	0	0	South Korea.....	0	0	829
Ferrotungsten: Tool, alloy, stainless, and heat-resisting steel.	816	276	575	71	0	0	Austria, France.....	17,769	2,025	309
Tungsten metal powder: Tungsten carbide powder: Superalloys, cutting and heat-resisting materials, mill products.	5,972	5,410	332	6	0	0	West Germany.....	3,290	1,899	1,948
Tungsten carbide powder: Cutting and wear- and heat-resisting materials, hard-facing rods and materials, armor-piercing ordnance.	8,865	12,312	331	4	0	0	West Germany, Sweden.....	12,845	2,033	2,724
Tungsten chemicals: Pigments and dyes, petroleum catalysts, ceramics.	538	865	371	70	0	0	West Germany.....	0	0	325

¹ Ratio of imports to consumption.

IMPACT OF TOTAL FOREIGN CUTOFF

1. Industry tungsten concentrate stocks at 1978 consumption rates would last 1 mo.
2. Government tungsten concentrate stocks at 1978 consumption rates would last 63 mo.
3. The United States has the capacity to produce at the 1978 rate the annual requirements of ammonium paratungstate, ferrotungsten, tungsten metal powder, tungsten carbide powder, and tungsten chemicals.

4. There would be no major impact on tungsten in the event of supply interruption from Africa, as more imports could be obtained from other countries. Africa accounted for only 2 percent of 1978 world tungsten concentrate production.

1978—U.S. DATA
[Short tons contained vanadium unless otherwise specified]

Commodity: Uses	Consump- tion (apparent)	Produc- tion (recovered)	Imports	Net import depend- ence ¹ (percent)	Imports from Africa (percent)	Imports from Africa major sources	Government stocks Dec. 31		Industry stocks, Dec. 31
							Goal	Inventory	
Vanadium: Ferrovanadium manufacture: Carbon and specialty steel manufacture; chemical: catalyst for production of sulphuric acid.	8, 164	5, 204	3, 375	36	1, 934	57 Chile ² -----	12, 671	540	3, 053

¹ Net import dependence equals imports minus exports plus adjustments for Government and industry stock changes.

² U.S.S.R. was an important source in 1977 and earlier years, but supplied nothing in 1978.

IMPACT OF TOTAL FOREIGN CUTOFF

1. Purchases by U.S. companies of foreign vanadium supplies are usually based on price advantage and availability. Total foreign cutoff would probably result immediately in fuller utilization of existing unused domestic capacity. Most of the loss of foreign supplies of vanadium could be made up by U.S. producers, assuming 1978 consumption levels. However, a significant portion of domestic primary production is a coproduct of uranium mining, or is a byproduct of phosphorus production. Vanadium supply from such sources is relatively insensitive to demand.
2. Because of loss of competing sources, prices would probably rise.
3. At increased consumption levels, energy savings that can be derived from the utilization of high-strength low-alloy steels (a major end use of vanadium), instead of heat-treated steels, may be threatened if demand becomes so great as to outrun the supply of vanadium for production of high-strength low alloy-steels.
4. At 1978 consumption levels, yearend 1978 industry stocks of vanadium would have provided about 5 mo's supply.
5. At 1978 consumption levels, yearend 1978 Government stocks of vanadium would have provided about 1 mo's supply.

[In thousand short tons, gross weight, unless other specified]

Commodity: Uses	1978 U.S. consumption	1978 U.S. production	1978 U.S. imports	Import ¹ dependence (percent)	Imports from Africa (percent of total)	U.S. stocks		Industry stocks, Dec. 31, 1978		
						Goal	Inventory			
Zinc: Galvanizing, die casting, brass and bronze-----	1, 158	487	681	59	50	7	Canada, Spain-----	1, 313	373	151

¹ Based on ratio of imports to consumption.

IMPACT OF TOTAL FOREIGN CUTOFF

1. Alternate materials such as aluminum and plastic could reduce demand by 10-20 percent.
2. The difference between U.S. mine capacity of about 500,000 tons and demand of about 950,000 tons, adjusted for substitution, could be made up by releases from the Government stockpile in the 1st year. Thereafter, demand would be limited to domestic capacity for mining and smelting zinc, and industrial stock drawdown.

APPENDIX 3

MEMORANDUM FROM INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY SHOWING INCREASE IN COVERAGE OF AFRICA BY U.S. MEDIA

Date : December 3, 1979.

Reply to attention of : PGM/RNA : Milton L. Iossi.

Subject : Materials for the Solarz Subcommittee.

Reference : Your memorandum of November 19, 1979.

To : AF : Ms. Julia C. Bloch.

Since receiving your request on November 19 our staff members have contacted seven graduate schools of journalism, the major wire services, the New York Times, the L.A. Times, and the Washington Post, as well as such specialized centers as the African Studies Association, the African Bibliography Center, and African Index. The Agency Library in the meantime has searched Journalism Abstracts and Dissertation Abstracts as well as the New York Times data bank.

Nearly all sources assert that there has been an increase in U.S. media reporting and coverage of African affairs over the past few years, but there have been very few quantitative measures of this increase. The following diverse items, however, reflect some of this increased attention to African news :

(1) The Washington Post has increased its full-time correspondents in Africa from one in 1974 to three in 1979 ; meanwhile, the New York Times has increased its Africa-based correspondents from three to four.

(2) The (U.S.) Journal of Communication, Spring issue, 1979, carried an article entitled "International Affairs Coverage on U.S. Network Television", in which the author, James Larson, noted the installation of additional earth stations (for the INTELSAT satellite network) in South Africa, Angola, Mozambique and Sudan during 1972-1976 had been a factor in increased television network coverage of Africa. The author noted, however, that the major contributing sources for increased media coverage remain the wire services (AP and Reuters) and the direct links of the U.S. press.

APPENDIX 4

LETTER AND TABLES SUBMITTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, LISTING U.S. AID TO AFRICA, WORLD BANK AND IDA LENDING BY REGION, AND WORLD BANK, IDA, AND AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK LENDING TO AFRICAN COUNTRIES

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
Washington, D.C., January 23, 1980.

HON. STEVEN J. SOLARZ,
*Chairman, House Subcommittee on Africa, House Foreign Affairs Committee,
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Enclosed please find the information you requested during my October 25th testimony before your Subcommittee: United States aid to Africa, World Bank and IDA lending by region, and World Bank, IDA and African Development Bank lending to African countries. Note that the MDBs are providing about twice as much aid per capita to Africa as are bilateral U.S. programs, and that IDA lends more to Africa per capita in most years than to any other region in the world.

Unfortunately, I am unable to provide a regional analysis of the impact of the oil price increases on Africa's balance of payments. Data are not readily available for many individual countries. Consequently, we make our estimates on the basis of a sampling within certain representative groups of countries, i.e., OECD, OPEC, non-OPEC LCDs. Breaking down these groups more finely introduces substantially larger statistical errors. I have included a table which shows these broader payment patterns, which implies, of course, a major adverse effect on Africa.

Should I be able to provide any further assistance, please let me know. As always, it was a great pleasure to appear before the subcommittee.

Sincerely,

C. FRED BERGSTEN.

Enclosures.

UNITED STATES AID TO AFRICA¹ 1975 THROUGH 1979 (AND PER CAPITA)²

[All figures in millions of dollars, except percentages and per capita amounts]

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Multilateral development banks (MDB's):					
IBRD:					
Total	648	508	571	466	583
Per capita ³	2.02	1.58	1.78	1.45	1.82
U.S. share (percent)	25.34	25.30	25.30	25.46	23.88
Imputed amount of U.S. aid	164.20	128.52	144.46	118.64	139.22
IDA:					
Total	433	383	394	604	619
Per capita ³	1.35	1.20	1.23	1.88	1.92
U.S. share (percent)	37.13	37.87	37.28	28.42	30.42
Imputed amount of U.S. aid	160.77	145.04	146.88	171.66	188.30
AFDF:					
Total	93	80	142	163	⁴ NA
Per capita ³	.29	.25	.44	.51	NA
U.S. share (percent)	0	3.52	7.99	9.02	NA
Imputed amount of U.S. aid	0	2.81	11.32	14.74	NA
Total MDB's	1,174	971	1,107	1,233	NA
Total imputed U.S. aid	324.97	276.37	302.66	305.04	NA
Total per capita	3.66	3.03	3.45	3.84	NA
	1975	1976 ⁵	1977	1978	1979
Bilateral:					
Economic aid	294	353	371	472	466
Per capita	0.92	1.10	1.16	1.47	1.45
Military aid ⁷	56	97	85	81	NA
Per capita	0.17	0.30	0.26	0.25	NA
Total bilateral	350	450	456	553	NA
Total per capita	1.09	1.40	1.42	1.72	NA
Total, U.S. share MDB's and bilateral	675	727	758	858	NA
Total MDB's and bilateral	1,524	1,421	1,562	1,787	NA

¹ Africa is defined here as all sub-Saharan African States including those of the Sahel region but excluding North African countries and the countries of South Africa and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).

² All figures on a commitments basis. The differing fiscal years of the World Bank group, The African development fund and the U.S. Government are not taken into account given data limitations.

³ Lending per capita, based on mid-1977 estimate of African populations at 320,900,000.

⁴ Not available. The AFDF runs on a calendar year basis.

⁵ Includes transitional quarter.

⁶ Source: AID congressional presentation for fiscal year 1980.

⁷ Source: "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants" and "Assistance from International Organizations," July 1, 1945 to Sept. 30, 1978. (AID publication.)

WORLD BANK LENDING BY REGION

Region (population)	1975		1976		1977		1978		1979	
	Total	Per capita	Total	Per capita	Total	Per capita	Total	Per capita	Total	Per capita
Africa (321,000,000):										
IBRD	648	2.02	508	1.58	571	1.78	466	1.45	583	1.82
IDA	433	1.35	383	1.20	394	1.23	604	1.88	619	1.92
Total	1,081	3.37	891	2.78	965	3.01	1,070	3.33	1,202	3.74
East Asia (235,000,000):										
IBRD	972	4.14	1,459	6.21	1,452	6.18	1,587	6.75	1,792	7.63
IDA	4	.01			23	.10	139	.60	338	1.43
Total	976	4.15	1,459	6.21	1,475	6.28	1,726	7.35	2,130	9.06
South Asia (847,000,000):										
IBRD	269	.32	260	.31	394	.47	330	.39	300	.35
IDA	921	1.09	1,089	1.28	770	.90	1,319	1.56	1,777	2.10
Total	1,190	1.41	1,349	1.59	1,164	1.37	1,649	1.95	2,077	2.45
Europe, M.E., Africa (256,000,000):										
IBRD	1,264	4.94	1,342	5.25	1,474	5.76	1,661	6.49	2,082	8.13
IDA	170	.66	144	.57	96	.37	195	.76	255	1.00
Total	1,434	5.60	1,486	5.82	1,570	6.13	1,856	7.25	2,337	9.13
Latin America (310,000,000):										
IBRD	1,167	3.76	1,409	4.55	1,868	6.03	2,054	6.63	2,233	7.20
IDA	49	.16	40	.12	25	.08	56	.18	32	.11
Total	1,216	3.92	1,449	4.67	1,893	6.11	2,110	6.81	2,265	7.31

AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK LENDING

[In millions of dollars]

	1974 ¹	1975 ¹	1976 ¹	1977 ²	1978 ³
Benin	1.9	4.8	3.5		6.5
Botswana					.8
Burundi	4.8				
Cameroon		5.3	6.8	6.1	
Chad				2.7	
Congo		3.0	6.0		13.0
Equatorial Guinea					8.6
Gabon	4.8	4.8	6.0		13.0
Gambia		2.4			
Ghana	4.8	9.9	3.5	9.0	
Guinea	8.1		1.8	.9	6.5
Guinea Bissau					1.3
Ivory Coast		6.0	2.4	12.1	
Kenya	3.6	3.6	3.6	11.1	6.5
Liberia	2.4	7.0	2.1	8.7	5.5
Malawi	.6	6.0		17.9	
Mali				6.1	
Mauritania		1.0			6.5
Mauritius		7.2	3.3	6.1	2.1
Mozambique					6.5
Niger				8.5	
Nigeria	5.7				
Rwanda					4.3
Senegal	.2	5.9	3.5	6.1	
Seychelles					4.9
Sierra Leone	2.9			3.6	1.8
Sudan	4.8				6.0
Swaziland	1.8	1.0	6.0	11.5	
Tanzania	4.8			3.6	
Togo	3.4		6.0	4.6	2.6
Uganda	5.8	4.2	6.0		6.5
Upper Volta	2.4				
Zaire		8.0	1.2	6.1	18.2
Zambia	4.8	6.0			12.8
Multinational		.7	15.9	6.1	39.0
Total	67.6	86.8	67.6	130.8	172.9

¹ Converted from bank units of account (UA) at UA equals US\$1.20635.² Converted from bank units of account (UA) at UA equals US\$1.21471.³ Converted from bank units of account (UA) at UA equals US\$1.30279.

BANK LOANS AND IDA CREDITS

[In millions of dollars, fiscal years]

	1977	1978	1979
Botswana	20.0	14.5	6.8
Burundi	10.0	17.4	5.0
Comoros			
Ethiopia	57.0	24.0	
Kenya	155.0	113.0	251.0
Lesotho	2.5	13.5	15.0
Madagascar	14.0	33.0	49.0
Malawi	32.0	21.2	39.5
Mauritius	3.6	37.7	
Rwanda	19.8	15.0	14.0
Somalia	12.0	17.0	24.0
Sudan	37.0	78.0	56.0
Swaziland	9.0	4.0	11.0
Tanzania	114.2	140.5	117.5
Zaire	26.0	9.0	46.0
Zambia	60.1	22.5	11.0
Benin	7.2	21.0	8.3
Cameroon	63.5	93.1	95.0
Central Africa Emirates			18.0
Chad	20.0	21.7	7.6
Congo, Peoples' Republic of	8.5		
Gambia		8.5	5.0
Ghana	57.0		19.0
Guinea			21.6
Guinea-Bissau			9.0
Ivory Coast	64.0	121.0	52.4
Liberia	20.3	36.8	24.7
Mali	26.0	25.0	21.0
Mauritania	6.2		8.0
Niger		9.5	37.0
Nigeria	62.0	90.0	182.0
Senegal	23.8	37.7	31.5
Sierra Leone		8.2	
Togo	10.0	19.8	16.2
Upper Volta	23.6	17.4	

GLOBAL PAYMENTS PATTERNS

[In billions of dollars]

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Balances on goods, services, and private transfers:					
OPEC	+71	+35½	+39	+33½	+5
OECD	-16½	+13	-7	-11	+26
Non-OPEC LDC's	-33	-42	-30	-25	-34
Of which:					
Leading LDC's	-12	-14	(-13)	(-8)	(-12)
(Others)	-21	-28	(-17)	(-17)	(-22)
Others¹	-10	-16	-13	-11	-12
Unexplained residual	-11½	+9½	+11	+14½	+15
Official transfers, net:					
OPEC	-1½	-1½	-2	-2	-2
OECD	-11	-13	-13	-15	-18
Non-OPEC LDC's	+8	+10	+9	+9	+12
Others	+½	+1	+2	+2	+2
Unexplained residual	+4	+3½	+4	+6	+6
Current account balance (including official transfers):					
OPEC	+69½	+34	+37	+31½	+3
OECD	-27½	0	-20	-26	+8
Of which:					
United States	(+2)	(+18)	(+4)	(-15)	(-14)
Others	(-29½)	(-18)	(-23)	(-11)	(+23)
Non-OPEC LDC's	-25	-32	-21	-16	-22
Of which:					
Leading LDC's	(-12)	(-13)	(-12)	(-7)	-11
Others	(-13)	(-19)	(-9)	(-9)	-11
Others	-9½	-15	-11	-9	-10
Unexplained residual	-7½	+13	+15	+19½	+21

¹ Others: China, Cuba, South Africa, Yugoslavia, and the centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe.

